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SPECIAL REPORT

GLOBAL SHOWDOWN



The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988

July 24, 1985

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Global Showdown: The Russian Imperial War Plan for 1988

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Preface

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

The report you are now reading is, up to the present time, the only comprehensive documentation of the current Soviet strategic threat available publicly in any language. Every fact listed has been cross-checked with leading authorities in NATO and other countries. Each evaluation of those facts has been reviewed with a dozen or more leading experts from the same roster of authoritative specialists. There has been almost no disagreement on facts bearing upon Soviet capabilities, and most agree that the period 1987-89 is the most probable point at which Soviet military superiority will reach the point at which Moscow might win and survive a "first strike" thermonuclear assault against the United States. Among the experts, there is a somewhat varied estimate as to how the Soviets might choose to exploit their military advantage, but no significant disagreement on the rate of growth of that advantage, and little disagreement on Moscow's near-term strategic aims. Most are profoundly alarmed by that wishful, "Neville Chamberlain-like," blindness to incontestable military facts of the threat, which prevails among most leading political circles and governments of the NATO countries.

Beyond that point, some disagreement has been expressed. All agree on the urgency of the situation, and also agree that present NATO policies are disastrously inadequate to cope with the threat. Most agree that the present monetary and economic policies of NATO countries are a strategic disaster in terms of their effects, but there is some disagreement on the subject of alternative monetary and economic policies, and limited concurrence, so far, on the best choice of approach to related political problems of policy-shaping among the Western Allies.

Despite some disagreements with some of *EIR*'s monetary, economic, and political recommendations, among the experts consulted, they are more or less uniformly delighted that *EIR* has committed itself to publication of this present report.

The key problem is, that the official strategic estimates of the NATO governments, especially the United States', have no correspondence to the crucial facts collected by official military and intelligence services. The facts seem to vanish somewhere in the process, between the collecting of intelligence and the final version of officially adopted estimates. Instead of starting from the facts, official estimates start from some wishful doctrine, such as Henry A. Kissinger's popular, but fraudulent insistence

that "the Soviet empire is crumbling." Facts which can be arranged to support such wishful views are arranged accordingly; facts which directly contradict those views vanish mysteriously during the process of writing and editing the official estimates.

Senior officials grumble, stating privately that the official estimates are so much garbage, while complaining that they are obliged to work in support of currently official estimates which they know to be willfully falsified. This problem is most acute in Britain, the U.S.A., and France. In the U.S.A., policy is written in the U.S. State Department, and the U.S. military and intelligence services are instructed not to circulate reports which might offend the State Department. In Britain, the Establishment rules, to similar effect. Everywhere, diplomacy and the "arms-control mafia," dictate policy and strategic perception to both government and to credulous parliamentarians, including the present majority of the U.S. Congress. Those old enough, compare the present situation to the days of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, and the popularity of Bertrand Russell's peace movements of the 1938 period. Today, as in the days of Adolf Hitler's march to war, the Allied governments and political parties are once again sleeping.

The slogan in most of official Washington today, is "Don't annoy me with facts; my mind is already made up for me."

For obvious reasons, this report has been designed as the strategic assessment which should be available to every military and intelligence official and member of Congress, the report which should be available, but which government so far fails to produce. In this form, it is also the form of report which every thinking and influential citizen must possess now, to help him or her in shaping the selection and policies of administration officials and members of Congress.

Many senior military and intelligence officials, individually, will be delighted with this report, and will hope that the circulation of the report helps to blow the lid off the absurd, official estimates presently circulating. Yet, officially, those officials probably will be ordered to disassociate themselves from support for this report. Privately, they will agree, enthusiastically; officially, probably, they will appear to stay in line with currently official policy, methods, and procedures. Such are the bureaucratic practices in official Washington, today, by which officials advance and protect their careers, by appearing to "stay in line" with policies which they know privately to be absurd and violently contrary to the most vital interests of the United States.

It is the unfortunate reality of political processes in the United States today, that good intelligence can be supplied only through private channels, such as *EIR*. So, by filling part of that vacuum, *EIR* has developed as what more than one official has described as "one of the world's best private intelligence services." This report is much more than a quality publishing effort; it is the fulfillment of our implicit duty, as both world-citizens and patriots, to aid in the defense of Western civilization, against the menacing new Genghis Khans of the Soviet imperial forces.

As to the quality of this report, there are features of the report, on monetary, economic, and political policy, which are legitimately debatable, on condition that the debate is a serious and thoughtful one. There can be no legitimate opposition either to the array of facts, or to the general strategic estimate presented. It is the best picture of the strategic threat currently available from any published source.

1. The Soviets Have Already Declared War on the U.S.A.

1.1. The Two Qualitative Facets of Soviet Strategic Mobilization Under the Operational Ogarkov Plan

At present, the Soviet Union is in a full-scale pre-war mobilization, with the objective of acquiring all capabilities needed to survive and win a full-scale thermonuclear-led assault against the United States, according to the Ogarkov Doctrinal War-Plan, by approximately 1988. The economic mobilization in progress is best characterized as an overlay of two complementary general policies. These two, overlain, policies we have designated as *Plan A* and *Plan B*, respectively.

Plan A, signifies the aspect of the current economic mobilization governed by a Soviet version of "systems analysis," the portion of the mobilization based on mobilization policies of practice in place prior to 1983.

Plan B, signifies a new dimension of Soviet mobilization policy, which was made visible in Soviet war-planning during the 1983-84 period, and has been implemented on a massive and accelerating scale immediately following General Secretary Gorbachov's installation in office. Fairly described, *Plan B* represents a virtual revolution in Soviet economic policy of practice. The intent of its addition, is to forestall any U.S.A. move to a "crash program" method of implementation of the Strategic Defense Initiative. It introduces to Soviet practice, "science-driver crash-program" methods of rapid technological upshifting of Soviet production in general.

What we have named *Plan B*, is based significantly on Moscow's exhaustive study and monitoring of the writings of U.S. economist Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. As far as we are able to determine thus far, this monitoring of LaRouche is centered within the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The Soviets fear that the Reagan administration might adopt the reforms in economic policy proposed by LaRouche and his associates. Soviet planners associated with Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov and General Secretary Gorbachov, are purging the Soviet apparatus of the so-called "Brezhnev Mafia," at an accelerating rate, in the effort to bring a Soviet imitation of LaRouche's "crash program" doctrine into effect.

The relevant Soviet strategic estimate is broadly as follows.

Option A: If the United States continues the monetary, economic, and defense-budget policies now in force, by 1988, the Soviet empire

will have the degree of strategic superiority needed to launch, survive, and win a general "first strike" assault against the United States with degrees of losses acceptable to the Soviet command, on condition that the U.S.A. does not adopt a "launch on warning" doctrine. For this case, *Plan A* is sufficient for Soviet war-economy mobilization.

Option B: However, in the case, that the United States not only adopts "launch on warning," but also unleashes those changes in monetary, economic, and budgetary policies needed for implementation of an SDI "crash program," *Plan A* would fail.

If the Soviets knew, that the U.S.A. had adopted a "launch on warning" doctrine, then a Soviet "first strike," a crucial feature of the maximum option under the Ogarkov Plan, would not be possible as early as 1988. At the earliest, Soviet "first strike" would be postponed to the 1990s, awaiting the deployment of a more advanced generation of Soviet BMD than is projected for deployment by approximately 1988.

If Soviet ability to survive and win a general war is postponed from the 1987-89 interval to the 1990-92 interval, as U.S. "launch on warning" would tend to have this effect, and if the U.S. also turns to a "crash program" implementation of SDI, Soviet *Plan A* war-economy mobilization would be disastrous for Moscow's ambitions. On this account, the Soviet planners are introducing *Plan B* rapidly and most forcefully at this time.

The relevant Soviet fear is: the cultural resistance to rapid technological program within much of the Soviet population, often labelled the "peasant problem" in Soviet production, would mean that even a scientifically inferior United States could outpace the Soviet economy technologically under the condition that the U.S.A. changed its present monetary and economic policies in the manner required for transforming the SDI into a "crash program." The Soviets are deathly fearful of the projected rate of increase of U.S. economic and technological prowess under revival of precedents of the 1939-43 mobilization and the pre-1966 phase of the U.S. aerospace program, a U.S. return to "pre-McNamara" defense policies.

Therefore, the current Soviet push to activate *Plan B*.

On the surface, *Plan B* takes the form of a massive purge of Soviet bureaucrats, to appoint industrial managers who are committed to forcing Soviet workforces to accept very high rates of adaptation to technological progress. This takes the form most visible from the scope and depth of the current barrage of policy-statements from the highest levels in Moscow, of introducing the managerial methods of the Soviet's high-technology military industries, especially the aerospace and nuclear sectors, into the management of firms generally.

Samples of recent Soviet policy-declarations to this effect are cited below.

Included in the Appendices of this Special Report, is a reprint of Lyndon LaRouche's keynote address of June 15, 1985, on the principles of "science-driver crash programs," to the Krafft Ehrlicke Memorial Conference of the Schiller Institute. That address summarizes the methods by aid of which, the United States could transform the SDI's implementation into a "crash program," the methods which the Soviets fear and seek to emulate.

Soviet administration has been long familiar with certain important features of successful "crash programs." Soviet knowledge and past practice of "crash programs" depended greatly on captured documents and veterans

of the German Peenemünde Projects. The Soviets employed thousands of veterans of those Projects; without these captured German scientists and engineers, the postwar aerospace and thermonuclear-fusion accomplishments of the Soviet military would not have been possible. The grafting of captured German science and scientists, onto Pasteur Institute-trained Academician Vernadsky's Atom Project, identifies the essence of Soviet knowledge and experience in this connection.

Soviet interest in LaRouche's work is twofold.

On the one count, President Reagan's March 23, 1983 announcement of an SDI policy congruent with LaRouche's earlier specifications, came at a time that leading Democratic Party circles had solemnly assured Moscow, that the President was efficiently blocked from taking such action. Consequently, Moscow exaggerated greatly LaRouche's influence on the President, to the degree Moscow worked together with its U.S. collaborators, including NBC-TV and the Anti-Defamation League, to orchestrate early 1984 demands that the President publicly distance himself from LaRouche.

More generally, and more accurately, Moscow recognized that LaRouche's work as an economist had opened up new dimensions of insight into the causal relationship between scientific progress and increases of economic growth-rates. Obviously enough, although LaRouche has provided the first successful theory for such programs, successful "crash programs" existed long before the circulation of LaRouche's discoveries. The existence of a competent theory of "crash programs" is merely an important, and very practical advancement in present-day knowledge. Although Moscow lists "LaRouche" as a "dangerous principled adversary," whom it wishes to destroy, this is not the first time that Moscow sought to learn as much as possible from those it seeks to destroy.

Moscow hates LaRouche on another relevant count. In analyzing Moscow's explosive rejection of the President's offer of March 23, 1983, LaRouche and his collaborators, beginning May 1983, published documentation of the Soviet political-philosophical outlook which caused this particular form of response. This documentation of the Soviet imperial doctrine of "Third Rome," is summarized in this report, below. Much as it hates the publication of this documentation, Moscow knows better than any other authority, that this documentation and the associated evaluations offered, are absolutely correct. LaRouche et al. have, in other words, revealed some of the innermost "family secrets" of the Soviet ruling class (the *Nomenklatura*) to Moscow's adversaries. This public exposure, the Soviets hate. Yet, Moscow recognizes that LaRouche et al. have put their index fingers on the kernel of the economic and administrative problems of the Soviet empire, the so-called "peasant problem."

This touches one of the most important facts about the character and internal problems of Soviet society, facts which most official U.S. intelligence agencies and private think-tanks usually ignore, and sometimes deny to exist. This Special Report presents essential background on the point in a later section. We refer now only to as much as is indispensable for understanding what we have named Soviet *Plan B*.

Briefly. We of Western Europe and the Americas, have inherited a cultural tradition, the Augustinian Judeo-Christian tradition, which is in every way vastly superior to the Byzantine tradition in Russia and other Byzantine-dominated sectors of Eastern Europe. As part of this, because our tradition places the emphasis in all matters on the creative-scientific and related potentialities of the individual human mind, and locates individual merit in the fostering of scientific and technological

progress, the Augustinian heritage supplies society with a vastly superior potential for not merely new and profound scientific discoveries, but also for rapid adoption of the technological benefits of those discoveries in production and other leading features of daily practice of the society as a whole.

Although the heritage of classical Greek language and culture within the Eastern Roman Empire, is essentially the same as the Augustinian current of Western European culture, the open conflict between Western and Eastern Europe since the time of Charlemagne, is the deep root of the East-West conflict in Europe and the Mediterranean ever since.

For example, Russia itself is a Byzantine creation. "Rus" is a Swedish name for the various tribes subjugated by the Scandinavian Varangians, Varangians who were themselves clients of Byzantium, the same Scandinavians deployed by Byzantium against Charlemagne's order and against the British Isles as part of Byzantium's efforts to obliterate Western European Christendom.

The characterization of the Soviet state as "Marxist," is essentially an absurdity. The truth begins to be clear, once we examine the so-called "socialist" reforms of the Emperor Diocletian, the Diocletian who was the patron of Constantine, and who shifted the seat of the Roman Empire to the East. If we compare the organization and philosophical outlook of Soviet society today with the form of "socialism" imparted to Byzantium by the Diocletian reforms, and study this connection in the light of the history of Eastern Europe since Cyril and Methodius, Russian "socialism" is more than 1,000 years old.

So, today's Soviet ruling class views history. The Soviets see Moscow as the successor to the cities of Rome and Constantinople, as the capital of a world-empire, and consciously, explicitly trace the precedents for the planned Russian world-empire to such Mesopotamian precedents as the Persian Empire. The Soviet ruling class, the *Nomenklatura*, is a ruling bureaucracy in the tradition of the collections of families composing the ruling bureaucracies of the Roman and Byzantine empires; it is a bureaucracy modelled on the Roman legions' military cult of Mithra, under Augustus and his successors. It is a society ruled by a triad of bureaucracy, military, and recently reemergent Russian priesthood.

Soviet ideology is "oriental socialism," in that specific sense: the imperial socialism of an empire ruled by one "superior race," the "Great Russians" of Muscovy.

In Russian history, eastern and western Europe are political and religious divisions of Europe dating essentially from Charlemagne, as modified after Charlemagne by the extension of Catholic influence into Poland. In Russian history, Poland, Bohemia, Croatia, and to a lesser degree Hungary, mark the intrusions of Western Christendom into the domain of eastern Europe. The conquest of Western Europe, through making Germans the satrapal pawns of Soviet imperial influence, and the destruction of the power of the United States, is the essence of Soviet strategic outlook today.

This perspective on Germany's role as a Soviet client-state, has been explicit Soviet strategic doctrine since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

On this account, the modern form of the strategic conflict between eastern and western Europe dates from the 1439-40 A.D. Council of Florence, at which time Muscovy became the bastion of eastern counteroffensive against the Augustinian doctrines affirmed at that Council of Florence. Any contrary view of the strategic issues, is superficial to the point of converging upon absurdity.

This cultural foundation of Soviet strategic outlook has been a perpetual

crisis inside Russia since the rise of the Romanovs. Repeatedly, enlightened Russian leaders, such as Peter the Great, Alexander II, Count Witte, and Lenin, have emphasized, that Russia could not become a world-power without assimilating Western science and technology to a large degree. Yet, the introduction of Western science and technology collides directly and bloodily with a "Russian peasant soul," a "peasant soul" which embodies the characteristic features of an Eastern, anti-Western religious and philosophical outlook. Consequently, for Russia to become a world-power, either Western European culture must destroy itself from within (as we have done to a large degree since the middle 1960s launching of the "post-industrial countercultural shift"), or the Russian population must be induced to accept a large degree of "cultural paradigm-shift," bringing the intrinsically inferior Russian culture up to the level of the hated Western European culture.

The result of this conflict is the schizophrenia exhibited by the plans of the Russian "Nazi," Fyodor Dostoevsky, for establishing a Russian "Third Empire" ("Third Reich"). Dostoevsky, much like Hitler, saw the need to combine Russian-style mystical irrationalism with the apparatus of a military-industrial power developed in Siberia. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov expresses the same conflict today. He is fairly characterized, as the equivalent of a mad Dostoevsky who has nonetheless qualified as an honors graduate of the Prussian General Staff: militarily super-rational, but also mystically irrational. So, one might say of the presently ruling Suslov-Andropov dynasty in Moscow: They are the reincarnation of the Brothers Karamazov, with a nineteenth-century Prussian General Staff's attention to military-industrial thoroughness.

The prospect of a U.S. "crash program" implementation of the SDI, brings this underlying conflict within Soviet society to a most acute form. They can not match the U.S.A. to the degree their strategic perspective requires, unless they rudely confront the "peasant problem" in production, unless they confront directly cultural hostility to rapid rates of technological progress in methods of production, a hostility which is endemic in the "Russian soul." Hence, their rage against the SDI is of a fury comparable to the most violent propaganda of the World War II period. A "crash program" implementation of SDI obliges Moscow to impose a key aspect of Western European values upon the Soviet population in general. In terms of the present institutions of Soviet society, this means a resumption of the methods of the Stalin period.

We restate this very important point.

From the time of the Swedish (Varangian) creation of Russia (Rus) out of assorted primitive tribes, until the rise of the Romanovs, the Russian priesthood was Greek in name and Byzantine in culture. The efforts of the Romanovs to orient Russia's cultural development toward Western Europe, unleashed a violent backlash by the forces of the "Old Believers" (Raskolniki), the mystical, anti-Westernizing forces centered around, and steered by, the Russian monks linked to Mount Athos. These Raskolniki revolts, which reached a peak of bloody confrontation during the period of Peter the Great, persisted in such later forms as the famous Pugachov insurrection, the Russian terrorist and other populist insurgencies against Czar Alexander II, and the Russian Revolution of 1917. V.I. Lenin himself, stated his recognition of the fact, that the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 was to a large degree a revival of the Pugachov insurrection of the eighteenth century.

The most concentrated form of the issue, separating East from West, is the East's rejection of the "individual soul" as Augustinian Judeo-Christian culture defines the "individual soul." The East believes in the

"collective soul" shared among the persons belonging to a specific body of common "blood and soil." In Western Europe, the Dostoevskian "blood and soil" and "Third Roman Empire" dogmas of the Nazis, are the best known and simplest illustration of the echoes of Russian ideology into the West.

So, as Hamilton's anti-Adam Smith American System of political economy typifies this policy, we in Western European culture place emphasis of merit upon the individual person's commitment and capacity to discover and to implement advances in science and technology. Eastern European culture places the emphasis of merit on "traditional ways"; Eastern European culture has a mystical hatred of technological progress, which it tends to regard as sacrilege against the local "blood and soil's" choice of mother-earth-goddess.

Here lies the most immediate cause for the bloody violence which erupts in Russia, whenever one faction attempts to "impose" rapid rates of technological progress upon the Russian people generally. It must never be forgotten, in such conflicts, both factions are equally "Russian." Even among the pro-technology factions, only a fraction is morally and philosophically committed to scientific and technological progress; the factions rallied behind the cause of technological progress have been dominated by those who adopt such progress with moral reluctance, as a strategic imperative of the East-West conflict. Fyodor Dostoevsky's writings on this role of technological progress, offer a most convenient insight into the implications. The pro-technology factions subordinate their blind instinct against technological progress to known strategic imperatives; the more ignorant Russian masses resist technology with the force and dedication of that same blind instinct. The result is bloody violence, bloody repression of one Russian faction by the other. The oriental mysticism and romantic sentimentality, which is the Russian character under other circumstances, assumes among all factions the form which mysticism and romantic sentimentality always assume when energized by irrationalist rage.

Partly, they hate the SDI because it spoils their plans of imperial conquest; this is the rational component of Soviet babbling against "militarization of space." More profoundly, they hate the SDI, because they regard its implementation as forcing them to return to Stalinist methods of mobilization of the Soviet labor-force as a whole. They see themselves so forced, because they are absolutely committed to a war-winning margin of military superiority over the United States; as Soviet officials have said publicly, repeatedly, during recent years, they can not accept strategic equality with the United States; they must have absolute superiority. In face of even a modest rate of development of the U.S. SDI, the gaining of absolute Soviet military superiority means a Soviet war mobilization which is massive not only in scale, but also massive in terms of rates of forced technological progress.

The economic science of Soviet war-plan 'Option B'

Recent changes in the levels of understanding of "crash programs" among leading circles of the Soviet Academy of Science, are based chiefly on accelerated studies of the economic writings of LaRouche over a known period of approximately 15 years. Although the evidence available is fragmentary, and the conclusions legitimately drawn from that evidence necessarily limited in scope, the evidence demanding certain broad but extremely important evaluations is conclusive in nature. It is based on an accumulated pattern of actions by highest level Soviet and East-bloc institutions since 1971-72.

Initially, during the 1968-70 interval, Soviet institutions viewed

LaRouche and his associates as a novel and potentially important phenomenon, to be explored, to determine whether this phenomenon could be penetrated and played to Soviet advantage. Soviet-deployed "sleepers" were sent into LaRouche's environment. Approximately 1971, East Germany-controlled ("Stasi") operations under Soviet direction launched a series of operations aimed at destroying LaRouche's influence in Western Europe and disrupting LaRouche's associations in the Americas. These Stasi operations were run during 1972-74 in conjunction with the Palme-Brandt faction of the Socialist International, and elements of British intelligence, including the London Tavistock Institute, which were then and now heavily penetrated by Soviet intelligence. As early as 1974, it was indicated by Soviet officials, that these operations were run with knowledge and direction from the highest levels of the Soviet command. The most recent phase of Soviet-directed operations against LaRouche and his associates was launched during April 1983, on decisions made at the level of then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko; most of the remaining "sleepers" assigned to penetrate the association were activated for counter-operations against LaRouche, and a massive campaign by leading elements of the Soviet news-media was launched, from spring 1983 into spring 1984, together with leading Soviet fellow-travelers in the U.S. news-media, Democratic Party, and elsewhere.

Soviet estimates of the work of LaRouche and his associates as "very dangerous" and as a "principled adversary," center around the estimate by highest levels of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, that LaRouche's own work in economic science represents an important new development in economic science, and is at the same time the most competent analysis of the U.S. and Western economies currently available. On this account, chiefly, LaRouche is officially described in the Soviet news-media as the "ideologue of late-capitalism."

Excerpts of 1983-85 Soviet statements on LaRouche and his associates, are supplied in the Appendices.

In the lexicon of Soviet dogma, "ideologue of late-capitalism" signifies the Soviet estimate, that economist LaRouche has presented a more or less comprehensive basis for reviving and saving the capitalist system. For example, at a recent, high-security Paris conference of world-wide Communist parties, June 12-13, 1985, Moscow reinstituted the old Communist International (Comintern). The featured theme of this conference, was the Soviet presentation of the thesis, that the United States had entered a new general economic depression, which would be the "final crisis of capitalism." Moscow assumes, that unless there is a sudden change in the monetary and economic policies of the OECD countries, the capitalist system is now in a "final stage of collapse." Moscow views LaRouche's proposed reforms as a set of means for saving capitalism from collapse, and thus depriving Moscow of the delights of a "final collapse of capitalism."

Moscow considers LaRouche "very dangerous," because it fears that LaRouche's proposed reforms are competent. Moscow views LaRouche's February 1982 proposal of what is now called the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, as both military competent, and also as a form of military-economic mobilization which could save the capitalism system through a new "crash program" like the 1939-43 war-economy mobilization under President Franklin Roosevelt.

Soviet officials have stated, that they view LaRouche as philosophically a Catholic, whose criticisms of Marx's Capital from this vantage-point constitute the basis for a "neo-capitalist" revival.

From Moscow's standpoint, LaRouche's work does in fact appear as a

rigorous critique of Marx's work from a Catholic philosophical standpoint, the standpoint of St. Augustine, Nicholas of Cusa, et al. From the Eastern standpoint in religion and philosophy, Western Christian traditions, excepting Gnostic tendencies introduced to Western churches, is the same thing to Russians as Catholicism in general; despite the doctrinal and related differences among Western European currents of Judaism, Catholicism and Protestantism, the common features of these currents are those which the Russians more or less accurately identify as Augustinian.

Respecting economics, in Soviet Russia today, there are only two general currents of thought: more or less "orthodox" Marxism on the one side, and the post-1966 growth of Cambridge "systems analysis" on the other. LaRouche's axiomatic criticisms of Marx's errors define LaRouche in Russian eyes as a "revisionist," to be debated from the standpoint of a more or less "orthodox" Marxism. However, the failures of Soviet systems analysis, and the failures of the econometricians of the West, have conditioned some among present-day Soviet circles to accept as "scientifically legitimate," any criticism of Marx's economics on points Marx employs some of the same premises as the Cambridge systems analysts.

Therefore, from the Soviet standpoint, if LaRouche's economics works, as they are inclined to believe it does, they hate LaRouche as much on this account as they hate his efforts to introduce the SDI to the military policies of OECD nations. The Soviets do not wish the Western nations to adopt any technology which might work to the strategic advantage of the Western alliances. Just as hatred of U.S. SDI does not prevent the Soviets from developing ballistic missile defense full-speed for their own forces, so, hatred of LaRouche's "neo-capitalist" economic science does not discourage the Soviets from studying and copying as much as might be to Soviet advantage.

Present Soviet views on the exceptional competence of LaRouche's contributions to economic science, date from about 1980-81. Their attention was focussed on the fact that a first-approximation application of the LaRouche-Riemann Method, to computer-based economic forecasting, had been consistently accurate, whereas all other Western forecasting services of governments and private agencies alike, had been discredited by events. The Soviets, too, had employed "Western" systems-analysis methods for their economic forecasting, and these had failed just as the econometricians of the West had failed. It was the fact that the LaRouche-Riemann forecasts were computer-based, which particularly attracted Soviet attention during this period; they tend to be impressed more by mathematics than by principled issues of scientific method, and have an increasing fascination with computer technologies and their applications.

It was the highest levels of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, especially the mathematics and physics sectors in the orbit of Academician Aleksandrov, which manifested the greatest degree of concentrated interest in the LaRouche-Riemann Method. Naturally, the U.S.A.-Canada Institute and related sectors were also interested, but it was the mathematics and physics sectors which are known to have concentrated upon the detailed features of the Method itself.

It has been clear, through statements by Aleksandrov and other relevant circles, since the close of the Brezhnev period, that during the process of consolidation of the factional position of Suslov's heirs of the currently ruling "Andropov dynasty," Soviet policy-making has moved toward replacement of the old industries "mafia" by managerial cadres

from the military-industrial sector. The planning of purges to accomplish this was already adopted by spring 1982, purges delayed during the Chernenko period, set fully into motion immediately by Gorbachov's accession as party leader. The skyrocketing barrages of statements to this effect, by Aleksandrov and others, since March 1985, sampled in this Special Report, do not signify the sudden eruption of a newly formed policy: they are the unleashing of a policy already adopted no later than spring-summer 1982.

There can not be a competent appraisal of the emerging "Plan B" aspects of current Soviet war-mobilization policy, without comparing ongoing shifts in Soviet policy with the central features of the published material on the LaRouche-Riemann Method. What the Soviets have been studying over the years, is most conveniently summarized in LaRouche's 1984 textbook in elementary mathematical economics, and in a series of articles appearing in the *Executive Intelligence Review's* weekly news magazine. From the standpoint of commonplace errors of assumption of U.S. econometricians, the most crucial points to be considered, in evaluating current directions in Soviet policies, are as follows.

U.S. econometrics today, is immediately a combined by-product of the work of Professor Wassily Leontief, on input-output analysis, merged with the analysis of systems of linear inequalities which grew up through the influence of the late John von Neumann and Operations Research. The most important incompetencies of econometrics today are either explicitly or implicitly arrayed in von Neumann's and Morgenstern's *Theory of Games & Economic Behavior*.

The first general error of modern econometrics, is the adoption of the notion of "marginal utility," as this was developed, first, in Jeremy Bentham's "felicific calculus," and elaborated on that basis by J. S. Mill, Jevons, and Marshall. This assumes that the relative price paid for an object or service converges statistically (ergodically) upon an equilibrium-price; it assumes that the only value to be considered in economics is the convergence of price, as a reflection of marginal utility, upon such an equilibrium-price, in an "indefinitely extended n-person game."

The second major fallacy, is that dogma introduced most authoritatively by von Neumann, that the solution of all problems of analysis in economies, could be accomplished by stating input-output expressions of the Leontief type as systems of linear inequalities.

The third, more subtle fallacy, is the analysis of economies solely in terms of changes in quantities and prices of inputs and outputs, without examining the impact on the economy of transformations internal to the processes of production as such.

Consider the third of these fallacies first.

It is easily shown, that military expenditures as such do not contribute to increase of the productivity of labor, and are not either producers' goods or households' goods. Therefore, it appears to be the case, that military expenditures constitute economic waste, simply a depressive tax upon the economy as a whole.

Yet, throughout the nineteenth century, and twentieth century to date, the greatest rates of progress in per-capita wealth of economies have appeared as by-products of war-economy mobilizations! The recovery of the U.S. economy from the Great Depression of the 1930s, and the more recent 1959-66 recovery under mobilization of aerospace programs, are characteristic examples of this.

Where lies the answer to this paradox? It lies in the fact, that war-economy mobilizations subsume mobilization of higher rates of technological progress in weapons-systems and in investment in production for

producing weapons-systems. In this respect, war-economy mobilization forces rapid advances in investment in productive processes, in an energy-intensive, capital-intensive mode. The acceleration of technology of capital-goods production, and the spill-over of this advancement in capital-goods technologies into production in general, causes rises in productivity in the non-military-goods sectors of production.

In other words, any "cost-benefit analysis" treatment of merely the addition of military-output requirements to an economy, is intrinsically an absurd form of analysis. We must consider the technological impact of increases in military production upon the increase of productivities in the economy in general.

In all cases, the primary thing to be considered, is not simply inputs and outputs as such. The most powerful impact upon an economy, is the impact of technological progress upon the process of production itself.

Translate this into the language of Soviet strategic doctrine. In previously established Soviet doctrine, *Plan A* doctrine, military production is treated as a drag upon the economy. Therefore, *Plan A* thinking reasons, if one power cranks up to full-scale war-economy mobilization, and a comparable opposing power does not, the weakening of the first power by such war-economy mobilization can be compensated only by either victorious warfare or other capitulation by the opposing power. If *Plan B* follows the LaRouche-Riemann Method on this point, then the power whose war-economy mobilization is at the higher technological level, can sustain such a mobilization indefinitely, constantly gaining in margin of economic advantage over the other. In economic terms, a full-scale war-economy mobilization, is a source of cumulative economic superiority, not weakening, on condition that the principle of a "science-driver" variety of "crash program" is adopted.

There lies the practical implication of the difference between *Plan A* and *Plan B*. There lies the feature of recent and current *Plan B*-type Soviet policy-statements, which must have first rank in evaluations.

In other words, if Soviet policy follows *Plan A*, the likelihood of warfare is at the greatest during approximately 1988. At that point, the Soviet war-economy mobilization will have peaked, and the religious mobilization leading into the 1988 celebrations will also have peaked. According to a version of Soviet strategic doctrine based on *Plan A*, the Soviet Union must launch a full-scale war against the United States by approximately 1988. After 1988, according to *Plan A* reasoning, the relative advantage to the Soviets will erode at an accelerating rate, unless NATO military capabilities and economies collapse of their own weight.

What, then, if the U.S. shrewdly focuses upon Soviet ideology respecting acceptable losses to the Soviet empire's Great Russian master-race, by adopting an operational policy of launch on warning, directed at Great Russia and choice Siberian targets? Even if the Soviets won the war otherwise, the losses associated with such victory become "unacceptable." This buys the U.S.A. several years of postponement of Soviet attack, until, as we have already indicated, Moscow deploys a "second generation" quality of strategic ballistic missile defense. Assume also, that the U.S. revises its monetary and economic, as well as military-budget policies, to foster a general economic recovery and increased SDI expenditures. Under that condition, the logic of *Plan A* appears to be problematic for the Soviets.

Against that contingency, Moscow is obliged to begin shifting rapidly from *Plan A* to *Plan B*. In that case, then 1988 is no longer a maximum point of relative strength for Moscow, but, rather, the date of maximum

strength is shifted to a later date, to a critical point during the early to middle 1990s.

That critical point is rather simply defined. Let X , Soviet total capability, be greater than Y , the total capability of the NATO alliance. Let the exponent of growth-rate for X be designated by " a ," and let " a " be less than the exponent of growth for Y , " b ." The point at which the absolute margin of growth of Soviet capability ceases to be greater than the absolute margin of growth for NATO capability, is a critical value. This is indicated better, by assuming, as is the normal case, that the growth-rate exponents " a " and " b " are not linear, and that " b " increases more rapidly than " a ": In other words, a U.S. mobilization "takes off" as did the 1939-43 mobilization. Once NATO's economies reach the critical value corresponding approximately to 1943, the rate of growth of NATO's power will accelerate relative to the rate of growth of the Soviets, on condition that the Soviets do not introduce an effective "cultural paradigm-shift," away from deeply-embedded Eastern cultural matrices during that interval.

Given, such broadly obvious distinctions between *Plan A* and *Plan B* varieties of policy-making, the practical question is circumscribed: How do we measure choices of investment in such a way as to obtain the optimal *Plan B* type of effect? The first step, is to throw away all "systems analysis," and "analysts": Economies do not function in the mode implied by solutions to systems of linear inequalities; every decision based on such fallacious methods will be an absurd decision. Economic processes are characteristically "non-linear."

Restate the practical question: How can we calculate the estimated increases of growth of productivity resulting from a choice of investment in improved technology? This obliges us to discard every British, Swiss, and Viennese economist, from the Physiocrat Quesnay, through Smith, Bentham, Malthus, Ricardo, Marx, the Mills, Walras, Say, Pareto, Marshall, Keynes, Friedman, Hayek, and so forth. We must return to the source of Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton's American System of political-economy, the establishment of economic science by Gottfried Leibniz.

LaRouche's principled contribution to economic science, centers around his improvement in Leibniz's definition of "technology," an improvement based on the work of Karl Gauss, Dirichlet, Weierstrass, Riemann, and Cantor. From this standpoint, the measure of increase of productivity and the military criteria of increases of firepower and mobility, have a precise mathematical correlation. This correlation is based upon a mathematical measurement of technology, a measurement accomplished by resituating Leibniz's original definition of technology within a Riemannian hyperspherical function: In other words, the notions associated with synthetic-geometrical construction of a Riemann Surface. This is indicated within LaRouche's elementary mathematical-economics textbook, as amplified in such published sources as his *EIR* items on "Artificial Intelligence" (May 14, 1985) and exposing the fallacies of Leontief's featured piece in the June 1985 *Scientific American* (*EIR*, June 10, 1985).

'Crash program' methods

The general theory of "science-driver" forms of "crash programs," is outlined in the Krafft Ehrlicke memorial address included in the Appendices. A few supplementary remarks, echoing the discussion period during that

conference, are most appropriate here, as bearing upon evaluation of those features of Soviet policy which coincide with, or tend to coincide with, *Plan B*.

In ordinary scientific research, scientists construct instruments for experimental work, chiefly, in collaboration with tool-makers skilled in development work. This used to be accomplished, chiefly, in machine shops associated with university and other laboratories, until the foolish introduction of line-item budgeting of such work, such that experimental work is usually delayed by months or years, while the scientists seek to win authorization for a line-item budget from among various governmental or private-grants institutions. These silly methods of budgeting have been one of the more important brakes against scientific progress, especially over the recent quarter-century since the Hoover Commission's proposed increase in the bureaucratization of government.

A weapon is essentially a scientific instrument adapted for military usage; so is a new type of machine-tool. Let us imagine that we take two steps. First, we junk the line-item budgeting of scientific research, and return to the sensible practice of budgeting only the staffing and equipping of the research-institution as a whole, and not the detailed activities within it. Second, for purposes of military development, we supply scientists with use of budgeted sections of generalized production-capacity in the economy as a whole. In this second feature, we budget only the indicated portions of capacity as a whole, and budget the use of these portions of capacity only for a species of materials or instruments, rather than some specified material or instrument.

For example. The SDI is most usefully defined as based upon a complex of species of technologies, species which are assorted as a whole into two general classifications, primary and auxiliary. The primary classes are controlled high-energy plasma-reactions, coherently directed beams, and optical biophysics. The auxiliary technologies, are those required to deliver, aim and fire the primary technologies. On this basis, we know in advance, at least in practice, the kinds of materials and instrumentation we shall require for yet-unspecified kinds of applications of these technologies.

What we wish to avoid, is the situation in which our scientists prove that a certain sort of instrument for military uses can be produced, but in which we do not have available the kinds of production facilities needed to produce the materials and instruments this design requires. Therefore, we assign manufacturers to allot some corner of their total capacity, to mastering the production of one or more of the varieties of materials or instruments we shall require. In other words, once we have determined the need for a specific sort of material or instrument, we have a working group in some industry qualified to work up a material or instrument to the level of specifications required.

Once we have produced a prototype of some instrument, we use the the lessons we have learned in producing the materials and instruments for that prototype, to launch expanded general production of such materials and instruments.

That is the first-approximation of a "science driver" variety of "crash program." What we have done, in such a case, is to expand the instrument-making resources of the scientific laboratory, beyond the scope of the machine-shop attached to that laboratory, to the effect of making production as a whole increasingly the machine-shop in which scientific research works.

This is key to understanding the reasons that such a "crash program"

takes the form of an accelerating rate of growth in quality and scale, from initially small beginnings.

This process subsumes a spread of new materials, instruments, and skills, from the initial interface between scientists and corners of production, into production more generally. This is the "spill over" of the new technologies into production generally. In other words, the "spill over" does not occur in the form of taking completed new designs from the isolated laboratory into production; the "spill over" is organic, is the effect of increasing the relative scale of production directly under the influence of the combined fundamental research and development work of scientific teams, by integrating manufacturing with laboratories engaged in fundamental research.

In this way, scientific research directly transforms the processes of production, in an energy-intensive, capital-intensive mode. This impact is mediated chiefly through the tool-making aspect of capital-goods producing, such that the rate of increase of productivity tends to be in proportion to the capital-intensity of investment in production generally.

This rarely occurs in larger-scale private manufacturing firms, even technology-intensive firms. Something like it tends to occur more frequently among newly formed small firms, created by scientists and engineers motivated more by a passionate commitment to a scientific principle than to precalculable rates of profit. It occurs, otherwise, only through commitment of governments, either in warfare or preparations for warfare, in which the risk of losing war, or the cost of unacceptable levels of warfare damage, outweigh the ordinary considerations of precalculable profitability.

This behavior of private entrepreneurs is ultimately very silly. There has never been a case in modern history of industry, that a new scientific principle was not most generously profitable, provided sufficient breadth and professional staffing of the investment were supplied. Expressed in terms of statistics, it ought to be U.S. policy, that the employment for research and development in physical and biological technologies ought to be about 10% of the total employment of the labor-force, perhaps 15%. If this investment in employment were made, adequately supported, and utilized, the resulting rate of increase of productivity of the labor-force as a whole would exceed the highest rates in modern history. The result would be, that the economy functioned in something like a "science-driver" "crash program" mode all of the time. However, with rare exceptions, practice in that direction occurs only under the pressure of perceived military expediencies.

This is the direction in which *Plan B* aspects of current Soviet policy are moving. Technically, from the standpoints of both physics and economic science, those efforts portend the highest rates of economic growth in the Soviet Union so far. The impediments to such an effort are chiefly cultural, as we have indicated here already, cultural impediments with potentially profound political implications for Soviet society as a whole. In the meantime, we must assume that the acceleration of Soviet urgency and confidence in its military imperatives, will overwhelm the cultural opposition, such that cultural resistance may impede success, but not prevent it entirely.

Our remarks on the nature and theory of a *Plan B* approach, here, should not be taken to imply that the Soviets are fully committed to the theory of practice which we have outlined here, nor are we estimating the probable net result of opposing cultural resistance and present efforts to force through a "science driver" approach. Our task here, is to alert

readers to this important aspect of current Soviet policy of practice, and to insist that existing U.S. governmental studies of the Soviet war-plans and economy must be replaced by methods appropriate to the close study of both Soviet policy and shifting Soviet capabilities.

All those who echo Henry A. Kissinger, in babbling the falsehood, that the "Soviet empire is crumbling," and so forth, should be disregarded or jailed, as proper statutes may prescribe for such cases. Soviet society is by no means "crumbling"; it is the NATO alliance which is already crumbling, as we note in such cases as recent developments in Greece and Scandinavia, and the threat that Willy Brandt's Soviet-allied Social-Democratic forces might come to power in Germany, and pull Germany rapidly out of the U.S. alliance.

There are sources of troubles inside the Warsaw Pact, and in Soviet society itself. Soviet society is inherently a very violent society, whose culture prescribes periodic convulsions. *Plan B* efforts will increase the potential for such convulsions, as we have indicated. However, the likelihood that either the Warsaw Pact or Soviet society itself will begun to crumble internally very soon, is so small as to be almost non-existent under present conditions. NATO threw away national-independence potentialities in Eastern Europe repeatedly: Germany 1953, Hungary and Poland in 1956, Berlin 1961, and Czechoslovakia 1968. The classical counteroffensive policy for Soviet attack through East Germany, to sweep into Poland and declare the national sovereignty of that nation's existing government, is not a practical alternative in the present correlation of forces. True, assuming that the Soviet empire was extended to domination of the nominally independent satrapies of today's Western Europe, as well as the Middle East, the Soviet empire must crumble eventually, as all oligarchical empires of the form of the Mesopotamian models have crumbled internally in the past. Those who speak wishfully of such as early-future prospects, under present correlations of forces, are doubly dangerous, as they sow Neville Chamberlain-like complacency among us, and prompt the Soviets to desire war more urgently, as the alternative to Western meddling in the internal order of Eastern Europe.

In the present term, our attention to troubles within the Soviet empire must be less wishfully ambitious, more precise, and more practical. It is important to watch closely the frictional impulses of cultural and policy conflicts, impulses not likely to cause the Soviet empire to crumble during the foreseeable future, but impulses which will affect greatly the way in which Soviet policy and performance shift marginally during the period ahead. The cultural and policy conflicts arising in the overlay of *Plan A* and *Plan B* are the best choice of benchmark for such observations and analysis.

1.2 Soviet Doctrine on the War-Economy

In no area can Soviet intentions to go to war be more precisely gauged than in that of the economy. Soviet military strategy, extending back to Sokolovskii, prescribes that there can be no strategy for war without a strategy for a war economy.

Without a sufficiently advanced economy, capable of being fully mobilized to meet the demands of the armed forces, it is impossible to wage modern war. This is the basic principle of the Soviet doctrine of war economy.

As we shall document below, this emphasis on the economy and economic mobilization capability was one of the foundations of the work of Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii and his team which developed the elaborated Soviet strategy for fighting and winning a global thermonuclear war, published as the book *Military Strategy* in 1962. But it is also the foundation of the present Soviet strategy expounded by Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov—what we refer to in this report as the *Ogarkov Doctrine*.

This documentation of Soviet statements on war economy will also make clear how and why the Soviet High Command under Ogarkov was instrumental in bringing to power the *Andropov Dynasty* for the specific purpose of *completing the crucial final preparations for victory in World War III*.

In Ogarkov's most extensive public version of his war strategy, a 1982 booklet entitled *Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland*, he identified the following dilemma for the Soviet planners of offensive nuclear war. In World War II, only a tiny fraction—perhaps as little as 10%—of all of the economic resources expended in combat had been produced *before* the war started. The other 90% were produced in the enormous economic mobilization carried on *during the course of the war*.

But that was World War II. Today, argue the Soviet military planners, a world war will almost certainly be much, much shorter. With thermonuclear weapons of mass destruction, and intercontinental missiles as delivery vehicles, the war may be decided in the first few minutes or hours of war. If so, there will be no time to make up for what is lacking, for what is not already in place and deployable *before* the war ever breaks out.

It is obvious, then, that the side which is capable of the maximum

pre-war economic mobilization will have enormous advantages over its adversary. However, here is where the problem arises. A maximum war mobilization is a state that cannot be maintained indefinitely. The maximum war mobilization is like that at the height of World War II: In Soviet terminology, it is when "the entire country has been transformed into a single camp of war, where everything and everybody goes for victory." And in the case of total, global war, the shorter it is, the more intense the mobilization must be. Nothing that might contribute to a margin of victory dare be left outside the mobilization, "kept in reserve" for some future that will never come unless victory is won.

In other words, the dilemma is how to mobilize as much and as far as possible in peacetime, without overextending the mobilization so as to undermine the very basis of the economy and society.

Ogarkov formulates the problem as follows:

As we know, it is inefficient to maintain armed forces in peacetime in the same fully deployed conditions as will be required in the event of war. Economically, no state can afford to do this, nor is there any particular need to do so. For this reason, in our country under conditions of peaceful construction, as indeed in other countries, a certain portion of the armed forces are kept in a constant state of readiness, i.e., they have a full complement of personnel and military hardware, while the rest are ready for rapid mobilization. Hence, a high degree of combat-readiness of the troops is inconceivable without well-organized mobilization training, aimed at ensuring that they can be quickly converted from a peacetime to a war footing. If the aggressor unleashes a war, the trained personnel and combat-ready equipment assigned to formations and units have to be available on short notice, immediately. For this reason, the task of constant readiness for immediate mobilization of the troops, and early transition of the armed forces and the entire national economy from a peacetime to a war footing, are of special and urgent importance to the state.

. . . The beginning and the course of World War II introduced further changes into the concept of mobilization, and to an even greater extent revealed the direct link which connected the mobilization and deployment of the armed forces with the transition of the entire economy to a war footing and the reorganization of the political, social, scientific, and other institutions of the state. The greater part of the economy and resources of the state were enlisted for the purpose of ensuring immediate war needs. It is sufficient to cite the following example. In the last war, around 90% of the material needs of the armed forces of the belligerent countries were provided by production which took place after the war had already begun, as a result of the mobilization of the economy. What emerged as the most important problems in this respect were the shortening of times for mobilization and ensuring that the economy could be converted to a war footing in a planned manner.

In former wars, as we know, the question of mobilization was not so acute. The weapons systems which countries had at their disposal, and the relatively low degree of mobility and maneuverability of their troops, even in the case of a surprise attack, were essentially incapable of disrupting the mobilization of the army, and even less so of predetermining the course and outcome of the war.

Under modern conditions, the situation has changed radically. The element of surprise played a definite role already in the Second

World War. But today it has become a factor of utmost strategic significance. The question of the early and rapid transition of the armed forces and the entire national economy onto a war footing, as well as that of their mobilization on short notice, has become a considerably more urgent matter. For this reason, providing the forces with trained manpower and combat-ready equipment, and the early transition of the economy to provide output according to wartime schedules, dictate the necessity of carrying out clear-cut, well-planned measures already in peacetime and of conducting co-ordinated action by party, soviet and military authorities locally. The full and qualitative fulfillment of all these measures will to a great extent determine the success of the organized entry of the armed forces into the war and the utter defeat of the aggressor.

The Soviet solution

To solve this dilemma of war economy mobilization, Soviet military strategy has developed a two-fold approach.

1) On the one hand, the military command must ensure at all times that economic decisions are taken with a view to a future war in mind. In other words, the mobilization will be extended backward, in advance of the outbreak of war, as far as possible, and be built up successively. This involves long-term measures of force development such as hardware, various defensive measures such as decentralization of vital industries and civil defense programs, and an overall direction of science and technology to benefit the defense sector.

2) Secondly, there will still be certain measures that must be "saved for the last minute." These concern economic measures that simply cost too much to maintain constantly. This category includes certain infrastructural programs (construction of key rail lines and highways in areas of military importance that cannot be used economically), strategic stock-piling of perishable foods, conversion of plants for arms, etc.

The general term the Soviets use for describing this approach to a war economy is that of building in a "surge production capacity" into the economy, i.e., on the basis of a "normal" level of war economy that can be sustained more or less indefinitely, the next step is to add a very specific program for a short-term massive shift and build-up.

A.N. Lagovskii

These aspects of the theory of war economy were elaborated already in the 1950s by Soviet strategists, most notably by the founder of the modern Soviet doctrine of war economy, A.N. Lagovskii. In 1957 then-Colonel Lagovskii was appointed as head of the newly-established Department of War Economy at the Soviet General Staff Academy. In that capacity, Lagovskii set up a curriculum for the subject as an on-going part of the work he was simultaneously doing in a group under the Chief of General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovskii, to develop a new Soviet strategy for nuclear war.

Lagovskii's elaboration of the theory of war economy was not only included in Sokolovskii's book, *Military Strategy*, but Lagovskii himself also wrote a separate textbook for the new curriculum. This textbook, entitled *Strategiya i ekonomika* (Strategy and the Economy), was published in 1957. With startling frankness, this 200-page book discusses 1) how the military high command ("strategy") has to take control of the economy

and economic planning, 2) the vital issue of what must be done in *peacetime* to prepare for war, 3) a whole array of necessary measures to protect the Soviets' own economy, such as the building of strategic reserves, duplication of industries, building underground plants, etc., and 4) not least, how the high command must thoroughly *map out the U.S. economy*, including its weak and strong points, with conclusions about which industries can be influenced (destroyed) in peacetime, which ones will be prime nuclear targets, and which ones should be saved for later use by a victorious Red Army.

The quotes below concentrate only on points 1) and 2), and even these are but a fraction of what Lagovskii states on these topics. But the following should indicate the essence of the modern Soviet strategy of war economy.

An advanced economy is the precondition for victory

Soviet military science has elaborated the far-reaching dependence of modern war on the economic factor. Without a sufficiently advanced economy, which can fulfil all the demands of the armed forces, it is impossible to wage war today. A strategic plan which oversteps the bounds of the country's economic potential will be an adventure. A strategy which lacks an adequate economic basis must necessarily fail.

The military command must run the economy

Today, as never before, strategy must systematically and thoroughly investigate all scientific and technological achievements as well as [the nation's] economic potential. . . .

However, as we know, potential is not yet reality. One has to know how to translate potential into reality, that is, one has to elaborate both a theory of war economy for war and carry out persistent efforts for the development of that economic potential. . . .

. . . In order to be able to meet [the] needs of the army and navy, the economy must, already in peacetime, prepare itself in all respects for the armed defense of the country.

Strategy bears great responsibility for the economic preparation of the country for a war. Above all, it has to determine the needs of the armed forces for the initial period of the war. These needs must be constantly adjusted in accordance with the new potential offered by the progress of the national economy, the achievements of science and technology, the course of the process of force development and the new principles of military art.

. . . Strategy has to compare the economic potential of its own country with the estimated needs of the armed forces and, in the interest of national defense, determine the directions in which the various branches of industry must develop as well as the rate of development required to attain the required capacities.

Strategy has to exert its influence on all economic problems which are connected with support of combat actions of the armed forces as well as their build-up in the period of preparation for war and during war. Strategy is duty-bound to advise the State in economic matters which bear upon the defense capability of the nation.

Rapid mobilization of the economy

One highly important factor in evaluating economic potential is the possibility of rapid mobilization of all branches of the economy for the needs of war and of far-reaching utilization of economic

reserves. Today, the strength of a nation is also dependent upon how long it takes to expand its economic potential in correspondence with the military-political situation. . . .

The rapid and comprehensive mobilization of all economic reserves is primarily dependent upon the economic system of a country. The main qualitative feature of the economic potential is the structure and organization of the national economy. The socialist system of planned economy has in this respect great advantages over the capitalist economic system.

Components of economic potential

Let us once again summarize the most important elements of economic potential: the size of a country's population, taking into consideration its cultural level and political and moral state; the economic system; the capacity of heavy industry; the productivity of labor and its developmental trends; raw materials; import dependency; density and size of the transportation network; the level of development of agriculture and its areas of specialization; the time required for mobilization of all branches of the economy; the possibility of utilization of economic reserves, and the state of the material reserves in the country.

Modern wars represent a severe test for a country's economic potential. They reveal whether or not that potential is capable of providing the nation with all means that are necessary for successfully waging armed struggle. In the Great Patriotic War, the socialist economic system of the Soviet Union managed to rapidly convert the entire economic might of the state to meet the needs of war to annihilate the enemy. The experiences gathered in this war in the utilization of economic potential furnish valuable guidelines for assessing the potential of the Soviet Union in the event of a new war. They show the path toward further strengthening of the defense capacity of the Soviet homeland and toward the creation of a mighty foundation for the material and technology equipping and supply of the Soviet army. A constant investigation of the economic potential of our own country provides the military command with data on the means which can be placed at their disposal for carrying out combat actions, on the possible extent of combat actions in the initial period and in the later periods of the war, as well as the time at which strategic operations can be launched. A precise study of economic potential and the comparison of the economic potential of the country with the needs of the army in war, make it possible to take measures for the crash development of one particular branch of militarily vital production or for building new means of communications.

The nation's economic potential has to be utilized even in peacetime as rationally as possible for the construction of the armed forces.

Mobilization in peacetime

. . . For strategy, it is very important to elaborate its own recommendations for the direction in which the economy should develop, so that the most favorable conditions for the mobilization of the armed forces and for their development and deployment, can be created. Therefore, strategy must, already in peacetime, exert its influence to prepare the economy in the manner required in case of war to supply the army and navy with everything it needs for armed struggle.

The composition of the means required for warfare must likewise be determined already in peacetime. In solving this highly responsible task, strategy plays the leading role. In the course of the war, military art can, on the basis of the experience it acquires, relatively quickly change its principles, and, similarly, the troops can relatively quickly implement new tactical methods and new demands on operational art. But things are different as far as the economy is concerned: Production facilities cannot react so quickly to the demands of the troops for provision with other war materiel and other armaments than the customary ones. The conversion of industry, even the partial conversion of the production program and the introduction of a new technology, is a complicated matter that demands a great deal of time. For this reason, the means and methods of conducting a possible war have to be determined in time and carefully thought through in close connection with the potentials of the national economy and its perspectives. Here, too, we see one of the most important tasks of strategy. It has to foresee the course of development of warfare as well as the possible changes in the methods of warfare and hence the changes in the needs of the troops. Of course, strategy is not capable of predicting all new demands of the armed forces in a long war. However, strategy is duty-bound to determine in advance the needs of the armed forces with respect to types and quantity of technical means and armaments for the initial period of the war, be it only a single year. This survey of the needs of the armed forces is necessary in order to determine the point at which the economic preparation of the country for the armed struggle should begin.

Geographical distribution

The geographical distribution of the productive forces and especially that of heavy industry, the leading branch of the economy and the foundation of the defense capacity of the nation, is under present conditions of exceptional political, economic, and strategic importance. . . . Economic potential is the basis for conducting modern wars, and this potential is the main target for the enemy's armed impact on the rear. . . .

Under present conditions, the individual parts of the advanced economic base, especially the industrial plants, must be distributed throughout the country in such a way as to provide the most favorable preconditions for production during the war.

In setting up new plants, the question of their defense against air attack must always be taken into consideration. In determining the geographical location of an industrial facility, both economic and military interests have to be taken into account. Sometimes, economic interests have to take second priority if they run counter to strategic considerations. . . .

. . . The same production, the same component or machine must always be produced in more than one factory in more than one area. A product must always be produced in many different plants.

Science and technology

The furious development of science and technology have much to offer to modern armaments and can thereby influence the methods of conducting war. This is why strategy is interested in the successes of science and technology.

If strategy is in a position of seeing far in advance, and if it does

not lag behind the economic development of the country, then the arming of the army can be rapidly developed. The level of development of science and technology today offers real possibilities, which occasionally are bigger than might have been foreseen some years ago. However, to move from the stage of prediction in the area of arms development to the design phase and from there to serial production, is a long road, often one that takes years. For this reason, it is important for strategy to be constantly up-dated with regard to the achievements of science and technology, in order to be able to utilize the latest developments in all areas of science for its purposes. But beyond that, strategy can and must also exert its influence to push scientific and technological research in directions that benefit the military.

Under the conditions of the stormy development of science and technology, it is becoming increasingly more difficult to utilize the experience of the Second World War for a future war; this is why the ability of strategy to foresee the development of technical means of struggle, the build-up of the army and navy, and the methods of conducting armed struggle, take on increasingly greater importance.

Labor power and labor productivity

The early preparation of a complete inventory of labor power resources for the event of war is of great economic and military significance. Strategy is interested in completing the mobilization of the armed forces in a short period of time by drafting population contingents. . . .

Strategy has to inform itself of one further factor which exerts substantial influence on the labor power requirements of the national economy, viz. the increase of the productivity of labor. This factor is important not only from the standpoint of an additional increase of goods of society, but also for supplying additional personnel to the armed forces. As is known, an increase in labor productivity means that less labor-time is needed for the production of a product, i.e., fewer workers are needed for the production of the same amount of products. The workers thereby freed from production may either—if the existing equipment so permits—be deployed to increase production of relevant products, or be assigned to different jobs, or in case of war, be drafted into the army or navy.

Preparing the theaters of war

The comprehensive preparation of the theaters of war is, under current conditions, a distinctive feature of the general war-preparedness of a country. Strategy is highly interested in this factor because it sees in it a necessary and important condition for the success of concentration and deployment of troops in the event of war, and for the success of initial military operations and perhaps even the entire campaign.

On the extensive territories of future strategic fronts, that is, the potential theaters of war, various kinds of relations may develop among neighboring states in peacetime. For this reason, international relations are one of the most important elements in determining the measures to prepare the scope and succession of work in the prospective theater of war.

. . . Such measures might include the establishment of a network of airfields, rail lines, highways, and pipelines, as well as the con-

struction of water routes for intensive traffic as well as the construction of electricity plants and power lines. . . .

. . . The preparation of the theaters of war must in case of emergency be carried out to some extent "at the expense of" the general economic development of the territory. . . .

In individual cases, military and economic interests may even diverge widely from one another. For instance, it is more advantageous to build one big electric power plant than several smaller ones. First of all, construction is cheaper, and secondly, the production costs of electricity produced in a large power plant are lower. However, this question has to be solved by looking at both the requirements of air defense and securing the needs of the troops, the national economy, and the population for electric power in war. From this standpoint, it may turn out in certain circumstances to be more expedient to build a network of small power plants which can be connected to the power grid of the relevant area. Often the interests of strategy and the economy can also diverge in the construction of transportation routes. . . .

The military issues orders

A comparison of our initial quotes from Marshal Ogarkov on economic mobilization with those from Lagovskii should illustrate the continuity of Soviet strategy for war economy from the 1950s until today. In the case of Ogarkov, there is a direct link. As a major-general in 1958, Ogarkov was in the first class to take Lagovskii's new course at the General Staff Academy. The book from which we have quoted above was the textbook Ogarkov used.

In Ogarkov's writings in the 1980s, he draws on another aspect of Lagovskii and Sokolovskii: the immediate, urgent measures that have to be taken, in addition to long-term direction of the economy. Ogarkov writes in his 1982 booklet *Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland*:

In the interests of raising the defense capacity of the country, it is more urgent than ever before that the mobilization of the armed forces be coordinated with the national economy as a whole, especially in the use of human resources, transport, communications and energy, and in ensuring the reliability and survivability of the entire vast economic mechanism of the country. In this connection, there must be a constant effort to find ways to improve systems of cooperation among enterprises which produce the basic types of weapons, and to make them more autonomous with respect to energy and water supplies, provide them with necessary stocks, and create an equipment and materials reserve. Further improvement has to be made in the actual system of mobilization readiness of the national economy on the basis of the principle that a close interrelationship between the mobilization readiness of the armed forces, the national economy, and civil defense is the most important condition for maintaining the defense capacity of the country as a whole on the requisite level.

The concentration of all forces to attain the goals posed, taking into account the extraordinarily changed conditions of modern war and the complexity of mobilization, is impossible without a reliable system of centralized leadership of the country and the armed forces. Our country has some experience in this respect. The State Defense Committee, as well as the defense committees in the cities of the

front zone, which had been created in the years of the Great Patriotic War, proved their value to the full extent. In a modern war, should the imperialists unleash one against us, it goes without saying that we will require an even higher degree of concentration of leadership (command) and, obviously, not only in the front regions, as was the case during the past war. In this connection, a significantly greater role will also be played by the corresponding local agencies which in the event of war might have to head up all efforts connected with the solution of mobilization tasks and tasks of territorial defense, as well as with the implementation of measures such as civil defense and so forth.

The year before Ogarkov graduated from the General Staff Academy, Colonel Semyon Kurkotkin had completed the same course of study. Today, Kurkotkin is a deputy defense minister and Chief of Rear Services—i.e., in charge of all logistics—for the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces, a post he has held since 1972. In March 1983, Kurkotkin was promoted by Yuri Andropov to Marshal of the Soviet Union. In fall 1984, only a few weeks after Ogarkov had personally taken charge of implementing the final phase of setting up the command structure for war against the West (see section 1.5), Kurkotkin wrote an article in the military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* urging the same economic mobilization measures as Ogarkov had previously done. The article titled, "The Experience of History and the Present Day: Economic Potential in Action," appeared in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Oct. 19, 1984.

. . . The Great Patriotic War confirmed anew and with absolute conviction that the socialist planned economy, in combination with its scientific management, opens possibilities which no capitalist state has or can have. The socialist planned economy possesses a unique mobilization capability and survivability which permits it to react operationally to a changing situation and rapidly implement a reorganization. For instance, the transition of the German economy onto a war footing took nearly six years, that of the U.S. about two years. Our country was able to carry out a mobilization of the economy in the course of a single year.

. . . In the 1939-41 period the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet Government adopted several important resolutions on questions of strengthening the defense capacity of the country. These included, for instance, decisions to convert existing and build new aircraft factories, and to produce T-34 tanks. As a result, the production capacity of our aircraft industry and of Soviet tank construction were nearly 1.5 times greater than the corresponding capacities in Germany by the summer of 1941.

Simultaneously with the development of the war industry, state reserves, and mobilization stocks of food and vital strategic materials were created at high rates.

Thus, on the basis of the overall growth of economic potential, the material basis of national defense capacity was strengthened. This work was carried out in complete correspondence with Lenin's conclusion that without the most serious economic preparation, it is impossible to conduct a modern war.

The economic potential of a state, once brought into play, becomes the most important factor of victory in war, provided that it is utilized in a purposeful manner and with maximum efficiency.

. . . In the nearly four decades separating us from the end of the

Great Patriotic War, the economic and scientific-technological potential of the U.S.S.R. has grown many times over.

. . . The course of imperialism towards material preparation of a new world war and the sharply increasing threat of nuclear war on their part compel the Soviet Union to do everything necessary to further strengthen its defense capability.

As a result of the measures that have been taken, the mobilization capability and the survivability of our economy are being raised. The planned, rational siting of productive forces is of utmost importance in this respect. The strengthening of our defense might is aided by the further development of existing, and creation of new, territorial-industrial complexes, the improvement of infrastructure, and its centralization on a nationwide scale.

The economic preparation of the country to rebuff imperialist aggression calls, as is known, for the accumulation of strategic reserves and the all-round development of all types of transportation. The improvement of the war economy potential and its efficient use, and close cooperation among the fraternal socialist countries on matters of war economy, are emerging as a particularly urgent problem.

. . . The significance of the transport sector in relation to the war economy is extraordinarily great. At the present time, the long-range orientation of its functioning is towards mechanization of loading and unloading operations and the introduction of advanced methods of freight transport. For instance, the introduction of containerization and packetization will permit an increase in productivity of labor by 3-5 times, free a large number of people, and cheapen transportation.

Thus, at the very point when one element of the preparations for a war countdown—the structure of command-and-control—was being put into place by Marshal Ogarkov, another spokesman of the military High Command issued the military's demands to the politicians to get moving on the urgent question of the economic mobilization. Indeed, in what might be construed as a direct threat that if the politicians could not move fast enough on the economic mobilization, the army was there to step in, Kurkotkin concluded his article with the following remark:

Of course, the problem of the effective use of the economic potential of the country in the interest of strengthening its defense capacity and reliable defense of the achievements of socialism will be solved with the most active participation of the entire personnel of our Armed Forces, especially the military cadres of the army and navy. And this is only natural. Warfare has its own internal structure and logic of development, and its own mechanism of quantitative and qualitative changes. And that mechanism has to be ready to receive the "services" of the economy and of scientific-technological progress.

A few weeks later, on Dec. 11, 1984, Mikhail Gorbachov—rather than General Secretary Chernenko—delivered the main speech at the "All-Union Scientific-Technological Conference on Implementing the June 1983 Central Committee Plenum Resolutions." There, Gorbachov announced that the new Soviet goal was to "lead the world" in science, technology and advanced industry by the "beginning of the next millennium."

Ogarkov, Kurkotkin et al. had themselves a leader who was going to tackle the problem of "putting economic potential into action" in a serious way.

1.3 Soviet Conclusions from World War II

As the previous section on the Soviet doctrine of war economy has already shown, modern-day Soviet military thinking is even today based to a large extent on drawing lessons from World War II. For the Western observer, it is often difficult to appreciate to what degree Soviet military thinking is dominated by that experience.

References to "the lessons of the Great Patriotic War," as the Soviets call their part of World War II, are constant and pervasive in the Soviet press. To take a most recent and typical example, the front-page editorial in the Soviet armed forces daily *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*) on June 22, 1985 was headlined: "History Teaches Vigilance" (which, by the way, is also the title of the newly published booklet by Marshal Ogarkov, reviewed in Soviet publications in early June). The *Krasnaya Zvezda* editorial is full of phrases like the following:

Vigilance—precisely this is the lesson of the history of the Great Patriotic War, which began by the perfidious attack by Hitler Germany on the Soviet Union forty-four years ago. And it is vigilance that is demanded by the complex and dangerous situation on the international scene as it has emerged in our own day.

Or, as the conclusion of the editorial:

Unremitting vigilance and the necessity of raising combat readiness constitute the holy duty of Soviet soldiers to their Motherland and to their people. This is the lesson of history.

Implicit in such references to "the perfidious attack of Hitler Germany" is of course the admission that the Soviet Union was indeed not prepared for the enemy's attack in 1941. Usually, that admission remains only implicit—since frank confession of past errors is hardly a characteristic feature of Soviet historians—but occasionally, in especially authoritative writings, direct references are allowed.

One illustrative example of such frankness was provided in the article written for the anniversary of the end of the war in the government daily, *Izvestia*, on May 7, 1985, by the Chief of General Staff, Marshal Akhromeyev. His article was entitled "The Great Victory and Its Lessons."

. . . On the eve of the war, the Communist Party of the Soviet

Union correctly evaluated the growing threat of war. In the complex prewar situation, the party did all it could to avert war, and at the same time, it strengthened the country's defense capability. The enemy's perfidious attack caught the Soviet Union at a time when many of the defense measures had not yet been completed.

. . . The victory of the Soviet people and their Armed Forces in the Great Patriotic War holds many lessons. Our sacrifices were great, but the outcome of the war taught us a great deal. From it, we have drawn important military-political conclusions and learned the necessary lessons. The significance of these conclusions and lessons is permanent and they are particularly topical in present conditions.

. . . Historical experience has taught us that in view of imperialism's aggressiveness, utmost vigilance is called for. It is necessary to constantly keep an eye on its intrigues, to analyze the developing military-political situation, to bear in mind its dangerous trends, to expose the possible nature of a future war that imperialism may unleash, and on the basis of this, and exercising great foresight, to resolve defense tasks and purposefully build and train the Armed Forces. We remember what the miscalculations and errors committed on the eve of the Great Patriotic War cost us. In present-day conditions, in view of the sides' large quantities of nuclear and other weapons, it would be considerably more difficult to rectify omissions while war was in progress.

As these examples show, the official Soviet calls for "vigilance" and "readiness"—at least those which are part of the public propaganda—are invariably framed in the context of a message that "we must not allow ourselves to be caught off guard." In the 1950s, during the era of Soviet inferiority in strategic nuclear weapons, this may have been a serious concern. Today, however—and this is overwhelmingly clear from the case of Soviet doctrine on war economy mobilization as we examined it in the preceding section—"preparedness" does not refer to the case of a possible surprise attack by the enemy nearly as much as it does the careful, methodical putting into place of the economic and military resources and the command structure required for an *offensive nuclear war* against the West.

Since 1945, Soviet military doctrine and strategy has evolved through four principal stages, culminating in the present version—the *Ogarkov Plan*. By examining both the official statements of Soviet strategy as published by the Soviets themselves, as well as the quantity and quality of the Soviet military, technological and economic build-up since the war, we can date these phases as follows:

1) A first postwar phase extending from 1945 to 1953. The break was not determined, as one might think at first glance, by the death of Stalin, but by the successful first test of the hydrogen bomb. This remains as a principle today: Soviet military strategy evolves in relation to global military events, not internal shifts in personalities and leadership.

2) The second phase of Soviet military doctrine began in 1954 and lasted until the first half of the 1960s. During this time, as the Soviet armed forces were being massively equipped with strategic and tactical nuclear missiles, a strategy for nuclear war-fighting was elaborated, and that strategy—known as the *Sokolovskii Doctrine*—began to have a clearly visible influence on Soviet force development and economic and technological directions.

3) From roughly 1962-65 through the early 1970s, Soviet military

doctrine passed through its third postwar stage. Following Sokolovskii's prescriptions, the U.S.S.R. for the first time achieved parity with the United States in respect of both quantity and quality of key strategic weapons systems. While the conventional build-up was also massive, the emphasis was on strategic weapons for intercontinental war with the United States.

4) Beginning in the 1972-75 period, the Soviet command proceeded toward the goal of attaining a clear superiority over the West in quality of offensive weapons systems, as well as in the development of defensive weapons based on "new physical principles" which would reduce the vulnerability of the Soviet Union in a nuclear war. The success of these efforts in the initial part of this phase clearly persuaded the Soviet leadership that by around 1987-88 the U.S.S.R. would have achieved a margin of superiority that would enable it to wage, survive and win a nuclear war. In terms of strategy, the Soviet Union concentrated during this phase on developing a war-fighting and war-winning capability for *all options*, from a maximum all-out global war to limited, "surgical-strike" possibilities.

In a later section, we will be examining in detail the systematic process involved in this fourth stage, the process by which the Ogarkov Plan has been, and continues to be implemented. However, before doing that, let us present to the reader the goal toward which this process is directed: the ability to carry out the "maximum option" in the Ogarkov Plan.

What would global thermonuclear war look like as directed by the Soviet High Command?

1.4 The 'Maximum Option' of the Ogarkov Plan: Winning Thermonuclear War

The scenario of global thermonuclear war, the "maximum option" of Marshal Ogarkov's war-fighting plan, does not begin with any particular incident, or with any incident at all. It begins one fine day, perhaps on a holiday weekend, when the decision has been taken by the Soviet military-political high command, that the Soviet empire will achieve its objectives by force of arms.

"The element of surprise," states Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov, "has always played a certain role. Today, however, it has become a factor of greatest strategic significance. And we are obliged to take strict account of this." Like the previously cited calls for vigilance, Sokolov's statement full well applies to Soviet *offensive* plans, which would unfold something like this. Each of the weapons used and steps described, which occur with virtual simultaneity, has either already been tested by the Soviet Armed Forces or is in the advanced stages of development.

minus 48:00 A large Soviet naval detachment, led by the cruiser "Kirov," sails into the North Atlantic. The ships surge through the Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gap in such numbers and with such speed, that NATO monitors lose track of some. Among them are Yankee class, Delta-III and Delta-IV class nuclear-powered submarines, armed with submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and the Akula-class sub with its long-range cruise missiles; they move toward the Atlantic coast of the United States, joining the submarines normally stationed there. The U.S. State Department describes the moves as "routine maneuvers."

minus 24:00 Soviet *spetsnaz* forces in place in Western Europe deploy, unnoticed, for sabotage actions against key NATO military airfields and Pershing-II missile launchers.

00:00 Soviet ground-based lasers and ASAT weapons attack U.S. early-warning satellites, destroying some and blinding others.

00:00 The Yankees, Deltas and Akulas, off both coasts of the continental United States, fire their missiles.

00:00 Giant Typhoon-class submarines, armed with SS-N-20 missiles, leave their berths at Murmansk, to take up positions under the Arctic Ocean ice.

00:00 Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) are launched from Soviet Central Asia on trajectories going up over the North Pole, the shortest route to targets in the United States.

00:00 SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) are fired at concentrations of U.S. nuclear missile submarines, detected by sensors on the Salyut space station. SS-20s in the Western U.S.S.R. aim at submarines in the Mediterranean, North or Baltic Seas and the Atlantic Ocean; SS-20s in the Soviet Far East fire into the North Pacific; and SS-20s in Afghanistan strike at the U.S. Indian Ocean base, Diego Garcia.

00:00 Soviet Su-24 fighter-bombers fly out of the western Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to inflict a massive air strike against NATO command centers and military targets in Western Europe. SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23 missiles are fired from Eastern Europe, against other NATO targets of the same type. A combination of nuclear and chemical weapons is employed, designed to limit blast and fire damage to areas the Soviets intend to occupy.

00:03 Missiles from the first barrage of SLBMs explode over and in the U.S. coastal cities, including Washington, D.C., Boston, New York, Baltimore, Norfolk, Va., and New Orleans.

00:06 High-altitude nuclear explosions over the United States, from the first barrage of SLBMs, further disrupt satellite and ground communications, by the generation of electro-magnetic pulse (EMP). U.S. Minuteman missiles are "pinned down" by the nuclear explosions occurring above them.

00:08 Further nuclear explosions from the first barrage destroy or cripple the North American Air Defense headquarters in Colorado and the Strategic Air Command post in Nebraska. The U.S. bomber fleet, its airfields under attack, is unable to take off.

00:15 More SLBMs, fired from the off-coast submarines, explode over targets in the continental U.S., continuing the pin-down effect.

00:20 The heavy Soviet ICBMs, fired from the U.S.S.R., begin to explode on target, destroying the pinned-down Minutemen in their silos and levelling American cities. Seventy-five to 125 million people in the United States are killed in this and the previous barrages.

00:30 The SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers in the Soviet Union, having been reloaded, fire a second barrage at the United States.

03:00 Soviet ground forces, equipped with vehicles and clothing for operation in areas saturated by atomic-biological-chemical (ABC) weapons, move swiftly into the Federal Republic of Germany.

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24:00 The United States, its military infrastructure and ports destroyed, is unable to transfer any forces for the defense of Europe.

36:00 The Soviet high command demands that the United States surrender, or face the destruction of surviving cities and industries by barrages of missiles from the Soviet submarines standing by under the Arctic ice.

2 wks The Soviets finish occupying the continent, including Spain and the British Isles. (Maps 1-6.)

This is the sequence of actions the Soviet command is organizing itself to perpetrate. In the next section, we will examine, how advanced these preparations are.

1.5 The Soviet Military Command for World War III

On Dec. 22, 1984, the Soviet military daily, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), in its obituary for deceased Defense Minister **Dmitrii Ustinov**, dropped an intelligence bombshell. By the order in which it presented the signers of **Ustinov's** death announcement, *Krasnaya Zvezda* confirmed for the first time that the Soviet Union had during the fall of 1984 set up four Wartime High Commands of the Soviet Armed Forces, covering every "strategic direction" representing the general strategic axes of advance by the Red Army in war contingencies ranging from all-out war to regional and local wars of the Soviet Armed Forces.

At the same time, that inconspicuous list of signers of the **Ustinov** obituary also settled, for any competent observer, all speculation about the whereabouts of former Soviet Chief of General Staff, Marshal of the Soviet Union **Nikolai Ogarkov**, who had been regarded by the overwhelming majority of "Sovietologists" as "demoted and disgraced" since his transfer from the General Staff post in September. *Krasnaya Zvezda* made it clear that **Ogarkov** was the commander-in-chief of the most important of the new commands, that of the Western Strategic Direction.

But most important of all, the *Krasnaya Zvezda* notice, by confirming that these wartime commands are operational, served notice to the West that the Soviet Union considers itself in an immediate pre-war situation, if not in the initial phases of war.

Later in this section, we will examine these new commands in detail, but for the moment, let us merely clarify the information so obliquely provided by *Krasnaya Zvezda*.

For the first time since World War II, the Soviet Union now has four High Commands at a level between that of the Supreme High Command and the military districts:

- 1) the High Command of the Western Strategic Direction, HQ in Minsk and Lignica (Poland), commanded by **Ogarkov**;
- 2) the High Command of the Southwestern Strategic Direction, HQ in Kiev, commanded by General of the Army **Ivan Gerasimov**;
- 3) the High Command of the Southern TVD (Theater of Military Actions), HQ in Tashkent, commanded by General of the Army **Yuri Maksimov**;

- 4) the High Command of the Far East TVD, HQ in Chita, commanded by General of the Army **Ivan Tret'yak**.

To this date, still only a small minority of so-called "Sovietologists" have recognized this dramatic reorganization of the Soviet command. Most, defending their initial misassessments that Marshal Ogarkov had been "demoted" in September 1984, also failed to note that at the same time that Ogarkov "disappeared," the most extensive restructuring of top field commands since the war had occurred in the Red Army. No fewer than 12 of 20 commanders of military districts and "Groups of Forces" (the name for Soviet divisions stationed in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary) were replaced late in 1984.

But above all, the "Sovietologists" failed to view this dramatic command restructuring and establishment of new offensive strike commands in light of the entire chronology of post-1975 Soviet military build-up and reorganization—a process which, if systematically reviewed, proves irrefutably that the Soviet leadership is completing the final phase of putting into place a capability to wage and win global thermonuclear war or any conflict with the West at any level below that threshold.

We present such a chronology below.

1972-75 SALT and ABM: Soviet strategy enters a new phase

In 1972, when the United States, under the stewardship of **Henry Kissinger**, stupidly allowed itself to be locked into the SALT Treaty and ABM Treaty trap, the Soviet Union confidently turned what previously had been an overriding desire—a comprehensive R & D and war production program to achieve overwhelming strategic superiority, and simultaneously effect decisive "theater" margins of superiority in Europe and Asia—into an actual strategic doctrine.

There are two major causal nodal points in the past 25 years of Soviet strategic build-up. The first was the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, after which—the period of the *Sokolovskii Doctrine*—the Soviet leadership embarked upon an accelerated program of missile development and deployment, to achieve strategic parity with the United States.

This goal had been achieved by 1972 at the latest. The SALT and ABM Treaties of that year provided the political precondition—indeed the golden opportunity—for the Soviet leadership to begin an even more accelerated program of strategic weaponry and necessary war preparations over a term of 15 and perhaps 20 years, whose culmination would yield undisputed, overwhelming Soviet strategic and theater superiority, simultaneously.

To better understand the mind-set of the Soviet military leadership during this critical 1972-75 conjuncture, a brief review of what was going on—or, better said, what was *not* going on—in the United States is needed.

The United States had completed production and deployment of the land-based Minuteman missile systems, and submarine-based Polaris missile fleet. And that was that. No new generation of missiles was anywhere near serial production. There was talk of starting a new generation of land-based missile called MX, which could also be made mobile. The debate on the MX went on, and on, and on. Now, in 1985, the first puny batch of some 40 or 50 will, one hopes, soon be in service—with, however, no reload capability, as is the case with all U.S. missile systems. There was a lot of talk about producing the next generation of nuclear missile submarine, the Trident. Thanks to Kissinger and Carter, that program is years behind what it could have been.

The Soviet leadership did the exact opposite. To test whether the

U.S.A.'s SALT "Nuclear Freeze" would hold, the U.S.S.R. in 1972 began to develop a new generation of intercontinental submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), known as the SS-N-20, with nine warheads and an 8,300 km range, and a new monster class of submarine to go with it—the 25,000 ton Typhoon class.

Not only did the U.S.A. do nothing militarily. Politically, Watergate finished off Nixon. A Kissinger administration continued under Lame Duck **Gerry Ford**.

1972: First signs of the Ogarkov Team

When the SALT and ABM treaties were signed in 1972, one of the members of the Soviet delegation who could be proudest of his accomplishments was General of the Army **Nikolai Ogarkov**. Ever since he had been brought onto the Soviet General Staff in 1968, one of Ogarkov's functions had been that of head of the *Office of Strategic Deception*. In that capacity, he made sure that the entire SALT negotiating process served the purpose of concealing real Soviet strength and intentions while duping the United States into disarming itself in strategic armaments.

Given the importance of the SALT/ABM Treaties, and **Ogarkov's** role in them, we can say that in a sense 1972 marks the beginning of the coming into being of the *Ogarkov War Plan*.

Another good reason for beginning our chronology in 1972 is that it is in this year that the first crucial posts in commanding positions are assumed by generals (later to become marshals), who have ever since been core members of the Ogarkov War Plan Directorate. In 1972, the key post of Chief of the Rear Services, who will oversee the Soviet and Warsaw Pact build-up and modernization of logistical capabilities, preparatory to launching war, is given to General Colonel **Semyon Kurkotkin**. Thirteen years, and many thousands of tons of logistics' capability, and thousands more modernized kilometers of rail and road later, Kurkotkin—now Marshal of the Soviet Union—is still directing the Rear Services.

In 1968, the General Staff Academy had resumed a program of nine-month academic and theoretical courses (suspended under Khrushchov in 1959), given to generals and promising senior officers. Kurkotkin was one of the attendees of that special 1968 General Staff Academy course.

Also in 1972, the Strategic Rocket Forces get a new commander-in-chief, General of the Army **Vladimir Tolubko**. Thirteen years and many new missile types later, Tolubko—now Chief Marshal of Artillery—still directs the Strategic Forces. Marshal Tolubko, like Marshal Kurkotkin, was a graduate of that special 1968 General Staff Academy course.

1973: A new strategy textbook is planned

In 1973, the Defense Council of the Soviet Union appoints a new head of the General Staff Academy, General of the Army **I. Ye. Shavrov**. One of Shavrov's first acts is to assemble a special team at the Academy whose task is to write a new textbook on military strategy. The idea is to update and revise the previous doctrine set forth in Marshal **V.D. Sokolovskii's** book, *Military Strategy*, first published in 1962. The new strategy will be based on the notion of how to achieve, and exploit, Soviet military supremacy in the post-SALT era.

Shavrov himself is the editor of the new book. Gen. Lt. **V.N. Karpov**,

head of the Department of Strategy at the General Staff Academy, leads the group of authors, which includes Generals **A.K. Zaporozhchenko**, **K.K. Belokonov**, **V.V. Solovyov**, **Ye. D. Grebish**, and Colonels **N.N. Kuznetsov** and **I.F. Yermachenko**.

April 1973

As the General Staff group begins its work, the April 1973 Central Committee Plenum makes some very important changes in the composition of the Politburo of the Soviet Union. These changes will later have great implications for implementing the new strategic doctrine in the U.S.S.R. Added to the Politburo are Foreign Minister **Andrei Gromyko**, Defense Minister Marshal **Andrei Grechko**, and a man who had known **Ogarkov** for 30 years—the Chairman of the Committee for State Security (KGB), **Yuri Andropov**.

1974-75: The new strategic doctrine is finalized

In 1975, the project to produce an updated version of **Sokolovskii's Military Strategy** is completed. But, in contrast to **Sokolovskii's** work, which had shocked the West when it was made available here shortly after publication, the 1975 textbook is *kept secret*; its contents will never be officially revealed.

In a rare comment on even the existence of this fundamental exposition of Soviet war strategy, Marshal **Viktor Kulikov**, then Chief of the General Staff and now Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, writes that it contains "new views on the nature and methods of waging war, and also of strategic actions of the services of the Armed Forces."

Though the 1975 strategy textbook has been kept secret, later events will make its contents transparent. The 1975 book will function as the blueprint for what has transpired ever since. The most important authors will form the core of the **Ogarkov** "think-tank" that continually updates Soviet strategy for nuclear war. The dictates and goals set out in their 1975 textbook remain the goals and dictates governing the **Ogarkov War Plan** to this day.

Marshal **Ogarkov's** 'think-tank'

By 1985, the think-tank—the "brains" behind the Soviet strategy for fighting and winning a global thermonuclear by 1988—includes the following individuals (ranks and posts as of 1985):

- 1) Marshal of the Soviet Union **Sergei Akhromeyev**, Chief of the General Staff.
- 2) General of the Army **V. Varennikov**, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
- 3) General of the Army **A. Gribkov**, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and First Deputy CINC of Warsaw Pact Forces.
- 4) Admiral **N. Amel'ko**, Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
- 5) Marshal of Artillery **Ye. Boichuk**, Chief of the Main Directorate for Nuclear War Planning of the General Staff.
- 6) General of the Army **M. Kozlov**, head of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy.
- 7) General Colonel **V. Karpov**, senior faculty member of the General Staff Academy.
- 8) General Lieutenant **A. Sokolov**, senior faculty member of the General Staff Academy.

- 9) General of the Army G. Obaturov, head of the Frunze Military Academy.

The hardware build-up: mobility and flexibility

In 1975, at the same time that the new Soviet doctrine for the 1980s has been finalized, the Soviet Defense Council makes a series of crucial decisions regarding some of the hardware that the strategy entails. This year, the U.S.S.R. begins simultaneously to develop a new generation of land-based ICBMs, a new generation of short- and medium-range missiles, and serial production of a new intermediate-range missile, the SS-20. Despite the variations in range and size of these missiles, they all have one feature in common: they are *mobile*.

Thus, in 1975, development proceeded with the:

- SS-24 ICBM mobile missile, housed on railway cars;
- SS-25 ICBM mobile missile, at least 460 launchers by end 1986;
- SS-20 IRBM mobile missile;
- SS-22 MRBM mobile missile;
- SS-23 MRBM mobile missile;
- SS-21 SRBM mobile missile;

The new strategic doctrine calls for all new land-based missiles to be mobile, not only for maximal deployment flexibility, but also for maximal cheating flexibility. There is no way to say that the Soviets have only "x" number of SS-24, or SS-25 missile launchers. Needless to say, these new missiles, as with previous stationary models, were all designed for cold launch, i.e., rapid-fire reload capabilities. Every half hour, another missile can be fired.

The mobile missile is ideal for rapid transport—the Soviets' giant new Antonov-124 transport aircraft, presented publicly in 1985, can take an entire SS-20 and fly it to, say, Cuba, or, Vietnam, or Angola, and the SS-20 is installed with its mobile launcher in a matter of a few days. This is just one of many variations made possible with the new generation of mobile missiles in every range category.

Thus, all at once, sweeping decisions are made regarding 1) a vast increase in number—and, above all precision—of ICBMs to be fired against the U.S.A. in that awesome first hour of thermonuclear war; 2) the introduction of a whole series of precision theater nuclear missiles (ranges of 120 km, 500 km, and 1,000 km) of both short and medium range, for use in theater conflicts in Europe, against China or Japan, and/or to give the theater ground forces the maximal "Hour 1" precision thermonuclear strike capability. In short, to take out as many NATO military and logistical targets, surgically as possible. What's left is mopped up by the invading ground forces.

For the first time, the Soviet Ground Forces would be acquiring (which now they have) a 1,000 km radius of action for their nuclear missiles, thus vastly expanding their effectiveness.

The military leadership decides also to accelerate the build-up of the theater amphibious landing capability, especially for the Baltic.

One of the benefits of the SS-20 program would be to greatly enhance the Soviet Union's anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. With the United States having frozen or delayed its Trident program, an IRBM missile is added to the Soviet arsenal, with three warheads and a range which could guarantee, once detected, destruction of U.S. Polaris missile submarines.

1976-77 Promotion of Ogarkov

April 1975

With a Soviet "green light," North Vietnam attacks South Vietnam, and within a few months, South Vietnam is taken. Vietnamese-aided Pathet Lao do the same in Laos, and Cambodia is taken by the Pol Pot forces.

Summer 1975

The Soviet Union gives the go-ahead and finances and arranges air transport for a massive Cuban troop deployment into Angola. With Cuban troops, the MPLA takes Angola.

March 1976, Moscow

The tempo of the Ogarkov War Plan mounts, encouraged to a degree previously thought impossible, when the Soviet leadership is told in March 1976 by a Chicago Council on Foreign Relations emissary of **Averell Harriman**, who visits Moscow that month, that one **Jimmy Carter** will definitely win the Democratic Party nomination, and go on from there to be elected President of the United States.

March 1976, Moscow

The Soviet Communist Party's 25th Congress elects two new members to the Politburo. They are **Dmitrii Ustinov**, since 1941 the leader of the Soviet war industry program, and, the young and tough leader of the Leningrad Party, **Grigorii Romanov**. Romanov will later, at a June 1983 Central Committee Plenum under **Yuri Andropov**, be named Central Committee Secretary, and be placed in charge of war industry.

April 1976, Moscow

Newly elected Politburo member **Dmitrii Ustinov** is made Defense Minister of the Soviet Union, following the death of Marshal **Andrei Grechko**. The *New York Times* publishes a front page article, asserting that Ustinov, as a "civilian," is a "dove."

July 1976, Moscow

While the United States is celebrating its bi-centennial, the "civilian dove," Defense Minister **Dmitrii Ustinov** is promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union.

Jan. 6, 1977, Moscow

General of the Army **Nikolai Ogarkov** is made Soviet Chief of the General Staff.

Jan. 14, 1977, Moscow

General of the Army **Nikolai Ogarkov** is promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union.

February 1977, Moscow

Timed with **Ogarkov's** assumption of his new post, the tactical journal of the Soviet Ground Forces, *Voyennyi Vestnik (Military Herald)*, with its February issue, begins a year-long series of articles written by both young division commanders and more senior generals. The articles, which carry the thematic heading of "the High-Speed Offensive," all emphasize two points: 1) the need for the adoption for a war-fighting strategy with top priority emphasis on the mounting of a surprise attack against the U.S.A. NATO adversary; and 2) the mounting of a high-speed, deep-penetration, blitzkrieg attack.

The doctrine of the high-speed, surprise-attack offensive is further elaborated as being the doctrine for the conduct of the ground and air

forces in both global conflict, and in every imaginable level of theater conflict, ranging from continent-wide to local surgical strikes.

Many of the authors of that 1977 ground-breaking series of articles in *Voyennyi Vestnik*, who in 1977 are division commanders, by 1983 will become the front line commanders of Soviet armies in East Germany—i.e. of the key Soviet blitzkrieg spearhead troops.

March 1977, Moscow

The Soviet Politburo decides to ally with Ethiopia, and airlift Soviet military equipment and tens of thousands of Cuban troops to Ethiopia, in the Ogaden War against Somalia. This marks the inception of adding Coptic Ethiopia to the Soviet Union's clients. General of the Army **Vasilii Petrov**, First Deputy CINC of the Ground Forces, is sent around May 1977 to Ethiopia to command the Soviet intervention, and run the Ogaden War.

Summer 1977, the Baltic

The 1975 decision to massively beef up Soviet amphibious capability for theater operations, is first tested in large Baltic amphibious landing maneuvers. From this point on, large-scale Baltic amphibious maneuvers become a regular feature of annual Soviet maneuvers.

Autumn 1977, somewhere west of the Urals

The first unit of SS-20 mobile IRBMs (range 5500 km with 3 warheads) is deployed.

1978 Reorganization of the Air Defense

The first unmistakable confirmation that the Soviet Armed Forces are being reorganized into Theaters of Military Actions (TVD) for war-time, is supplied by the fact that a complete reorganization of the Troops of National Air Defense (PVO) is begun. The 10 PVO Air Defense Armies are reorganized into 5 PVO Air Defense Armies, corresponding to 5 TVDs.

Most important of all: Each of the 5 new PVO Air Defense Armies will be placed under the direct command of a commander-in-chief of the TVD. The reorganization of the air defense command is completed by 1981, and its completion directly follows the very extensive wave of command changes in the Ground Forces that occur in December 1980, which we will amply document as our chronology proceeds.

November 1978, Moscow and the Far East

For the first time in postwar history, a unit of Soviet naval infantry (marines) is stationed permanently in the Kurile Islands. These islands, seized from Japan in 1945 by the Soviet Union, are the easiest stepping stones for invasion of Japan itself.

The same month, a new Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty of Mutual Assistance is signed, granting the U.S.S.R. base rights at the former U.S. naval and air bases of Cam Ranh Bay and Danang. Cam Ranh Bay is acknowledged by all defense authorities as the best naval anchorage in all Southeast Asia.

As events early in 1979 will show, both the stationing of the marines on the Kuriles and the preparations for basing of Soviet forces in Vietnam are the first steps to a massive Soviet expansion of its presence in the Far East, and to a concomitant reorganization of the Soviet command for this important Theater of War.

Nov. 27, 1978, Moscow

One **Mikhail Gorbachov** is summoned from Stavropol to Moscow by top Kremlin ideologue and political godfather to both **Andropov** and

1979

From the Far East to Afghanistan

Gorbachov, **Mikhail Suslov**, to become the new Central Committee Secretary for Agriculture. From this point on, Gorbachov is no longer in the provinces, but at the center of developments in Moscow.

January 1979

The Vietnamese army enters Cambodia. Cambodia is freed from the Pol Pot genocide, but, a permanent Vietnamese occupation begins. Vietnam has Laos also under de facto military occupation. All of Indochina is de facto a "Greater Vietnam."

Feb. 17, 1979, Southeast Asia

China invades Vietnam to, in the words of Deng Hsiao Ping, "teach Vietnam a lesson." China's invasion fails, with heavy Chinese losses. The Soviet Union utilizes the war to move forward its global war plans.

March 1979, Moscow and Chita

Gen. Army **Vasilii Petrov**, First Deputy CINC of the Soviet Ground Forces, is dispatched from Moscow to Chita, in Siberia, to set up the High Command Far East (HCFE). The HCFE, which had existed briefly at the end of World War II, was reactivated during the Korean War, and then became dormant after the Korean War ended in July 1953.

The setting up of the HCFE and the parallel restructuring of the Air Defense Armies into the Theater Strike Commands, mark the first phase of what will unfold, by 1984, into a completed Wartime High Command structure.

Equally ominous is the fact that the HCFE, headquartered deep in Siberia, is designed as an *alternative command and survival center* for the U.S.S.R. in the event of nuclear war.

March 1979, Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam

With the reactivation of the High Command Far East, the first Soviet naval units arrive at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam. This marks the start of permanent Soviet use of their newly acquired overseas Pacific naval base.

September 1979, Moscow

Volume 7 of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* is released from the printers. The new volume contains an article, "Military Strategy," signed by Marshal **Ogarkov**. This is the most extensive and authoritative statement on Soviet military strategy to be published openly since Marshal **Sokolovskii's** book with the same name, which had appeared in three editions in the 1960s. Ogarkov follows the basic principles laid down by Sokolovskii, but adds significant new theses regarding the use of theater forces in combination with and independently of strategic forces. Members of Ogarkov's "think-tank" (see list of names under "1975") write other key articles: e.g., Gen. Col. **Karpov** writes on "Questions of Strategic Command and Control," and Gen. Army **Kozlov** on "Questions of Strategy."

Ogarkov will write later articles and booklets addressing issues of strategy, but the published versions will give only broad outlines of his thinking, never the detailed plans. The details will for the most part only be seen *after* they have been put in place.

Nov. 27, 1979, Moscow

Mikhail Gorbachov is promoted to candidate member of the Politburo.

November 1979, Tashkent

General Colonel **Yuri P. Maksimov** is promoted, on the eve of the Afghanistan invasion, to commander of the Turkestan Military District. In late 1984, when the creation of Ogarkov's Wartime High Commands

is announced, Maksimov will be revealed as the Commander-in-Chief of the High Command of the Southern TVD.

Dec. 29, 1979, Afghanistan

The Red Army invades neighboring Afghanistan. This is the first time since World War II that the Soviets have invaded a non-member of the Warsaw Pact. The invasion army will remain in Afghanistan as a permanent occupying force, increasing its strength as time goes by, and building a network of fighter-bomber and missile bases targeting the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.

During the entire occupation, the Red Army uses Afghanistan as a combat training ground, testing new hardware and tactics and, perhaps most important of all, creating a new generation of battle-tested commanders. Once again, just as occurred in 1939-40 when the U.S.S.R. invaded neighboring Finland, the Soviet Union fights a "little war" to prepare itself for a probable future major war.

October 1980, Moscow

Mikhail Gorbachov becomes a full member of the Politburo.

December 1980, from Berlin to Vladivostok

A dramatic rapid-fire series of command changes in the Soviet Ground Forces begins, lasting through January of the next year. One more big step is taken in the implementation of new Theater Commands.

In early December, Gen. Army **Vasilii Petrov**, having completed the initial phase of setting up the High Command Far East, is called back to Moscow to succeed Gen. Army **Ivan Pavlovskii** as CINC of the Ground Forces. Gen. Army **Vladimir Govorov** succeeds Petrov in the Far East.

At the same time, the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG)—the Russian spearhead troops for the invasion of West Germany—is thoroughly shaken up. The CINC of the GSFG, Army Gen. **Ye. F. Ivanovskii**, trades commands with the commander of the Byelorussian Military District, Gen. Col. **Mikhail M. Zaitsev**. The Chief of the Political Directorate of the GSFG, Gen. Col. **I.S. Mednikov**, is switched with the political commander of the Baltic Military District, Gen. Col. **I.A. Gubin**.

Zaitsev brings with him a group of younger commanders who had in 1977 elaborated and tested the "High Speed Offensive." Most of these commanders will be rotated into Afghanistan to give them combat experience and then be brought back to the GSFG. The advent of the Zaitsev team in East Germany signals a massive upgrading and strengthening of the Soviet Forces in East Germany. (See section 3.4 on Germany).

In January 1981, the commander of the Central Group of Forces (in Czechoslovakia), Gen. Col. **D.T. Yazov**, is made the commander of the Central Asian Military District, replacing Gen. Col. **P.G. Lushev**, who takes over the flagship Moscow Military District command from Govorov. Lushev's political directorate chief in the Central Asian MD, Gen. Col. **M.D. Popkov**, is made the Chief of the Political Directorate of the entire Ground Forces.

February 1981

The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1981 represents a virtual revolution in the formal status of the Soviet military in politics. A series of generals are promoted to either full, or, candidate membership on the Party's Central Committee. At the same time, another striking form of political upgrading occurs in

1980 Strengthening of the Ground Forces

1981 The military men become politicians

1981: an across-the-board promotion of the generals who in late 1984 will become the commanders of the Wartime High Commands onto the corresponding regional Politburos. This pattern had begun with the promotion of Kiev Military District commander, Gen. Col. **Ivan Gerasimov**, to the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

The 26th Party Congress appoints the following army generals as full members of the Soviet Central Committee, with an Ogarkov War Plan "twist." (Note, that six years after the 1975 turning point, and well into the phase of active war preparations, there is a very heavy emphasis on appointing *field commanders* to the Central Committee.)

- 1) General of the Army **Grigorii Salmanov**
At the time Commander of the Transbaykal Military District. At present, assumed to be holding an important wartime command function, with his actual whereabouts unknown. A veteran field commander.
- 2) General of the Army **Mikhail Zaitsev**
Then, as now, Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. A field commander of spearhead invasion troops.
- 3) General of the Army **Pyotr Lushev**
Till December 1980, commander of the Central Asian Military District. Since then, till the present, commander of the flagship Moscow Military District.
- 4) General of the Army **Vladimir Govorov**
He was, since the big December 1980 restructuring, Marshal **Vasilii Petrov's** successor as Commander-in-Chief of the High Command Far East. The Commander of a wartime high command. From 1972-1980, Govorov was commander of the Moscow Military District. He is now a Deputy Minister of Defense in Moscow.
- 5) General of the Army **Anatolii Gribkov**
First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Forces, and ex-officio First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet General Staff. Gribkov is a member of Marshal **Ogarkov's** unofficial "think-tank."
- 6) Marshal of Aviation **Aleksandr Koldunov**
Commander-in-Chief of the PVO Air Defense Forces, from 1975, and spanning the 1978-81 reorganization of the PVO Air Defense Forces.

The 26th Party Congress appoints the following Army generals and Navy admirals as candidate members of the Central Committee.

- 1) General of the Army (since March 1983, Marshal) **Sergei Akhromeyev**
Ogarkov's First Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff. The **Andropov** June 1983 CC Plenum will promote him to full membership in the Central Committee.
- 2) Colonel General **Mikhail Popkov**
The Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces.
- 3) General of the Army **Mikhail Sorokin**
Commander of the Leningrad Military District from 1976 till November 1981. His new post has never been announced. Assumed to be holding, in 1985, an important wartime command post, possibly that of Commander-in-Chief of a Northwest Strike Command, under **Ogarkov**, or, in a high staff function with Ogarkov.

- 4) Admiral of the Fleet **Vladimir Chernavin**
Since July 1977, the commander of the U.S.S.R.'s main nuclear submarine strike force, the Northern Fleet; at the end of 1981, Chernavin promoted to the post of First Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Navy; the No. 2 man in the Soviet Navy.
- 5) Admiral **Vladimir Sidorov**
Named Commander of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in 1981.
- 6) General of the Army **Yuri Maksimov**
Then Commander of the Turkestan Military District, and since late 1984, the Commander-in-Chief of the Wartime High Command, Southern TVD.
- 7) General of the Army **Dmitrii Yazov**
Till December 1980, Commander of the Soviet "Central Group of Forces" in Czechoslovakia, then Commander of the Central Asian Military District. In mid-1984 he will become the Commander of the crucial Far East Military District.
- 8) Colonel General **Mikhail Druzhinin**
Chief of the Political Directorate of the High Command Far East, from its inception in March 1979; first under **Petrov**, then after December 1980, under **Govorov**, and after mid-1984, under General of the Army **Ivan Tret'yak**.

The regional Politburos take on a wartime look

In 1981, following the precedent already set by General of the Army **Ivan Gerasimov** in 1980, when he was made a member of the Ukrainian Politburo, leading generals are placed on the Politburos of regional Communist Parties. In Gerasimov's case and that of Gen. Army **Yuri Maksimov**—named to the Politburo of Uzbekistan—the appointments place these generals in the top *political* leadership of the regions which geographically will in 1984 become their wartime Theater of Military Actions (TVDs).

In addition, General of the Army **Yevgenii Ivanovskii** is named to the Politburo of Byelorussia, and General of the Army **Dmitrii Yazov** is named to the Politburo of Kazakhstan.

Two milestones on the road to war

The reorganization of the Soviet air defense (PVO) command, begun under **Ogarkov** in 1978, is *completed*.

Sept. 4-12, 1981, Byelorussia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Baltic Sea

In the largest combined amphibious and airborne maneuvers ever held in the Baltic, the Soviet Union tests a major component of a European surprise attack. The mammoth exercise is called *Zapad-81*—Russian for *West-81*.

The *Zapad-81* maneuvers are significant not only for their size and the speed with which they were executed, but also because they mark the first time that both ground and airborne forces from two or more adjoining military districts (in this case, troops drawn from the Byelorussian and Baltic Military Districts) in the Soviet Union are simultaneously involved, along with the Baltic Fleet and its naval infantry (marine) units. Leading the simulated airborne assaults is the elite 103rd Guards Air Assault Division, with an entire regiment which had participated in the invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

To this day, the Soviet High Command has been extremely pleased with the "pay-off" provided by the *Zapad-81* maneuvers in respect to the 1975 decision to embark on a large program of reinforcing amphibious and airborne landing capability.

As recently as June 23, 1985, one can read in a front-page editorial in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the following passage:

"The ability to master complex, modern technology was demonstrated by the exercises *Zapad-81* and *Druzhiba-84*. Both these maneuvers proved that, on the ground, in the air, and on the seas, he will win, who has mastery of his weapons."

The continuing importance of *Zapad-81* for the airborne forces was underlined on June 10, 1985, when the commander of all Soviet Airborne Forces, Gen. of the Army **Sukhorukov** gave a high order to the 103rd Airborne Division. He praised the unit for one outstanding performance above all others: *Zapad-81*.

And regarding the build-up of amphibious landing capability, there is no doubt that *Zapad-81* is a milestone: That exercise was the debut of the Soviet Union's first landing ship dock, the *Ivan Rogov*. This huge vessel can carry a battalion of Soviet marines, with all their equipment and vehicles. With two helicopter decks and space for three *Lebed* class air-cushion vehicles (a maximum speed of 100 km/hr), a powerful assault force can be shuttled onto shore at a speed never before seen in warfare.

1982 Ogarkov presents his plans in writing

As 1982 begins, two of the key components of Marshal **Ogarkov's** reorganization plan have been completed: 1) All national air defense forces (PVO) have been restructured to fit future Theater Commands, and 2) for the first time ever, Soviet forces on the land, in the air and at sea have been tested in a single, giant maneuver—*Zapad-81*. Now, with the results of both new elements fully evaluated, Ogarkov decides to put in print his own concrete plans for the overall reorganization plan. In 1982 he publishes a book—called that by the Soviets, although it is in fact only a 71-page pamphlet—entitled *Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland*.

As modest as it seems in size, it is a sensational price of writing. It is the most extended piece ever published by Ogarkov and it will remain so until June 1985. Above all, never before has he stated so clearly that what the General Staff under his direction is actually working on is an entirely new level of *command and control*—that of the *High Command of the Theater of Military Actions* (TVDs). The 1982 booklet also signals a phase in which Ogarkov writes more and more frequently in the military and other press of the Soviet Union, repeating many of the same ideas each time, but also showing a marked sense of greater urgency, that the changes he is implementing *must be ready in time*.

As a collection, this series of articles is extensive. We present below only some of the most important selections from various different sources, breaking our normal chronology temporarily in order to follow Ogarkov's thinking from 1982 to 1984.

First, one of the essential passages from the 1982 *Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland* (here and below, the emphasis is added):

The experience of past wars testifies convincingly to the fact that the emergence of new offensive systems inevitably and always leads to the creation of corresponding means of counteraction, and ultimately to the development of new means of waging battles, larger engagements, operations and war as a whole. For instance, the rapid development of tanks, airplanes and submarines was accompanied

by an equally rapid development of anti-tank, anti-aircraft and anti-submarine systems and appropriate modes of defense against these types of weapons and military hardware, and eventually, new forms and modes of military actions.

This is *fully applicable to nuclear missile weapons* as well, the creation and rapid growth of which compelled military-scientific thought and practice to actively elaborate ways and means of countering them. The emergence of means of defense against weapons of mass destruction in turn dictated the necessity of improving offensive nuclear missiles. All this confirms the conclusion that the continuous struggle between offensive and defensive weapons, i.e., arms and military hardware, is one of the foremost sources of development of warfare as a whole.

At present, dialectical contradiction is particularly visible in such a complex process as *command and control*. At one time it used to take years to prepare a military campaign; in World War II, front operations were in preparation for months. In present conditions, when the probable adversary disposes over weapons systems that would allow him to deliver surprise strikes and carry out high-speed maneuvers and regrouping of troops, no more than several weeks or even a few days can be allotted for such preparations. For this reason, under conditions of the increasingly dynamic nature of military actions and the differences in each particular military situation, commanders and staffs must display greater flexibility and effectiveness of leadership than ever before.

In another section of the booklet, Ogarkov clarifies this notion of a change in *command and control*. He explains that as warfare has evolved, the scale of military actions that are centralized under a single command has grown: from single battles and engagements by individual armies, to more sustained activity by groups of armies—the World War II “front operation”—and then to the late-war phase of multiple and simultaneous front operations. In the postwar period, argues Ogarkov, even these gigantic operations have become outmoded. He explains:

Today, the command of a front may possess weaponry (rockets, missile-carrying aircraft, long-range aviation, etc.) whose combat capabilities go significantly beyond the framework of front operations. The mobility and maneuverability of troops has increased immensely, the times required for concentration of shock groupings have been reduced, and the conditions and means of solving operational and strategic tasks by formations of the branches of the armed forces have changed. And with the creation of strategic nuclear forces, the higher military leadership has acquired the possibility of substantially influencing the attainment of the strategic military-political goals of the war. As a result, the previous forms of utilizing the formations of the branches of the armed forces have already to a large extent ceased to correspond to modern conditions.

Thus, the role of the basic operation of modern war can evidently no longer be ascribed to the front operation, but only to a form of military actions on a greater scale—that of *the strategic operations in a theater of military actions*. In the course of such an operation, each front (fleet) can conduct two or more front operations in succession, with only brief pauses or none at all.

This description of the new “strategic operation in a theater of military actions”—a TVD, to use the Russian abbreviation—fits the course of

the *Zapad-81* maneuver to a "T." In Soviet planning, each peacetime military district and each fleet will be converted into a "front" in war. A group of such fronts constitutes a TVD. The two military districts (two wartime "fronts") and one fleet (a third wartime "front") participating in *Zapad-81* were in fact practicing a "strategic operation in a TVD"!

Ogarkov continues, and seems to indicate that more training will be necessary before the new capability is perfected:

All this convincingly reaffirms the importance of conducting all scientific investigations of the processes and phenomena of warfare on a solid Marxist-Leninist methodological ground. Only under such conditions will they yield effective results. The party teaches us to boldly free ourselves from the shackles of inertia or provincial interests, to quickly notice the sprouts of the new and the progressive, and yet at the same time *not to lose touch with reality*, but to draw conclusions thoughtfully, *without undue haste*, on the basis of having comprehensively tested them *in practice*, for practice is the criterion of truth.

Thus, as late as 1982, Ogarkov apparently feels he has plenty of time to carefully build up capability for the Ogarkov Plan. He can even warn more eager colleagues against "undue haste." In 1983, however, it will be Ogarkov himself who urges utmost speed in implementing the plan. The difference between 1982 and 1983 is, of course, March 23, 1983: U.S. President Reagan's announcement of the SDI.

In his first published statement after President Reagan's March 23 announcement—an article in the May 9 issue of *Izvestia*, Ogarkov shocks the West by unveiling now the full extent of his plan. In an emergency comment on Ogarkov's article, **Lyndon LaRouche** writes in the *EIR* that "it has been a long time since any major power announced in the press that it has a definite war-plan against another power, especially a war-plan implied to be ready to go into operation as early as this year. That is exactly what the author of the article, Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, did."

Here is what LaRouche was referring to:

Forty years have passed since the Great Patriotic War. In that time, radical quantitative and qualitative changes have occurred in military affairs. Military art does not stand still. And a new war, if it is unleashed by the imperialists, will differ sharply from the last one.

Since the 1950s the decisive means of armed struggle has been nuclear arms. The arsenal of various kinds of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles accumulated in the world now totals many tens of thousands. Such quantitative changes have led to qualitative changes—that which was possible to achieve by nuclear arms 20-30 years ago has now become impossible for the aggressor. A devastating nuclear counter-strike awaits him!

At the same time, there is an accelerated improvement of existing strategic and operative-tactical weapons systems and the creation of new such systems based on the latest achievements of electronics and other engineering sciences. Significantly improved automated systems of command and control of troops and equipment, and new highly-effective conventional weapons systems are being developed and introduced. The scope of such systems is also being significantly expanded. In the U.S., for example, space-based military attack

systems and weapons complexes based on new physical principles are being created. All this will naturally influence the character of a possible war, and the forms and methods of preparation for and conduct of modern operations and battle.

For this reason, it is important not merely to recall the lessons of the past war and the conclusions of military art of those years, but most important—on the basis of experience acquired, to see and understand the perspective of development of military affairs in the future, and dialectically, creatively think through the changes occurring in the means and methods of armed struggle and to take timely and appropriate measures to further raise the combat-readiness of our land and naval forces. [Emphasis in the original.] Narrow-mindedness and a stubborn, mechanical and unreflective clinging to old ways is dangerous under modern conditions.

Taking into account the changes occurring in military affairs and the aggressive preparations of the United States and its allies, there must be an especially well-considered and harmonious development of the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces, the fighting arms and special forces, as well as modernization and improvement of the organizational structure of the forces and command and control organs.

In a new war, should the imperialists manage to unleash one, it will be impossible to contain military actions within any limited scope, as the strategists from Washington maintain. It will inevitably encompass all of the territories of the combatant states. It will be difficult to distinguish the combat front from the home front. The methods of solving tasks may also be different, especially in the beginning of the war. It is this that dictates the specific role and significance of the initial period of the war under modern conditions.

The experience of the initial operations of the Great Patriotic War has already introduced serious corrections in previously prevailing views. In 1941 large-scale operations developed all at once on a vast front, with deep penetration, and they were conducted with extremely decisive goals.

Now the situation in this respect has become even more complicated. Most imperialist states constantly have various long-range weapons of enormous destructive force in a combat-ready state. Already in peacetime, they maintain highly mobile armed forces units capable of immediately beginning military action without advance deployment. This determines the unprecedentedly tense and demanding character of operations in the initial period of the war and demands from the defensive side, in the very first hours, clear-cut and active operations to repulse the attack. Under present-day conditions, such operations may be of decisive significance, as is demonstrated by the experience of local wars. This requires a profound analysis and comprehensive study of the aggressive preparations of imperialism and its true military doctrines and conceptions. This will permit the timely detection of the possibility of unexpected actions and the new means and methods of armed struggle which might be used by the aggressor.

The experience of the last war showed the extreme importance of command and control of the land and naval forces for the successful conduct of military actions. Now, the demands on military command and control of the Armed Forces in operations on land, at sea and in the air, the demands of their consistency, reliability and operative nature have acquired a qualitatively new character.

Decisions will be made in short periods of time, missions will be carried out in a matter of minutes, and the art of fulfilling them will be highly demanding. This brings about the necessity of having, in peacetime, organs of command and control which could immediately go into action at the outbreak of war without a lengthy period of reorganization.

To this end our Armed Forces are constantly raising the combat-readiness of our troops and staffs as well as the field, air, and naval training of the personnel. The organizational structure of the land and naval forces and the command and control bodies are being improved.

Later that same year, Ogarkov becomes more explicit on the command and control question. In *Izvestia* of Sept. 23, 1983, he writes:

Taking into account the aggressive direction of the military preparations of imperialism, the development and training of the Soviet Armed Forces at the present time are being carried out on a qualitatively new level. In accordance with this, the system of operative, combat, and political training of the army and navy is being made more precise. Modern, complex military hardware and weaponry are being successfully mastered, and there is a constant search for more effective methods of their use. The organizational structure of the Armed Forces is being constantly upgraded. *On all levels, we are introducing a new system of command and control and elaborating a more effective organization of all types of support functions.*

At the same time, the troops of the Soviet Armed Forces understand quite well that we cannot rest on past accomplishments, that the advent of new means of armed struggle demands the constant upgrading of existing and development of new forms of combat actions, and that *we require bold experiments and solutions*, not hesitating to break with outdated traditions, views and theses.

The next spring—again, on the occasion of the anniversary of the end of World War II, although this time in the military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda*—Ogarkov talks explicitly about the changes in warfare that will occur as a result of beam weapons technologies. And he is even more urgent in his call to *test out the Red Army's new structure and systems*. From *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 9, 1984:

. . .the stormy development of science and technology in the postwar years has created the real precondition for the appearance, in the immediate future, of . . . previously unknown types of *weapons based on new physical principles*. . . . They will be reality in the very near future, and *to ignore this fact would already now be a serious mistake*. But this in turn will necessarily alter existing notions regarding the means and methods of armed struggle and, indeed, regarding the military might of the state.

. . .It goes without saying that all of this must constantly and profoundly be analyzed, generalized, and taken into account in the practice of construction of our armed forces.

Taking this into account, the technical equipping and the organizational structure of our armed forces, and their command and control are being implemented in such a way as to ensure that they are *always prepared under any circumstances* to deliver an immediate counterstrike to any aggressor. *Such a capability must be guaranteed under all circumstances*. . . .

The tasks of military force development and training of our armed

forces are being resolved on the basis of a comprehensive and profound analysis of the current military-political situation and development of the means of armed struggle. For that reason, our military personnel must not merely copy, but creatively use the experience of the past and enrich it. They must constantly perfect the training and organizational structure of the forces and for this purpose boldly conduct a scientific inquiry, taking into account the constantly occurring changes in warfare *and must, if necessary, take justified risks. It is better to test out new forms in peacetime than to look for them in the course of a war. Indeed, today, there will be no time for that.*

1983 Ogarkov's generals become marshals

March 23, 1983, Washington, D.C.

U.S. President **Ronald Reagan** announces that the United States will begin a program for beam-weapons ballistic missile defense.

March 25, 1983, Moscow

Soviet party boss **Yuri Andropov** promotes four of his four-star generals to the rank of marshal. At the time, all of the new appointments are regarded as surprising. However, subsequent events will show that this group of four, together with Ogarkov, constitutes the core group in the Soviet High Command which is designated to complete the final phases of preparation of the Soviet military command for a global showdown, and will be the men who form the actual war command.

We present below a brief sketch of the past careers and present functions of these five men.

The Soviet High Command for World War III

Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Vasilevich Ogarkov

Born on Oct. 30, 1917 in the Kalinin Oblast (region) of Russia. Presently the Commander-in-Chief of the Western Strategic Direction for the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.

Ogarkov joined the Red Army in 1938, graduating from the Moscow Kuibyshev Military Technical Engineer Academy in 1941. He was sent immediately to the engineer troops on the Karelian Front. This marked the beginning of 42 years of close collaboration with **Yuri Andropov**. During these years when the young Ogarkov was fighting in Karelia, Andropov was the head of the Karelian Komsomol (Young Communist) organization.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Ogarkov served for several years on the staff of the High Command Far East, which was re-established during the Korean War. There, Ogarkov received first-hand experience in the functioning of a *theater command*, experience which he would draw on 30 years later, when he was to set up similar theater commands for the new age of nuclear war. From 1953 to 1959 Ogarkov remained in the Far East, on the staff of the command of the military district.

After graduating with a Gold Star from the General Staff Academy in 1959, Ogarkov served in senior command positions in the Western military districts of the U.S.S.R. and in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

In April 1968 Ogarkov's career took a dramatic turn when he was brought onto the General Staff to head up its most important subdivision, the Main Directorate for Operations. According to Soviet sources, the function of Ogarkov's directorate was "determination of the goals of Soviet military actions, distribution of troops and hardware, methods of combat actions, coordination of forces, and assignment of missions to troops."

Already a candidate member of the Central Committee since 1966 and promoted to full member in 1971, it was clear at an early stage that Ogarkov was a likely candidate to succeed Marshal Sokolovskii as the formulator of Soviet war doctrine and planning for the 1970s and 1980s. That role was confirmed on January 6, 1977, when he was named Chief of the General Staff and promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union a week later. It is also intriguing to note that Ogarkov received the Order of Hero of the Soviet Union in 1977. That order is always reserved as a symbol of recognition of actual accomplishments, not as a mere token of status; its being awarded to Ogarkov that year would indicate that the work he had performed at the General Staff prior to becoming its chief was of utmost importance. As our chronology indicates, it was in the crucial years around 1975 that the present war strategy of the Soviet Union was elaborated.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei Fyodorovich Akhromeyev

Born on May 5, 1923. Present function: Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R.

Akhromeyev was only the First Deputy Chief of General Staff when he was promoted to Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1983. Since the presence of such a high-ranking officer in that post was unprecedented in the history of the Red Army, it is clear that Akhromeyev was already then being designated as the future Chief of General Staff. Two months after his promotion to Marshal, he was made a full member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

Akhromeyev was a battalion commander in the army in World War II, even though his officer's training had actually been at a naval academy. After the war, he graduated from the Moscow Malinovskii Tank Academy. He rose in the ranks of the tank troops to become a division commander in 1965. In 1967 he graduated from the General Staff Academy (awarded a Gold Star), and after several senior commands in military districts (including the Far East Military District), he was brought onto the General Staff in 1974. Since that time, Akhromeyev has been Marshal Ogarkov's most trusted lieutenant.

Akhromeyev received the order of "Hero of the Soviet Union" in 1982.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Vasilii Ivanovich Petrov

Born on Jan. 15, 1917 in the Chernoleskoye/Prikumsk district of the Stavropol region. Present function: First Deputy Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R.

Petrov was promoted to his present post at the beginning of this year, after having served as the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces of the U.S.S.R. since December 1980. He was a battalion commander and deputy chief of staff of a division during the war. In 1948 he graduated from Frunze Military Academy.

Petrov has had extensive experience in the Far East: From 1954-61 he was chief of staff and then commander of the elite Pacific Guards Motorized Rifle Division in the Far East Military District. He then became head of the 5th Combined Arms Army in Ussuriisk. From 1966-76 he was chief of staff and then commander of the entire Far East Military District. With that background, he was a logical choice in early 1979, when he was sent by Marshal Ogarkov to re-establish the High Command Far East. He remained there for a little more than a year-and-a-half before being named CINC of the Ground Forces in December 1980.

In the middle of these stints in the Far East, however, Petrov was entrusted with another highly significant mission. In the spring of 1977,

he was dispatched to Ethiopia to command the Cuban and Ethiopian ground forces and their supporting Russian and East German fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons in the effective crushing of the Somalian invasion of the Ogaden desert region of Ethiopia. In leading this classic "out of area operation," Petrov worked closely with **Yuri Andropov**, then head of the KGB.

Although Petrov is no longer commander of the ground forces, it is likely that he would in fact be the man who would coordinate and control the actions of all ground, air and air defense forces in the implementation of the Ogarkov Plan for global war against the West.

Since becoming a First Deputy Defense Minister, Petrov has appeared more often in public, including before Western TV cameras. So far, his performances have tended to corroborate the description of the vain and arrogant Petrov once given by the Ukrainian dissident Gen. **Pyotr Griorenko**, who at one time worked under Petrov: "Vasilii Ivanovich is a quick-thinking and very self-assured man. He has a very high opinion of his own talents, and as a result he often makes rash decisions. *And God save anyone who tries to oppose his decisions.*"

Marshal of the Soviet Union Semyon Konstantinovich Kurkotkin

Born on Feb. 13, 1917 in the Moscow region. As the Chief of Rear Operations of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces since 1972, Kurkotkin is the man responsible for the immediate prewar and wartime command of the Soviet war economy.

Kurkotkin's 1983 promotion to marshal was especially surprising, since the rank of marshal is extraordinarily high for the formal status of the Rear Services commander. The promotion therefore indicates the increasing importance attached to this function, especially by **Ogarkov** personally.

Kurkotkin has served in the Red Army since 1937. During the war he had both leading political posts and combat command posts up to the brigade level. He graduated in 1951 from the Moscow Malinovsky Tank Academy and in 1958 from the General Staff Academy. During the 1950s and 1960s he served in various senior field commands, including that of First Deputy CINC of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Right before being appointed Chief of Rear Services, Kurkotkin was the commander of the Transcaucasus Military District. In that capacity, he was also a member of the Central Committee, and for a brief period, the Politburo, of the Georgian CP. One of his associates on the military council of the Transcaucasus MD was **Geidar Aliyev**.

Chief Marshal of Artillery Vladimir Fyodorovich Tolubko

Born on Nov. 25, 1914 in Krasnograd in the Ukraine. His present function is Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet strategic nuclear missile arsenal, known as the Strategic Rocket Forces.

Tolubko graduated from tank academies before World War II and then saw combat at the Leningrad, Kalinin and 3rd Ukrainian Fronts, including during the occupation of Belgrade and Budapest. He rose to the post of deputy chief of staff of a corps and regimental commander by the end of the war.

Tolubko graduated from the General Staff Academy in 1950 and was promoted to General Major shortly afterwards. During the 1950s he held various senior field commands, including in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG). From 1960-68 he was the First Deputy CINC of the Strategic Rocket Forces. From April 1968 to May 1969 he was commander of the Siberian Military District, and from May 1969 to April 1972 the commander of the Far East Military District.

Since 1972 he has been the CINC of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Tolubko was awarded the order of "Hero of Socialist Labor" in 1976.

June 1983, the Soviet Navy

Directly following the **Andropov**-convened June 1983 Central Committee Plenum, the Soviet Union begins a mass program to convert at least 25 of its attack submarines into cruise missile submarines, each outfitted with at least 20 3,000 km-range nuclear cruise missiles. The conversion program embraces minimally all 18 Victor III class submarines, one old Yankee class ballistic missile submarine, all six modern Sierra class submarines, and the one very modern Mike class submarine in active service at that time.

Thus, in the course of the next two to three years, the Soviet submarine fleet will jump from a long-range cruise missile strength of zero, to around 500! These long-range cruise missiles will be added to Soviet long-range offensive nuclear capability, with a substantial portion of the cruise missile submarines deployed off the U.S. coast.

September 1983, Sakhalin and Moscow

A combat pilot from the Soviet air defense forces of the High Command Far East shoots down the KAL-007 airliner, killing 269 civilian passengers. In Moscow in the ensuing days, a press conference is held in which, for the first time since World War II, the military speaks for the Soviet State. The press conference, televised worldwide, is conducted by Marshal **Ogarkov**.

1984

The first year of maneuvers to perfect a global blitzkrieg

The 1984 chronology shows a dramatic—and, quite frightening—qualitative leap in the intensity of Soviet war preparations. It is the year of transition in the Soviet armed forces from "standard" peacetime command and control order of battle, to newly created and staffed Wartime High Commands.

Operationally, maneuvers suddenly erupt on land and on the seas, of a type and scope never before seen. All are conducted with a realism not seen before, and clearly bear the stamp of one prime purpose—perfecting the myriad components of the surprise attack invariant, the crucial feature to all the option levels of the **Ogarkov War Plan**.

For the first time, the execution of first strike components of the **Ogarkov Plan**, such as the launch of missiles from submarines off the U.S. coast, to destroy the White House, the Pentagon and remaining U.S. command and control centers—in plain English to kill our civilian and military leadership, starting with the President—are tested. We are not talking, as in 1962, about a nuclear strike from Cuba, with Florida having a five-minute warning, but our capital of Washington D.C. having a five-minute warning. In 1984, the "strategic decapitation" of Washington is rehearsed with wartime realism. The same realism characterizes huge Soviet summer maneuvers along the borders of West Germany and Austria.

In 1984, the 1975 decision to build mobile, precision missiles across the board, bears operational fruit. The Red Army is equipped with the SS-21, SS-23 and SS-22 mobile, precision short- and medium-range Euromissiles. The final testing and beginning of crash program level serial production of the mobile land-based ICBMs, the SS-24 and SS-25, occurs. The program of refitting some 25 attack submarines with 3,000 km-range cruise missiles, to add a massive new nuclear barrage component to the sub fleet stationed off the U.S. coast, is in full swing.

The Soviet maneuvers of 1984 are of a type and on a scale never witnessed before. On land, in the European, or Western, Theater, and,

globally, at sea, the army and fleet begin rehearsing and perfecting their assigned roles in the Ogarkov War Plan. The focus is on perfecting the art of surprise attack, for the maximum knock-out of U.S. and NATO forces in the first hour of war, under the plan's "Maximum Option."

During 1984, **Ogarkov's** Western Theater forces (the Soviet forces stationed in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the Western U.S.S.R.) of the spearhead first echelon, and the "next wave," second echelon, are brought up to wartime supply requirement levels in armor, artillery, vehicles and equipment, and munitions and fuel. By year's end, the theater missile modernization program (SS-21, SS-23, SS-22) is concluded.

Similarly, the forces in the Western Theater—Europe—engage in maneuvers to perfect limited theater military options, such as the seizure of West Germany, or one region (Schleswig-Holstein or West Berlin) of Germany, in a surgical strike. On the Southern Flank, the classical limited option would be the seizure of the Turkish Straits; on the Northern Flank, the seizure of northern Norway (Finnmark) and/or Spitzbergen.

The ground forces' maneuvers culminate from June 28-July 5 in the largest military maneuvers by far (in size and geographical range) staged by Soviet Ground and Air Forces since the end of the war.

On July 4, in a manner never seen before, troops from 11 Soviet divisions in East Germany, all stationed in proximity to the West German border, simultaneously leave their barracks, and move off in full combat regalia toward the West German border—exactly as they would have when war begins—and conduct exercises very close to the West German border. The maneuvers are staged exclusively by Soviet units, a point of political, as well as military significance. The Soviets accompany the maneuvers with a wave of propaganda, accusing Bonn of "revanchism" and violation of the July 1945 Potsdam Agreements; the Russians maintain that the Potsdam Agreements give them "victor rights" to militarily intervene into West Germany, to crush "Neo-Nazism" or any "threat" emanating from West Germany.

In the spring of 1984, in the North Atlantic, the Soviet Northern and Baltic Fleets, and naval aviation bombers, position themselves in their wartime "blocking screen" to protect the nuclear missile submarine component of the Ogarkov Plan first strike, against U.S. attack submarines and carrier task forces. For the first time, the Soviet submarines stationed off the U.S. coast with their "pin down" and strategic decapitation barrage assignments, participate in a realistic wartime exercise.

To sum up, in 1984, with the new model of surprise attack maneuvers, with the operational stationing of the precision Euromissiles, with the stationing of ballistic missile submarines off the U.S. coast, and with the final go-ahead to produce and deploy the new generation of mobile ICBMs; the Soviet Union moved past the point of no return into a wartime mode.

We now show with the Soviet forces on the ground, at sea, and on the missile testing ranges in Northern Russia and Kazakhstan, the 1984 countdown chronology of that shift—past the point of no return—into a wartime mode.

The hardware and the command for blitzkrieg

Early 1984, the Soviet Forces in East Germany

A five-year period of massive re-equipping and war stockpiling of ammunition and fuel, etc. is capped with the stationing of the new mobile

short- and medium-range missiles, the SS-21, SS-23, SS-22, with all the Armies of the GSFG.

The Armies of the Soviet Forces in East Germany, the "GSFG," after several years of massive reinforcement in tank, armored vehicle, artillery and missile strength, are placed under the command of the generals who were the leaders of the 1977 *Voyennyi Vestnik* "debate," which decided in favor of a doctrine of surprise attack and high-speed offensive.

These include Generals **Pyankov**, **Lobachev**, and **Shein**, all central authors in the 1977 *Voyennyi Vestnik* series. By early 1984, all are serving as commanders of Soviet Armies in the GSFG.

The blitzkrieg commanders—a profile

Guards General Major G.A. Lobachev:

Lobachev was brought, hand-picked, to the GSFG in December 1980, by the GSFG's new Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army **Mikhail Zaitsev**. In 1967, Lobachev had been a tank unit commander in a Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Rogachev Guards Motorized Rifle Division in the Byelorussian Military District. The commander of that division was Zaitsev, who later went on to command the Byelorussian Military District, before moving over to command the GSFG in December 1980. The Rogachev Division received high awards and praise for distinguishing itself during the DNEPR exercise of 1967, observed by **Brezhnev** and then Defense Minister, Marshal **Andrei Grechko**.

In 1976, Lobachev was named commander of the elite Taman Guards Motorized Rifle Division—the "Showpiece Division"—of the Moscow Military District. In early 1977, when **Ogarkov** became Chief of the General Staff, Lobachev was chosen to launch the *Voyennyi Vestnik* series (February 1977) praising the virtues of the "high speed offensive" and surprise attack.

Lobachev, in his February 1977 article, stressed the importance of a Soviet precision nuclear strike to open the attack in the European theater, a nuclear strike which would throw "the enemy off balance," destroy "vital nuclear means of delivery. . . . [and] communications centers." Then, the "high-speed offensive" would "occupy crucial areas of strategic importance," and lead to the enemy's "political collapse."

Lobachev emphasized the need for "high rates of advance" after smashing the enemy on "narrow sectors of breakthrough," adding: "Our tank and motorized rifle units now possess greater firepower and strike capability, are extremely maneuverable, and have highly efficient means of command and control." If Lobachev could write that in 1977, one can imagine what "firepower and strike capability"—given the new Euro-missiles and all the other modern arms and equipment—now exist for the Soviet Armies.

Lobachev now (mid-1985) commands an Army of the GSFG.

Guards General Lieutenant Boris Yevgenevich Pyankov:

In the late 1960s, like Lobachev, Pyankov was also a unit commander in the Byelorussian Military District. He then went to the Frunze Military Academy and graduated with a Gold Medal. He was then posted to the Transcaucasus Military District to command a motorized rifle division. In February 1976, he commanded this division in Transcaucasus maneuvers, where he "defeated" a strong attacking force in poor weather and difficult mountainous terrain. The maneuvers were observed by then Defense Minister **Grechko**, and then First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Marshal **Nikolai Ogarkov**.

Under Ogarkov's tutelage, Pyankov was selected to attend the Soviet 25th Party Congress in Moscow as a "military delegate," and later in 1976, to attend the General Staff Academy. He left the General Staff Academy in 1979, and—shortly before the invasion of Afghanistan—was named commander of an Army or a Corps in the Central Asian Military District, where he stayed through Spring 1983.

He is now commander of the GSFG's spearhead 3rd Shock Army, headquartered at Magdeburg, an all-armored force of four tank divisions.

Guards General Lieutenant B.P. Shein:

Shein was, during the 1977 *Voyennyi Vestnik* series, a colonel and commander of a tank division of the Soviet Central Group of Forces, in Czechoslovakia. He contributed the article to the series which gave a detailed analysis of the "role of surprise" in the "high-speed offensive." He stressed "initial surprise" and made the automatic linkage to *Lo-bachev's* stress on the initial nuclear strike.

In late 1979, shortly before the invasion of Afghanistan, Shein was transferred to the Turkestan Military District, and remained in the Afghanistan theater of operations till early 1983. He now commands an Army of the GSFG.

Practicing the art of blitzkrieg

January 1984, the airspace over East Germany, Poland, and the Western Soviet Union, during the long winter nights

Large formations of Soviet bombers, fighter-bombers, interceptors, and Mi-24 attack helicopters, engage in a very heavy schedule of winter night-flying, and, low-level flying over long distances over land and water (the Baltic). A lot of invaluable—and crucial for invasion flight patterns—experience is gained. One by-product is a high number of air crashes.

February 1984, East Germany

Large, unannounced exercises involving more than 60,000 Soviet and East German troops are held in East Germany. The exercises, which conclude in field training areas near the West German border, feature simulated wartime river crossings of the Elbe. These wide river crossings become a feature of all Soviet exercises in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

March 1984, Bulgaria and the Black Sea

Russia and Bulgaria hold the *Soyuz-84* Maneuvers. The maneuvers simulate a surprise attack seizure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles by the Soviet and Bulgarian Armed Forces. This is a critical testing of one of the many "surgical strike" options in the Ogarkov Plan. It would also form one of the invasion routes in the European Theater that would accompany the Ogarkov Maximum Option.

March 27-April 5, 1984, the Atlantic Ocean, North Sea and the Baltic Sea

The largest naval maneuvers since *Okean-75* are held, involving the Northern Fleet based in Murmansk, and the Baltic Fleet. Speed of "break out" from Murmansk and the Baltic is perfected, but far more important, the simultaneous coordination of the two most modern classes of nuclear missile submarines, the Delta-III and Typhoon, in the Barents Sea; the ASW and SAM, and anti-ship function of the surface warships of both fleets, and of Soviet Backfire bombers and other naval aviation (num-

bering in the hundreds) against NATO air forces, carrier forces and nuclear attack "hunter killer" submarines; and—for the first time ever in a maneuver setting—the nuclear missile and cruise missile submarines in place off the U.S. coasts since the late autumn of 1983. These latter simulated their "pin down" barrage against U.S. land-based nuclear missile sites.

April 1984, the South China Sea

For the first time ever, Soviet carrier task force naval maneuvers are held in the South China Sea, near Vietnam and the permanent Soviet overseas naval and air base at Cam Ranh Bay. The exercises are led by the Kiev class carrier, the Minsk. Another "first" for the maneuvers is a landing by Soviet marines from a landing ship dock, of the Ivan Rogov class, the "Aleksandr Nikolayev," on the Vietnamese coast south of Haiphong.

Late June 1984, Western Hungary, very near the Austrian border

Soviet, Hungarian, and Czech units, totalling over 60,000 troops, begin the *Danube-84* maneuvers. They exercise very close to the Austria border, and remain there for some days *after* the official termination of the maneuvers—something which had never previously happened.

June 28-July 5, 1984, on a Front covering East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic Sea, the Baltic States, Byelorussia, and the Carpathian Military District

The Soviet Union holds its biggest maneuvers ever since the war: *Druzhba-84*. Only Soviet troops take part. For the first time, a surprise attack at "front" level against West Germany is thoroughly rehearsed, not only by field units, but at all staff levels, from Moscow HQ, to first and second echelon HQ, to wartime invasion staff HQ. This exercise marks the direct transition to the Wartime High Commands which will be established under Marshal **Ogarkov** in the autumn.

On the climactic day of the exercises, July 4, 11 of the 12 Soviet divisions in East Germany stationed near the West German border, simultaneously leave their barracks, and go into combat maneuvers, very close to the West German border.

The exercises are unique also in that they include simultaneously, large ground forces' deployments, large airborne troop paratroop drops (one airborne division) and amphibious landings by naval infantry in the Baltic.

Summer 1984, Plesetsk Missile Testing Grounds

The first test phase of the SS-X-26, the heavy solid-fueled ICBM successor to the huge SS-18, begins at Plesetsk. Missile base areas under consideration for the SS-X-26 include Verkhney, Salda, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Tyumen.

End of August 1984, Moscow

The Soviet Defense Ministry announces tests of a 3,000 km range land-based cruise missile. The type, called the SSC-X-4, has a speed just under the speed of sound.

September 1984, Czechoslovakia

Large Warsaw Pact exercises—*Shchit-84* (*Shield-84*)—are held in Czechoslovakia. Over 60,000 troops take part, drawn from the Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia, Czech units, and units from East Germany, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and a staff contingent from Romania. Soviet airborne troops, based in the U.S.S.R., also take part, as had been the case in the big summer maneuvers.

September 1984, the Northwest Pacific Ocean

Tests of both land-based and submarine-launched ICBM missiles begin at an accelerated rate, with the target zone in the mid-Pacific. There is a clear pattern of using the tests to perfect the precision accuracy of the ICBMs.

The tests begin on September 1 with a test firing of the mobile, railway-housed precision ICBM, the SS-24, which in wartime would contain between 20 and 30 warheads. The SS-24 hit with precision accuracy, its designated target.

Other heavy rounds of such missile tests will take place in December 1984, and again, in May 1985.

September-October 1984, the Sea of Okhotsk

The Soviet Navy conducts its first ASW exercise with a carrier task force led by a Kiev class carrier, the "Novorossiisk," in the Sea of Okhotsk. The Sea of Okhotsk, a Soviet lake between the Russian-occupied Kuriles and the Soviet Far East mainland, is the Pacific launching area for Russian nuclear ballistic missile submarines. The Novorossiisk is accompanied by one Kara class ASW cruiser and one Kresta II class ASW cruiser.

Late 1984, Tyuratam Test Silos in Kazakhstan

The first silo tests of the mobile ICBM, the SS-X-27, are conducted at the Tyuratam test silos in Kazakhstan. Actual flight tests of the SS-X-27, which is bigger than the SS-18, are scheduled for later this year.

Late November 1984, Soviet Pacific Fleet HQ, Vladivostok

The first missile range ship ever built for the Soviet Navy, the 30,000 ton Marshal Nedelin (named after the pre-1962 Marshal who headed the Strategic Rocket Forces) arrives in Vladivostok to join the Pacific Fleet. It began active deployment in the Central Pacific, during series missile tests from Dec. 6-15. From now on, it will be regularly stationed in the missile firing zones in the Central Pacific, for each new series of ICBM, SLBM, and IRBM tests.

The Marshal Nedelin, though officially classified as a support ship, is heavily armed with modern SA-N-8 (the same SAM armament as is on the Kirov, for example) SAM missiles.

Late 1984, early 1985

Russia begins stationing of the SS-25 fully mobile ICBM, the first of the new generation planned in 1975, to assume ready status. By the end of this year, (1985) the total minimal program for the stationing of 460 SS-25 ICBM launchers, each with at least 4 missiles, will be completed. A crash production program has been underway to meet this deadline.

Late 1984, early 1985

The first Tu-20 Bear H bombers and Tu-22M Backfire bombers are outfitted with the AS-15 supersonic nuclear air launched cruise missile. The AS-15 will also be outfitted on the new long-range supersonic Blackjack bomber.

Late 1984, early 1985

During 1984, Cam Ranh Bay is built up into a major Soviet overseas naval and air base. By the end of 1984, about 30 Bear and Badger bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, including 20 bombers, are stationed there permanently, along with 14 MiG-23s. At any one time, between 20 and 30 Soviet warships and navy supply ships are using the base, including 6-8 surface warships, including 2 frigates on the average, and 5-6 submarines. One battalion of Soviet marines is there to guard the facilities, along with SAM units.

Soviet 'maskirovka': Ogarkov is 'demoted'

Sept. 6, 1984, Moscow

Moscow announces that Marshal **Nikolai Ogarkov** has been "relieved of his duties as Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. in connection with his transfer to a new post." The new Chief of the General Staff is Marshal **Sergei Akhromeyev**.

Ogarkov's disappearance triggers a wave of speculation in Western media to the effect that Ogarkov has been "demoted" on account of his "hawkish views."

The authors of the present report write, in contrast, that it is unthinkable that Ogarkov has been removed by the political leadership in Moscow. In the *EIR* issue dated Sept. 25, 1984, we outline Ogarkov's program for 1) a centralized war economy, 2) development of new weapons systems "based on new physical principles"—i.e. beam weapons, and 3) the reorganization of the Soviet command. On that basis, we conclude: "In short, the most important economic and military changes in the Soviet Union have been done under the guidance of Ogarkov. It is unlikely that he would be demoted just at the point that the reorganization process is to be completed." Our hypothesis is rather that by giving the appearance of having lost position and power, Ogarkov is engaging in the same sort of strategic deception—what the Russians call *maskirovka*—that he successfully practiced back in 1968-72 when he, as a consultant to the Soviet SALT delegation, duped the U.S. into disarming itself right before he launched the massive Soviet build-up.

We explain: "If *maskirovka* is also the explanation for Ogarkov's dramatic step-down, it would be yet another case in which present-day Soviet policy has taken a cue from Russia's Byzantine past: In 1564, Czar Ivan Grozny (The Terrible) made a show of 'abdicating' and withdrew to the town of Aleksandrov outside Moscow. He demoted himself to 'Prince of Moscow,' while setting up a puppet 'Czar of All Russia,' to whom he pretended to render homage. Meanwhile, from his fortified palace in Aleksandrov, Ivan built up his power to unprecedented heights."

In the end, even Ivan's enemies begged him to return—and so he did, to unleash purges and carry out "reforms" of unprecedented scale and scope.

Oct. 12, 1984, Kiev

A report carried in *Krasnaya Zvezda* states that a group of military school graduates, meeting at the headquarters of the staff of the Kiev Military District, are "addressed by Gen. Lt. **V. Osipov**, commander of the Kiev Military District." There is no mention of the fate of the former district commander, although this is the real significance of this little item: The previous commander was one of the top generals of the Red Army, Gen. Army **Ivan Gerasimov**, and he has been removed from the top command post he has held for nearly 10 years.

Thus, another top commander has mysteriously "vanished." Later events will show that his disappearance is very much linked to that of **Ogarkov**.

Oct. 13, 1984, Helsinki

Soviet Politburo member **Grigorii Romanov**, visiting Finland, replies to a journalist's question regarding the fate of **Ogarkov**. "Marshal Ogarkov commands the Soviet Union's largest Western force," says Romanov.

Oct. 13, 1984, East Berlin

Marshal **Ogarkov** arrives in East Berlin for a meeting with the East German leader **Erich Honecker**. Ogarkov is received with honor. The

following day, the East German party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* carries a front-page photograph of the allegedly "demoted" marshal standing beside Honecker.

November 1984

The political journal of the Soviet military, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, carries an article by **Ogarkov** on World War II. The article places particular emphasis on **Josef Stalin's** Headquarters of the Supreme High Command—the *Stavka*—and on "Stavka representatives, and Chiefs of the General Staff during the period of the Great Patriotic War: **G.K. Zhukov, A.M. Vasilyevskii, B.M. Shaposhnikov and A.I. Antonov.**"

It begins to dawn upon a growing, though still tiny, number of astute observers that there are, indeed, striking parallels between the careers of Marshals Zhukov and Ogarkov. Zhukov, it is recalled, was the Chief of the General Staff when the Nazis invaded the U.S.S.R. on June 22, 1941. At that critical and desperate moment, rather than keep his top marshal in Moscow, Stalin dispatched Zhukov to the front to intervene directly. Ogarkov, it is hypothesized, may be performing the same function today.

If so, it will be confirmation that the Soviets regard the present situation not as a "prewar period," but as already the initial phase of war.

Dec. 22, 1984

Nearly hidden, in a long list of other signers, the name of "**N.V. Ogarkov**" appears in the obituary for deceased Soviet Defense Minister **Dmitrii Ustinov** in *Krasnaya Zvezda*. Ogarkov's name is paired with that of **B.P. Utkin**, just as **I.A. Gerasimov** is matched with **V.S. Rodin**, **Yu.P. Maksimov** with **A.I. Shirinkin**, and **I.M. Tret'yak** with **M.I. Druzhinin**.

Now there can be no doubt: Since Tret'yak and Druzhinin are known to be serving as commander-in-chief and chief political officer in the High Command Far East, these must be the paired names of the commanders-in-chief and political commanders of four previously secret Theater High Commands.

The mystery of Ogarkov's whereabouts is finally answered—albeit in incredibly Byzantine fashion—by the Soviets themselves. The same goes for the fate of former Kiev commander, Gerasimov.

At the same time, closer study of the list of names of military district commanders and political chiefs on the same obituary shows that the creation of the High Commands is being accompanied by a radical reorganization of commands on the next lower level, that of the military districts and equivalent "Groups of Soviet Forces" abroad. No fewer than 12 of the 20 commanders at this level have been replaced! The complete list of district command changes that can be deduced to have occurred on or around the Ogarkov "disappearance" is the following (abbreviations used: MD = Military District; CDR = Commander; CINC = Commander-in-Chief; FDC = First Deputy Commander; COS = Chief of Staff):

1) Baltic Military District

Old CDR: Gen. Col. **S.I. Postnikov**

New post: CDR Transbaikal MD

New CDR: Gen. Col. **A.V. Betekhtin**

Old post: COS Odessa MD

2) Byelorussian Military District

Old CDR: Gen. Army **Ye. F. Ivanovskii**

New post: CINC Ground Forces of U.S.S.R.

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New CDR: Gen. Col. **V. Shuralev**
Old post: FD CINC Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

- 3) **Central Asian Military District**
Old CDR: Gen. Army **D.T. Yazov**
New post: CDR Far Eastern MD
New CDR: Gen. Col. **V.N. Lobov**
Old post: FDC Leningrad MD
- 4) **Far Eastern Military District**
Old CDR: Gen. Army **I.M. Tret'yak**
New post: CINC High Command Far East
New CDR: Gen. Army **D.T. Yazov**
Old post: CDR Central Asian MD
- 5) **Kiev Military District**
Old CDR: Gen. Army **I.A. Gerasimov**
New post: CINC High Command Southwest
New CDR: Gen. Col. **V.V. Osipov**
Old post: FDC Belorussian MD
- 6) **North Caucasus Military District**
Old CDR: Gen. Col. **V.K. Meretskov**
New post: Soviet representative to the Warsaw Pact
New CDR: Gen. Col. **V.V. Skokov**
Old post: Unknown
- 7) **Siberian Military District**
Old CDR: Gen. Col. **N.I. Popov**
New post: CDR Turkestan MD
New CDR: Gen. Col. **V.A. Vostrov**
Old post: FDC Far Eastern MD
- 8) **Transbaikal Military District**
Old CDR: Gen. Army **G.I. Salmanov**
New post: Unknown
New CDR: Gen. Col. **S.I. Postnikov**
Old post: CDR Baltic MD
- 9) **Turkestan Military District**
Old CDR: Gen. Army **Yu.P. Maksimov**
New post: CINC High Command South
New CDR: Gen. Col. **N.I. Popov**
Old post: CDR Siberian MD
- 10) **Ural Military District**
Old CDR: Gen. Col. **I.A. Gashkov**
New post: Chief of a General Staff Directorate
New CDR: Gen. Col. **N.F. Grachev**
Old post: FDC Carpathian MD
- 11) **Central Group of Forces (Czechoslovakia)**
Old CDR: Gen. Col. **G.G. Borisov**
New post: Unknown
New CDR: Gen. Col. **V.F. Yermakov**
Old post: Unknown
- 12) **Northern Group of Forces (Poland)**
Old CDR: Gen. Col. **Yu.F. Zarudin**
New post: Unknown

New CDR: Gen. Lt. A.V. Kovtunov
Old post: COS Central Asian MD

1985 All maneuvers under wartime commands

Moving to overwhelming strategic and theater nuclear superiority

We are now in 1985, a turning point on the road to war. The Soviet Wartime High Commands have been established, and all Soviet military exercises in 1985 are under wartime command and control. Wartime command and control, and the critical surprise attack function, are under constant rehearsal and perfection. The 1985 round of summer exercises begins in western Czechoslovakia near the West German border. In what will become the "norm," they are personally overseen by the Wartime Commander in Chief, Marshal **Ogarkov**, and are launched with no prior preparations, visible to Western Intelligence.

The naval component of the Ogarkov Plan, conducts large-scale rehearsals of that Plan, for the first time in the Pacific Ocean. Much more ominously, grand-scale "Pin Down" barrage exercises are held in the last week of June by some 24 Soviet submarines, from battle stations off the U.S. coast.

1985 marks another—frightening—turning point. The corner is turned by the Soviet Union from wide to overwhelming strategic and theater nuclear superiority. This turning point transformation embraces the years 1984 and 1985.

Before 1984-85, there were no mobile SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs stationed.

Before 1984-85, there were no submarines with long-range cruise missile capability.

Before 1985, there were no operational SS-21, SS-23, or SS-22 precision Euromissiles.

By the end of 1985, the Soviet Union will have at least 460 operational SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers.

By the end of 1985, the Soviet Union will have over a hundred operational SS-24 mobile ICBM launchers. Each SS-24 can contain up to 30 nuclear warheads.

By the end of 1985, the Soviet Union will have at least 25 attack submarines equipped with some 20 cruise missile launchers each. Thus, some 500 nuclear cruise missiles, of 3,000 km range, capable of hitting the United States.

The Soviet Union already has its full complement of SS-21s, SS-23s, and SS-22s in place. The same holds for the SS-20, nearing completion, with a minimum of 500 launchers.

March 1985, the Sea of Okhotsk

The first ship of the new Krivak III Class, the Menzhinsky (named after the head of the KGB predecessor, the OGPU, from 1926-34), a large patrol ship, arrives at the Nakhodka Naval Base on the Sea of Okhotsk, where it will be stationed. Its purpose is to patrol the Sea of Okhotsk, the Pacific launching pad for Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines, against surface or underwater intruders.

March 31-April 16 1985, the Pacific Ocean

The Soviet Navy conducts its first mid-Pacific extended ASW exercises. The exercises are a first, as realistic as possible, rehearsal of the Pacific Ocean deployed component of the Ogarkov Plan's first hour of war, strategic bombardment of the United States, and key U.S. Pacific military and naval facilities.

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In a manner similar to the April 1984 huge Atlantic naval exercises, a Kiev Class carrier task force, led by the Novorossisk, the most modern of the Kiev Class on active Fleet deployment, simulated ASW detection and defense against U.S. Nuclear Attack Submarines whose wartime mission would be to seek and destroy the Soviet Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines, stationed in the Sea of Okhotsk.

The main area of the exercises was from 900-1,400 miles NW of U.S.-owned Midway Island, where the carrier task force formed a screen between Midway and the Sea of Okhotsk.

With the Novorossisk were three Kara Class ASW Cruisers, one Kresta II Class ASW Cruiser, one Krivak Class ASW Missile Frigate, and two oilers.

April 13, 1985, the Black Sea

The Kharkov, the fourth and last of the Kiev Class ASW carriers, is undergoing sea trials, and will officially join the Soviet Northern Fleet this year.

April 1985, the Soviet Forces in East Germany

British Intelligence assessment, reflected in the 1985 United Kingdom Defense White Paper, is published, that confirms that the Soviet blitzkrieg spearhead forces, the 20 Divisions grouped in five Armies, stationed in East Germany, already have on hand sufficient stocks of arms, ammunition, and fuel in all categories, to conduct 60-90 days of warfare. The British Intelligence estimate for 1980, was a 30-45 day stockpile.

April 1985, the Soviet Forces in East Germany

A new pipeline-laying brigade, with the most modern pipeline-laying machinery, joins the Soviet GSFG in East Germany. Its function is to supply Soviet troops in wartime with fuel by pipelines going to the front.

May 1985, Shindand, southwestern Afghanistan

It is confirmed that the large, expanded Soviet Air Base built at Shindand, in southwestern Afghanistan, is not only a forward base for long-range Su-24 fighter-bombers, but, also already houses 12 SS-20 launchers, targetting the U.S. Indian Ocean Naval and air base at Diego Garcia and U.S. Nuclear Missile Submarines stationed in the Indian Ocean.

May 23-June 6, 1985, Mediterranean and North Atlantic

A Soviet carrier task force of eight ships, led by the ASW carrier Kiev, leaves the Mediterranean and proceeds through the Bay of Biscay and English Channel to the North Sea-Shetlands area for ASW exercises.

The Kiev led Carrier Task Force also contained two Kresta II Class ASW Cruisers, one Krivak II Class ASW Missile Frigate, three modern Sovremenny Class destroyers with 110 km-range anti-ship missiles, and one modified Kashin Class destroyer.

The Kiev, the first of its class, had just completed a two year refit and modernization in a Black Sea shipyard.

May 26-May 31, 1985, Czechoslovakia, near West Germany

Soviet-Czech ground and air maneuvers, overseen by Marshal Ogarkov, take place. They are held very close to the West German border, begin with no prior visible preparation, and are designed to rehearse a surprise attack.

This maneuver marks the inception of a phase of Warsaw Pact exercises, where an attack with no prior visible physical signs that would tip it off, is to be rehearsed.

June 4, 1985, the air space over the Baltic

A very large one-day exercise involving Naval Aviation Backfire and Bear Bombers, some equipped with AS-15 Cruise Missiles, from Baltic bases in the Soviet Union, fighters, fighter-bombers and Soviet SAM units based in East Germany and Poland, is held over the Baltic, East Germany and Poland. At least 1,000 sorties are flown by some 500 Soviet combat aircraft of different types.

A massed force of Backfire and Bear Bombers flew out over the Baltic, and then, over the East German island of Rueggen, abruptly turned 90 degrees southeast, and landed at air bases in East Germany and Poland.

The exercises were designed to rehearse Soviet attainment of air supremacy over the Baltic and East Germany during the critical first hours of war. Destruction of NATO Air Forces is one of the crucial conditions that must be fulfilled to allow the rapid, unimpeded advance of the Soviet blitzkrieg armored and mechanized formations through West Germany.

June 1985, Murmansk

The ASW carrier Kiev arrives in Murmansk, the Northern Fleet HQ, resuming its station, after a two year refit and modernization at a Black Sea shipyard. With the arrival in Murmansk by the end of 1985 of the newest of the Kiev Class ASW carriers, the Kharkov (now undergoing sea trials in the Black Sea), the active duty ASW carrier strength of the Soviet Northern Fleet will jump from zero on Jan. 1, 1985, to two at the end of 1985.

Final week of June 1985, Hungary, near the Austrian border

Warsaw Pact exercises *Danube-85*, with a total of 60,000 Soviet, Hungarian and Czech ground and air force units take place near the Austrian border.

End of June 1985, off the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts

Large-scale exercise of Soviet Nuclear Ballistic Missile and Cruise Missile submarines stationed off the U.S. Atlantic and Pacific coasts. At least 24 submarines are reported involved, in this dramatic rehearsal of the five minute warning "Pin Down" barrage of U.S. missile bases, and a submarine-launched strategic decapitation of Washington, D.C. and other leadership and command centers.

Final week of June 1985, the Norwegian Sea and North Pacific

Timed with the "Pin Down" barrage launched by Soviet submarines off the U.S. coast, global Soviet naval maneuvers begin, including task forces operating in the Norwegian Sea and the North Pacific.

July 1985, Moscow

As we go to press, sources in Moscow have said that Marshal **Ogarkov** will become First Deputy Defense Minister and replace **Kulikov** as CINC of Warsaw Pact Forces. Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, Army General **Mikhail Zaitsev**, and his top political officer, Gen.-Col. **Aleksei Lizichev**, have been transferred to as-yet unspecified commands. Lizichev, reportedly, will replace Gen. **Yepishev** as Armed Forces political officer.

2. Soviet Imperial Motives

2.1 Soviet Imperial World-Domination by the 1990s?

If the United States continues the recent and present trends in monetary, economic, diplomatic, and defense policies, it is more or less certain that Moscow will have established its position as capital of a world-empire by the early to middle 1990s. True, if the United States were to repudiate the malthusian, "post-industrial-society" flaws its present monetary, economic, and defense-budget policies, the Soviet drive for world-empire would be at least delayed, or even halted permanently. However, the kinds of changes in policies needed to prevent Soviet victory, are changes which the Reagan administration and the Congress have so far refused to consider, changes which prevailing opinion in Washington insists, would never be allowed to occur.

The authors of this report are not as pessimistic as these observations might suggest. U.S. policies can be altered as needed, altered suddenly and drastically; it has happened in past U.S. history, and the kinds of conditions under which such abrupt changes do happen are erupting now. The point is, unless and until the United States wakes up and changes its foolish ways in monetary, economic, diplomatic, and defense-budget policies, the United States is doomed to an early strategic humiliation, either through military defeat, or surrender to avoid military conflict.

Given a continuation of the present trends in U.S. policies, the defeat of the United States would occur most probably during an interval of approximately five years, 1987-93. True, a new "missile crisis" could erupt earlier than 1988, under special circumstances. There are effective actions available to the United States which might postpone the confrontation to a point beyond 1993. However, if we limit our calculations to facts of fundamental Soviet interest and relative capabilities of adversary forces, the interval 1987-93, appears the probable point of decisive strategic confrontation, with the period 1988-89 the most probable.

In the preceding chapter, we have emphasized that two sets of estimates of Soviet capabilities must be composed: the first according to what we have designated as *Plan A*, and a second estimate taking into account the added consideration which we have designated as *Plan B*. *Plan A* estimates the capabilities generated by Soviet war-mobilization for the case that the economic mobilization is approximately "linear." In this first case, we take two factors of expansion into account: 1) Increase of

the percentile of the Soviet economy devoted to a war mobilization; 2) Extension of technologies of the military sector of Soviet production into the civilian sector. In the second instance, we add a third "factor": rising Soviet productivity of labor, resulting from forced-draft ("science-driver crash-program") rates of assimilation of successively more advanced technologies into Soviet industrial output in general.

The crucial distinction between *Plan A* and *Plan B*, is that under *Plan A* conditions, Soviet war mobilization would peak approximately 1988-89, and would have retrogressive impact upon Soviet economic potential after approximately that point; whereas, under successful implementation of the recently-activated *Plan B*, there would be no such asymptotic limit to Soviet war-economy mobilization. Therefore, 1988-89 is the most probable point of strategic confrontation under *Plan A*, but a somewhat later dating is consistent with Soviet interests if *Plan B* prevails.

EIR's calculation of such probable timing, is based chiefly on several overlapping classes of considerations:

- 1) Soviet Russia's culturally embedded imperialistic commitments, identified in the present chapter of the Special Report;
- 2) Soviet strategic doctrine, identified in the preceding chapter;
- 3) The rate of current Soviet development of the relative military capabilities required to meet the requirements of the "Ogarkov Plan's" maximum war-fighting option, as that Plan is described in Part 6 of this Special Report;
- 4) The present rate of internal collapse of the economic, political, and military capabilities of the Atlantic Alliance;
- 5) The possibility of merely delaying the point of potential Soviet thermonuclear attack on the United States, to as far beyond 1989 as 1993, by means which change recent U.S. policy-trends only marginally, is indicated in Part 7.

Thus, in this Special Report as a whole, we present both Soviet intent and capabilities. In the present Part, we summarize the culturally determined nature of Soviet imperial intent.

Cultural imperatives of the East-West conflict

With relatively minor adjustments, the strategic conflict between the Atlantic Alliance and Soviet empire today, is merely a continuation of a division within Europe and the Mediterranean region dating from the furthest eastward advance of Western Christendom under Charlemagne (Map 9). Under Charlemagne and the Othonian emperors, power in Europe was divided chiefly into three parts: Western Europe, Byzantium, and Byzantium's ally and later successor, Venice. Up through the Empress Maria-Theresa, Western Europe was extended somewhat beyond Charlemagne's realm, into as far west as Roman Catholic Poland in the north, and the Catholic regions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

In this approximately thousand-year period, the emergence of Russia is shaped primarily in three phases: 1) The Byzantine client-state of Varangian Russia, into the Mongol subjugation; 2) The shift of the center of Russia from Kiev Rus to Muscovy, under the Mongol satrapies; 3) The establishment of Moscow as the projected capital of a "third and final" world-wide Roman Empire, beginning 1440-53 A.D., and consolidated by Ivan the Terrible's adoption of the hereditary title and pontifical trappings of "Caesar" (Czar).

The name "Russia," is derived from the Swedish name for the Varangian

colonies, "Rus." Into the sixteenth century, the ruling class of Russia was essentially Swedish, a nobility which shared its relatively decreasing power over Rus with a Greek monastic priesthood. The "Russification" of Russia begins to be an accomplished fact with the rise of the Romanovs: Peter the Great's reforms of the Russian Orthodox hierarchy, defeat of the Swedes, and adoption of the industrialization program provided him by Gottfried Leibniz, is the consolidation of the beginnings of modern Russia. Successful Venetian intervention into Russia, during the second half of the eighteenth century, overthrew Peter the Great's reforms, and plunged Russia's social and intellectual development backwards, but also increased Russia's power in Europe, by turning Russia's principal drive southward and eastward, into the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Siberia (Maps 10-19, "Expansion of Russia under Peter I and His Successors").

Until 1914-18, the principal checks to Russian imperial impulses were the rise of industrial Germany in the north, the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires in the south, and the British-led "Great Game" in the Middle East and Subcontinent. In this connection, the Ottoman Empire is correctly seen as a Venice-sponsored, 1453 A.D., bringing of the Ottoman dynasty to power as a continuation of the Byzantine Empire, with Venice establishing its own empire in regions of the Adriatic and the portions of Greece which the Ottomans awarded to Venice in payment for Venice's delivery of Constantinople to the Ottomans (Map 20, "The Eastern Mediterranean Before and After 1453 A.D.").

The failures intrinsic to Venice's efforts to use Russia as the ruler of Europe, according to the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, led into the orchestration of the first World War, through which the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires were destroyed, and Germany weakened to a great degree. The second World War destroyed Germany as a major power in Europe, and cleared the way for Russian imperial power as soon as the remaining obstacle, U.S. power, was removed. Venice's ancient goal, of destroying the kind of impulse toward civilization established under Charlemagne, was nearly completed.

The conflict between Augustinian Christendom and the Eastern Empire, which assumed its general modern form under Charlemagne, is an expression of an older conflict. European history begins with the emergence of classical Greece out of the dark age of illiteracy which had erupted in the Mediterranean near the close of the second millenium B.C. The political history of European civilization begins with Solon's constitutional reforms at Athens, at the beginning of the sixth century B.C. The East-West conflict in Europe begins with both the wars between Greece and the Persian (Achaemenid) Empire, and the conflict within Greece itself, between the republican institutions of Solon's Athens and the Lyncurgan slave-society at Sparta. The enemies of civilization within European history, are modeled on the combined forms of the Persian Empire and Sparta, including the Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine empires, and the influence of Venice.

The conflict between Charlemagne and Byzantium, including Byzantium's Scandinavian-centered barbarian instruments in northern Europe, was both a continuation of the earlier wars between the traditions of Solon and the Babylonian model, and of the presently continuing war between St. Augustine's Christianity and the evil political, religious, and legal traditions of the Roman Empire.

The form of Roman Empire confronted by Charlemagne and his successors, is the "socialist" form of that Empire established by the reforms of the Emperor Diocletian, as continued and consolidated by Diocletian's

protégé and successor, Constantine. The modern Soviet empire is modeled upon the Diocletian "socialism" of Byzantium in all axiomatic features.

Almost instinctively, most U.S. strategic evaluations leave these most crucial historical facts out of account. The most conspicuous fault in modern U.S. intelligence and related policy-shaping practices, is the ignorant, short-sighted "pragmatism," which has emerged as the characteristic American ideology. In other words, the essence of the American ideology, is the foolish, blind assertion, that "we Americans are practical people, who abhor any sort of ideology." We dumb Americans generally, ignore or even deny that cultural legacies transmitted over many generations, even thousands of years, have an underlying influence on behavior of peoples which is more or less decisive in shaping the major events of contemporary history. We foolishly insist, that our own notions are merely reflections of contemporary "common sense." Since we are blind to the degree our own behavior is governed by transmitted cultural influences, we fail to recognize the fact that it is cultural influences dominated by traditions as old as centuries or longer, which shape the behaviors of peoples and nations generally. This pride in our ignorance of such matters, renders Americans generally very poor historians and worse strategists. Thus, it is our record of performance in the affairs of the twentieth century, that the United States wins general wars, but infallibly loses the peace which follows the wars.

In the conflict now menacing us, this flaw in our national character is potentially a fatal one. Most emphatically, the important feature of Soviet policy is not "Marxism," or some particular goal of a current Soviet hierarchy; the most important feature of Soviet policy is the Russian character, as the imperial drive was embedded in the Russian character in the course of developments extended over approximately 1,000 years of Russian history. These governing influences in the Soviet population's character today, are centered around the East-West conflict we have identified, and around that kind of "blood and soil" dogma embedded in the Muscovite character, that racialism of the Muscovites which will not let itself rest until the Great Russian race has ascended to that same degree of rule over peoples which was attributed to the imperial Romans. Up to the point that even Soviet victory in war would mean the virtual end of the Muscovite race, the Soviet Empire will risk terrible war, if war is the only means by which the remaining obstacle to Soviet imperial rule, the United States, might be destroyed.

Any strategic assessment which fails to assimilate the imperialist imperative embedded in Muscovite culture, is a wrong strategic assessment. Russian behavior must be measured by the yardsticks of Russian culture, not the inappropriate yardsticks of Polish or any other branch of Western culture. Russian racialist, religious hatred of the Polish people, is one of the clearest symptoms of the Russian character on this account. "Purges" in Soviet society, are not symptoms of a "crumbling Russian empire"; they are symptoms of Russian culture in its most self-confident and resolute moods. To understand what the Soviet population accepts as a credible definition of vital national interests, and to understand the natural Soviet disposition to act according to such perception of self-interests, one must understand the present, oligarchical form of Russian society historically, culturally.

Any strategic assessment which omits those considerations, is intrinsically an incompetent assessment.

The economic factor in Soviet Grand Strategy

The Soviet commitment to full-scale war mobilization at this time, is based chiefly on a Soviet estimate that the capitalist world is in the process of plunging into a "general breakdown-crisis." This means to them, that a collapse of the U.S. dollar in a new monetary crisis, and an ensuing deep economic depression, is the singular moment of opportunity for catching U.S. power at its weakest. It means also, that they dare not wait, to afford the United States the opportunity to recover from such a crisis. They expect that the period 1987-89 will find the United States at its weakest moment. Therefore, they have timed their war-mobilization to match that 1987-89 interval.

The Soviet government's strategic economic estimates, are known to emphasize: 1) The spiraling rise in the ratio of indebtedness to income throughout the capitalist sector; 2) The collapse of physical output-levels throughout the developing sector, Western Europe, and the United States, both a) in absolute quantities, and b) per-capita rates of output. The 1985-88 period is currently, the period during which the Soviet government expects the collapse of the economies of the capitalist sector to parallel the 1931-34 period of the 1930s Great Depression.

However, although the Soviet government is convinced that this economic collapse is built into the economies of the United States and its allies at this time, the government also recognizes and fears the potential of the U.S. economy to recover under measures similar to those taken under President Roosevelt during the 1939-43 period. Therefore, that government is obliged to assume, that a U.S. monetary crisis, by discrediting the U.S.A.'s present monetary and economic policies, will remove those policies as obstacles to Roosevelt-echoing recovery measures.

By this logic, were Moscow to postpone its war mobilization to peak at a 1995 date, for example, instead of 1988, 1995 might be a point at which U.S. economic and military strength would be increasing, rather than collapsing. So, Moscow's war plans are aimed to catch the United States at its anticipated point of greatest military weakness and political demoralization, and in the midst of the vacillation which must be expected to characterize the period of the 1988 presidential election-campaign.

Documentation: Interview with Fidel Castro in *Folha de São Paulo*, June 2, 1985—see *Appendix*.

The religious factor

1988 is also the year of massive Soviet state celebration of the thousand-year existence of the Russian Orthodox Church. During the period of those celebrations, the presently rising religious fervor in the Russian population will reach approximately its peak.

The Soviets learned from experience of the early phase of World War II, that:

- 1) Never again must Russia enter a general war except in a state of full-scale mobilization in depth, adequate to survive and win such a war with losses deemed acceptable price of victory;
- 2) The majority of the Russian population will not mobilize to fight a war unless that population is mobilized to fight in the name of the Russian Orthodox Church.

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Thus, by *Plan A* criteria, as a gridding of Soviet literature and practice indicates this to be the policy of the Soviet planners, the several-fold significance of the year 1988 is:

- 1) Relative Soviet military superiority over the U.S.A. will not only be at a peak, but Moscow will be situated to win a "first-strike"-led war against the United States, on condition that the U.S. has not adopted a "launch on warning" counterstrategy, and that the United States lacks deployment of some significant degree of ballistic missile defense.
- 2) The economy of the United States will be in the steepest rate of decline, and the political demoralization within the Western command at a relative maximum.
- 3) The Soviet population will be at a relative maximum degree of religious fervor for "Holy War" against the United States.

2.2 The History of the Soviet Imperial Tradition

When nations have existed for a long and glorious time, they cannot break with their past, whatever they do; they are influenced by it at the very moment when they work to destroy it; in the midst of the most glaring transformations they remain fundamentally in character and destiny such as their history has formed them. Even the most daring and powerful revolution cannot abolish national traditions of long duration. Therefore, it is most important, not only for the sake of intellectual curiosity but also for the good management of international affairs, to know and understand these traditions.

François Guizot

The dominant ideology in the Soviet imperial bid for world domination is certainly not Marxism, Leninism, nor any species of historical or dialectical materialism. The ruling doctrine of Soviet imperial ambition is rather an insane cult belief, which sees in the present Soviet Empire the direct heir of the defunct Roman and Byzantine Empires, and thus the modern representative of a tradition that goes back to Babylon and beyond. This hideously irrational cult belief ascribes to Russian power the apocalyptic mission of purging the world of the heretical contagion of Western European Platonic humanism, best exemplified by the nation-building of Charlemagne and by the fifteenth-century Golden Renaissance of Italy.

This cult doctrine, dating back to the decades between the fall of Constantinople to the Turk in 1453 and Columbus's voyage to the New World in 1492, is that of Moscow as the Third Rome—which is indispensable for an understanding of Soviet Russian grand strategy in today's world.

The Kremlin's messianic imperialism is founded on the idea that Moscow will be the Third Rome, center of universal empire. The bearer of the cult of the Third Rome has been not so much the Russian state or the state security apparatus, although they have played their part. Moscow the Third Rome is rather the hallmark of that evil priesthood for the propagation of pagan cults and human degradation, known as the Russian Orthodox Church. Today a resurgent Russian Orthodox Church, on the eve of its thousandth anniversary, is proposing to harness the formidable resources of the Soviet Empire, the greatest military power seen in world

history, for the purpose of subjugating the world to the Third Rome (Map 21).

Thus, less than forty years after the cataclysm of the Nazi Master Race, the *Herrenvolk*, humanity is once again threatened by an immensely powerful clique of fanatical madmen—more powerful than the Nazis could ever have dreamed of. In reviewing the origins of the Third Rome in the conflict between Western-Augustinian and Slavic-Byzantine civilizations, we will be looking into the minds of the composite Hitler that runs the Kremlin today, and will be sifting through the most primordial cultural impulses that impel Marshal Ogarkov, General Secretary Gorbachov, Politburo member Aliyev, Patriarch Pimen, and the rest of the *Nomenklatura*. For, it is from the cultural paradigm associated with the Third Rome, that these gentlemen derive their criteria of judgment, world outlook, even their most intimate sense of personal identity and will.

Insight into Soviet affairs begins with the realization that we are in fact dealing here with a different civilization with a cultural paradigm all its own. The entire course of Russian history, including most emphatically the current "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," has been profoundly influenced by the heritage of the Byzantine or East Roman Empire. That Byzantine Empire, with its capital in Constantinople, persisted for a full thousand years after the extinction of the Roman Empire in the West. What is today referred to as the Byzantine Empire called itself simply the Roman Empire, and in fact embodied an even more refined system of genocidal evil than the one presided over by Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, and the other early emperors in the West. Even after the fall of Byzantium, many of its imperial functions continued to be exercised by the Venetian Republic, which lasted until the time of Napoleon.

The different cultural geometries of the Latin-Germanic West and the Slavic-Byzantine East must be grasped despite the fact, that each of these civilizations derives from the earlier Graeco-Roman classical civilization. The decisive difference is that whereas in the Byzantine sphere, the traditions of the decadent Roman Empire were taken over directly and lived on in their full virulence, in the West we witness a new beginning through the work of St. Augustine and his circle, who, basing themselves on Plato, laid the basis for Charlemagne's founding of a new state that would uplift humanity from the Dark Ages. Western civilization would be appropriately called Augustinian civilization, since this great African was its indispensable architect. On the Byzantine side, the founders include the emperors Aurelian, Diocletian, and Constantine.

The East-West conflict of today is best elucidated by the fact that the Slavic-Byzantine civilization, from at least the time of Charlemagne, has seen its primary world-historical mission not in some positive achievement of its own, but rather in the merciless destruction of the Western-Augustinian paradigm. The unprecedented missile buildup of the Third Rome in our own age presages the coming fulfillment of this task.

The dominant schools of Sovietology and Kremlinology, the ones patronized by Averell Harriman, Henry Kissinger, George Kennan, and Zbigniew Brzezinski, are all bankrupt on precisely these crucial points. The same dupes and traitors of academe who babble of the crumbling Soviet Empire also are firmly agreed that the Soviet Union began in 1917 as a total transformation of the hitherto existing Russian society, the "wooden Russia" of monasteries, troikas, and samovars, to which they ascribe a highly positive value. In this way, the actual dynamic of Mus-

covite imperialism is hopelessly obscured, and the practical outcome of this faked analysis is support for old-fashioned, pre-communist Great Russian nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church, precisely the most dangerous imperialist elements in the Soviet ruling combination.

An example of such highly suspect incompetence is the recent study, *Land of the Firebird: The Beauty of Old Russia*, by Suzanne Massey. President Reagan, at the suggestion of the White House Palace guard, read this book and met with its author on Sept. 28, 1984, just before his meeting with the then Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Massey's view of Russian history is dominated by a series of foreign invasions, from the Mongols in the thirteenth century to Napoleon at the beginning of the nineteenth (and by extension, Hitler). The result is a paranoid fear of outside aggression, which in turn impels Russian rulers to build up an immense military apparatus, of the type seen today. Newspaper accounts suggest that the President was struck by the vivid and romantic descriptions of foreign invasions that are the high-points of the book. Other Soviet experts remarked at the time that this sort of historiography renders precious service to Moscow's public relations apologetics, but the same is true of virtually all publications on the subject.

The Byzantine paradigm

Among the earliest recorded inhabitants of what is today Russia were the Scythians, of whom the Greek historian Herodotus assembled a profile back in the fifth century B.C. The Scythians were in the habit of drinking the blood of their enemies, flaying them, scalping them, and sometimes sewing the scalps together to provide themselves with garments. Herodotus notes also that the Scythians "never, by any chance, wash their bodies with water." Most interesting is the xenophobia of the Scythians, which lives on unaltered among the Russians unto this very day. "They studiously avoid the use of foreign customs, not only therefore will they not adopt those of each other, but least of all Greek usages, as the example of Anacharsis, and afterwards of Scylas, sufficiently demonstrated," writes Herodotus, referring to two prominent Scythians who were murdered by their own people because they had adopted foreign customs. (Herodotus, Cary translation, p. 262.)

The first Russian centers, like Kiev, were created along the Dnieper River, which was a route of communication between the Byzantine Empire and its mercenaries in Scandinavia, whence the warlike Normans conducted their missions of conquest against the enemies of Byzantium. The steppes and forests were populated by Finns, and later by the Slavs. About A.D. 700, the Slavs came under the domination of a Viking people known as the Varangians, as legend recounts. These Vikings called the land Rus, and when one of them emerged as the uncontested ruler, his name turned out to be Rurik. Etymological speculation has it that Rus means simply "the Earth," and that the dynasty of the Ruriks or Rurikids are legendary "earth kings." If this is so, Matushka Rus', Little Mother Russia, would turn out to be nothing other than Mother Earth herself (Map 22).

The central fact of Russian history is the decision made in 988 by Prince Vladimir to convert from his previous pagan beliefs to the Orthodox Christianity purveyed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, himself an appendage of the Byzantine Emperor. Vladimir's conversion came as part of a package deal that also included his marriage to the Byzantine princess Anna, the sister of the two co-emperors of Byzantium, Basil and Constantine. With that, the Greek Orthodox faith, the church founded by the "Isoapostolic" Emperor Constantine, became the official and oblig-

atory state religion for all of Vladimir's subjects in the Kievan Rus. At the same time, Vladimir became at least in theory the political satrap of the Byzantine Empire.

Vladmir, whom the Orthodox today call a saint, had a harem of more than 800 concubines, and is described by a German chronicle of the period as a *fornicator immensus et crudelis*—perhaps something of a rapist. Other chronicles relate that before choosing Orthodoxy, Vladimir carefully examined Judaism (which had been recently embraced by his neighbors, the Khazars), Islam, and Roman Catholicism (recently chosen by Poland and Hungary). He is said to have turned down Mohammed because of his belief that Russians need hard liquor, which that faith would have precluded.

Rusi est vesel piti,
Bez nego ne mozhet biti,

he commented: "Russians enjoy drinking, without which they cannot live" (Fitzroy McClean, *Holy Russia*).

From this time onwards, Russian development would be determined by the Byzantine Imperial model. Today numerous incompetent Sovietologists of the Kissinger school attribute features of the Russian regime, like state control of the means of production, or totalitarianism, to the recent, 1917 imposition of "Communism." In reality, both of these and much more are a slavish copy of the Byzantine Imperial system as it existed more than one and a half millenia ago.

The founders of this brand of communism were not Marx or Engels, but Roman Emperors like Aurelian, Diocletian, and Constantine. In particular Diocletian, who lived from A.D. 245-316, is in a strong position to claim the title of founder of Communism in the East.

The Roman Empire did not collapse in A.D. 476. In reality, the entire empire, East and West, went to pieces totally during the period between A.D. 200 and 300. This was a period of chaos, anarchy, internal coups d'état and subversion, and external invasions by the barbarians, out of which emerged a new imperial structure which borrowed heavily from the practice of the Sassanian dynasty of Persia, of the Ptolemaic regime in Egypt, and from other oriental despotisms. This new system was even more sinister than the one that had prevailed from Augustus to the year A.D. 200, and it was this new system that persisted over the thousand year Reich of Byzantium, and continues, to shape Russian civilization down to the present day.

Thus, if the Soviet Empire of our time is a totalitarian military autocracy, the roots of this lie not in communism, but in Byzantium.

Totalitarianism

Diocletian's reforms created an oriental despotism of the most pervasive type, in which all aspects of life were most minutely controlled by the state. This was most evident in economic matters. The Codex Theodosianus of Roman and Byzantine law documents the obligation of every citizen to provide compulsory public service in the guild or corporation in which his father served. This was a class society, in which class status was inherited and enforced by administrative sanctions: No one was allowed to change his station or way of making a living. At the same time, the practice of each corporation or guild was rigidly fixed, also by imperial decree, according to "ancient custom." The affairs of shipmasters, breadmakers, charioteers, cattle and swine collectors, limeburners, wood

transporters, and others were prescribed in adamant detail. This amounted in practice to an outlawing of any form of technological innovation, which would have interfered with the stability of the guilds and the value of their property, which could not be transferred or otherwise changed.

Diocletian imposed a crushing and complicated tax system, with payments in kind prescribed for commodities which the imperial state required. The tax burden was so heavy that vast areas of land became the property of the state through tax default. Large parts of the population became tax debtors to the state, and were forced to become serfs on the public lands. Under Diocletian, free labor in agriculture virtually disappeared in favor of hereditary serfdom, with the serfs being bound to the land and owned by the imperial state—a situation very similar to that in Russia in the seventeenth century, under the Romanov dynasty, and not unlike the Soviet collective farm system today.

Diocletian was also responsible for the celebrated Edict on Maximum Prices of A.D. 301, the most systematic attempt known in the ancient world to impose state control on economic activity. The decree sets maximum prices for a list of hundreds of commodities, including gold. But it also prescribes maximum wages for artisans, lawyers, and other trades and professions.

Most remarkable is the demagogic attack on capitalists, plutocrats, and producers, with which this "Communist" Emperor justified his edict:

If, indeed, any self-restraint might check the excesses with which limitless and furious avarice rages—avarice which with no thought for mankind hastens to its own gain and increase, not by years or months or days but by hours and even minutes—; or, if the general welfare could endure undisturbed by the riotous license by which it, in its misfortune, is from day to day most grievously injured, there would perhaps be left some room for dissimulation and silence, since human forbearance might alleviate the detestable cruelty of a pitiable situation. Since, however, it is the sole desire of unrestrained madness to have no thought for the common need and since it is considered among the unscrupulous and immoderate almost the creed of avarice, swelling and rising with fiery passions, to desist from ravaging the wealth of all through necessity rather than its own wish; and since those who extremes of need have brought to an appreciation of their most unfortunate situation, can no longer close their eyes to it, we—the protectors of the human race—viewing the situation, have agreed that justice should intervene as arbiter, so that the long-hoped-for solution which mankind itself could not supply might, by the remedies of our foresight, be applied to the betterment of all . . . for we think it far better that the stains of intolerable depredation be removed from men's minds by the feeling and decision of the same men whom, as they daily plunged into more and more serious offenses and turned, in their blindness, to crimes against the state, their grievous iniquity had charged with the most cruel inhumanity, the enemies of individual and state. . . . For who is so insensitive and so devoid of human feeling that he cannot know, or rather, has not perceived, that in the commerce carried on in the markets or involved in the daily life of the cities, immoderate prices are so widespread that the uncurbed passion for gain is lessened neither by abundant supplies nor by fruitful years; so that without a doubt men who are busied in these affairs constantly plan to control the very winds and weather from the movements of the stars, and, evil as they are, they cannot endure the watering of

the fertile fields by the rains from above which bring the hope of future harvests, since they reckon it their own loss if abundance comes through the moderation of the weather. And the men whose aim it always is to profit even from the generosity of the gods, to restrain general prosperity, and furthermore to use a poor year to traffic in harvest losses and agents' services—men who, individually abounding in great riches which could completely satisfy whole nations, try to capture smaller fortunes and strive after ruinous percentages—concern for humanity in general persuades us to set a limit, our subjects, to the avarice of such men (Emperor Caesar Gaius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus, *Edictum de Maximis Pretiis*, in Tenney Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*).

This document has more to do with the present Russian system than *The Communist Manifesto*. Notable is also the death penalty that Diocletian imposed on those who tried to circumvent his norms.

Totalitarianism was enforced by a massive growth in the imperial bureaucracy, with a reorganization of the province structure and the creation of a plethora of new bureaucratic posts and office staffs for total top-down administration of all facets of life. At the top was the emperor, or rather four co-emperors, two Augusti and two subordinate Caesars who would succeed them, flanked by Politburos like the Consistorium and consilia sacra. Then there were hierarchies of iudices, duces, praetorian prefects, praeses, equites, and so on, all organized into a ranked table called the *Notitia dignitatum*, which corresponds directly to the Russian *Nomenklatura* used from the time of Peter the Great to the present day.

Militarism

The announced purpose of all these reforms was imperial defense. In the Edict Diocletian writes: "we, who by the gracious favor of the gods have repressed the former tide of ravages of barbarian nations by destroying them, must guard by the due defenses of justice a peace which was established for eternity" (*Ibid.*, p. 311). Diocletian nearly doubled the number of legions, which went from 33 to 60, and built the military highway known as the Strata Diocletiana, which went from Damascus through Palmyra to Sura on the distant Euphrates. Taxation, administration, and the compulsory unpaid services of subjects in economic affairs all went for the imperial military machine.

Autocracy

Diocletian copied the Persian imperial model, where the emperor was a god. An earlier emperor, Aurelian, had pioneered in this area, calling himself "Deus Aurelianus, Imperator Deus et Dominus Aurelianus Augustus." Diocletian, who came of humble background in the Dalmatian coast of Illyria, today's Yugoslavia, became not just pontifex maximus, or chief priest of the official state mystery cult religion, but a "son of gods and creator of gods," with the title of Jovius, meaning Jupiter. Diocletian was "a true autocrat, an emperor-god who wore the imperial diadem. Oriental luxury and oriental ceremonial were introduced at his court. His subjects, when granted an audience, had to fall on their knees before they dared to lift their eyes to view their sovereign. Everything concerning the emperor was considered sacred—his words, his court, his

treasury; he himself was a sacred person" (A.A. Vasilyev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, p. 62). The court ceremony was called the Adoratio of the emperor, who was always pictured equipped with a nimbus, or halo, like a saint. Eunuchs were introduced at the court.

Diocletian spent most of his time in what is today Turkey, then called Nicodemiá, and only visited Rome once. He oriented the empire towards the East, a process that would be furthered still more by his successor Constantine, who set up his capital on the shores of the Bosphorus at the eastern limit of Europe.

Under this totalitarian system, all aspects of human activity—politics, economics, religion, and thought—were regarded as departments of the imperial state. The imperial state ran the economy for military purposes. The patriarch was at the head of the imperial church, but the deified emperor was its sacral leader, thus establishing the Byzantine idea of caesaropapism, with all power in the autocratic emperor. The church was a special, powerful department of the state bureaucracy.

This idea dominates Russia today, where the state religion merges Russian Orthodox idolatry with the cult of Stalin. There has never been a civilian or secular form of government in Russia. Lenin is taught to school children as a good spirit who intervenes to help those who are in difficulty, and almost all the Russian emperors, including Ivan the Terrible and now Nicholas II, are numbered among the saints of the Russian Orthodox Church.

In the Augustinian West we are accustomed to distinguish: 1) the nation state per se, with its governing functions; 2) civil society, composed of companies and corporations, trade unions, churches, associations, clubs, and other social institutions; and 3) the individual in his or her own private sphere. Slavic-Byzantine civilization, however, has always dissolved all three of these levels into the state, which in turn is always imbued with religious and cultist overtones. Any institutions in society which are not part of the state must be crushed, and ideas produced outside of the state bureaucracy are a threat to the state monopoly on intellectual life. The individual does not exist, but is rather swallowed up in the collective soul of the state or the "people." Any Russian who offers you his personal opinion is a liar; no Russian is allowed to express any such thing. This is "Communism," as founded by Diocletian.

Vladimir brought all this to Russia, and above all he brought the Orthodox Church, the mystery cult religion of Byzantium. Orthodoxy is a thinly disguised variant of oriental paganism, in which the Virgin Mary (*theotokos*) retains the key characteristics of the Magna Mater, Cybele, Isis, Shiva, and the other Great Mothers concocted by oligarchical priesthoods over the millenia. For Orthodoxy, man is a worm who has no hope of ever approaching God through faith and good works in the real world, but only through mystical contemplation. Since mankind cannot be raised to the level of divinity, divine mysteries must be brought down to earth, especially through attempts to duplicate the Transfiguration of Christ in one's own monkish cell. This is the tradition of the *hesychia*, or inner calm and quietism. It later became the theology of the monasteries of Mount Athos, the holy mountain, the Venetian-Byzantine command center for the East over the last thousand years.

The Greek Orthodox Church joined by Vladimir of Kiev was not yet formally separated from the Roman Catholic Pope in Rome, since the definitive exchange of anathemas and excommunications between the Pope and the Greek Patriarch would come somewhat later, in 1054. But Orthodox theology had already repudiated the decisive theological and political commitment of those Western European humanists who had

Augustine and the Filioque

fought for the survival of civilization in the West after the extinction of the Roman Empire there.

In a word, Orthodoxy had already rejected the *Filioque*.

The *Filioque* is the centerpiece of St. Augustine's concept of the Holy Trinity, and thus represents the concept upon which the whole of Western civilization has been based. "The West" is not a geographic concept, but rather indicates those areas in which the *Filioque* prevailed. "The East," by contrast, refers to those areas which rejected the *Filioque* out of fealty to the Byzantine Emperor and to the Greek Orthodox Church.

St. Augustine developed his theology of the *Filioque* in his works *De Trinitate*, *Tractatus in Joannis Evangelium*, and *Contra Maximum Arianum*. In the second on these works, Augustine poses the question of the procession of the Holy Spirit: "Some may ask whether the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son." Augustine answers: "Why should we not believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from the Son, since he is the Spirit of the Son also" (Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, p. 1,888 ff.). This, Augustine argues, is proven in Scripture when Christ breathed the Holy Spirit on the disciples in the Pentecost. "What else did that breathing signify except that the Holy Spirit proceeds also from Him?" "The Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father into the Son, and from the Son to the creatures . . . but he proceeds at once from both." For Augustine, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and from the Son (or, expressed in Latin, *ex Patre Filioque procedit*).

The theological point involves the question of whether God is present in each and every concrete human individual as a divine spark, divine quality, or participation to some measure in the divine. If the Holy Spirit proceeds from Christ as well as from the Father, and since Christ breathed that Holy Spirit on His Church, each human being has access to the divine reason of the Holy Spirit as Logos. The *Filioque* provides the exclusive basis for real human knowledge, and thus for efficient human action on the order of nature and on the political world. It is the divine quality of Man thus guaranteed, which allows him to supplement God's initial act of creation with Man's own continuous creation during the course of history.

The denial of the *Filioque*, by contrast, destroys the Trinity. According to Augustine, the single difference between the Father and the Son is that the Father begets the Son, whereas the Son is begotten by the Father. But all their other qualities are exactly the same. If the Son is deprived of the full procession of the Holy Spirit/Logos, he is no longer God at the same level as the Father, but some inferior being. Thus, without the *Filioque*, the Trinity is destroyed in favor of some version of the Arian heresy, which boils down to the attempt to deny the full divinity of Christ.

The Greek view of the matter is seen in these excerpts from the *De Fide Orthodoxa* of the Eastern theologian and church father John Damascene: "[We believe] in one Father, the principle and cause of everything . . . Father of only one by nature, his Only-Begotten Son . . . and Projector of the most Holy Spirit. . . . The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father. For this is the teaching of Holy Scripture. . . We also believe in the Holy Spirit . . . who proceeds from the Father and rests in the Son . . . proceeding from the Father and communicated through the Son. . . . The begetting of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit are simultaneous. . . . Therefore, all that the Son and the Spirit have is from the Father, including their very existence. Unless the Father exists, neither the Son nor the Spirit exists. And unless the Father

possesses a specific quality, neither the Son nor Spirit can possess it. . . . We do not speak of the Son as a cause. We speak of the Holy Spirit as from the Father and call him the spirit of the Father. And we do not speak of the Spirit as from the Son, although we call him the Spirit of the Son" (Migne, *Patrologia Graeca*, pp. 94, 805 ff.).

For present purposes, the political significance of the *Filioque* must be considered more than its strictly theological impact. It should be clear that under the Byzantine system, all power and reason had to proceed from the divine emperor only, and that these qualities had to be denied to the human individual in the name of order and stability of the imperial system. The denial of divine qualities to the mass of humanity has made the rejection of the *Filioque* the common platform of all oligarchical forces coming into contact with Christianity in any way, and not just of the Byzantine or Soviet Empires.

Denial of the *Filioque* leads to the doctrine that Stalin is always right (the Logos proceeding only from the Father), and that all individuals must be directed in all their actions by an omniscient state planning authority like the Gosplan or the Oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible. The alternative is the Western system, seen in the Prussian *Auftragsprinzip* or assignment principle, in which the individual is given a large area of initiative to solve problems that emerge in the course of carrying out overall policies with which the individual politically agrees.

Thus, the *Filioque* creates the concept of the individual, who in turn participates in both freedom and necessity, and must accept responsibility for both. This idea of the exercise of individual reason has always excited the hatred of Byzantium and its successors. It is the key to the fight between Western freedom and Soviet totalitarianism today.

As a result of Augustine's colossal authority as the pre-eminent Church Father of the Latin West, the *Filioque* concept was assimilated by numerous writers, including Boethius, Fulgentius, and many others. In these areas, this concept was so pervasive as to be virtually universal.

In 589 at the Spanish church council of Seville, which was presided over by Leander, the elder brother of Isidore of Seville, the Visigoths under King Reccared renounced Arianism and accepted Augustinian Roman Catholicism. In his first speech to the council, King Reccared declared that "the Holy Spirit also should be confessed by us and taught to proceed from the Father and the Son." At Toledo, the *Filioque* was inserted into the Credo or creed of the Western Church, adding the word "Filioque" to the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed which had prevailed previously.

The full political importance of the *Filioque* and of its insertion into the creed became evident during the time of Charlemagne. Charlemagne King of the Franks and his councilors, above all Alcuin, strove to create a progressive humanist state out of the wreckage of Roman collapse and barbarian invasions. In so doing, they used the writings of Augustine as manuals of statecraft and theology. Charlemagne inevitably came into violent conflict with the Byzantine Empire, a conflict that increased when Charlemagne was crowned emperor by Pope Leo III, thereby breaking the Byzantine monopoly on a legitimate state form anywhere in Christendom.

The hallmark of Carolingian theology is the *Filioque*. Alcuin, who was of English origin, wrote of "the Holy Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son in an ineffable manner." In 802 Alcuin wrote a treatise entitled *De Fide sanctae et individuae Trinitatis*, a work grounded totally in Augustine. The *Filioque* was the centerpiece of the *Libri Carolini*, a summa theologica of the Charlemagne regime, which remarks on the

subject that "the whole Catholic Church believes that he [the Holy Spirit] proceeds from the Father and the Son." The *Filioque* was included in the creed as it was intoned and sung in the chapel of the Emperor at Aachen.

The *Filioque* had become the battle cry and political slogan in the fight for civilization against Byzantine decadence and oligarchism. The Byzantine attempt to refute and destroy the *Filioque* was led by the sinister Photius, the Patriarch of Constantinople from 858 to 867 and then again from 878 to 886, who also, and not by coincidence, brought Orthodoxy to the Bulgarians, and thus prepared for its reception in Russia. Photius was determined to fight a doctrine that posed such a potentially lethal threat to the Byzantine system, and issued an Encyclical full of violent attacks on the *Filioque* as a doctrine, as an addition to the creed, and on those who supported these.

The substance of Photius' argument is that if the Holy Spirit proceeds from both Father and Son, this introduces two causes into the Trinity, whereas there is room for only one cause. Photius' argument never gets beyond the level of formal-logical trickery. All the more violently does he anathematize his Carolingian opponents: "Where have you learned this fact which you assert? In what Gospel have you found this word? To what Council belongs such blasphemy? Who will not stop his ears at this blasphemy? It stands in battle, as it were, against the Gospels." (*Patrologia Graeca* 102, 728-29, nos. 15 and 16)

Photius repeated these arguments in a letter written to the Patriarch of Aquileia, which dates from 883 or 884. He later developed them at greater length in a work called the *Mystagogia*, in which he counterattacked Ratramnus of Corbie and other Carolingian writers who had answered his original Encyclical. The Council of Worms, convening in 868, had reaffirmed the *Filioque* and had issued a warning to the Greeks. Among the participants was Bishop Anno. Photius had also held his own council in 879-880, at which the papal legates had sold out the *Filioque*.

In the *Mystagogia* Photius brings forward a new parade of arguments on the procession of the Holy Spirit, some of which are most revealing: "Just as the Son is born of the Father and lives unchangeable in himself, preserving his dignity of Son, so also the Most Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and lives unchangeable in himself, preserving his faculty of proceeding from the Father. Thus, the Spirit, coming forth from the uncaused Father . . . [retains] the eternal character of his procession. So also the Son, who is born of the uncaused Father, would not know how to be the origin of any birth or any procession. . . . He would not know how to distort his privilege of being Son by introducing some new relation" (*Patrologia Graeca* 102, 324 and 326). Here the oligarchic intent of degrading the Son and, through Him, all of humanity, is evident.

At the same time Photius tries to defend the Byzantine *Führerprinzip* in the realm of theology. He argues in effect, that if anyone other than Stalin is allowed the faculty of initiative, then this undermines Stalin's prerogatives. He also asserts that procession from the Son can be of no benefit: "If the procession of the Spirit from the Father is perfect, and it is, because it is a perfect God who proceeds from a perfect God, what then does procession from the Son add? If it adds something, it is necessary to state what it adds. . . . This theory is absolutely of no usefulness, neither for the Son, nor for anyone . . . there is no way he can gain from it." As for Augustine's authority, Photius suggests that the works quoted by the Carolingians may be forgeries.

With the fight against the Carolingian heritage led by Photius, East became East, and West West. The tragedy of Russia was then Vladimir's

988 choice of the East, which ought to be lamented as a calamity rather than celebrated, as the Soviet Empire is now preparing to do.

The Mongol domination: The Golden Age of the Russian Orthodox Church

During the 20 years leading up to 1240, the Kiev Rus came under the increasing pressure of the Mongols, who until 1223 were under the leadership of Genghis Khan (the "ruler of the world"). The Mongols were at this time a tool of Venice. The Venetian political intelligence services, without equal anywhere in the world, provided the Mongol leadership with the most precise information concerning the troop and other dispositions of the Mongols' intended victims. This secret intelligence advantage of the Mongols was the decisive component in the development of their reputation for military prowess and invincibility as they moved to attack Europe during the first half of the 1200s. The first large-scale clash between the Prince of Kiev and the Mongols occurred at the River Kalka, near the Sea of Azov, in 1223, and resulted in a crushing victory for the Tartars. In 1240, the Mongols razed Kiev to the ground and slaughtered its inhabitants. For the next century and a half, most of Russia was dominated by a Tartar Empire called the Golden Horde, which had its capital near the later city of Stalingrad (Volgograd).

Mongol rule was based on the exacting of a very onerous tribute in the form of cash payments to the Mongol Khan. Attempts at rebellion were crushed with great bloodshed, but otherwise the Mongols controlled Russian affairs by making the various Russian princes their satraps, and also by making use of the institutional services of the Russian Orthodox Church, for which the Mongol domination, the age of Appanage Rus', was truly a Golden Age of growth and power. The church entered into a type of symbiosis with the Mongol Khanate, enjoying special powers and privileges. The top prelate of the Orthodox church enjoyed a status something like that of the Greek Patriarch under the Ottoman Empire, in which he served as the Ethnark of the Christians. In addition, the Mongols had great respect for the Russian prelates, whom they considered to be the best shamans and medicine men available anywhere in their vast domains.

The era of Mongol domination saw the unprecedented growth of Orthodox hesychast monasticism in the Russian lands. *Hesychasm* is the form of mystical irrationalism that was developed during the sixth century A.D. by St. John of the Ladder at the Monastery of St. Catherine of the Sinai, in what is today Egypt. This monastery was founded under the Byzantine imperial regime of Emperor Justinian and his Empress Theodora. *Hesychasm* was based on oriental models, especially Daoism and Zen Buddhism. *Hesychia* means inner calm or quiet, and was sought by the monks through mystical contemplation and exercises which were supposed to replicate for the individual the Transfiguration of Christ. The hesychast uses various devices to immerse himself in the "divine darkness," in the "cloud of unknowing" and to talk to God in an ecstatic trance. One such device is the so-called "Jesus prayer," in which the name of Jesus is attached to every breath that the monk takes. Another is literally the contemplation of the navel, since it was here that the union with God was thought to take place. Barlaam of Calabria, a Greek linked to the Dante-Petrarch network, ridiculed the Eastern monks as *omphaloscopoi* because of this habit of gazing at their belly buttons.

By the time of the Mongol domination of Russia, hesychasm had

become the very special stock in trade of the pan-orthodox monastery of Mt. Athos the Holy Mountain in Greece, where the leading hesychast of the period was St. Gregory Palamas (1296-1359), who guided the hesychast party to total victory in a factional altercation in the Byzantine state and church bureaucracy.

Thus it came about that the monasteries founded in Russia during the Mongol domination were based most explicitly on the doctrine of Byzantine hesychasm. These monasteries were controlled in their operations by Mt. Athos, and generally served the purposes of the Venetian political intelligence agencies. Especially the fourteenth century, the heyday of monastery foundation, was marked by a great outburst of hesychasm in Russia.

One center of this monastic revival was Zagorsk, where in 1337 a Muscovite nobleman turned priest, St. Sergius of Radonezh, founded the celebrated monastery of the Holy Trinity, which became the principal home base for further projects in monastery foundation in a vast area through the course of the fourteenth century. During the hundred years after the creation of the Holy Trinity in Zagorsk, about 150 monasteries were founded, reaching as far north as the Solovetskii Monastery on an island in the White Sea. St. Sergius became known as the "Builder of Russia."

These monasteries became the center of elaboration of everything that can be lumped under the heading of "Russian culture." They developed the strenuous six-hour liturgy of the Russian church, its hagiographies of the lives of saints, its school of Byzantine icon painting, its characteristic music, and the like. All of these were founded on the basic world outlook of the unwashed, mystical, apocalyptic monks, which saw in reason and rationality a form of materialism, or the surrender to the things of this world, and thus sin and depravity. Irrationality was equated by the monks with piety, and this they were determined to cultivate, using their hesychast apparatus as a prime asset.

The attitude of the Russian Orthodox to the Mongols is perhaps best shown by the famous Alexander Nevsky, Prince of Novgorod, who submitted to the Tartar yoke without ever having been formally militarily defeated. Alexander paid his tribute and urged his fellow princes to do so. But although Alexander Nevsky was obedient to the Mongols, he waged pitiless war against the Western powers, including Swedes, Teutonic Knights, and Lithuanians. Thanks to the public relations apparatus of the Russian Orthodox Church, Alexander Nevsky became a Russian national hero of the Mongol era, celebrated also because he kept out the Roman Catholic powers who would have harmed Orthodoxy. Alexander duly became a saint of the Russian church. In 1942, to celebrate the seven hundredth anniversary of Alexander's victories, Stalin instituted a Soviet military decoration named in his honor.

Moscow was first fortified in 1156, at a time when Novgorod was already a large trading center and Kiev a European city of the first rank. Moscow began its ascendancy when the Russian church selected the Princes of Moscow as its chosen instruments. In the early fourteenth century the Metropolitan of Russia was nominally based in Kiev and was in fact something of a vagabond. In 1326 the Metropolitan chose Moscow as his official residence, and advised the Moscow prince that if he were to build a church and dedicated it to the Virgin, and bury the Metropolitan there upon his death, Moscow would be magnified beyond all other Russian cities, and the future Metropolitans would help the Muscovite princes to defeat their foes. Shortly thereafter, in 1339, we pick up the first notes of the Imperial theme in Moscow, with a scribe comparing

the prince of Moscow with the Byzantine Emperors Constantine, Justinian, and Manuel Comnenus. By this time the Grand Prince and the Metropolitan of Moscow were adding "Of all Rus'," or "Of all the Russias" to their titles.


But none of Moscow's new pretensions would have been possible without the permission of the Mongol overlords. In the year 1328 Ivan Kalita, or Ivan the Moneybag, was recognized by the Tartar Khan as the Grand Prince of Muscovy. The moneybag was an allusion to the special role of the Prince of Moscow as the principal tax collecting agent for the Mongol Khan. Collecting tribute for the Tartars from the other Russian princes was combined with a role of policing them in case of any revolts against the Tartars, which the Muscovites often joined in putting down.

Thus, out of the Mongol Dark Age there emerged an immensely stronger Russian Orthodox Church, with the Grand Prince of Moscow representing the political-military concretization of that Orthodox power. Later Moscow was to play a leading role in the Venetian-controlled process of removing the Tartar yoke. The Venetians, who had helped to create the vast Mongol Empire, now determined to collapse it. The overthrow of the Mongols coincided with the final, decisive war between Venice and Genoa, the two greatest world powers of the time, which was the War of Chioggia, which reached its climax in the Genoese siege of the Venetian lagoon in 1379 and 1380. The year 1380 saw the first signal victory of Moscow over the Tartars at the battle of Kulikovo field on the Don. Muscovite military preparations had been aided this time by St. Sergius, and the Muscovite commander, Grand Prince Dmitrii, won a decisive victory and the honorific title of "Donskoi." Interestingly enough, a Genoese detachment fought on the side of the Mongols against the Muscovites at Kulikovo field.

The emergence of the full-fledged doctrine of Moscow the Third Rome began during the middle of the fifteenth century. Everything once again revolved around the *Filioque*, this time as the centerpiece of efforts of humanists from the entire world to defeat the growing power of the Ottoman Empire, better called the Ottoman dynasty of the Byzantine Empire, whose tradition it continued. These humanists also sought to defeat Venice, which was using the Turks in a geopolitical attack on the Italian Renaissance. These were the issues that dominated the Ecumenical Council that convened in Florence in 1439.

The Council of Florence: Russia rejects the Renaissance

The Council of Florence was the supreme moment of the Italian Golden Renaissance, uniting one of the most distinguished gatherings of humanists the world has ever seen. Their project was to transform the course of history, exporting the Golden Renaissance to all points of the compass, and dealing a fatal blow to oligarchical forces in East and West. The Council of Florence was based on a principled ecumenicism: The Eastern and Western churches were to be united on the basis of the acceptance of the *Filioque* by all participants. This would provide the platform for a general political alliance of Christendom against the Turks. In particular, the Medici dirigistic system of economic development was to be introduced everywhere in a crash program to stem the Ottoman advance. At the time, the final Turkish assault on Constantinople was imminent. Defeating the Turks would defeat the Venetians, and open the door to the general economic and cultural uplifting of humanity.



Grand Prince Dmitrii won the title "Donskoi" after leading the Moscovites to victory over the Tartars in the 1380 battle of Kulikovo field on the Don.

This project was received with more violent rejection in Moscow than in any other place in the world, and Moscow glories in this rejection to this day, founding upon its benighted backwardness the patent of its imperial ambition.

The Council of Florence was attended by the Byzantine Emperor, John VIII Paleologus, by the Patriarch of Constantinople Joseph II, accompanied by some two dozen archbishops and metropolitans from the East, including Bessarion of Nicaea, later a Roman cardinal, and the philosopher Gemisthos Plethon. The proceedings in Florence were sponsored by Cosimo de' Medici, and attended by Pope Eugenius IV. Cardinal Nicolaus Cusanus was involved in the preparations on the Latin side, as was Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, the future humanist Pope Pius II. Included in the Orthodox delegation was the Metropolitan of Moscow, Isidore, who was a Greek by birth. Isidore developed during the theo-

logical and doctrinal debates of the council into a strong and active supporter of the Union of the churches.

The Grand Prince of Moscow in those years was Vasili II, called the Dark or the Blind, since his eyes had been gouged out by some of his relatives in the course of a power struggle. At the time that Isidore set out for the Council of Florence, Vasili was young and ignorant, and very much a creature of the Orthodox priesthood. The Orthodox were opposed to the idea of an eighth ecumenical council, since they contended that the seventh council had given them the true faith, signed, sealed, and delivered. Vasili grudgingly granted his permission for Isidore to go to the council, but bid him farewell with a threat: "You are going to the Eighth Council, which should never take place according to the rules of the holy fathers; when you return from it, bring us back our ancient Orthodoxy which we have received from our ancestor Vladimir . . . bring us nothing new and strange, for whatever you will bring to us that is new will displease us." This is the version given by the *Tale of Isidore's Council*, a chronicle of these events composed after the fact by the priest Simeon, who opposed the Church Union.

In Florence, the prelates of East and West endorsed the project of Union. The Patriarch was reconciled to the cause of unity and died a short time after, and his tomb can be seen today in the Church of Santa Maria Novella. But a part of the Eastern delegation opposed the Union. Among them was Mark, Metropolitan of Ephesus, and Abraham, Bishop of Suzdal', in Russia.

The Decree of Union, *Laetentur Caeli* (*Let the Heavens Rejoice*), was issued on July 6, 1439. This Decree states:

In the name therefore of the Holy Trinity, of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, with the approval of this holy Council of Florence, in order that this truth of the faith be believed, received, and professed by all Christians, we define that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the Son, and that the Holy Spirit has its essence and its being at the same time from the Father and the Son, and proceeds from each as from one cause and single source.

We declare that that which is said by the holy doctors and fathers, namely that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, means to make known that the Son also, just like the Father, is according to the Greek expression a cause, and according to the Latin expression a principle, of the existence of the Holy Spirit.

And because all things which are of the Father have been given by the Father to his only begotten Son in engendering him, except for being the Father, the Son receives eternally from the Father, by whom he is eternally engendered, this: that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son.

We define additionally the explanation given by these words 'and from the Son' [*Filioque*] to be for the purpose of declaring the truth, and to have been added legitimately and reasonably to the symbol by what was then urgent necessity.

Moscow was at this time a village of log huts huddled together on a vast plain. Isidore returned there on March 19, 1441, wearing the red hat of a cardinal of the Roman Catholic Church, and carrying a Latin cross before him. When he held mass at the cathedral, he replaced the declaration of fealty to the Greek Patriarch with the name of the Roman pontiff. After the service, in the words of the *Second Sophia Chronicle*,

"Isidore ordered the proclamation of the decisions of this apostate eighth council . . . that is, of the sugar-coated falsities of the Latins; all this in order to remove Christendom from the Divine Revelation." This included the *Filioque*, as well as the use of unleavened bread in the mass, which the Greeks taught was the Apollinarian heresy, the denial of the human nature of Christ. Upon hearing all this, the chronicles relate, Grand Prince Vasili, a true defender of the Orthodox faith, saw that the "wolf-like" Isidore was a heretic, refused to accept a benediction from him, and soon after that decreed the ouster of Isidore from the Metropolitan See of Moscow. Isidore was then arrested and jailed in the Chudov monastery, awaiting trial. This hostile reception for Isidore had of course been prepared in advance, most probably in Venice, where the Russian delegation had passed on its way home. Here certain key members of that delegation went into open revolt against Isidore and his support for the Union of the Churches. Isidore was thus lucky to get out of Moscow alive. Isidore was in Constantinople fighting the Turks when the city fell, but escaped and died in Rome.

But Vasili the Blind had been well briefed by his Orthodox controllers, the tools of Mount Athos and of Venice. His vicious, spiteful repudiation of the Decree of Union guaranteed the continued degradation of the Russian population as a mass of pathetic heathens, thralls of the Orthodox priesthood. The civilization of the Italian Renaissance, the luminous Quattrocento Florentine world of Cusanus, Brunelleschi and Leonardo, never reached Moscow.

Venice had won an important battle in its war against the Renaissance, and the Russians are paying for it to this day. Such rabid rejection of the most advanced form of civilization yet attained anywhere in the world is indicative of the wellsprings of blind chauvinism and xenophobia that lurk in the shadowy corners of the Russian soul.

Since all the other powers had accepted the Council of Florence, it became the opinion of the Orthodox true believers that Russia had emerged as the only land of the true faith, the only truly Christian country in the world.

The chronicles of the period reflect on the one hand the idea that the Paleologue Byzantine Emperor had become an apostate, and on the other the inchoate notion that an imperial mission for Moscow may now be looming on the horizon. One chronicler addresses the Paleologue Emperor: "O great sovereign Emperor; why did you go to them? What were you thinking of? What have you done? You have exchanged light for darkness; instead of the Divine Law you have received the Latin faith; instead of truth and righteousness, you have loved flattery and falsity. Formerly you were the agent of piety, now you are the sower of evil seeds; formerly you were clothed by the light of the Heavenly spirit, now you are clothed in the darkness of unbelief" (From *Selections from the Holy Writings against the Latins and the tale about the composition of the Eighth Latin council*).

The first notes of the Moscow Imperial Theme are also in these Russian chronicles of the Council of Florence. Here Vasili the Blind, although strictly speaking no more than a grand prince or grand duke, is referred to as "the white Tsar of All Russia." Vasili is the "New Constantine," the "great, Sovereign, God-crowned Russian Tsar."

In his chronicle of these events, the Orthodox monk Simeon reflected above all the defamation of Florence and the self-righteous exultation touched off among the Orthodox unwashed of the Russian monasteries because of the actions of Vasili II. He concludes his *Tale of Isidore's Council* with the following:

Rejoice oh pious Grand Prince Vasili, for you have confirmed the Russian land in faith; truly you have placed on your head the crown of holy baptism.

Rejoice, Orthodox Prince Vasili, for you have confirmed all your priests; they who were naked, you have confirmed. . . .

Rejoice, Orthodox Prince Vasili, you have stifled the Latin heresy and would not let it grow amongst Orthodox Christians. . . .

Rejoice, Orthodox Prince Vasili, the confirmer of Orthodoxy and of all the Russian lands . . . the joy and the happiness of the Divine Church and of all Orthodox Christians. . . .

Rejoice, Orthodox Grand Prince Vasili Vasilievich, beautified by the crown of the Orthodox Greek faith, and with you rejoice all the Orthodox princes of the Russian land. . . .

Rejoice, Prince Vasili, for you are renowned in all the Western lands and in Rome itself; you have glorified the Orthodox faith and the whole land of Russia (In Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, New Haven, 1961, p. 37).

In 1448, Vasili II ordered all of the bishops in his realm to elect a new metropolitan to replace Isidore. With that, the Russian Orthodox Church came into being as an autocephalous church under its own metropolitan, quite independent of the wishes of the Greek Patriarch in Constantinople. That Patriarch was considered by the Russians to be in the grip of the devil, for he was still bound by the Florence Decree of Union his predecessor had signed, although he refused to promulgate the Union in his church of Hagia Sophia.

Then, on May 29, 1453, the Turks entered Constantinople, killed the Emperor, sacked the city, occupied the Hagia Sophia, and took the Greek Patriarch prisoner. The end of the Eastern Roman Empire at the hands of the murderous Ottomans gave rise to a wave of general consternation and terror in Europe, but this consternation certainly was not shared by the Russians. Instead, they regarded the destruction of Tsargrad, the old imperial city, with *Schadenfreude* and self-righteous complacency. Such, they felt, were the fruits of subjugating oneself to the Roman heretics: the destruction of the Eastern Empire was in the Russian view the vengeance of God against those who had betrayed his true faith through their compacts with the Western apostates. The Turks were merely the instruments of a justly merited and inevitable divine retribution. Russia, they concluded, had been confirmed in its status as sole homeland of the true faith.

Moscow the Third Rome

Centuries before, at the Council of Chalcedon, Constantinople had been declared the New Rome or Second Rome. From the point of view of imperial legitimacy, that Second Rome had now ceased to exist, just as the original Rome had in A.D. 476. What took place at this point, according to the messianic theoreticians of Muscovite imperialism, is a process of *translatio imperii*, or transfer of the seat of empire, and thus by definition of the capital of the world, since the empire in theory at least embraces all lands of the planet.

In 1472, Ivan III, the son of the Orthodox champion Vasili the Blind, arranged to marry Sophia (or Zoe) Paleologue, the niece of the last Emperor of Byzantium. This marriage was set up with the help of the Venetian Pope Paul II, who had cared for Sophia as his ward for over ten years. Members of Sophia's entourage came to Moscow with letters



Ivan III, the first to take the title of Russian Caesar (Tsar), inaugurated Byzantine imperial rule based out of Russia.

from the Venetian Signoria which certified Sophia as the true heiress to the Byzantine throne (a matter about which there was some doubt), and specified that the man who married her would in effect become the Byzantine Emperor. The dynastic succession that underpinned the Third Rome was thus of Venetian manufacture, and Venetian influence in Moscow increased still further through the large number of Venetians who came to Russia in Sophia's retinue. Grand Prince Ivan began to call himself Tsar (Caesar) or Emperor, and adopted the double-headed eagle of Byzantium as the symbol of the Russian monarchy. Ivan also began to call himself autocrat (*samoderzhets*), the precise Byzantine term for one-man imperial rule.

With so much Venetian encouragement, the imperial theme now became the ruling obsession of the political theoreticians and mythographers in the Moscow monasteries. A legend was dusted off to the effect that the insignia of empire that had once belonged to Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon had been taken to Byzantium and thence to Kiev, with their magical powers now devolving upon Moscow. In the closing years of the fifteenth century we find the fanciful pseudo-history "The Legend of the Princes of Vladimir," (*Skazaniye o Knyazyakh Vladimirskikh*) which invents a hitherto unknown brother of the Roman Emperor Augustus, called Prus. This fantastic Prus, says the chronicle, had been sent by his brother the emperor to the banks of the Vistula to introduce imperial order into eastern Europe. Prus thus became the founder of Prussia. Fourteen generations later, the Slavs invited a descendant of Prus to become their ruler, and this turns out to have been none other than the legendary Rurik, the alleged founder of the Kiev dynasty of which St. Vladimir was a representative. The message here is clear enough: The Tsars of Moscow are genealogically and dynastically the legitimate heirs of the original Roman emperors. Now only an historical or eschatological doctrine was needed for the *translatio imperii* to be consummated.

The model for this new doctrine was provided by a certain Dmitri Gerasimov, who in 1492 composed a work called "The Legend of the White Cowl." In the course of this story a character representing the old Roman Pope Sylvester makes the following prophecy: "Ancient Rome fell from glory and the Christian faith through pride and willfulness: In the new Rome, which is Constantine's city, the Christian faith similarly is perishing through the oppression of the sons of Hagar. But in the Third Rome, which stands in the land of Russia, the grace of the Holy Ghost has shone forth; and know, then, that all Christian men in the end will enter into the Russian kingdom, for Orthodoxy's sake."

"The Legend of the White Cowl" brought Rome to Russia, but not specifically to Moscow, for indeed Gerasimov was thinking of Novgorod as the new world center. Moscow the Third Rome required a more specific investiture.

Not surprisingly, this was provided by a monk: by Filofei of Pskov, whose name is sometimes transliterated as Philotheus or Philotheos. Pskov was a commercial republic, a smaller sister of Novgorod. Filofei lived in the monastery of St. Eleazar in the years after 1510, when Grand Duke Vasili III of Moscow had added Pskov to his domains. Of Filofei it is known that he wrote five letters to contemporaries, especially to government officials and to rulers. The most interesting of these letters are one to a certain Moscow government official resident in Pskov, one addressed to Vasili III, and one to the latter's son, Ivan IV (later "The Terrible").

The content of Filofei's letters is the systematic exhortation of the rulers of Moscow to implement the God-given status of their city as the

Third Rome. In his letter to the official, whose name was M. G. Misjur'-Munexin, Filofei notes that some 90 years have gone by since the destruction of Byzantium, and that empire has not been restored. The Greeks, writes Filofei, "betrayed the Greek Orthodox faith to the Latins." The Latins are heresiarchs, and Filofei recalls that the crucifixion of Christ was a joint atrocity of the Jews and the (west) Romans. Despite this, the Roman Empire is eternal, because Our Lord was born and registered under Roman rule.

Filofei then goes on: "I would like to say a few more words about the existing orthodox empire of our most illustrious and most high ruler. He is, in the entire world, the only tsar of the Christians, the ruler of the holy, divine throne of the Holy, Ecumenical, and Apostolic Church, which exists, instead of the Roman and Constantinople Church, in the city of Moscow which God has saved, as the church of the holy and famous Dormition of the most pure Mother of God. This church alone shines on the entire globe brighter than the sun. For know, you lover of Christ and lover of God: All Christian empires have ceased and have come together in the One Empire of our Ruler, according to the prophetic books: that is the Russian Empire [*roseiskoe tsarstvo*]. For two Romes have fallen, but the third one stands, and a fourth there shall not be" (adapted from texts in Hildegard Schaefer, *Moskau Das Dritte Rom*, Darmstadt 1957, after texts in V. Malinin, *Starets Eleazarova monastyrja Filofei i ego poslaniya*, Kiev, 1901). This prophecy is accompanied by suitably apocalyptic imagery borrowed from the Revelation of St. John the Divine.

In his later and most celebrated letter to the Grand Prince Vasili III, Filofei gives the classic, definitive exposition of the cult doctrine of Moscow The Third Rome:

I write to you, the Most bright and most highly-throning Sovereign, Grand Prince, orthodox Christian Tsar and lord of all, reinholder of the Holy ecumenical and Apostolic Church of God of the Most Holy Virgin . . . which is shining gloriously instead of the Roman or Constantinopolitan [one]. For the Old Rome fell because of its church's lack of faith, the Apollinarian heresy; and of the second Rome, the city of Constantine, the pagans broke down the doors of the churches with their axes. And now there is the Holy synodal Apostolic church of the reigning third Rome, of your tsardom, which shines like the sun in its orthodox Christian faith, pious tsar, as all empires [tsardoms] of the orthodox Christian faith have gathered into your single empire . . . you are the only tsar for the Christians in the whole world.

Do not break, o Tsar, the commandments laid by your ancestors, the Great Constantine and the blessed Vladimir, and the God-chosen Iaroslav, and the other blessed saints, of which root you are. . . .

Listen and attend, pious Tsar, that all Christian empires are gathered in your single one, that two Romes have fallen, and the third one stands, and a fourth one there shall not be; your empire will not fall to others, according to the great Evangelist. (*Ibid.*)

The rest of the letter is devoted to a denunciation of crimes of sodomy being carried out in monasteries.

This insane cult belief, spawned by Venetian intelligence among the hesychasts of the Russian monasteries, and transmitted by those monasteries into the whole body of Russian culture, remains to this day the program of the Russian Orthodox Church and of the Muscovite state. The Russians, the only ones in the world who have kept the true faith,

will one day compel the world into an universal empire for the purpose of purifying and purging the decadent "putrid" West and the other wayward races influenced by the West. For this pervasive cult, Russian territorial claims include the entire world.

Thus, in 1547, Ivan the Terrible, strong in the teaching of the monk Filofei, assumed the official title of Tsar, Emperor. The Russian Empire was proclaimed as the direct successor of the Second Rome, Byzantium.

In 1589, the Muscovites prevailed upon the Patriarch of Constantinople, who was engaged in a fund-raising tour through their territories, to elevate the Metropolitan of Moscow to the full status of a Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. As the Greek Patriarch performed the ceremony, he uttered the words of Filofei of Pskov: "Since the old Rome fell because of the Apollinarian heresy, and the Second Rome, which is Constantinople, is possessed by the godless Turks, thy Great Russian Tsardom, pious Tsar . . . is the Third Rome . . . and thou alone under heaven art called the Christian Tsar in the whole world for all Christians; and therefore this very act of establishing the Patriarchate will be established according to God's will."

Vasili III's interpretation of the Third Rome included the Byzantine proprietary theory of law, which specified that the state, the land and the people were all the property of the tsar. This is documented by the testimony of Baron von Herberstein, who was twice ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire to Moscow during this period. Von Herberstein wrote of Vasili III: "He holds unlimited control over the lives and property of all his subjects. None of his councillors has enough authority to dare oppose him or even to differ from him . . . they openly declare that the Prince's will is God's will . . . all the people consider themselves to be kholops, that is slaves to their prince." (In Fitzroy McLean, *Holy Russia*, p. 32.)

The next Tsar was the imperial Ivan the Terrible, an instructive example of a Russian ruler who was steeped in the culture of the Russian monasteries, and who considered himself to a very large degree to be a monk. One Harrimanite writer on the subject has this to say about Ivan the Terrible: "Ivan was in his own rather strange way a deeply religious man and also a strong upholder of the doctrine of the Third Rome." (McLean, p. 38). Several years into his reign, at the end of 1564, Ivan left Moscow and transferred his residence to the Monastery of the Holy Trinity and St. Sergius at Zagorsk. He announced that he was abdicating as Tsar because of the intrigues of the Boyars or feudal noblemen. Ivan's move into the monastery of Zagorsk is known in Russian history as his *Hegira*, and bears comparison to Marshal Ogarkov's ouster from the post of Chief of the Soviet General Staff in favor of his new post as commander of the western theatre of war. Ivan said that he might be willing to resume the Tsardom, but only in exchange for life and death powers over all of his subjects. These were granted, leading to the unspeakable orgy of massacres and death by torture that followed. Ivan killed his enemies by boiling them in oil, by sewing them into bearskins and having them torn to pieces by hounds, by frying them in giant frying pans constructed for this purpose. Ivan customarily passed from the direct personal supervision and devising of torture and executions, to religious devotions and acts of penance, to sexual orgies of rape and sodomy. One piece of Ivan's handiwork was the total destruction of the city of Novgorod, in which about 60,000 people were massacred.

Most important, Ivan the Terrible founded the so-called *Oprichnina*, a new state within the state, apart from the existing institutions, and under the direct personal and dictatorial control of the Tsar himself. The

Oprichnina had its own physical boundaries, its own form of government, and its own secret police, the Oprichniki, who went around slaughtering those whom they designated to be the enemies of the Tsar, and who in turn were often slaughtered by the Tsar. The Oprichnina on the one hand resembles the SS state of the late Nazi regime. It has proven a durable institution in Russian society, foreshadowing the KGB-militarized economy of today.

Ivan created a monastery of his own near Zagorsk, of which he himself was the "Abbot." He enjoyed composing music for the Orthodox church liturgy. He always gave lists of his victims to the monks after he had dispatched them, so that prayers might be said for their souls. In other ways Ivan recalls Diocletian. Ivan used the Oprichnina to set up a centralized state with a standing army, and with fixed classes, especially serfs, all of whom owed specific services to the imperial autocrat. Ivan used the army to wage wars in the service of Moscow the Third Rome, capturing Kazan from the Tartars, and also pressing towards the shores of the Baltic, and becoming embroiled in wars with Livonians, Swedes, Lithuanians, and Poles.

Ivan murdered his own son, the heir to his imperial throne. He obviously prefigures another monkish Oprichnik of our own century, the former seminarian of the Georgian Orthodox church, Stalin. Nevertheless, Ivan the Terrible is today a saint of the Russian Orthodox Church.

During the last years of the sixteenth century, the Russians expanded their colonization of Siberia, building forts on the River Ob in 1596 and shortly thereafter the Yenisei. By 1639, Muscovite power had reached the Pacific, and eventually advanced as far as San Francisco. This advance went on inexorably even during the Time of Troubles, the period of Polish invasion and dynastic chaos that took up the close of the sixteenth century and the first decade of the seventeenth.

In February 1613 the *zemskii sobor* or assembly of the Russian lands elected Michael Romanov as Tsar, thus inaugurating a new imperial ruling house. The real ruler for the first decades was the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church, Fyodor Nikitich Romanov, the father of Michael. The leading feature of the opening years of the new dynasty was the consolidation of *universal serfdom* as the normal condition for peasant labor in the Russian Empire. This uniform regime of serfdom came at a time when free labor was already the rule in the West. Earlier, in 1606, there had already been a serf revolt, joined by Cossacks and others, led by the escaped slave Ivan Bolotnikov, who devastated large areas during an abortive march on Moscow. Bolotnikov was the founder of the modern Russian tradition of class war, the peasant revolt or *jacquerie*, but on the titanic scale suitable to the Russian steppes—the tradition that later gave rise to the Bolshevik Revolution itself.

Michael Romanov was succeeded in 1645 by his adolescent son, Alexis the Gentle, whose decree of 1649, the *Ulozhenie*, completed the total enserfment of the Russian peasantry, bound urban taxpayers to remain in the locality in which they were registered, and introduced the concept of political crimes to the inventory of Russian totalitarian thought. Alexis' reign was to be marked by the great schism or *raskol* within the Russian Orthodox Church, which introduced a new involution into the doctrine of Moscow the Third Rome. This great religious and political revolt was brought about by the Patriarch whom Alexis appointed, Nikon.

The Old Believers

Soon after his elevation to the Patriarchate in 1652, Nikon decided to embark upon a series of reforms of the liturgy of the Russian Church, which he said had become corrupt through an accretion of errors over



Cavalrymen of Ivan IV, the "Terrible."

the course of the centuries. Nikon enjoyed the position of Grand Sovereign, in effect a kind of co-tsardom with Alexis. His personal ambitions went in the direction of theocracy, with Nikon occupying the number one post. In this, he recalls Photius, who also argued that the Patriarch was supreme. From his monastery outside Moscow, which he called the New Jerusalem, Nikon promulgated a series of liturgical changes which elicited a massive, raving rebellion in church and state.

Nikon was undoubtedly well aware that his "liturgical reforms" would produce the whirlwind of revolt to which they in fact gave rise. He was undoubtedly familiar with the Bogomils, a sect of the Bulgarian Empire that gave rise in the West to the Cathars or Albigensians. He may have been instructed by controllers in Venice or at Mount Athos to carry out his reforms in order to re-invigorate, by means of the inevitable mass revolt, the monastic tradition of other-worldly irrationalism and fanaticism. Such controllers may have wished to create a current of Orthodox integrists to counterpose to the Westernizing and modernizing tendencies that the Romanov dynasty would later promote, above all in the person of Peter the Great. All of this, but above all the representation and celebration of mass insanity and the rejection of the paradigm of Western

civilization, was accomplished through Nikon's provocation of the schism of the Old Believers, or Raskol'niki.

The Nikonian liturgical reform was premised on the idea that Russian practice was corrupt, and that Greek Orthodox practice was older and purer. Nikon brought in new prayer books in which the spelling of the name of Jesus was changed. He ordered that the sign of the cross not be made with two fingers, according to the Russian tradition, but rather with three fingers, on the Greek model. He altered the direction of processions around the church, and the number of Hallelujahs to be chanted at certain points in the liturgy. He stipulated that the eight-pointed Russian cross be replaced with the four-pointed Greek cross. He decreed that all Russian churches built in the future had to have five domes.

Remember that the basic credo of the Third Rome was that Constantinople and the Greek church had fallen because they had betrayed the true Christian faith by their dealings with the apostate Latins. Now Nikon was proposing to change some rather sensitive parts of the Russian liturgy to make them conform to Greek models. As Archpriest Avvakum, one of the most important spokesmen for the Raskol'niki was later to write, upon receipt of Nikon's circulars, "hearts froze and legs began to shake." The general conclusion was that the minions of Antichrist, or Antichrist himself, had seized control of the Russian Church, that the earthly repository of the true faith was now in danger, and that the definitive corruption of the pure Russian faith might occur, in which case the apocalypse would be at hand.

All over Russia monks, parish priests, bishops, metropolitans, serfs, Cossacks, and others rushed to join the party of the Raskol'niki, those who violently rejected the Nikonian reforms. These Old Believers are called in Russian the *Starovery* or *Staroobradtsy*, and collectively the *Starina*. The Old Believers insisted on the pre-Nikonian liturgy, and quickly encountered the massive repression of the Tsarist regime. Hundreds of thousands, if not millions, fled from the populated areas of Russia into the wilderness, with large communities of Old Believers quickly appearing on the lower Don and the lower Volga Rivers, as well as in the Ural mountains. Some penetrated even further, into the Siberian taiga. As Avvakum had said, "It behooves us to secede and flee in the season of the Antichrist." Soviet ethnologists discovered one small community a few years ago which had never heard of the Second World War, because it had lived in total isolation from the rest of the world. Other Old Believers felt that the coming of Antichrist was to be expected at any moment, and an undetermined but very large number of them committed mass suicide on the Jonestown model (certainly more than 20,000), arguing that it was better to die at once than to look on the face of the Antichrist. One Old Believer put it this way: "I would take a burning brand and set fire to the city; how joyous it would be, if it were consumed from end to end together with old and young, so that the seal of Antichrist could not be laid on any of them" (Alexander V. Soloviev, *Holy Russia* [The Hague, 1959], p.34). One of the stories the Old Believers concocted during their wanderings in the wilderness was the Legend of the Invisible City of Kitezh, afterwards made into an opera by Rimsky-Korsakov.

The Old Believers fragmented at once into a myriad of contending sects and sectlets. After the initial martyrs had gone to their rewards, the Old Believers discovered that they had no bishops consecrated in the approved Orthodox apostolic succession who could ordain priests. In response to this state of affairs, some sects chose to be priestly (*popovtsy*), and accepted runaway "Nikonian" priests after these latter had

undergone a type of ritual purification to put off their cloak of apostasy. The more radical priestless sects (*bezpopovtsy*) would have nothing to do with any Nikonian, and decided they would have to get through the short interval before the convening of the Last Judgment without the help of clergymen.

Dramatic resistance against the Nikonian reforms emerged at the Solovetskii Monastery, located on an island in the White Sea, near the Arctic Circle. In the narrative of Raskol'nik leader Epifanii, upon hearing of Nikon's innovations, "in the Solovetskii Monastery the holy fathers and the brothers began to grieve and to weep bitterly and to speak in this fashion: 'Brothers, brothers! Alas, alas! Woe, woe! The faith of Christ has fallen in Russia, just as in other lands, through Christ's two enemies, Nikon and Arseni'" (Crummey, p. 10). By 1666 the monks were in open revolt. When Archimandrite Sergei of the Iaroslavskii Monastery arrived to enforce the Nikonian dispensations, the assembled monks replied thus: "We are attentive to the Tsar's decree and are in all matters obedient to him, but the orders concerning the confession of faith and the three-finger sign of the cross . . . we do not accept and do not want to hear, and we are all unanimously ready to suffer." The leader of the Solovetskii uprising was a the former abbot of the Savvinskii Monastery, who held up his hand in the three-fingered Greek position, and exclaimed, "that instruction—that we are ordered to cross ourselves with three fingers—is Latin tradition, the seal of the Antichrist" (Robert O. Crummey, *The Old Believers and the World of Antichrist*, Madison and London, 1970, p. 19).

The monks of the Solovetskii Monastery held out until 1676. In 1673 they decided no longer to pray for the tsar. After the defeat of the serf, Cossack, and Old Believer revolt of Stepan Razin had been crushed, the Solovetskii monks sheltered many of the fugitives. The population of the White Sea regions sided to a large extent with the monks, and sent them food. At the end almost 200 monks were slaughtered when the monastery was sacked. A number escaped to tell the story of the revolt, which quickly became a legend among serfs and Raskol'niki. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that from the time of the schism onward, the monasteries were hotbeds of open or latent sympathy with the Raskol'nik point of view, to which the monks gravitated at once, especially later on under Peter the Great.

One recent writer sums up the *Weltanschauung* of the Old Believers as follows: "The liturgical reforms, one of the products of the nascent internationalism of the court circle, ran counter to the widely held attitudes usually summarized in the loosely tied bundle of historical conceptions known as the Third Rome doctrine. In their attacks on the liturgical reforms, Avvakum and the other Old Believer spokesmen from among the parish clergy and the monks repeatedly stressed that, after the apostasy of the first Rome and of Byzantium, only Moscow preserved Christian orthodoxy. . . . For the Old Believers, the issue was simple, at least on the surface. If Ivan IV and his subjects had possessed the true faith, then no detail of the dogma or the ritual of his time could be changed. And what worse fate could befall the Russian church than to change its practices to conform to those of the apostate Greeks?" (Crummey, p. 12).

Here, in his own words, is a statement on the theme of the Third Rome made by the Old Believer ideologue Avvakum at the Russian church council of 1667, which was called to judge the issue of Nikon and Nikon's reforms in the presence of a group of Eastern patriarchs:



Raskol'nik—the Old Believers are the key to Russian insanity and the rejection of the paradigm of Western civilization.

The last word they said to me was, "Why are you so stubborn? All of Palestine—and the Serbs, the Albanians, the Wallachians, the Romans, and the Poles—all of them cross themselves with three fingers and only you remain obstinate and make the sign with five fingers. That is not fitting!" And I answered them for Christ as follows: "Ecumenical teachers! Rome has long since fallen and lies prostrate, and the Poles perished with them, and are the enemies of Christians to the end. Among you Orthodoxy has become mottled because of the violence of Mehmet the Turk—and one must not be amazed at you: You have become powerless. And so henceforth, come to us to study, for, by the grace of God, we have autocracy. Before Nikon the apostate, in Russia, under our pious princes and Tsars, Orthodoxy was complete, pure, undefiled, and the church without uproar. Nikon, that wolf, and the Devil ordered us to cross ourselves with three fingers: But our first pastors crossed themselves with five fingers and likewise gave their blessing with five fingers according to the tradition of the holy fathers, Meletius of Antioch, the blessed Theodorite, Bishop of Cyrene, Peter of Damascus, and Maxim the Greek. Likewise the local council of Moscow under Tsar Ivan ordered us to cross ourselves and give the blessing, putting our fingers together in that way (Crummey, p. 12).

The Old Believers were an integral part of the emergence of the full-blown Russian tradition of class war and social upheaval. In the year 1667 a band of Don Cossack bandits under the leadership of Stepan (or Stenka) Razin made their way from the Don to the Volga and thence to the Caspian Sea and the Ural River, recruiting Cossacks, Old Believers, and runaway serfs as they went. They made a detour into Persia, and by 1670 were ascending the Volga towards Moscow, where panic broke out, since Razin had declared war against those he branded as the oppressors of the Russian people: landowners, merchants, and government officials. A specially assembled army under foreign officers defeated Razin, who was captured and put to death in Moscow in 1671. His army dispersed into marauding bands that were tracked down and annihilated, but only after much effort.

Among Russian peasants, the legend of Razin still persists, including in the form of a folk song. The legend says that on the lower Volga there is a hill sacred to Razin, and that if you climb that hill at midnight, you will learn Razin's secret, the secret of class war.

Many Raskol'niki had suspected that Nikon was not the true Antichrist, but that this title were better bestowed on Tsar Alexis himself. From the year 1666 onwards, the expectation of a "sensuous Antichrist" became overwhelming. With the advent of Peter the Great, all Raskol'niki agreed that the Tsar was indeed the Antichrist. Peter carried on a program of Westernizing reform, partly under the influence of Leibniz and of his academy movement. Naturally the Raskol'niki were violently hostile to any Western importations. They were against Western science, Western geometry, and Western ways of doing things. Technological improvements were equated in their eyes with sin.

Peter traveled in the West, a thing unthinkable for any tsar up to that time, and brought back German, Italian and Dutch experts to carry on his crash program for economic development of Russia. Peter moved the capital from Moscow to his newly constructed Western window at St. Petersburg, which in the eyes of the Old Believers and the monks certified Peter's betrayal of the Third Rome prophecy. Later in his reign Peter in effect abolished the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church,

and replaced the Patriarch with a government organ, the Synod, under the leadership of a functionary with a German title, the *Oberprokurator*. The Patriarchate stayed abolished until after the fall of the Romanov dynasty in 1917, when a new Patriarch was elected on the very eve of the October Revolution. All of these changes brought the rage of the fanatic Raskol'niki to an absolute paroxysm.

Much later, in the 1780s, Catherine the Great sought to carry out a variant of the Third Rome through what she called her Greek project. The centerpiece of this plan, which Catherine developed together with her lover, Prince Potemkin, was the creation of a new Byzantine Empire in the Balkans and Asia Minor as a Russian puppet state, with Constantinople to be garrisoned by Russian troops and the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to be open to Russian shipping. The designated emperor of this new Byzantium was Catherine's great-grandson, who appropriately received the name of Constantine. This Greek Project restated a number of leading motives that had been developed by the Orlov family during preceding decades, especially in regard to Russia's need for warm-water ports.

Despite her own pursuit of the Third Rome, however, for the Old Believers Catherine was just one more representative of the Antichrist of the Romanov dynasty. In the 1770s there were the first signs of revolt among the Don and Ural Cossacks, among whom Raskol'niki were heavily represented. In 1773 a Don Cossack by the name of Emelian Pugachov proclaimed that he was the true Tsar Peter III, a previous husband of Catherine whom the tsarina had in reality liquidated somewhat earlier in the game. The Pretender Pugachov created a bizarre version of the Imperial court around his own person, assembled an army of Cossacks, Raskol'niki and serfs, and advanced up the Volga towards Moscow in the midst of the largest serf rebellion ever seen. Pugachov's targets were officers, officials, merchants, priests, and landowners, all of whom he executed as soon as they were captured. The comparison to the Bolshevik Revolution is once again quite obvious. The October Revolution emerges in retrospect merely as the largest of the Raskol'nik-Cossack-serf revolts of the Romanov dynasty, with the important difference that Lenin and the Bolsheviks succeeded in seizing power in Moscow and in the rest of Russia.

Pugachov was defeated by an imperial army under General Alexander Suvorov, who began inflicting the most savage reprisals on all those who took part in the uprising. Suvorov hunted down Pugachov and captured him, and the Cossack-Raskol'nik leader was dismembered in a public square in Moscow in January 1775, at about the same time as the outbreak of the American Revolution. For years after the death of Pugachov himself, the Imperial government systematically liquidated all those who had taken part in the rebellion. Entire villages were razed to the ground, and gibbets with dangling corpses were silhouetted against the horizon as a warning to the peasantry and the dissenters. This colossal uprising, which was the greatest in Europe in the century before the French Revolution, left a heritage of bitterness and hatred which was still smouldering under the surface in 1905 and in 1917. As for the Cossacks, they were regimented as a military unit of the Imperial government, from which distilled a part of the officer caste of the Empire. Ogarkov derives from this tradition; furthermore, Gorbachov himself and Russian Republic Prime Minister Vorotnikov are alleged to be of Cossack, and therefore of Raskol'nik, stock.

The Old Believer mentality asserted that the West was the enemy, as it had been from time immemorial. The specific Old Believer twist was



Emelian Pugachov—proclaimed himself Tsar Peter III.

in the notion that the Romanov dynasty and the top hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church had themselves sold out to the West, and therefore had to be overthrown to permit the restoration of the Tsardom, the people, and the Third Rome in the pristine spiritual purity in which they had existed before 1613. For this, the Old Believers argued, a revolution and class war were necessary.

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, many of the Raskol'niki who had migrated into the wilderness peripheries of the Russian Empire, returned to their holy city of Moscow. Peter III and Catherine II chose not to persecute Old Belief per se, but only political sedition. Many of the Old Believers who came back to Moscow prospered as salesmen, teachers, factory managers, light industrialists, and the like. Their position in the sweatshop-based Moscow textile industry was very strong. Reports of the Tsarist authorities in the nineteenth century stress that the number of Old Believers was in continuous expansion. The estimate may be ventured that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the Old Believers amount to at least 15% of the total population of the Russian Empire.

Many Raskol'niki became secularized, or even atheists, but they persisted in the idea that the Romanov state was illegitimate, and that the official Russian Orthodox Church was a gang of heretics. They wanted the state to wither away into a church, which would allow Holy Russia to carry out her assigned mission as the Third Rome. Secularized Old Believers made up a considerable portion of the Narodniki populists, and of the People's Will, the society that blew up the reforming Tsar Alexander II, who for the Raskol'niki was but another incarnation of the Antichrist. Indeed, secularized Raskol'niki were a sizable part of the recruiting base of all Russian nineteenth-century radical movements, including most emphatically the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in both its Menshevik and Bolshevik factions. Apart from the well-known penetration of the Bolsheviks by the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana, at the highest level (Stalin was a notorious Okhrana agent at the beginning of his career), many Bolshevik leaders, like the "God-maker" faction of Bogdanov and Lunacharskii, had been trained at the Benedictine center on the Italian island of Capri. The violent attacks on the church made by the Bolsheviks during the 1920s are entirely consistent with the outlook of Raskol'nik irrationalists, especially of those coming from the priestless sects.

The Russian monasteries—and again, many of them shared the outlook of the Old Believers—were systematically repressed during the reign of Peter the Great. Of the 2,000 monasteries that had been in operation at the end of the seventeenth century, only 318 survived in 1764. But from this low ebb, comparable in some ways to the first two decades of the Bolshevik regime, the monastic movement was destined to stage a powerful comeback, determining the Russian culture of the nineteenth century and creating the cultural paradigm of the Bolshevik revolution.

The nineteenth century

Yesterday Russian propaganda told us: I am Christianity—tomorrow it will tell us: I am Socialism. —Jules Michelet, 1851

The starting point for this new monastic revival was the Venetian-Orthodox command center of Mt. Athos. Its mystical and irrational textbook was the *Philokalia* of Saint Nicodemus, the Hagiorite of the Holy Mountain (1748-1809). The *Philokalia* was an anthology of hesychast writers from the fourth to the fifteenth centuries, with special emphasis on the Jesus prayer. Other key personalities of the monastic

upswing included Paissus Velikhovskii, who came to Russia from Mt. Athos in the eighteenth century to spread the line of repudiating secularism and worldliness in favor of the asceticism of the early desert fathers, the hermits and stylites of the East. Paissus founded a number of new monasteries in Moldavia and southern Russia. Following in the footsteps of St. Benedict, Paissus developed a monastic rule (*regula*) all his own. Paissus' rule was characterized by its extreme severity, which was based on the notion of the monk as a hermit in the wilderness. The monasteries where the austere rule of Paissus was in force usually took the title of *pustyn*, or desert, rather than *lavra* or other earlier terms. Other fanatical protagonists of the monastic revival included Tikhon of Zadonsk, and later, Seraphim of Sarov.

Seraphim of Sarov expanded the role of monasteries as controllers for secular intellectuals, who came to the monasteries for periodic spiritual retreats and visits. Each visitor was assigned to a specific *starets*, or elder of the monastery. The most significant example of this role of the monasteries is that of Optina Pustyn, which exerted a virtually single-handed control over Russian literary production in the nineteenth century. Optina controlled the leading Slavophile Ivan Kireevsky, who later came to the monastery to live. Other followers of the Optina elders were the novelist Count Leo Tolstoi, scion of a family that traditionally exerted a powerful influence over the Okhrana, and the novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky, the most influential of all the Slavophiles of the nineteenth century. The character of the monk Father Zossima in Dostoevsky's *Brothers Karamazov* is a composite of Father Ambrose, the monastic *starets* whom Dostoevsky visited for guidance at Optina, and of Tikhon of Zadonsk, whose writings Dostoevsky thoroughly studied. Another spiritual visitor to Optina Pustyn was Vladimir Solovyov, one of the most sophisticated and insidious of the literary apologists for Russian mysticism.

Because of this predominant role of the Russian Orthodox monks, the Russian literature of the entire nineteenth century after the passing of Pushkin and his circle, takes on the character of a titanic revolt against Reason, with the typical apocalyptic Third Rome themes, messianism, and other-worldly mysticism occupying center stage.

The Third Rome ideology of the first half of the nineteenth century is best profiled through some observations on the Slavophiles, who together with their co-thinkers, the Westernizers, dominated Russian intellectual life in this period. The principal Slavophile writers included Khomiakov, Ivan Kireevskii, the brothers Konstantin and Ivan Aksakov, Yurii Samarin, and others, all profoundly influenced by the Russian Orthodox Church. Herzen, a so-called Westernizer, once admitted that the basic outlook of both Westernizers and Slavophiles was the same. The Slavophiles were much influenced by Hegel and Schelling. They pointed to the solution of social problems through a return to primitive Slavic institutions like the agricultural commune or *mir*, which later, under Stalin, reappeared as the collective farm. The Slavophiles also glorified the *artel*, or artisan commune, as an alternative to the modern factory. The Slavophiles condemned Reason as a Western perversion, and recommended instead that all problems be solved by a *zemski sobor*, or council of the Russian estates. In Western terms, they are a group of solidarists and fascists, who added a powerful impetus to the growth of fascist and solidarist ideas in the West. The roots of Dostoevsky's ideological profile are very much in this group of writers and, as we have seen, in the Optina elders who dominated the lot of them.

The first element in the Slavophile creed is an aggressive, imperialist Third Rome chauvinism, based on the messianic, "disinterested" mission

that the Russian people is called upon to carry out. Konstantin Aksakov wrote: "The history of the Russian people is the only history in the world of a Christian people, Christian not only in its profession of faith, but also in its life, or at least in the aspirations of its life" (Quoted in Riazanovsky, *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles*, p. 74). Brother Ivan Aksakov chimed in: "The Russian people is not a people; it is humanity; it is a people only because it is surrounded by peoples with exclusively national essences, and its humanity is therefore represented as nationality" (Riazanovsky, p. 121).

The issue dividing Russia from the decadent West is unerringly portrayed by the Slavophiles as the underlying theological question of the *Filioque*, which the Slavophiles, in best Photian tradition, take straight back to the time of Charlemagne. Here is an extraordinary summary of the case from Khomiakov, the founder of the school:

Now let us betake ourselves to the last years of the eighth or the beginning of the ninth century, and let us imagine a wanderer who had come from the East to one of the cities in Italy or in France. Pervaded by the feeling of ancient unity, and quite confident that he is in the midst of brethren, he enters a church to sanctify the last day of the week. Full of love, he concentrates on pious thoughts, follows the service, and listens to the wonderful prayers which had gladdened his heart from early childhood. Words reach him: Let us kiss one another, that we may with one mind confess the Father, Son, and the Holy Ghost. He is listening carefully. Now the Creed of the Christian and Catholic church is proclaimed, the Creed which every Christian must serve with his entire life, and for which, on occasion, he must sacrifice his life. He is listening carefully,—But this Creed is corrupted, it is some new, unknown creed! Is he awake, or is he in the power of an oppressive dream? He does not believe his ears, begins to doubt his senses. He wants to find out, asks explanation. An idea occurs to him: He may have walked into a gathering of dissenters cast away from the local church. . . . Alas, this is not the case! He heard the voice of the local church itself. An entire patriarchate, an entire vast world fell away from unity. . . . By its very action (that is, by the arbitrary change of the Creed) the Roman world made an implicit assertion that in its eyes the entire East was not more than a world of helots in matters of faith and doctrine. Life in the church ended for an entire half of the church" (Riazanovsky, p. 65).

Here we can note in passing a typical Russian Orthodox reversal of the causal relations of the real world. The *Filioque* was advanced to rescue human beings from slavery, but for Khomiakov it becomes a means of shackling the entire East as helots.

The rest of the Slavophile polemic derives from the implications of this central issue of the *Filioque*. For the Slavophiles, the cardinal sin of the West has been its cultivation of Reason. The dichotomies they set up always oppose the West as the realm of Reason to the East as the full development of all faculties of the mind, primarily irrationalism and insanity. Here is a sample from Ivan Kireevsky: ". . . the Roman church in its deviation from the Eastern is characterized by precisely the same triumph of rationalism over tradition, of outer reason over inner spiritual comprehension. Thus the dogma concerning the Trinity was changed contrary to the spiritual meaning and tradition, changed as a result of an external syllogism, deduced from the concept of divine equality of the Father and the Son" (Riazanovsky, p. 96).

For Khomiakov, “. . . rationalism or the narrowly logical analysis became the nature of the Western church, in contrast with contemplative cognition, which was preserved in the East. Prayer, ritual, sacrament, good works acquired, in the relationship of man to God, the nature of merit and of exorcising power. . . .” In Khomiakov’s view, Western rationality was the cause of the destruction of true religion there, “for such is the nature of that logical mechanism, that ‘self-propelled knife’ which is called rationalism—once it is admitted into the heart of human thinking and into the highest sphere of religious ideas, it must of necessity cut down and crush everything living and unconditioned, the entire, so to speak, organic vegetation of the soul, and leave nothing but a cheerless desert behind it” (Riazanovsky, p. 92).

For Khomiakov, Reason was a hollow principle which could prevail in the short run but then had to be overturned by the specific organic genius of each people. Khomiakov held Reason in absolute contempt: “The conditional, as the creation of reason . . . easily assumes the appearance of a shapely form, easily unites material forces around itself and goes straight to its always one-sided goal. An invention of one locality or of one people, it is easily accepted and adopted by others because it does not bear the signs or the stamp of any locality or of any people. It is a fruit of Reason, which is everywhere the same, not of the complete organism, which is everywhere different. Its power and its seduction are in its weakness and its lifelessness.” Ivan Kireevsky shared that contempt for Reason: “But this falling apart of the mind into particular forces, this domination of reason over the other activities of the spirit, which ultimately had to destroy the entire edifice of medieval learning, at first had the opposite effect, and caused a development which was the more rapid, the more one-sided. Such is the law of the deviation of the human mind: the appearance of brilliance and the inner dimness” (Riazanovsky, pp. 99-100).

The Reason deriving from the doctrine of the *Filioque* was in turn the basis for the Augustinian concept of the individual. The Western individual was a target of special anathema on the part of the Slavophiles. Here is Ivan Kireevsky once again: “The entire private and public life of the West is founded on the concept of separate, individual independence which assumes individual isolation. Thence the sanctity of the external, formal relations, the sanctity of property and of conditional enactments are more important than human personality. Each individual—a private person, a knight, a prince, or a city—is, *within his rights*, a despotic unlimited individual, who is the law unto himself. The first step of every man in society is to surround himself with a fortress, from the depth of which he begins negotiations with other and independent powers” (Riazanovsky, p. 98).

The Slavophiles hated all the Western nations, with the sole exceptions of Venice and of Great Britain. For Germany they had the most attention, and a horrible fascination, since they were attracted by German intellectual life. It was easier for them to hate France, Spain, and Italy. Initial Slavophile interest in the United States was soon supplanted by a special form of hatred, reserved for the country that seemed to present many of the features of the decadent West in their most radical and extreme form. Here is a Slavophile profile of the United States from the pen of Ivan Kireevsky, the pupil of Optina, for whom the United States carries with it all the horror of an experiment in reason:

That experiment has already been made. What a brilliant future appeared to belong to the United States of America, built on such

a reasonable foundation, after such a great beginning!—And what happened? Only the external forms of society, deprived of the inner source of life, developed, and they crushed the man under the external mechanism. The literature of the United States, according to the reports of the most impartial judges, is a clear expression of this condition. An enormous factory of talentless poems, without a shadow of poesy; trite epithets signifying nothing and yet constantly repeated; a total absence of feeling for everything artistic; an obvious contempt for all thinking, which does not lead to material gains; petty personalities without general foundations; puffed up sentences with a most trifling content, a profanation of the sacred words, *humanity, fatherland, common good, nationality*, to such an extent that their use has become not even hypocrisy, but simply a recognized stamp for selfish interests; a superficial respect for the external side of the laws combined with most insolent violations of them; a spirit of cooperation for private gains combined with an unblushing faithlessness of the cooperating individuals, and an obvious disrespect for all moral principles, so that it is evident that at the basis of all this mental activity lies the most petty life, cut off from everything that lifts the heart above personal profit, sunk in the world of egoism, and recognizing material comfort together with its subsidiary elements as the highest goal. No! If indeed a Russian is fated, for some impenitent sins, to exchange his great future for the one-sided life of the West, then I would rather fall into reverie with the abstract German in his involved theories; I would rather fall into indolence until death under the warm sky, in the artistic atmosphere of Italy; I would rather start whirling with the Frenchman in his impulsive, momentary desires; I would rather turn into stone with an Englishman and his stubborn and unaccountable habits than I would suffocate in this prose of factory relations, in this mechanism of selfish worry (Riazanovsky, p. 112-13).

For the Slavophiles, it is not Russia that hates the West; the Russian people is totally free of any racial, national, or ethnic prejudice. In their view it is rather the West that is responsible for existing tensions. Ivan Aksakov writes: "It is time to realize that we shall not purchase the favor of the West by any amount of willingness to please; it is time to understand that the hatred, not seldom instinctive, of the West towards the Orthodox Slavonic world stems from other, and deeply hidden causes; these causes are the antagonism of the two opposite spiritual principles of enlightenment, and the envy felt by the decrepit world towards the new one to which the future belongs. . . . The hatred of the West towards the East and towards Orthodoxy is a traditional, instinctive, and peculiarly spontaneous feeling and motive force in the history of the world" (Riazanovsky, p. 83).

The Slavophiles thus had no doubt about to whom the future belonged. A decisive and recurring theme of all their output is the coming apocalyptic cataclysm of the West, a kind of literary prefiguring of the Ogarkov plan of today. Khomiakov made this the theme of a celebrated poem, paraphrased as follows:

Sadness, sadness comes over me! Thick darkness is falling on the distant West, the land of holy miracles: Former suns become pale as they burn out, and the greatest stars fall from the sky. . . . Woe! The age has ended, and the entire West is covered with the shroud of death. There darkness will be deep. . . . Hear then the call of

fate, spring up in a new radiance, awake, oh somnolent East! (Riazanovsky, p. 118).

We see here that the previous Old Believer view has been changed in the important respect that now it is only the West, and not the entire world, certainly not Russia, which is to be subjected to destruction. Once again, Marshal Ogarkov agrees.

Paganism has always been at the heart of the Russian Orthodox Church approach to religion. The Russian church was and is the mystery religion of the imperial state, and has gathered into itself all of the pre-existing cult forms, going back to Little Mother Russia and Mother Earth. Writers who were active at the same time as the Slavophiles leave no doubt that for them God is not a universal divine principle, but rather a tribal totem, strictly limited to the Great Russian Master Race. One writer whose ravings cast light on the subject is V. A. Zhukovsky, a leading court poet during the reign of the oppressive and reactionary Nicholas I. Zhukovsky was the tutor of the future Tsar Alexander II, who abolished serfdom. The following is taken from a letter to a friend which appeared in July 1848 in the magazine *Russkii Invalid*.

Meanwhile our star, *Holy Russia*, shines on high, shines undisturbed, and may God preserve it from an eclipse. *Holy Russia*—this word is coeval with Christian Russia. . . . Is there not marked more clearly in it our particular union with God, as a result of which we have received from our forefathers his wondrous name, the *Rus God* (*Ruskii Bog*, not the Russian God, (*Rossiiskii Bog* . . .) the way Oserov ends his "Dimitry Donskoi." The Russian God, *Holy Russia*—such names for God and fatherland no other European people has. . . . The other expression of our people, *Russian God*, has a profound historical meaning. . . . The expression *Russian God* conveys not just our faith in God, but also a particular popular tradition about God. He is from ancient times the champion of Russia, visible to our ancestors at all times both good and bad, glorious and miserable. . . . *Russian God* is in the same relation to our faith in God, as *Holy Russia* is in relation to Russia. . . . This conception of the Russian God . . . is derived by the Russian people out of the revelation contained in its own history. It is a conception of a tangible God, of a proven God, recognized universally without any propagandizing. . . . It would be ridiculous to say: English, French, or German God; but at the sound *Russian God* the soul is transported. It is the God of our popular life in whom, so to say, there is personified for us our faith in the God of our soul. It is the image of the heavenly savior, visibly reflected in the earthly history of our people (Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* New Haven, 1961, pp. 173-75).

Dostoevsky

With a pagan chauvinist credo of this sort, we have entered the world of Fyodor Dostoevsky, a world that is all the more significant because it was *not* the solipsistic creation of an isolated madman, but a very representative phenomenon, typical of the inner life of whole strata of monks, Old Believers, Orthodox faithful, Okhrana officials, and other wretched denizens of the Russian Empire. And in the Soviet Union today, Dostoevsky has been taken off the index, and is once more the required reading of all cultural elites.

Fyodor Dostoevsky is the classic irrationalist fanatic of Moscow the Third Rome in the modern era. Dostoevsky was born in Moscow in 1821 as the son of a resident doctor in a charity hospital. He lived on the hospital grounds, and so was able to gain first-hand experience of the

human wreckage generated by the strongly autocratic regime of Nicholas I. His fascination with misery and misfortune is evident in many of his writings. By the 1840s Dostoevsky was achieving some modest success as an author. Then he fell in with a group of Utopian socialists and was arrested by the Tsarist secret police. In 1849 he was subjected to a mock execution, and after that spent almost a decade in various prison camps and penal battalions in Siberia. His principal literary productions date from the years between 1859 and his death in 1881. In addition to his well-known novels (*Notes from the Underground*, *Crime and Punishment*, *The Idiot*, *The Possessed*, and *The Brothers Karamazov*), his essay magazine called *The Diary of a Writer* is a compendium of his political ideas. Dostoevsky's work is remarkable in that it prefigures the essential ideological apparatus of German Nazism. In other words, Dostoevsky has no trouble with either side of the Nazi-Communist coin.

In the *Diary of a Writer*, Dostoevsky advances the classic territorial demand of Third Rome Imperialism: "Constantinople must be ours." This is explicitly placed in the framework of the messianic mission of the Third Rome, which Dostoevsky explicates as follows: ". . . in the name of what *moral* right could Russia claim Constantinople? Relying upon what sublime aims could Russia demand Constantinople from Europe? Precisely as a leader of Orthodoxy, as its protectress and guardian—a role designated to her ever since Ivan III, who placed her symbol and the Byzantine double-headed eagle above the ancient coat of arms of Russia, a role which unquestionably revealed itself only after Peter the Great when Russia perceived in herself the strength to fulfill her mission and factually become the real and sole protectress of Orthodoxy and of the people adhering to it. Such is the ground, such is the right to ancient Constantinople. . . ." (*The Diary of a Writer*, "My Paradox").

In the name of this Imperial mission, Dostoevsky exalts the role of war and armed conflict. This theme is vehemently developed in pieces written for the *Diary* during the Eastern crisis of 1877. Dostoevsky advances the case that war has a positive, therapeutic value, helping to purge the social organism of toxins accumulated during intervals of peace. Dostoevsky comments: "Believe me that in certain, if not in all cases (save in the case of civil wars) war is a process by means of which specifically international peace is achieved with a minimum loss of blood, with minimum sorrow and effort, and at least more or less normal relations between the nations are evolved. Of course, this is a pity, but what can be done if this is so? And it is better to draw the sword once than to suffer interminably. And in what manner is present peace, prevailing among the civilized nations, better than war? The contrary is true: Peace, lasting peace, rather than war tends to harden and bestialize man. Lasting peace always generates cruelty, cowardice and coarse, fat egoism, and chiefly—intellectual stagnation. It is only the exploiters of the peoples who grow fat in times of long peace. It is being repeated over and over again that peace generates wealth, but only for one tenth of the people, and this one tenth, having contracted the diseases of wealth, transmits the contagion to the other nine tenths who have no wealth. And that one tenth is contaminated by debauch and cynicism" (*Diary*, April 1877).

It is instructive to bear such remarks in mind in pondering present Soviet propaganda statements, in which the real content of the term "peace" is very close to that assigned by Dostoevsky.

Dostoevsky is also certain that the Russian system is better suited for war than the methods of the Western powers, militaristic and bellicose though those may be. He makes the following comments in April 1877:

Our principal strength is precisely in the fact that they do not understand Russia at all—they understand nothing about Russia! They do not know that nothing in the world can conquer us; that we may, perhaps, be losing battles, but that nevertheless we shall remain invincible precisely because of the unity of our popular spirit, and by reason of the people's consciousness; that we are not France, which is all in Paris; that we are not Europe, which is altogether dependent upon the stock-exchanges of her bourgeoisie and the 'tranquility' of her proletarians which is being purchased—and this only for one hour—with the last resorts of their local governments. They do not comprehend and know that, if it be our will, neither the Jews of all Europe nor the millions of their gold—not even the millions of their armies, can conquer us; that if it be our will, it is impossible to compel us to do something we do not wish, and that there is no such power on earth which could compel us.

Here the instinctive populism of the Slavophile mingles with the rhetorical notes of the Communist and with the anti-Semitism of the Nazi. The Nazi-Communist Dostoevsky, since he is free of the cancer of Reason that has consumed the putrid West, is blissfully unaware of any contradiction, and indeed there is none.

Dostoevsky's political creed is further illuminated in his essay "My Paradox," appearing in the *Diary* in 1876. The paradox is that Third Rome Russian patriots, when they go to Europe, become leftists and socialists, since they find that this is the most appropriate way of working for the destruction of Europe. By contrast, a Russian conservative who goes to Europe and becomes a conservative European, is not a good Russian, but rather an enemy of Russia, since he has sold out his Motherland. This piece reads like a manual for the foreign operations of the KGB and the GRU, which to some degree it undoubtedly is.

Dostoevsky asks himself the rhetorical question, "You assert that every Russian, turning into a European Communist, thereby forthwith becomes a Russian conservative." This, he replies, is too risky a conclusion. He refines the point thus:

Russian European socialists and Communards are not Europeans, and . . . in the long run, when the misunderstanding shall have been dispelled and they know Russia, they will again become full-blooded and good Russians. And secondly, . . . under no circumstances can a Russian be converted into a real European if he remains the least bit Russian. And, if this be so, it means that Russia is something independent and peculiar, not resembling Europe at all, but important by itself. Besides, Europe herself is, perhaps, not in the least unjust when condemning Russians and scoffing at their revolutionary theories: It means that we are revolutionists not merely for the sake of destruction where we did not build—like the Huns and the Tartars—but for the sake of something different, something, which, in truth, we do not know ourselves (and those who know, keep silent). In a word, we are revolutionists, so to speak, because of some personal necessity—if you please, by reason of conservatism.

Dostoevsky was also, as is well known, a publicist for the violent anti-Semitic campaigns that swept across Russia during the closing decades of the nineteenth century, in the form of the pogroms organized by the oligarchical Black Hundreds, and in the form of the official policies of the Imperial Interior Ministry which counted on eliminating Jewry in Russia by forcing one third to emigrate, one third to convert to Ortho-

doxy, and by liquidating the remaining third. In Dostoevsky's mind hatred of Jews is mixed with his inchoate anti-capitalism and anti-Western feeling, as well as with his fascist populism. These comments are from the notorious essay "The Jewish Question" from March 1877:

Jewry is thriving precisely there where the people are still ignorant, or not free, or economically backward. It is there that Jewry has a *champ libre*! And instead of raising, by its influence, the level of education, instead of increasing knowledge, generating economic fitness in the native population—instead of this, the Jew, wherever he has settled, has still more humiliated and debauched the people; there humaneness was still more debased and the educational level fell still lower; there inescapable, inhuman misery, and with it despair, spread still more disgustingly. Ask the native population in our border regions: What is propelling the Jew—has been propelling him for centuries? You receive a unanimous answer: *mercilessness*. He has been prompted so many centuries only by pitilessness for us, only by the thirst for our sweat and blood. . . . The Jew is offering his interposition, he is trading in another man's labor. Capital is accumulated labor; the Jew loves to trade in somebody else's labor. But, temporarily, this changes nothing. As against this, the summit of the Jews is assuming stronger and firmer power over mankind seeking to convey to it its image and substance.

It will be found that Dostoevsky was the decisive epistemological influence on Friedrich Nietzsche, who referred to the older Russian writer as his "beloved father." Alfred Rosenberg, the author of *The Myth of the Twentieth Century*, the Nazi Party ideological handbook, carried out an in-depth study of Dostoevsky. Here he found a concept of blood and soil (*pochva*), which prompted the Nazi emphasis on *Blut und Boden*. He also discovered, in novels like *The Possessed*, the theory of the superman for whom everything is allowed, even the most heinous crimes. Moeller van den Brueck, who translated Dostoevsky's works into German, coined the phrase "The Third Reich" as the title for one of his books. His inspiration had come from Dostoevsky's Third Rome.

For Dostoevsky, questions of imperialist politics were essentially theological in their foundations. He wrote in the January 1877 issue of the *Diary*: "If it wishes to live long, every great people believes that in it and in it alone, is contained the salvation of the world; that it only lives in order to stand at the head of all the peoples, to assimilate them into itself and to lead them, in a harmonious choir, to the final goal fore-ordained for them all." For Dostoevsky, this applied above all to the imperial mission of Russia. His most developed statement on the nature of this messianic Russian imperialism of the Third Rome is to be found in his speech on Pushkin, which was delivered on June 8, 1880 at a meeting of the Society of Lovers of Russian Literature, and which was then published in the *Diary*.

This appreciation has very little to do with Pushkin, since the latter most emphatically did not share Dostoevsky's outlook. Dostoevsky rather uses Pushkin's genius for an ulterior political motive of his own. He comments that Pushkin's foreign characters are in each case the most authentic representatives of their national characters that can be found anywhere, even in Shakespeare. This bespeaks an unmatched universality on the part of Pushkin. Right, says Dostoevsky, and in this Pushkin is typical of the whole Russian people, who have exactly such a universal mission. And then . . . hold on to your hat:

Nay, I assert emphatically that never has there been a poet with

such a universal responsiveness as Pushkin. . . . This we find in Pushkin alone, and in this sense he is a unique and unheard-of phenomenon, and to my mind a prophetic one . . . since it is exactly in this that his national, Russian strength revealed itself most—the national character of his poetry, the national spirit in its future development and in our future, which is concealed in that which is already present—and this has been prophetically revealed by Pushkin. For what else is the strength of the Russian national spirit than the aspiration, in its ultimate goal, for universality and all-embracing humanitarianism? Having become a fully national poet, having come in contact with the people and their vigor, Pushkin at once began to foresee their future destiny. In this he was a diviner and a prophet. . . .

Indeed, at once we began to strive impetuously for the most vital universal all-humanitarian fellowship. Not inimically, (as it would seem it should have happened), but in a friendly manner, with full love, we admitted into our soul the genius of foreign nations, without any racial discrimination, instinctively managing—almost from the first step—to eliminate contradictions, to excuse and reconcile differences, thereby manifesting our readiness and proclivity to enter into an all-embracing, universal communion with all the nationalities of the great Aryan races.

Yes, the Russian's destiny is incontestably all-European and universal. To become a genuine and all-round Russian means, perhaps (and this you should remember), to become brother of all men, *a universal man*, if you please. Oh, all this Slavophilism and this Westernism is a great, though historically inevitable, misunderstanding. To a genuine Russian, Europe and the destiny of the great Aryan race are as dear as Russia herself, as the fate of his native land, because our destiny is universality not by the sword but by the force of brotherhood and our brotherly longing for the fellowship of men. If you analyze our history after Peter's reform, you will find traces and indications of this idea, of this fantasy of mine, in the character of our intercourse with European nations, even in our state policies. For what else has Russia been doing in her policies, during these two centuries, than serving Europe much more than herself? I do not believe that this took place because of the mere want of aptitude on the part of our statesmen.

Oh, the peoples of Europe have no idea how dear they are to us! And later—in this I believe—we, well, not we but the future Russians, to the last man, will comprehend that to become a genuine Russian means to seek finally to reconcile all European controversies, to show the solution of European anguish in our all-humanitarian and all-unifying Russian soul, to embrace in it with brotherly love all our brethren, and finally, perhaps, to utter the ultimate word of great, universal harmony, of the brotherly accord of all nations abiding by the law of Christ's gospel.

Dostoevsky was a worshipper of the Russian God, the tribal totem mentioned earlier. His ideas on this point emerge most clearly in the discussions between Shatov and Stavrogin in his novel,

The Possessed is a novel based on the Bakunin terrorist underground. The starting point of the following exchange is the question of what makes the Russian people the God-bearer. The speaker is Shatov: "The purpose of every popular movement or motion, in every people and at every moment of its being, is, exclusively, the search for God; its own

God, only its own. . . . God is the synthetic personality of the whole people taken from its beginning until its end. There never had been one common God for all or many peoples, but each people had its own particular one. . . . When the Gods are shared in common, then they die and the faith in them, together with the peoples themselves, also dies. The stronger the people, the more exclusive its God. There had never been a people without religion, that is, without the conception of good and evil and its own, unique, good and evil."

Stavrogin answers: "You have reduced God to a simple attribute of nationality."

Shatov: "Reduce God to an attribute of nationality? . . . on the contrary, I raise the people up to God. And could it be otherwise? The people is the body of God. Every people only remains such while it has its own God and while it rejects all other Gods in the world uncompromisingly; while it believes that with its God it will conquer and drive from the world all the other gods. . . . A truly great people can never be reconciled to a secondary role amongst humanity, or even to a primary role, but only and exclusively to the first role. . . . But truth is only one, and therefore, only one of the peoples can have the true God, even though the other peoples have their own great gods. The only 'God-bearer' people is the Russian one. . . ."

Stavrogin then asks Shatov whether he believes in God. Shatov answers: "I believe in Russia, I believe in her orthodoxy—I believe in the body of Christ.—I believe that the Second Coming will take place in Russia—I believe—Shatov babbled madly.—But in God? In God? I—I will believe in God."

Thus in the end, the idolater of the so-called Russian God reveals himself to be an atheist. This is no surprise, since a God who is the exuded essence of an ethnic group or people is no God, but a mere pagan tribal totem, however much Dostoevsky may prate in other locations about the universality of the Orthodox faith. The most characteristic aspect of Dostoevsky's mental processes is that he is not troubled by being an Orthodox atheist, a Christian pagan, a tolerant anti-Semite, a peaceful warmonger, a brotherly imperialist, or a Nazi Communist. For him this is the normal order of things.

Stalin

Today's Soviet official propaganda is increasingly preoccupied with the glorification of Stalin, who is the supernatural force presiding over today's build-up of the military economy. Like a Roman Emperor deified after his death, Stalin is the object of a state mystery cult, the Soviet Mars of the Third World War. It is misleading to speak of the rehabilitation of Stalin; Stalin was never really in disgrace, and in any case what is happening today is his elevation to the level of a god.

The principle of Stalin's actual political career was nothing but the cult of Moscow the Third Rome. The obvious comparison is with Ivan the Terrible, whom Stalin admired greatly and with whom he compared his own exercise of power. To attempt to explain any of Stalin's actions in terms of the Marxist-Leninist categories with which they were packaged for the edification of credulous gulls is the most absurd folly.

The young Stalin was shaped in a decisive way by the Georgian Orthodox Church. He first attended a church school, and then a seminary for the training of priests. As he himself later commented, the seminary experience made him familiar with Jesuit casuistry—scholastic methods of lying. During this time Stalin began to identify himself with the character of Koba in the novel *The Untameable* by Alexander Kasbegi, a nineteenth-century romance about the Georgian liberation struggle.

Stalin married a deeply religious woman, and at her early death he complied with her request for a funeral according to the Orthodox rite.

The young Stalin was a terrorist and agent provocateur, and there is no doubt that he was in the pay of the Tsarist secret police, the Okhrana. Stalin was active in the illegal fundraising program of the Bolsheviks, and masterminded the 1907 robbery of the State Bank in Tiflis, during the course of which 50 people were killed and wounded. Stalin directed a protection racket to extort funds from shopkeepers and merchants in Georgia. Stalin was also a pimp, running a chain of brothels, and a letter exists showing that Lenin both knew of, and approved, this fund-raising activity.

During the 1920s, Stalin opposed those who saw the 1917 revolution as a kind of *salto mortale* in Russian history. Stalin himself emphasized the continuity of that history, often repeating, "We are accountable for the bad and the good in Russian history." In December 1927, Stalin was at pains to deny rumors published in the Hearst newspapers in the United States reporting a secret speech by Stalin advocating the speedy conclusion of a concordat between the Soviet regime and the Russian Orthodox Church. Stalin staunchly defended the "justified national pride of the Great Russians."

Stalin's conversations with filmmaker Sergei Eisenstein show his deep personal identification with Ivan the Terrible, especially with Ivan's lifelong campaign to exterminate the boyars, the Russian feudal nobles who were more or less independent of the central power in Moscow. Stalin laughingly criticized Ivan the Terrible's habit of sending lists of the names of his victims to the monasteries so that prayers could be said for their souls. Stalin said that he would have used that time to massacre even more boyars.

Stalin's equivalent to the boyars were the kulaks, the prosperous peasants who had grown up under the aegis of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP). In 1929, Stalin adopted the policy of "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," which meant the slaughter and deportation of several million peasants and their families, representing the most successful part of Soviet agriculture. This went together with Stalin's decree for the forced collectivization of agriculture, with all peasant being deprived of their holdings and coerced into joining *kolkhozes*, or collective farms. This went together with the policy of forced industrialization, which provided the economic base necessary for twentieth-century warfare.

Starting in about 1935, Stalin began a policy of systematic imprisonment and liquidation for certain categories of persons deemed "objectively suspect" of collaboration with foreign powers against the Soviet regime. This recalled very explicitly the Oprichnina of Ivan the Terrible. Now, instead of the black-clad Oprichniki of the sixteenth century, it was the Cheka-NKVD-OGPU-GPU-MGB-KGB succession that carried on the arrests, show trials, and slaughter, under leaders like Yagoda, Yezhov, and Beria. The wide-ranging, gratuitous murder of suspects, but also the slaughter of the secret police themselves (called by Ivan the Terrible "sorting folks out"), made the years of the Yezhovshchina uncannily resemble the Oprichnina. The internal butcher's bill of the Stalin regime is in the neighborhood of 30 million dead.

Stalin's attitude toward the West was also the canonical Third Rome one. He used the Communist Third International and its German party, the KPD, to assist the success of Hitler because he viewed Hitler as anti-Western, being especially impressed with the attacks on the Versailles system, Britain, and France that were the dominant note in Nazi propaganda and Hitler's personal demagoguery. Stalin saw the Nazis as a force to destroy the pro-Versailles and pro-Western SPD leadership, and later

as a force to turn against the Western powers. Stalin is quoted as saying in 1931: "Don't you believe . . . that if the National Socialists should come to power in Germany, they would be so exclusively preoccupied with the West, that we would be free to build socialism in peace here?"

The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of August 23, 1939 was firmly grounded on Stalin's side in the imperialist tradition of the Third Rome. It resembled the Tilsit accords of 1807, negotiated on a barge by Emperor Napoleon and by Tsar Alexander I of Russia, while the hapless King of Prussia paced and waited on the bank. Both deals gave Russia a free hand east of a line of demarcation; both were directed against the British. Stalin was the only national leader of 1939 who wanted general war, and the Hitler-Stalin alliance was the crucial factor in allowing Hitler to begin what was to become a world conflict. Russia became an ally of Germany and a kind of associate member of the Rome-Berlin-Tokyo axis.

The raw materials deliveries set up by Ribbentrop and Molotov provided the Nazi war machine with the sinews of war: oil, rubber, grain, nickel, and other vital raw materials. Stalin's medium to long-term intention was to use Hitler to batter the French, the British, and the minor continental powers into submission, but at the same time to use the German raw materials dependency on Russian deliveries (in the face of the British sea blockade) to enforce satrap status on Hitler.

Stalin exerted pressure on Romania, which had oil, while the Nazis kept a presence in Finland, which had nickel. On the occasion of Molotov's last visit to Berlin on November, 1940, the Soviet government expressed interest in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, Poland, Sweden, and the Skaggerak and Kattegat—the entrances to the Baltic Sea between Sweden and Denmark. On November 26, 1940, Stalin told the German ambassador in Moscow that he would be ready to join the Axis if he received the undisputed possession of Finland, the right to occupy Bulgaria, with a land and sea base to command the straits and overwhelm the Turks, and the area south of Batum and Baku in the direction of the Persian Gulf, including Iran. He also wanted the Japanese island of Sakhalin.

During the war, Stalin kept a channel open to the Nazi government through neutral Stockholm, and contacts were especially active during 1942 and 1943. In December 1942, on the eve of Stalingrad, the Soviet representative offered immediate separate peace on the eastern front, the terms being status quo ante—the restoration of the Molotov-Ribbentrop line. (See Peter Kleist, *Eine Europäische Tragödie*).

In June of 1943, Stalin was making new offers, summed up as follows:

The Soviets do not intend to fight one day, not even one minute, longer than is necessary for the interests of England and America. Hitler, in his ideological blindness, let himself be driven by the intrigues of the capitalist powers into this war, which upset the Kremlin in the decisive phase of its buildup plans. The Soviet Union can, indeed, through the employment of its last resources and with the help of deliveries from the U.S.A., offer resistance to the German armies, and can perhaps even destroy them in a murderous war. But then the Soviet Union, bleeding from its many wounds, will face, over the corpse of an annihilated Germany, the shining weapons of the Western powers, unblunted by any blows. Even now, the Anglo-Americans have made no guaranteed declaration on war aims, on territorial determinations, on the form of peace, etc. etc. (Kleist, *Eine Europäische Tragödie*).

In September 1943, after the German defeat in the battle for the Kursk salient, there was a new Soviet offer: "The goal of the Kremlin's nego-

tiations is the restoration of the Russo-German borders of 1914, a free hand in the straits question, German disinterest towards Soviet efforts in all of Asia, and the development of extensive economic relations between Germany and the Soviet Union" (Kleist). There are unconfirmed reports of a Ribbentrop-Molotov meeting during the summer of 1943, with a Soviet-Nazi separate peace as the key agenda item.

As U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes and others have noted, the Soviet catalogue of demands did not change from the Ribbentrop-Molotov period to the Teheran-Yalta-Potsdam period. The Soviets continued to demand the recognition of their sovereign hegemony over satrap states in eastern Europe, including Poland, up to the 1939 line of demarcation and well beyond it. Stalin demanded and got the division of Germany into zones of occupation—which have proven to be permanent—and also demanded his own Morgenthau Plan for the destruction and plundering of the German economy, in the form of the *démontage* of factories and their transfer to the Soviet Union, plus assigned shares of German industrial production year by year.

In the Far East, Stalin was every bit as much the unabashed Third Rome imperialist, demanding the restoration of territory and interests lost in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, including Sakhalin Island, imperial concessions of Russian pre-eminent interest in Manchuria (like the running of the Manchurian railroads), and possession of the port of Darien and the naval base of Port Arthur. Stalin also slyly included on his list the Kurile Islands, which had never been Russian, but which he was determined to seize anyway.

The Soviet propaganda of the late Stalin era made no secret of the Third Rome and Great Russian racist inspiration of Kremlin policies. One historian sums up the case as follows: "The grandeur of Tsarist Russia was trumpeted more stridently than it ever had been during the war. The historians exalted every feat of imperial conquest: They presented every act of violence once inflicted upon Russia's subject nations as an act of emancipation and progress, for which the oppressed nations should have been grateful. They hailed Catherine the Great and Nicholas I as the benefactors and protectors of the peoples of the Caucasus and of Central Asia; and they portrayed the leaders of those peoples, who resisted Tsardom and struggled for independence, as reactionaries and British or Turkish stooges. Schoolchildren were given a view of history as a single sequence of wicked foreign conspiracies invariably foiled by their ancestors' vigilance and valor. No one was to doubt that Russia, and Russia alone, was the salt of the earth, the cradle of civilization, the fount of all that is great and noble in the human spirit. The Russians became the pioneers, discoverers, and inventors of all those feats of modern technology which an ignorant or malicious world attributed to Britons, Germans, Frenchmen, or Americans. Day in day out, the newspapers filled their pages with stories of miraculous Popovs or Ivanovs who had been the first to design the printing press, the steam engine, the aeroplane, and the wireless" (Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin* [New York, 1970], p. 603-4).

The ideological profile assembled here has been the dominant one in Russian history. The Byzantine cultural paradigm by its essence is more binding than the Western, Augustinian one. This ideological profile of Russian imperialism has been operative in this century, even during the times that its workings were somewhat subterranean, and there can be no question that it is efficient today. It has been noted by a number of writers that if we examine a Russian Orthodox believer of the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, a Slavophile of the nineteenth century, or a Communist commissar of the twentieth century, we will find virtually no

change in the internalized mental map of reality, in particular in regard to the relations between Russia and the West. Only the labels have changed. Out of these most superficial and ephemeral changes, the ideologues of this century have attempted to manufacture theories to obscure the historical essence of the problem.

Stalin's recreation of the Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church on Sept. 4, 1943, and the accompanying changes made in official Soviet propaganda and other arrangements, as the price for Orthodox support in the conduct of the Great Patriotic War, serves as a very powerful illustration that some things do not change so easily. If we review the fragmentary materials available on the history of the Rossiya Society, alias the Society for the Preservation of Architectural Monuments, a group of Great Russian chauvinist military officers of the highest ranks founded by Marshal Chuikov and continued by Marshal Grechko and others, it is evident that the old traditions of the Third Rome, along with the Stalin revival, constitute the ideology of the present Soviet build-up for World War III. It may be an esoteric ideology for empiricist academics or those on the Kissinger or Harriman payrolls, but for a competent analyst it is a plain fact, and not very esoteric at all.

Stalin himself publicized his own views on the matter to a certain extent in his concluding toast at the Kremlin banquet for Red Army commanders on May 24, 1945, in which the Generalissimo stated: "I should like to drink to the health of our Soviet people . . . and first of all to the health of the Russian people. I drink first of all to the health of the Russian people because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations of the Soviet Union. . . . It has won in this war universal recognition as the leading force in the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country. . . . The confidence of the Russian people in the Soviet government was the decisive force which ensured the historic victory over the enemy of mankind—fascism."

On July 8, 1948, the Stalin regime organized a large-scale celebration in Moscow for the 500th anniversary of the autocephaly of the Russian Orthodox Church. The following observations from the speech of Stephen, Metropolitan of Sofia and Exarch of Bulgaria, demonstrate the continuing central importance of the Third Rome prophecy:

In this way the Russian Orthodox Church freed herself from subjection to Constantinople (*Tsargrad*). It was not a revolt of subjects against authority; it was also not a rejection by an adult Daughter of the duty of unconditional obedience to her Mother. It was a majestic act of Orthodox zeal, a defense of one's own Orthodoxy against new criminal attacks on it. It was a courageous step by a great Church which was prepared to defend all Universal Orthodoxy, including the Greek one. . . . Moscow became the Third Rome, having taken the place in the confession of Christ's truth of the First Rome which had departed from the truth, and of the Second Rome which had slipped off the path of faith—Constantinople" (*Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, no. 8, 1948, p. 16).

Or, put more succinctly, in the words of the late Metropolitan Nikodim of the Russian Orthodox Church spoken to representatives of the Church of England in Lambeth Palace in Canterbury several years ago: "One day very soon you will have to recognize that we are the Third Rome!"

2.3 Imperial Soviet Russia and the Chaldean-Byzantine Model of Empire

The Soviet state's *raison d'état* is *Imperial Peace* in the same sense as it was in the old Russian Empire, and the Ottoman, Byzantine, and Roman Empires before it. Political folklore has preserved the notion of the doctrine of Imperial Peace in the form of traditional gossip about *Pax Romana*, *Pax Britannica* and so on. Imperial Peace is that state of affairs in which a great empire has extinguished from the face of the earth every possible rival state or political institution. It is, today, the substance of the Soviet-sponsored "peace movement," and the price that the Western alliance's appeaser faction, beginning with Lord Carrington, is willing to pay in order to "avoid war."

The actual political doctrine of Imperial Peace first emerged as a fundamental commitment of the state in the third millennium B.C. during the Ur period of Akkadian hegemony in Mesopotamia, under the influence of the Chaldean priesthood, as far as recorded history informs us. The Ur Chaldean doctrine of Imperial Peace, in fact, bears striking resemblance to the present policies, both domestic and foreign, of the Soviet Union. Essentially, the concept is: In order to maintain the stability and continuity of a state, based on internal repression and on state management of the economy, one must destroy any and every other state or political entity, near or far, which might become a rallying point of ideological or political loyalties or which might threaten the material resources of the state-run economy.

A quick summation of the Mesopotamian notion of statecraft from the Ur Chaldean period will bring out the similarities to the Soviet state: As tens of thousands of surviving cuneiform tablets of the period show, the economy of Mesopotamia in that period was a state-run, centrally planned economy similar, institutionally, to that of the U.S.S.R. Planning and management were carried out by the Chaldean priesthood at the temples who, in later years, became known as the Magi, or "magicians." In that riparian-agricultural economy, economic management consisted of seeing through the annual agricultural production cycle: storing and preserving the seed, distributing the agricultural tasks from

sowing to harvesting, and meting out payments to the working population in the form of stipends from the stores of the temple. The most important task, however, was water management:

In the geography of Mesopotamia, this meant political and military control over the entire area irrigated by the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, a task involving the subjugation of peoples inhabiting not only the Tigris and Euphrates basins but also all the territories which might endanger control over the two rivers' headwaters and by extension, those further territories and peoples adjacent to territories in proximity to strategic locations near the rivers. This perspective brought the foreign policy interests of the Chaldean priesthood all the way up to the north coasts of the Caspian and Black Seas and out into the Eastern Mediterranean.

These perceived needs of the Chaldean priesthood gave rise to the original notion of Imperial Peace: All nationalities and peoples inhabiting any relevant territory of the known world must be deprived of the means and ability to form politico-military institutions of state. World Empire thus became the practical requirement for preserving dominion over the state-socialist run strip of fertile land between Tigris and Euphrates from Ashur down to Babylon.

The means adopted by the Chaldean statesmen for imposing such world Imperial Peace over different populations have changed little over the centuries. They have remained principally five: 1) genocide, 2) population relocation, 3) assimilation into the dominant group, 4) bestowal of a special status of subjugation and alliance which in the Roman Empire period became known as *Foederati*, 5) religious cult manipulation which, as state policy during the Roman Empire, was given the name *Pax Deorum*—"peace of the gods."

In Soviet policy, these five motifs are very familiar: 1) Genocide against Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Tatars, Poles, et al. is known to have occurred repeatedly; 2) Relocation both of Russian populations into hostile territories and of hostile non-Russian populations away from their national home has also been the standard Soviet policy; 3) Assimilation, especially by means of forced Russianization, especially against Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians is also well documented; 4) Bestowal of the status of *populi foederati* is the policy of what we see happened to Eastern Europe's "captive nations," as well as the Cuban and Vietnamese "surrogates." Ironically, the East Germans of today have acquired the status of the favored *foederatus* once enjoyed by the Ostrogoths from the time of Constantius to that of Justinian; 5) Finally, the policy of *Pax Deorum* is, in content, nothing different from Josef Stalin's famous *nationalities policy*: Each nation, each *gentium* of gentiles is allowed to worship its own hearth, provided that all hearths together, all nationalities, sacrifice and work for the aggrandizement of the Imperium.

Continuity of imperial tradition

What must be understood first and foremost, if one is ever to adequately estimate what the Soviet Union in fact is, is this: These hideous policies of oppression and brutality such as genocide, ethnocide, mass brainwashing, coercion, "assimilation," manipulation and prostitution of captive nations, are not arbitrary whims of tyrants who enjoy administering brutal oppression. They are the logical consequences of a highly refined tradition of statecraft, going back many thousands of years, a tradition associated with the notion of "Ecumenical Empire" and, thus, "Ecumenical Peace." When the Chaldean priesthood of Ur first devised this notion,

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it found great fascination in its application and execution. Over a period of many centuries, though dynasties changed as the Babylonian "King Lists" show, the Mesopotamian Empire, under many different names such as Akkadian, Sumerian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Persian, remained. The great engineers of Empire, the Chaldean priesthood, remained at the controls through all these changes. Each time a particular dynasty or a particularly successful king threatened this control, it or he was replaced. What remained invariant in Mesopotamian politics was the Imperial principle and its practitioners, the Chaldeans. They practiced religious manipulation, genocide, population relocations; they manipulated and controlled at will militarily powerful primitive tribes; they invented and practiced with abandon what many centuries later Rudyard Kipling would dub "The Great Game."

Over the centuries of practice, for the Chaldean Magi, "the play became the thing." A deeply rooted tradition of Magi-associated statecraft emerged in the affairs of mankind. The Old Testament, in more ways than one, reflects the struggles associated with this tradition of statecraft, the Cult of Temporal Power. In the New Testament, it is echoed in the references to the Whore of Babylon and in the account of Jesus Christ's triumph over the temptation presented in the form of "the Prince of this World."

As the Great Game itself became the "thing," the tradition of Ecumenical Empire and thus Ecumenical Peace, was transplanted westward. The last great project of the old Chaldean priesthood, in the name of their own power, involved employment of Persian military might to the task of reducing the Greek republics to slavery. It produced the "Persian Wars" described by Herodotus, which resulted in defeat of the empire. In order to preserve the idea of empire, the Chaldean priesthood was willing to undermine its own Mesopotamian seat of power and to build up Sparta, Thebes, and finally Macedonia as powerful military marcher lords against the republican forms of government in ancient Greece.

In order to preserve the Imperial idea, they allied with and helped augment the power of the militarily superior Macedonia, on the basis of agreements with King Philip, to restore ecumenical "Imperial Peace" under the infamous "Isocrates Plan." Philip's son, Alexander the Great, abandoned his father's deal, destroyed militarily the power base of the Chaldean priesthood, restored ancient republican liberties, and for this he was assassinated. After Alexander's assassination, the Chaldean Magi and other recipients of their tradition, embarked on the project of transplanting their notions of imperial statecraft, the "Great Game" of world empire, westward. Eventually, by means of influences over and through the Ptolemaic and Seleucid dynasties, and through the cult of Magna Mater, the Roman Empire was constructed as an ecumenical empire, to maintain ecumenical imperial peace.

Rome maintained this peace by means of the same "population control" policies devised earlier by the Chaldeans: genocide, population relocations, assimilation through extension of Roman "citizenship," *Pax Deorum*, and use of *populi foederati*.

Thus, the ecumenical power of world empire was being preserved, and the Chaldean Magi's principle of statecraft ruled triumphant, whereas all nations and peoples ruled by this scheme were nearing extinction, in the depths of cultural, economic, and demographic "heat death," the proper outcome of imperial "Ecumenical Peace." Christianity emerged as the affirmation of Natural (God's) Law, against this entropy, the law of empire. The struggles which ensued, led directly to the famous "Diocletian Reforms," and the founding of the Byzantine Empire, the direct predecessor of the present Soviet Empire.

Diocletian reforms and the Russian cultural matrix

The reason for which General Secretary Gorbachov and Marshal Ogarkov today are beating their heads against the culturally induced anti-technology bias of the mass of the Russian population, is the same reason to which they owe their current position of extraordinary political power: the Diocletian Reforms of the Roman Empire toward the end of the third century A.D. These reforms codified a number of laws and decrees whose purpose was not merely to prohibit any technological change in society's economic practice, but also to promote institutional forms of life which would extinguish the very idea of the possibility of technological change from the minds of the subject populations.

The Diocletian Reforms also created the framework of institutions of Imperial power which remained dominant throughout the 1,123 years of existence of the Byzantine Empire and which we find today in the Soviet Empire: the elected (not hereditary) Emperor, or General Secretary, the appointed/elected (not hereditary) Senate or Central Committee, and the continuity of the Imperial administrative class or *Nomenklatura*.

Emperor Constantine I, "The Great," formally inaugurated the city of Constantinople, to be the Second Rome, on May 11, 330. The "City" fell to Sultan Muhammad II, The Conqueror, on May 29, 1453. During the intervening 1,123 years, the Eastern Roman Empire, called "The Roman Empire," by its contemporaries, and "The Byzantine Empire," by our contemporary historians, was ruled on the basis of the administrative edicts of Emperor Diocletian, without the slightest alteration.

These edicts, the so-called Diocletian Reforms, were based on specific legislation explicitly prohibiting the introduction of any technological innovation, whatsoever, in society's economic practice, on grounds of preserving the stability of professional guilds; the Diocletian Reforms also included major legislation, whose stated intent was the reduction of population.

Emperor Diocletian, also, around 303, was the first emperor to publicly proclaim Mithra, Sol Invictus Mithra, Protector of the Empire. An earlier Roman emperor, Tiberius, who ordered the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, was, on the island of Capri, under the overwhelming influence of actual Chaldean priests who had persuaded him to proclaim Mithra a god-protector of the empire. Tiberius had failed to persuade the Senate to agree. Diocletian did so with the addition "Sol Invictus," Sun Invincible. At the time of Diocletian's proclamation of Mithra as "Protector of the Empire," Constantine was a tribunos in Diocletian's court.

Zero growth and technological standstill, was the stated axiomatic, philosophical, purpose to which, the imperial state, designed by Diocletian, was dedicated. The state's internal administrative regulations, the so-called constitution, regulating the behavior of the institutions of power, the political "system" of Diocletian state, the Byzantine Empire, was:

- 1) *The Emperor*: Not a hereditary, but an elective office. The Byzantine emperor had to be elected by the Senate, acclaimed by the Army, and confirmed by acclamation by the "people," i.e. the riff-raff of Constantinople's streets.

- 2) *The Senate*: Even before Diocletian's reforms, the "Roman Senate" had been transformed beyond recognition. Diocletian merely codified those transformations. "Senatorial Provinces," administered by traditional patrician families, ceased to exist. The Senate lost all legislative power. Instead, it became the consultative assembly for all the Senior Imperial Advisers, the power seat of the senior functionaries of govern-

ment. Its function, almost identical to the modern day Soviet Central Committee, was a) to run the day-to-day affairs of state, b) elect the emperor, c) in its capacity as a special sort of judicial court, to approve broad policies. Like the members of the Soviet Central Committee, the Byzantine, Diocletian-modeled Senate, had its members divided into three classes: those residing in the seat of power, Constantinople, the *illustres*, also adopting the title of Patrician, those permanently stationed in the seats of provincial governments, like *Oblast* secretaries, the so-called *clarissimi*, and those who floated between the capital and the provinces, like Geidar Aliyev in the 1970s, called the *spectabiles*.

3) *The Church*. A special function of the Imperial Administration. In the pre-Christian era of the Diocletian Empire, its function was exemplified by the institution of *Pax Deorum*, to be administered by the priesthoods of all the different cults under the direction of the Pontifex Maximus, the emperor.

Emperor Constantine I, the Great, who allowed Christianity to be included in the list of officially sanctioned religions of the empire, was a senior ranking member in Emperor Diocletian's court, a *tribunus*, during the time of the great Diocletian persecutions of the Christians in 303 and afterward. The founder of the Eastern, Byzantine, Roman Empire, was thoroughly schooled in the Diocletian reforms.

When Diocletian introduced his reforms, including the cult of Sol Invictus Mithra, he was reigning in the eastern part of the empire. He remained in the East throughout his life. While he was "Augustus," his deputy, the "Caesar," was Galerius. There is no evidence that Diocletian, whose name was applied to the "Diocletian persecutions," was in any way especially hostile to the Christian cult of the time. He was merely in favor of a uniform cult orientation for the whole empire's population, a cult orientation which would "pray for the state." Evidence suggests that the "Diocletian persecutions" were ordered by Ceasar Galerius in an effort to establish such uniformity of worship.

The Diocletian-Galerian persecutions, the last ever to take place, were suspended by an edict, signed by Diocletian and Galerius as well as the two co-emperors of the West, in which the Christians were allowed free worship, and full restoration of their properties, both private and church property, with the understanding that they would "pray for the state." (The text of the edict survives, see *Appendix*.)

The imperial tradition is passed to Muscovy

Documented elsewhere is the fact that the Byzantine Empire, during the Paleologue dynasty, had abandoned the Chaldean doctrine of statecraft and aligned with the Augustinian traditions of the Catholic Church in the West. For this, members of the imperial elite and clergy of Byzantium engineered the military conquest of their own seat of power by the Ottoman Turks. The same political faction transferred the mandate for Imperial statecraft to one of their backwater dependencies, the obscure Grand Duchy of Muscovy, by means of the legend of the "Third and Final Rome."

Maps 10-19 chart the territorial growth of the Russian state from the 1400s—when its rulers were bitten by the "bug" of the "Third and Final Rome,"—to the present day. In the span of 500 years, since, more or less, the discovery of America by Columbus, the Russian state grew from a miniscule patch of land defined by the Tver-Kaluga line and by the

Volga and Oka rivers, to a vast expanse covering one-sixth of the surface of the earth. Beyond its own formal territory, it exerts dominion over millions of square miles of territories inhabited by its *populi feoderati* in Mongolia, Afghanistan, North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany, etc.

The growth of this empire has been astounding. It has been fueled by strategic motivations which are coherent with the old Chaldean concept of ecumenical Imperial Peace: The Russian state, either in its Soviet or in its earlier form, "cannot feel secure" so long as there exist other socio-political formations in the world which might challenge its power.

The Soviet Union's Institute of Ethnography, the Soviet state's watchdog for "nationalities' policy," routinely but painstakingly preaches that the *organized state* is the finest achievement an ethnic group, or nation, can attain. Having reversed "classical Marxist" tenets on the subject, it argues that "the state" is an accretion of a nation's, not a class's, historical activity. Any given social class, e.g., the proletariat, may attain to political supremacy in the state, only if it can best serve the state interests of the nation. It short, the currently official justification for the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the Soviet Union is, stated explicitly, that it is the political arrangement which best serves the *state of the Russian nation, the Russian Empire*.

Seen through the eyes of the Russian imperial state's Institute of Ethnography, Russia's adversaries in the modern world are the states which have been formed by the largest rival ethnic formations.

To quote the Director of the Soviet Institute of Ethnography, Yulian Bromley:

Although a single biological species, which develops according to common social laws, the human race today falls into a multitude of different historically formed communities, such as race, class, family, state, etc. Among these human communities, a special place is occupied by units now customarily referred to as ethnic: tribe, nationality, nation, ethnic group, etc. According to very conservative estimates, the human race has inherited from the past at least two or three thousand of these units. They differ enormously—both in level of development and in number—ranging from nationalities archaic by origin, and even tribes which now have only thousands, if not hundreds of members, to nations of many millions. Characteristically, 11 peoples alone constitute almost 50 percent of mankind. The 7 largest exceed 100 million each. They (starting from the largest, according to 1978 data) are: Chinese (934 million), Hindustanis (180.5 million), U.S. Americans (172.2 million), Bengalis (138.7 million), Russians (138.6 million), Japanese (115.7 million), and Brazilians (112 million). At the same time, the almost 1,500 small peoples numbering up to 100,000 each account for less than one percent of the world's population.

In the Russian/Soviet leadership's scheme, a nation is as good as its state. It is a long-established dictum in the Russian tradition of statecraft that nations, either become the dominant force in world history, or, failing that, they become "ethnographic material" for other, more successful nations. Here lies the secret of the Russian state. Without the obsessive idea, from the 1440s onward, of Moscow's mission as the "Third and Final Rome," nothing can be either understood or explained of the history of the Russian state. It is a history of an endless struggle to prevail

over other ethnic populations, transform them into "ethnographic material" for the Russian state, lest Russia itself become their "ethnographic material."

The maps of the history of the Russian state's growth tell much of the story (Maps 10-19):

In the year 1,300 A.D. the Russian state, as it had been left by Alexander Nevsky, Grand Prince of Moscow, was a minuscule settlement around the city of Moscow. When the messianic doctrine of the Third and Final Rome became adopted by Moscow's rulers after 1439 and they dropped the title of "Grand Prince of Muscovy" in favor of the Byzantine style of "autocrat," the Russian state was still no more than a patch of land delineated by the Oka and Volga rivers surrounding Moscow and the Tver-Kaluga line. This tiny triangle, in fact, is the home of the people who are identified as Great Russians.

The great expansion of the immense Russian state out of the confines of Tver-Kaluga/Oka-Volga begins with the pursuing of the dream of the Third Rome. Ivan III, coached by the Byzantine Greek priesthood, lays claim to the title of the last Byzantine emperor, whose niece he had married, and launches the great drive of conquest. Under him, the Russian state expands north to the Kola peninsula and the Arctic Sea; east to the Ob river; south to Kursk; and West to Smolensk and the outskirts of Pskov.

Under Ivan IV, the Terrible, the Russian state, in pursuit of its destiny as the Third and Final Rome, and under the skillful guidance of Metropolitan Makarii, expands south of the Don River and up to 200 miles south and east of the Kama River. These newly acquired vast stretches of land of the growing Russian state were not filled by "ethnic Great Russians," the peoples inhabiting the narrow stretch of Volga-Oka/Tver-Kaluga. The peoples who were subjugated were also subjected to forced Russianization: Votyaks, Permians, Cheremissians, Mordvins, Bashkirs, Voguls, Syrians, Cossacks, Chuvashes, and others (Maps 23-24).

The technique then, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was identical to that employed today by the Soviet forces in Afghanistan: decapitation of national leadership, violent extinction of national intelligentsia, forced mass relocations, and selective settlements of Russian population in such strategic locations as forts and administratively important urban centers. This technique of transforming subjugated populations into "ethnographic material" for the Russian state was to be repeated again and again over the centuries, as the Russian state continued its relentless expansion eastward into Asia, southward through the Ukraine into the Black Sea and the Caucasus, and westward into Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, East Prussia, Bessarabia, Moldavia, etc.

In the 1979 census, 109 different nationalities were reported to exist inside the Soviet state. Ten years earlier, they were 129. Some have dropped out as used up "ethnographic material," their former members now identifying themselves as "Russian." Not easily racially identifiable, a "Russian" is one whose inner sense of national identity is, essentially, rooted in the axiomatic, not necessarily conscious, acceptance of the messianic mission of the Third and Final Rome. From "Great Russian," the circle expands to "Byelorussian," "Ukrainian," "Slavic," "Panslavic," "Indoeuropean."

The Soviet Union today is the old "Great Russian" state which has enlisted, willy-nilly, the resources of Byelorussians, Ukrainians, Slavs, "Panslavs," to the drive to construct the "Third and Final Rome." It has now embarked on exacting the loyalties of the "Indoeuropeans" of Western Europe, Iran, and the Subcontinent, to the imperial scheme of

dominating the "Eurasian landmass." If the Soviet Institute of Ethnography has its way, then Germans, Italians, Frenchmen, Spaniards, English and so forth, will become the "Great Russian" state's "ethnographic material, going the way of Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Poles, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians and other proud and "fiercely independent" people.

However, for these nations to become "ethnographic material," their organized nation-states must first be destroyed—which is exactly what the Soviet Union intends to do upon establishing unchallenged strategic dominance over the Eurasian landmass. The Soviet Institute of Ethnography has, for many years, maintained the most meticulous record of ethnic separatist movements which might be used against the existing European nation-states.

Each year, this institute produces the most comprehensive annual encyclopedia of developments in every one of the thousands of ethnic groups, tribes, minorities etc. around the world, called *Peoples and Races of the World*. The results of this comprehensive monitoring are communicated to various specialized organizations such as the Oriental Institute, the Latin American Institute, and others which function as the think tanks of the KGB and its associated SSD of East Germany which, in turn, fan the flames of separatist insurgency around the globe from the Basques, Britons, Corsicans, et al., of Europe to the Sendero Luminoso, Tupamaros, and so forth of Ibero-America, to the various religious, tribal, and ethnic insurgencies of Asia and Africa. These are Third Rome's battering rams for the eventual pulverization of the existing nation-states, which it views as the final obstacles to its dream of Imperial Peace, the Third and Final *Pax Romana*.

The 'Great Russians' and the 'Great White Race'

The expansion of the Russian Empire during the twentieth century can not be merely described as territorial expansion *qua* territorial expansion—extensive as that has been. The expansion of the geographical boundaries of the Empire have been accompanied by a far greater change in its ethnic map. For the Russian Empire, territorial expansion means expansion of the territory settled by the Great Russian Race.

No real understanding of the racist and Russian-chauvinist mind of the Soviet leadership, past and present, is possible without examining in depth, the historically unprecedented scale of human forced migrations that have occurred as a result of Soviet Russian policy decisions. Through the past 65 years, and with especial intensity under Stalin from 1943-48, "enemy" non-Russian ethnic populations numbering in the tens of millions have been forcibly uprooted and expelled from territories they had inhabited for hundreds of years. Millions of Great Russians have been resettled by official policy into these vast territories vacated by the expelled millions.

As we shall see, moving the Great Russian ethnic line westward, southward, and eastward, has also meant moving the Diocesan boundary of the Russian Orthodox Church an equal distance in each of these directions. Put into historical terms, in the last four decades, the East-West cultural and religious divide has been moved, along with the Great Russian and Russified Slav ethnic line, hundreds of kilometers to the West.

Expulsion and Great Russian expansion has been westward, southward, and eastward, always away from Russia proper. The accompanying Russian ethnic area expansion, has been likewise in these three directions. To the west, it has been at the expense of Protestant German and Baltic populations (East Prussian, Baltic German, Pomeranian, East Branden-

Mass expulsion of Germans: 1944-1947

Region	Number Expelled
East Prussia	1,950,000
Danzig	300,000
Pomerania and East Brandenburg	1,900,000
Silesia	3,250,000
Prewar central Poland	650,000
Sudetenland	2,900,000
Hungary	250,000
Yugoslavia	300,000
Romania	100,000
Prewar eastern Poland	275,000
Black Sea Germans (U.S.S.R.)	250,000
Baltic Germans	185,000

burg, Estonian, Latvian) and Roman Catholic German and Polish populations, (Silesian, and the Polish populations east of the Bug and the San, the rivers forming the current Soviet-Polish boundary).

To understand the magnitude of massacre and expulsions involved in the Russian Empire's expansion to the west under Stalin, one must start with a view of what the Russian prewar western boundary of 1939 looked like. To the west of Russia was Poland with a population of 35 million, Germany with 72 million, Czechoslovakia with 14 million, and the Baltic republics: Estonia with 1,127,000, Latvia with 1,925,000, and Lithuania with 2,462,000 people.

Then came the Hitler-Stalin Pact, the partition of Poland, the Russian seizure of the three Baltic republics, then the war, and, finally Stalin forcing through his territorial expansion demands, and his mass population expulsion. In short, a staggering redrawing of the territorial, ethnic, and ecclesiastical map of Europe, not seen in centuries.

Ten years later, by 1948, the territories along the western boundary of the Soviet Union looked quite different. The entire German ethnic populations of prewar Poland, the three Baltic states, and Czechoslovakia were expelled. The areas of prewar Germany, east of the rivers Oder and Neisse, were all but vacated of Germans. Forty percent of the area of prewar Poland was acquired by the Soviet Union. Most of its Polish population was forcibly expelled—to settle the depopulated areas of prewar Germany that were added to Poland after the war. The part of prewar Germany taken by Russia—the northern half of East Prussia around Königsberg—was settled exclusively by Russians. Its Russian (Orthodox) population functions as an ethnic and ecclesiastic “buffer,” or *cordon sanitaire* between Roman Catholic Poland and Lithuania, the only Roman Catholic republic in the Soviet Union.

The table shows the magnitude of the Stalin program of mass population expulsion, making Eastern Europe a thoroughly Slavic preserve, by removing the Germans from Eastern Europe, and in doing so—“compensating” Poland and Czechoslovakia at the expense of Germany, binding the non-Orthodox Slavic Poles and the Czechs to Russia. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the Germans represented 24% of the country's prewar population. The population density of the country's western regions has, to this day, never recovered.

By the same token, removing the Poles from their historical eastern

provinces, "purified" the Russian Empire down to three main Slavic groups: Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians.

The western Ukrainians were also "purified" through Stalin's 1946 edict outlawing the Vatican-affiliated Ukrainian Uniate Church. The Church's leaders, its bishops and priests, were arrested, imprisoned, or deported to Central Asia, and many were executed or died in prison camps. This smashing of the Church, together with the 1945-50 "mini-Afghanistan" type of anti-Russian partisan warfare which raged in the western Ukraine—and was brutally suppressed—broke the back of Ukrainian nationalism.

Since then, the entire Ukraine has been officially Orthodox in religion, and its population has been increasingly Russified. The same very advanced Russification process has been underway in the other Slavic republics, Byelorussia, and in the Baltic states.

The conclusion and aftermath of World War II produced 15,310,000 refugees from Eastern and Central Europe. Of these, 12,310,000 were German-speaking—not to mention the two million non-combatant Germans who were killed in those countries.

Eastern and central Poland saw massive displacements, in addition to the six million Poles who died under Nazi occupation. Of the 1,600,000 eastern Poles deported to Siberia by the Russians, 508,000 died in short order. Following the war, 1,500,000 from eastern Poland, and 3,500,000 from central Poland, resettled in the new territory of western Poland, which had been carved out of the German Reich.

Regarding the Baltic states, especially Estonia and Latvia, the basic population figures speak for themselves. Above all, the Estonians and Latvians have never recovered from the mass deportations and executions of 1940-41, and 1944-46.

The Soviet occupation administration of neighboring Lithuania, 1944-46, was run by Mikhail Suslov, the political godfather of both Yuri Andropov and Mikhail Gorbachov.

According to the 1935 census, conducted in each of the three Baltic states while they were independent, there were 1,473,000 Latvians and 993,000 Estonians. Neither of these two nationalities has yet to regain its 1935 numbers. The 1979 census recorded only 948,000 Estonians, and 1,344,000 Latvians.

The Latvians are about to become a minority in their "own" republic. In 1979, they made up only 53.7% of the population (only 52.4% in the 1984 interim count), while Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians combined added up to 40% of Latvia's population (the Russian component being 32.8%). In 1935, Latvia was only 10% ethnically Russian. The Latvian capital of Riga now contains at most a 38% Latvian population; the majority is Russian. With the scheduled start of construction on the Riga Subway, thousands of Russian construction workers and their families will be brought in, and the balance will tilt even more.

The Russian ethnic takeover of Latvia is the result of a postwar policy of settling Russians and other Slavs into the Baltic republics—above all in Latvia and Estonia. Estonia's Russian population has risen from less than 4% in 1935. (Officially the Estonian census of 1935 records an 8.2% Russian population, but more than half of the people were concentrated in the area called Virumaa, south of Lake Peipus, which was annexed by the Russian Republic in 1945. Its population included 48,300 Russians, 14,700 Setukesen—an Estonian-speaking tribe which had converted to Russian Orthodoxy back in the Middle Ages—and a mere 7,800 Estonians.) Today, Estonians make up 64.7% of the population

in the 1979 census (63.5% in the 1984 interim count), while in 1979, Russians made up 27.9% of the population, and with Ukrainians and Byelorussians, 32%.

We must not overlook the Russian ethnic and religious extension of the line in the far north and far south of the new, postwar western boundaries of the empire. In the far north, the Karelia region, annexed from Finland, which was then run by the Finnish member of the Russian leadership, Otto Kuusinen, and his young aide and sidekick, Yuri Andropov. The Finnish population was expelled en masse to Finland during 1944 and 1945. Some 450,000 Finns were deported. In addition, from 1941 to 1944, some 62,000 Ingermanlander (one of the ethnic groups which has disappeared from Russia) from the Karelian area, were trucked to Finland.

Karelia has since been resettled with Russians and Ukrainians. The same heavy resettlement has occurred in formerly Romanian Bessarabia, seized by Russia in 1940, and renamed the "Moldavian Republic."

Lebensraum to the south and east

The Russian Empire's drive to the south during this century can be demarcated into two phases. The first phase began following 1917, and was in full swing under Stalin—from the collectivization through the war. It involved a huge extension of the boundary between the Great Russian Race and the Moslem populations to the south—at a horrendous cost to the Moslem populations.

This phase embraces the "Afghanistans" of its time: 10 years of brutal suppression of Moslem and Turkic revolts in Central Asia (1919-29) and among the Moslem nationalities of Russia proper; brutal actions, including the mass genocide of the Kazakhs, during the Collectivization period, 1929-33; and the forced deportation of the Crimean Tatars and the Moslem tribes of the northern Caucasus, during the war from 1943 to 1945.

The second phase, which has been underway since 1978 at the latest, has involved a further southern expansion, accompanied by a grisly repetition of the 1943-47 themes of mass murder and mass expulsions of populations from the empire, this time to the ethnic benefit of an officially recognized and sanctioned Turanian Division of the Russian Empire, added to the historical Slavic one.

During the time of the Tsarist Empire, there were never more than token Russian populations in areas such as the northern Caucasus, the Crimea, and the areas of Tatar and Bashkir concentrations between the Volga River and the Urals, let alone the huge expanses of Kazakhstan—by far the biggest geographically of all the Central Asian republics.

All these areas today are either predominantly Russian inhabited (or in the case of the Crimea, Ukrainian), or have a Russian majority (the case of Kazakhstan). This change occurred at the expense of forcibly evicted Moslem populations, who were either murdered, as in the case of the Kakakhs and Bashkirs, or were forcibly deported to Central Asia under Stalin during 1943-45.

Of those forcibly deported, hundreds of thousands did not survive the trip, or the camps. They included Crimean Tatars, who were expelled en masse to Central Asia, and the five Moslem tribes of the northern Caucasus: the Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Balkars, and Kalmyks. Slavic Ukrainians were settled in the Crimea, and Great Russian settlers poured into the northern Caucasus.

These Moslem tribes, though allowed under Khrushchov to resettle in their original areas (with the exception of the Crimean Tatars, who have never been allowed back), have never regained their status as the majority inhabitants of the region. The area lying to the south and southeast of the Great Russian Krasnodar-Stavropol region (home of Yuri Andropov and Mikhail Gorbachov) has become, like the Krasnodar Region itself, a Great Russian preserve.

As we shall document, the post-1917 period in Russian history has seen the realization of the Russian imperial "final solution" for every Moslem ethnic population located within the geographical confines of the Slavic Russian or Ukrainian republics. The largest Moslem ethnic groups in the Russian Republic proper were, and are, the Volga Tatars, and the Bashkirs, who inhabit the region west of the southern Urals. Through a process of massacre, dispersal, and Russification, the Great Russian Race "purification" of the Russian Republic proper, has reached a degree unprecedented in history. The Russian record would make Anglo-Saxon racist Cecil Rhodes blush with envy.

The Volga Tatars, who numbered six million in the 1970 census, were "pacified" through a process of massacres during the Civil War following the Revolution, and were then scattered throughout the Russian Republic, such that they have lost a sense of geographical concentration and continuity. The Tatars numbered some 2,400,000 in the 1897 census; 30 years later, in the 1926 census—reflecting the Civil War depredations—their population had only grown to 2,856,000.

Their dispersal over the decades has formed the precondition for a strong Russification of the Tatars. Their population peaked at six million in the 1970 census, and remained stagnant at 5,931,000 in the 1979 census. This cannot be accounted by any birth rate phenomenon, but is rather the proof of ongoing and intensified Russification.

Concerning the Tatars as a group, pious believers in the potential of "Moslem card" destabilization of the Soviet Union, can forget about them. The same is true for the second largest Moslem ethnic group in the Russian Republic: the Bashkirs.

Two case studies of genocide

What happened to the Bashkirs during the Russian Civil War, 1918-21, can only be described as genocide. In the 1897 census, they numbered 1,500,000, and had grown to two million by the end of World War I. After the 1917 Revolution, the Bashkirs, celebrating their freedom from the Tsarist yoke, declared an independent state. In 1920, Red Russian armies crushed the Bashkir State, executed all Bashkir leaders, and massacred the population.

Over one million Bashkirs were murdered in the wave of killings, burnings and executions that swept their territory. The 1926 census, which recorded barely one million Bashkirs, bears mute testimony to the extent of the genocide. The ensuing post-genocide Russification is documented by the otherwise inexplicable census of 1959—33 years later—which records only 954,000 Bashkirs, and that of 1970, which records 1,181,000 Bashkirs. The latest census, in 1979, showed only 1,240,000 Bashkirs. Shall the Bashkirs, who have never regained their 1897 population level—let alone that of 1918—pose a "Moslem card" threat to the Russian Empire?

The genocide committed against the Bashkirs was followed up with the mass murder of the Moslem Kazakhs of Central Asia. The Soviet

Russian suppression of the Kazakh uprising of 1918 killed many Kazakhs, but did not stop their population growth. The 1926 census counted 3,800,000 Kazakhs, nearly all in Kazakhstan. Before the 1929-33 Collectivization, the Kazakhs were nomads. The Collectivization triggered the second Kazakh revolt. By the end of Collectivization, 1,400,000 Kazakhs had been killed—40% of the entire Kazakh population. In 1936, the Kazakh population was reported to be 2,600,000.

Since then, the Kazakhs have belonged to the assimilated Russophile variety of Moslem nationalities, and served Mother Russia very well during the war (as was also the case with the Volga Tatars and the Bashkirs). They have been poorly rewarded for this good behavior. They have a Republic with an enormous land area which bears their name, Kazakhstan. The name is a bad joke. The Kazakhs make up less than 40% of the population of "Kazakhstan." The largest ethnic population in "Kazakhstan" is Russian (over 45%).

Stalin took no chances on preserving the Russian domination of Kazakhstan. Besides the normal contingents of Ukrainians settled in along with the Russians, most of the Volga Germans, deported en masse in 1941 after Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union, were moved to Kazakhstan. The flip side of this coin, is that over 20% of the Kazakh population of the Soviet Union has been dispersed outside Kazakhstan, including 9% scattered throughout Russia.

Afghanistan and Iran

From 1978 on, the Russian leadership has been overseeing the same pattern of mass killings and population expulsions it conducted along the western boundary of the empire during the 1940s, but this time along its southern boundary. This has continued down to the present. Soviet asset Khomeini and the Tashkent variety of Mullahs have locked Iran and Iraq into a replica of the Thirty Years War, a grisly re-run of the killing fields of World War I.

A recent estimate put out by New York Council on Foreign Relations member Philip Geyelin mentions 500,000 Iranian and over 200,000 Iraqi war dead. *Sunday Times* of London correspondent Amin Taheri, an Iranian exile, adds an estimated 12,000 political opponents executed by Khomeini; 250,000 killed in clashes with urban guerrillas, in the raging guerrilla war in Iranian Kurdistan, and other tribal rebellions. In addition, Taheri says that over 2,000,000 Iranians have emigrated since Khomeini came to power. This gives a population outflow of more than three million from Iran, which borders on the Moslem part of the Soviet Union.

In Afghanistan, which also borders on the Moslem part of the Soviet Union, the dimensions of the population outflow are even more staggering. Out of an Afghanistan population of 16 million, according to recent statements by Christian Democratic member of the West German Bundestag, Jürgen Todenhöfer, over one million have been killed by the Russian occupation (a repeat performance of the revolt suppression and genocide committed against the Soviet Central Asian populations during the 1920s and 1930s), and nearly 5,500,000 refugees have been generated, most of whom have fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran. Thus, through death and exile, within a few years the area of Afghanistan has lost over 40% of its population, as Kazakhstan did during the 1930s.

The burden of more than 3,200,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan, is threatening to tear that country apart, a consequence not unforeseen by

Soviet planners. It should be noted that the genocide depredations against the Moslem populations of Soviet Central Asia during the 1920s, also produced a wave of refugees into Iran (of Turkmens) and Afghanistan (Uzbeks, Tadjiks, and Kirgiz).

Those Afghans who remain behind are being ground up into the new assimilated generation—though this time with a Turkic twist. The most telling feature of the Soviet political-demographic occupation policy in Afghanistan, apart from the population reduction itself, is the basing of all schooling upon the ethnic language of the respective village or region. Concretely, this means that in the northern regions of Afghanistan, inhabited by Turkic-speaking populations (Uzbek, Tadjik, Turkmen) the local language—corresponding to the same Turkic languages of the Soviet “republics” on the the other side of the border—is used.

This strategem will establish a laboratory for the future expansion of the Turanian division of the empire, into the Turkish-speaking parts of Iran—Azerbaijan and Iranian Turkmenistan.

The Greater Race's junior partners

Another striking pattern, especially evident since the mid-1970s, has been that nearly all the Soviet Union's far-flung “surrogates,” have themselves been engaged in a parody of Great Russian Race expansion, at the expense of neighboring populations, and of ethnic minorities within their own national boundaries. The case studies are:

Syria: This nation has been steering a depopulating civil war and ethnic-religious conflicts in neighboring Lebanon—the domain of “Greater Syria”—since 1975, when the mass ethnic killings began. Lebanon, with a mere three million people, has seen more than 100,000 of its citizens killed, and a mass emigration of even greater magnitude. Syria has aided Iran in continuing the slaughter in Iraq, and is now aiding and abetting the beginnings of a Kurdish revolt in southeastern Turkey.

Ethiopia: Expulsion of Moslem and ethnic-minority Christian tribes in Coptic Ethiopia began with the Soviet-backed Ogaden War in 1977-78 against Somalia. The Moslem-nomadic Somali population of the Ogaden were driven out *en masse* into the squalid refugee/death camps of Somalia (the mass starvation of 1980, and again recently, along with the mass cholera outbreaks). In the north, besides the hundreds of thousands killed in over 20 years of fighting in Eritrea, Moslem Eritrea has been one of the worst-ravaged famine areas. This same pattern of brutal repression and mass starvation, with no aid allowed in, has plagued the northern provinces of Tigre and Wollo.

Libya: Soviet client Libya began its expansion in 1973 with the annexation of the Aouzou Strip in neighboring Chad. Last year saw the *de facto* annexation of the northern half of Chad, already depopulated through Libyan actions. The Libyan occupation of northern Chad has generated a massive refugee influx into southern Chad, and into western Sudan. Western Sudan, currently a center of famine deaths from drought, is itself being rapidly depopulated, as the famine survivors move south and east.

Bulgaria: The “Bulgarization” of the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, speaks for itself. The Bulgarian “race,” stagnating in population, will grow through the forced assimilation of the country's 10% Turkish minority.

We will conclude this section with some telling notes on Russian population policy.

Siberian populations and the Jews

Russian expansion to the east—into Siberia—was already accomplished under the Tsars. The Soviet period has been used to consolidate the Russian populating of Siberia, and the far-eastern region north of the Amur and Ussuri Rivers, by transforming the huge region from a virtually empty tract, into one with a multi-million Russian population.

No treatment of Russian ethnic policy would be complete without a word on Soviet policy over the period of Yuri Andropov as KGB chief (1967-82) and party General Secretary, which is the period of permitted Jewish emigration. Over 260,000 Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate in this period.

The motivation behind the policy—aside from certain obvious deals and arrangements with Israel, and Israeli “pay-offs” in return for the “blood transfusion” of European Jewish immigrants into a state where emigration has tended to exceed immigration—has been the final implementation of late nineteenth-century Russian Orthodox Church leader Pobedonostsev’s “solution” to the Russian Jewish “Problem”: “Let one-third die, one-third emigrate, one-third assimilate.”

That is precisely what has been set into inexorable motion under Andropov’s KGB tenure, and even though the ratios may have changed, they still add up to 100%. In 1897, there were 4,308,000 Jews in the Tsarist Empire. In the 1970 census, there were 2,150,000; and by 1979, after the peak period of Andropov-allowed emigration, only 1,800,000.

These gross figures, however, do not tell the full story; the age structure of the remaining Jewish population does. By 1979, only 6% of the Jewish population was children under 10 years old, compared with a Soviet average of over 18%. In 1970, 12% of the Soviet Jewish population was over 60 years old. By 1979, this had risen to an alarming 38%. Andropov and the KGB had allowed the “unassimilable” young Jewish couples with children to form the bulk of the emigration. Left behind have been the aged, who will soon die, which will produce a stupendous drop in the Jewish population over the next two decades. The “rest,” as Pobedonostsev would say, “shall assimilate.”

2.4 The Andropov Dynasty: 'Stalin's Children'

The ascendancy of **Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachov**, who only in 1980, at the age of 49, had become the youngest full member of the Politburo, met with enthusiasm among many Western politicians and alleged experts on the Kremlin. "Mikhail Gorbachov: Best Bet for Reform in the Kremlin," Princeton Russian affairs specialist Stephen F. Cohen called him (Nov. 11, 1984, *Los Angeles Times*). The London *Observer* profiled Gorbachov as "Kremlin's apostle of change" (Nov. 11, 1984), shortly before Gorbachov—not yet the party General Secretary—arrived in London with his wife Raisa, to show off to the world the outward shine of the modern folk who were about to take over at the Kremlin.

When U.S.S.R. President and Communist Party General Secretary **Konstantin Chernenko** died on March 12, Gorbachov was proclaimed his successor as party chief just four hours and 15 minutes after Chernenko's official death announcement. The record swiftness of his elevation, in the name of a unanimous Central Committee, bespoke a collective leadership decision made weeks, if not months, beforehand. The rosy forecasts and commentaries resumed, with a stress on Gorbachov's "accent on reform," and supposed interest in achieving early breakthroughs in arms control—the latter supposition having been furthered by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's announcement after five hours of talks with Gorbachov during the December 1984 visit to London, that "I like Mr. Gorbachov; we can do business together."

Just a few sour notes snuck through in the West. Amid the widely professed optimism, "cautious" and otherwise, one West German TV station reminded its audience that "Gorbachov, after all, was a close supporter and follower of Yuri Andropov's policies . . . and, one shouldn't forget, it was under Andropov that East-West relations were the worst ever, . . . the deepest Ice Age." Foreign Minister **Andrei Gromyko**, it was leaked, had nominated Gorbachov at the Central Committee plenum after Chernenko's death, with this vote of confidence: "This man has a nice smile, but he has iron teeth!"

The qualifications for party chief today, begin with the ability to manage the war machine that Soviet society has become, under the direction of the combined political-military command. Indeed, the sturdiest link in the *Nomenklatura*, the official hierarchy of the Byzantine Soviet bureaucracy, is one veiled in secrecy—the Defense Council of

the U.S.S.R. Consisting of the combined inner core of the party and military leadership, the Defense Council provides continuity of purpose and policy, which explains the resoluteness and consistency of Soviet foreign policy, even as the top party post of General Secretary passed through four sets of hands in the last three years. As of 1984, it included political leaders: the party General Secretary, the prime minister, the foreign minister, the chairman of the KGB, and the Central Committee Secretary for defense matters; and from the military, the defense minister, the Chief of Staff, the Commander-in-Chief of Warsaw Pact Forces, the CINCs of the Soviet Strategic Missile Corps, Ground Forces and Navy, and the first deputy defense minister in charge of reserves. The most senior members, former Foreign Minister (now President) **Andrei Gromyko** and Adm. **Sergei Gorshkov**, have been members of the Council since the late 1950s.

Gorbachov's every pronouncement to date follows the watchword of **Marshal Ogarkov**, that the civilian economy must be so integrated with the military, that it can be thrown into full war-mobilization gear at a moment's notice. The shake-up of the party bureaucracy and industrial ministries, which from 1981 to 1983 moved key defense-industry managers into top positions in the machine-tool and electric-power sectors, resumed under Gorbachov. Thus the party and government purges, the most sweeping in decades, are taking place under the aegis of this political-military command. The regional party organizations, through the plant-level party organizations subordinate to them, are responsible for obtaining results in the mobilization of the economic and defense capacity of the Soviet Union.


Beginning March 22, with the ouster of 70-year-old **Ivan Besspalov** from the post of First Secretary of the Kirov Oblast party organization, the leadership of 11 Oblast (province) and Krai (territory) party organizations has changed hands. Gorbachov and his men could move so quickly, because they were already Yuri Andropov's men. During the short time that Andropov, the ex-KGB chief, was party General Secretary (Nov. 1982-Feb. 1984), he launched a clean-out of the Central Committee apparatus, the staff which administers the rest of the party.

In May 1982, during the last year of **Leonid Brezhnev's** life, **Yuri Andropov** made his move from the KGB, to become a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Within a short time, Andropov had launched an assault on Brezhnev's political allies throughout the security apparatus (KGB and interior ministry, which is the political police), the party, and the government, using the device—which was simultaneously useful for shocking the economy out of lethargy—of the “anti-corruption” drive. He elevated three key figures of today's leadership: **Mikhail Gorbachov**, **Vitalii Vorotnikov**, and **Yegor Ligachov**. He increased the scope of Gorbachov's power in the Central Committee Secretariat, from responsibility for agriculture, to ideology and aspects of foreign affairs and cadre policy. Vorotnikov, he brought back from a virtual exile as ambassador to Cuba, to become First Secretary of the Krasnodar Kraikom—after the incumbent, Brezhnev-allied **Sergei Medunov**, was ousted on corruption charges (to be subsequently expelled from the Communist Party). Andropov brought Ligachov in from the Tomsk provincial party organization, in Siberia, to take over the Central Committee Department of Organizational Party Work, which handles hiring and firing throughout the party organization.

The shakeout of the Central Committee staff began in 1982, when 2 of the 23 departments of the Central Committee staff changed hands (Economic Affairs and Propaganda). In 1983, there were six more new

Simplified scheme of main institutions of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Soviet Government.

Lines with arrows indicate important lines of command. Numbers indicate size of body.



*The CPSU Central Committee comprises all the members of the Politburo and Secretariat, many members of the Council of Ministers, First Secretaries of Republic and Obkom party organizations, and high-ranking military officers. Unlike the other institutions shown, it is not a standing, executive body, but convenes periodically (two or more times a year) in plenary session, to debate and approve policies set at the level of its executive bodies, the Politburo and Secretariat.

Other overlapping memberships:

The 13 full members of the Politburo include 3 CC Secretaries, 5 members of the Council on Ministers and 3 First Secretaries of CPSU committees of important republics or cities.

The 13 (estimated) members of the Defense Council include (at least) 6 Ministry of Defense officers, 2 Central Committee Secretaries who are also on the Politburo, and 4 members of the Council of Ministers.

Party committees at all levels overlap with the leadership of government institutions, including economic entities. They may also include military officers from commands in their regions.

department heads, including the crucial appointment of Yegor Ligachov as chief of the Organizational Party Work Department, which handles hirings, firings, and purges throughout the party organization. Some of the retirees had been in power for the entire Brezhnev era (Nikita Khrushchov was ousted in Oct. 1964). One more Central Committee department, the Construction Department, has changed hands in 1985, and the imminent abolishment of another, the International Information Department, created by Brezhnev in 1978, is rumored.

CPSU Central Committee department leadership changes, 1982-85

CC Department	Old chief Date installed New post	New chief Date installed Previous post
Administration of Affairs	G.S. Pavlov 1965 Retired	N. Ye. Kruchina December 1983 Deputy Chief, CC Agriculture Dept. since 1978, while Gorbachov was CC Secretary for Agriculture
Cadres Abroad	N.M. Pegov 1975 Retired	S.V. Chervonenko January 1983 Amb. to France
Construction	I.N. Dmitriyev 1969	B.N. Yeltsin April 1985 First Secretary, Sverdlovsk Obkom

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CPSU Central Committee department leadership changes, 1982-85
(continued)

Economic Affairs (formerly Planning & Finance)	B. I. Gostev 1975	N. I. Ryzhkov December 1982 Deputy Chairman, Gosplan; originally from Sverdlovsk
Heavy Industry	V. I. Dolgikh 1976 Politburo	I. P. Yastrebov 1983 First Deputy Chief, Heavy Industry Dept.
General	K. U. Chernenko 1965 Gen. Secretary, now deceased	K. M. Bogolyubov July 1983 Deputy Chief, Gen. Dept.
Organizational Party Work	I. V. Kapitonov 1965 CC Secretary (retained post)	Ye. K. Ligachov April 1983 First Secretary, Tomsk Obkom (Siberia)
Organizational Party Work (2d change)	Ligachov April 1983 Politburo	G. P. Razumovskii June 1985 First Secretary, Krasnodar Kraikom
Propaganda	Ye. M. Tyazholnikov 1977 Amb. to Romania	B. I. Stukalin November 1982 Chairman, State Committee for Publishing
Science and Educational Institutions	S. P. Trapeznikov 1965 Retired	V. A. Medvedev August 1983 Rector, CC Academy of Social Sciences

There were also major changes at the Central Committee Secretariat and Politburo level:

February 1982	Death of Mikhail Suslov , CC ideologist and power broker for over three decades.
May 1982	Yuri Andropov becomes CC Secretary.
May 1982	Vladimir Dolgikh , CC Secretary for Heavy Industry, becomes candidate member of Politburo.
November 1982	Death of Leonid Brezhnev ; Andropov is General Secretary of the CC CPSU.
November 1982	Nikolai Ryzhkov becomes CC Secretary, as he moves from the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) to be chief of the reorganized Economics Department of the Central Committee.
November 1982	Geidar Aliyev , former KGB official and candidate member of the Politburo since 1976, is made full Politburo member and moved from the post of First Secretary of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, to First Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R.
May 1983	Death of Arvid Pelshe , Politburo member and chairman of the Party Control Commission.

June 1983	Grigorii Romanov , the Leningrad Party chief, a Politburo member since 1976, becomes CC Secretary.
June 1983	Vitalii Vorotnikov , the First Secretary of Krasnodar Kraikom, whom Andropov had "rescued" from Cuba in 1982, is made candidate member of the Politburo and prime minister of the Russian Republic (RSFSR). Candidate Politburo member Mikhail Solomentsev succeeds Pelshe at the Party Control Commission.
December 1983	Solomentsev and Vorotnikov , the past and current prime ministers of the Russian Republic, are made full members of the Politburo.
December 1983	KGB Chief Vitalii Chebrikov becomes candidate member of the Politburo.
December 1983	Yegor Ligachov , whom Andropov put in charge of organizational work in May, is made a CC Secretary.
February 1984	Death of Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko , long-time Brezhnev aide, becomes General Secretary.
November 1984	Death of Marshal Dmitrii Ustinov , Politburo member and defense minister.
March 1985	Death of Chernenko. Mikhail Gorbachov is General Secretary.
April 1985	Ligachov and Ryzhkov are made full Politburo members, without apprenticeship as candidate members. Chebrikov becomes a full member, Defense Minister Marshal Sergei Sokolov a candidate member.
April 1985	Viktor Nikonov , a Volga basin party official who had been RSFSR agriculture minister since 1983, is made CC Secretary for Agriculture.
July 1985	Romanov removed from Politburo. Edvard Shevardnadze , First Secretary of Communist Party of Georgian Republic, promoted from candidate to full member of the Politburo. Shevardnadze becomes foreign minister, as Andrei Gromyko is named chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (President).
July 1985	B.N. Yeltsin , former First Secretary of Sverdlovsk Obkom, now head of the CC's Construction Department, and Lev Zaikov , since June 1983 the First Secretary of Leningrad Obkom, become CC Secretaries.

Two or three regional power bases were coming into play, as Andropov, and then Gorbachov, assaulted Brezhnev's bastions in the bureaucracy. (From among the First Secretaries of the 158 Communist Party regional organizations—the Oblast and Krai committees, or obkom and kraikom—comes approximately one-third of the membership of the ruling party's Central Committee.)

One power center is the south Russian agricultural region, just north of the Caucasus mountains, comprising Stavropol Krai and Krasnodar Krai. From this region, where **Suslov** was First Secretary of Stavropol Kraikom (1939-44), where Andropov was born and Gorbachov made his career, come **Gorbachov**, **Vorotnikov**, and **Razumovskii**.

Another is the central Siberian area of three adjacent oblasti: Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Kemerovo. **Ligachov**, originally from Novosibirsk, was First Secretary of the Tomsk Obkom for 18 years. **V.K. Sitnikov** and **V.V. Bakatin**, Secretaries from Kemerovo Obkom, were installed as First Secretaries of Irkutsk Obkom (March 1983) and Kirov Obkom (April 1985), respectively, to replace Brezhnev-era appointees who were

retired; Kemerovo First Secretary **L.A. Gorshkov** moved to government of the Russian Republic, as deputy prime minister, in April 1985.

A third area feeding cadres into the national leadership is the Ural mountain complex of heavy industrial cities like Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk, which were built up after the evacuation of industry from the Ukraine during World War II. **Nikolai Ryzhkov**, who took over the Central Committee Economics Department under Andropov and whom Gorbachov put on the Politburo, came to national prominence as director of the giant Uralmash machine tool plant in Sverdlovsk. In June 1985, the Sverdlovsk Obkom Secretary, **B.N. Yeltsin**, came to Moscow to run the CC Construction Department, and on July 1, was promoted to Secretary of the Central Committee; he is succeeded in Sverdlovsk by another official originally from that city, **Yu.V. Petrov**, who in the meantime worked as one of Ligachov's deputies in the Organizational Party Work Department. **Solomentsev**, who came out of the Chelyabinsk party organization in the 1950s, brought **M.G. Voropayev** from the Chelyabinsk Obkom First Secretary's job to the staff of the Party Control Commission in January 1984.

All of these are key regions of the Russian Republic, whereas Brezhnev had built his machine out of the Dnepr River basin industrial area, in the Ukraine.

A dozen obkom First Secretaries were replaced in the first 12 months that Andropov was General Secretary. The party elections of November 1983-February 1984, run by Gorbachov and Ligachov while Andropov was dying, switched 19 more. In all, one-fifth of the obkoms changed hands. Only five obkom changes occurred in 1984, but as Chernenko faded from the scene, the purge resumed in 1985. Three obkom secretaries were transferred in the first two months of the year; then, with Gorbachov in the saddle, the shake-up resumed full strength with the 11 further reappointments and retirements of March-June 1985.

Meanwhile, reports pour in of scores of removals and transfers at lower levels of power, throughout the U.S.S.R. These range from the addition of 9,000 personnel to the KGB and police agencies in Uzbekistan, to publicized firings of party officials for corruption in Bratsk (Siberia). Typical of the brusque Gorbachov approach was a TV interview given by Sverdlovsk party leader **B.N. Yeltsin**, shortly before his promotion to the CC apparat in Moscow. "We summed up the results of work done in the first two months of the year and came to the conclusion that it was necessary to get rid of managers who failed to show their worth," he explained, "And we have decided to relieve Comrade Charnov of the post of director of Krasnouralsk combine. . . ."

They have not finished yet. With an eye toward preparations for the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in February 1986, *Pravda* on June 20, 1985, editorialized in favor of "improvement of the style of work"—and an infusion of new blood. "Stability of leadership, which involves a correct combination of experienced and young party workers, is very valuable," said *Pravda*. "But this cannot be accompanied by any stalling whatsoever, in the movement of cadres. It is necessary more boldly to advance to responsible positions women and young people, and promising workers." The new Central Committee king-pins, many of whom are heavy and defense industry managers and engineers by background, are looking for people who will produce results.

Gorbachov's generation

Who are these men of Gorbachov's generation? (The oldest of the recent promotees, Aliyev and Ligachov, were born in the early 1920s; Gorbachov in 1931.) The best choice of terms for describing this younger generation as a whole, is "the Andropov dynasty."

They were barely of an age to be soldiers in World War II, if at all. Their youth was shaped during the cult of "Czar" Josef Stalin, and they emerged into junior or field-grade military ranks, or began their party careers, in the first years of the Stalin period. In short, they are "Stalin's children." Once again, the way to imagine their minds, is to think of the mental outlook of Fyodor Dostoevsky's letters and memoirs, overlaid by Soviet military General Staff training that integrates the tradition of the Prussian General Staff.

Andropov's own case is indicative. He emerged as a prominent figure in Hungary, in 1956, under the direct patronage of the highest ranking Soviet families from the old Communist International apparatus.

Andropov had been a CC Secretary once before his power play of Spring 1982. He took leadership of the KGB only in 1967, after a career in the party and foreign service that culminated in a 1962-67 stint as CC Secretary in charge of relations with ruling Communist Parties, i.e., Eastern Europe and China. The man who brought Yuri Andropov to Moscow was an old Finnish communist named **Otto Kuusinen**, whose subordinate he was, first in the party organization in Karelia, near the Finnish border, and then at the Central Committee.

In the 1920s and 1930s, Kuusinen had worked on the Executive Committee of the Communist International. After a failed attempt to become the Soviet-sponsored President of Finland on the eve of World War II, Kuusinen joined the CPSU and eventually sat on its Politburo from 1957 until his death in 1964. Kuusinen was instrumental in effecting an institutional shift in the late 1950s, which was momentous for Soviet foreign policy. Together with the Armenian old Bolshevik and survivor of purges **Anastas Mikoyan**, the only Soviet Politburo member to have graduated from an Orthodox seminary (the same one Stalin attended), Kuusinen called for expanding the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the Soviet party and state. Two things resulted: re-establishment of Hungarian Communist **Eugen Varga's** think tank under the name Institute for the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), and constitution of a special CC consultants' group on international affairs, reporting to Kuusinen and then to Andropov. There was, and still is, much circulation of personnel between the think tanks (formally attached to the Academy of Sciences) and the CC staff. **Georgii Arbatov**, the head of the IMEMO spinoff Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, and another Kuusinen protégé, was head of the CC consultants' group in 1964-67.

The think tanks not only process huge quantities of intelligence data, but advise the party Central Committee and the foreign ministry on operations in the regions they study. The foreign policy apparatus of the Soviet Academy includes the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada, the Africa Institute, the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System, the International Workers' Movement Institute, the Latin America Institute, the Institute of Orientology, and the Far East Institute. They are a favorite playground for the children of the older generation of Soviet leaders—not just because papa could obtain a prestigious post, but because posts in these institutions, free of the protocol restraints that government officials have, allow a great flexibility of travel and operation for this powerful younger generation of the Soviet elite. Mikoyan's son, **Sergo Mikoyan**, edits the Latin America Institute's monthly, *America Latina*, one of the Soviet social science community's most vociferous boosters of "indigenist" insurgencies against nation states. **Anatolii Gromyko**, son of long-time Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, heads the Africa Institute. **Igor Andropov**, Yuri's offspring, attended the foreign ministry's prestigious Institute for International Relations, a training ground for the think tanks, before opting for the foreign service—he is now Russian

imperial pro-consul (ambassador) in Greece. (Under Gorbachov, the life and family of Andropov have even become the subject of a TV documentary.)

If Andropov gave them their promotions, the fresh faces of Gorbachov and his Russian Republic power-base colleagues owe their advance also to the stalwart Stalinist ideologue of the three post-war decades, Mikhail Suslov. Before he died in 1982, there is every reason to believe, Suslov extended his protection to Gorbachov—the promotee from Suslov's Stavropol Krai, who otherwise might have floundered as CC Agriculture Secretary during a string of miserable Soviet grain harvests in the late 1970s. Ligachov, Gorbachov's henchmen in the ongoing purge, had a touch of Suslov in his background as well; before his 1983 promotion, the only stint Ligachov had served in Moscow, between assignments in the Novosibirsk party apparat and then as party leader in Tomsk, was from 1961 to 1965, as deputy chief of the CC Propaganda and Agitation Department—within Suslov's bailiwick.

Background of key personnel in party leadership:

Gorbachov, Mikhail S., Politburo, General Secretary of CC CPSU

Born 1931. After work at a machine-tractor station in Stavropol Krai, Gorbachov went into full-time party work. He obtained a law degree in 1955. His whole career was in the Stavropol Krai Komsomol and party, until promotion in 1978 to be CC Secretary for Agriculture.

Aliyev, Geidar ali-Reza, Politburo, first deputy prime minister

Born 1923. Born in a Shi'ite Muslim family in Azerbaijan, Aliyev was a career KGB officer with field experience in Turkey and Iran, who rose to head the Azerbaijani KGB in 1967, the year Andropov took over at the national level. Two years later, Aliyev became head of the Communist Party in the Azerbaijan Republic and tore the party and state apparat apart from top to bottom, replacing nearly 2,000 officials with KGB men, in order to carry out a pilot project that became known as "the Azerbaijan experiment." Aliyev's special formula was a sweeping anti-corruption purge, extensive profiling of public opinion by sociologists, and attention to the "spiritual needs" of the population. Deemed a success by Andropov, he was brought to Moscow as a full Politburo member and first deputy prime minister—with a portfolio covering the militarily crucial area of transportation, as well as his pre-existing responsibilities for special operations in the Middle East and Asia.

Chebrikov, Viktor M., Candidate Politburo, chairman of KGB

Born 1923. Although his party career was launched in Dnepropetrovsk, the center of Brezhnev's machine, Chebrikov came to the KGB in 1967 with Andropov and worked with him for fifteen years.

Dolgikh, Vladimir I., Candidate Politburo, CC Secretary

Born 1924. Trained as a mining engineer, Dolgikh made a name for himself as chief engineer and then director of the Zavenyagin Mining-Metallurgical Combine, in Norilsk—the only such industrial complex above the Arctic Circle. He came to Moscow as a CC Secretary in 1972 and officially headed the CC Heavy Industry Department beginning in 1976. Dolgikh became a candidate Politburo member in 1982, but has not surged forward with the Andropov/Gorbachov tide.

Ligachov, Yegor K., Politburo, CC Secretary for organization

Born 1920. A graduate of the Moscow Aviation Institute, Ligachov worked as an engineer at an aircraft plant in Novosibirsk, where he became involved in the Komsomol, then party work. From 1961-65, he was in Moscow in the CC Propaganda and Agitation Department, then headed the Tomsk party organization until promotion to head the CC Organizational Party Work Department in April 1983.

Ryzhkov, Nikolai I., Politburo, CC Secretary for the economy

Born 1929. Trained at a technical school, Ryzhkov worked as a welder and then an engineer in Sverdlovsk. In 1970 he became General Director of the giant "Uralmash" machine-tool plant in Sverdlovsk, in 1975 First Deputy Minister of Heavy and Transport Machine Building, and in 1979 one of the deputy chairmen of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan).

Vorotnikov, Vitalii I., Politburo, prime minister of Russian Republic (RSFSR)

Born 1926. A railroad locomotive repairman as a teenager during the war, Vorotnikov later worked in industry in the Volga town of Kuibyshev, where he graduated from an Aviation Institute and became a party official. He was First Secretary in his native region of southern Russia, Voronezh, from 1971 to 1975, then rose in the RSFSR government apparatus, before being packed off as ambassador to Cuba in 1979. His recall and promotion through Krasnodar Krai to the RSFSR premiership and the Politburo came under Andropov.

Yeltsin, Boris N., CC Secretary

Born 1931. Educated as a construction engineer, Yeltsin became First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom—also Ryzhkov's town—in 1976. After nearly a decade of running that heavy industry center, Yeltsin was brought to Moscow by Gorbachov, to head the Central Committee Construction Department, in April 1985. That he was being groomed for a promotion was evident, when Yeltsin led the CPSU delegation to the a West German Communist Party event in October 1984.

Zaikov, Lev, CC Secretary

Born 1923. Zaikov was director of a defense-related electronics firm in Leningrad, before he became the city's mayor in 1976. He succeeded Grigorii Romanov as Leningrad Obkom First Secretary in 1983, when Romanov—who came out of the Leningrad shipbuilding industry, another important defense sector—was made Central Committee Secretary for industry, particularly the defense industries. Today, Romanov is disgraced, but not the defense-linked Leningrad party organization. Shortly after becoming Central Committee Secretary, in June 1985, Zaikov accompanied Gorbachov on a visit to the Byelorussian Military District, where they are believed to have met with Marshal Ogarkov.

3. Soviet Imperial Objectives

3.1 Redrawing the Political Map of the World

Soviet imperial grand strategy is centered upon establishing a world-empire of a form echoing the Persian, Roman, and Byzantine empires. Under the circumstances such an empire were established without general warfare, by the early 1990s, the world would be aligned more or less as follows.

All of continental Eurasia and Africa would be under Soviet domination (Map 25).

In Europe: The existing states of Western Europe, as altered to some degree by split-off of independent or semi-independent "separatist" enclaves, would be nominally independent, "semi-colonial" client-states of the Soviet Empire. Croatia and possibly some other Dalmatian fragments of a dismembered present Yugoslavia, would be assigned to the western portion of Europe, with the rest of Yugoslavia divided among an enlarged Serbia, an enlarged Albania, and expansion of Bulgaria to more or less the extent of the medieval Bulgarian Empire, the latter including Macedonia and most of Thrace.

In the Middle East: A somewhat carved-up Turkey would have nominal independence, and the rest of the Middle East and North Africa would be under the domination of Syria, with a special role assigned to a nominally independent, and expanded state of Israel. Essentially, Syria would be the principal Soviet instrument throughout the region of the former Ottoman Empire's greatest extent.

In Central Asia: A nominally independent Iran would be a Soviet client-state, minus a portion awarded to a newly-created state of Baluchistan. Afghanistan would continue to be assimilated into the Soviet Empire proper, gobbling up northern portions of Pakistan.

In the Asian Sub-Continent: India would exist, perhaps partially dismembered, as an independent state under Soviet domination, while Pakistan as such would cease to exist.

In East Asia: China, Japan, and Vietnam would be the only states with nominal independence in their present form. As long as they were under Soviet strategic domination, both Japan and Vietnam would be encouraged to build up military capabilities as checks upon China's inherent expansionist impulses.

Black Africa is largely written off to effects of famine and pandemics, with Africa south of the Sahara assigned to be a source of strategic minerals for Soviet-dominated Eurasia, conserving strategic minerals in Soviet territory as such.

The Americas: The Soviets have no near-term imperial ambitions within the Americas as such. Andropov (*Der Spiegel*, April 24, 1983) assigned the Americas to the U.S. sphere of influence, and Andropov's successors have continued that policy. Soviet meddling in the Americas has the limited but crucial strategic objective of drawing collapsing U.S. military capabilities into endemic warfare throughout Central and South America, thus aiding the process of reducing the U.S.A. to a third-rate power.

Generally: The build-up of Soviet naval forces is aimed during the near-term as part of the constellation of forces for possible fighting of World War III, especially the submarine force. The Soviet surface fleet is intended, for the longer-term, to serve as the Soviets' arm of imperial power on the oceans of the world, the successor to the nineteenth-century role of the British Navy.

The pivot of Soviet attempts to secure this empire without generalized warfare, is the Soviet hope of pulling West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany) out of the Atlantic Alliance and into the Soviet sphere of influence. Germany has had this special place in Bolshevik strategy throughout the present century, even before the 1917 Revolution. It continues to be Soviet policy, that with Germany as the favored tool of Soviet imperial expansion, Soviet imperial victory is assured. Today, because of the decisive strategic and economic position of the Federal Republic in Europe, were Soviet asset Willy Brandt's Social Democratic coalition to come to power in the Federal Republic, not only would all Germany slide more or less irrevocably into the Soviet strategic sphere of "Finlandization," but all of Western Europe would rapidly follow suit.

In the case that the Soviet world-empire were established by means of generalized warfare, the picture of a 1990s world under Soviet domination would perhaps be somewhat different than we have outlined above. Nonetheless, the outline supplied above gives an adequate insight into Soviet imperial strategy for the purposes of this Special Report.

The 'New Yalta' agreements

The Soviet Empire could never have reached the present degree of probability of victory without massive collusion from inside top-most leading circles in the Atlantic Alliance. Specifically, beginning Soviet participation in the 1955 London Conference of Bertrand Russell's World Association of Parliamentarians for World Government, the Liberal wing of the Anglo-American Establishment negotiated agreements with the Khrushchov government for future redrawing of the world's political map.

Under this agreement, excepting the special case of China, the entire world was to be placed under rule of a single super-government, a modified United Nations Organization with greatly enlarged powers. Under this arrangement, the entire world, excepting China, was to be divided into two sub-divisions of world-government, one Soviet-dominated, and the other dominated by the powerful financier families associated with the Anglo-American Liberal Establishment. Those institutions of the modern sovereign nation-state, established during the fifteenth-century Golden Renaissance and, later, the American Revolution, were to be caused to

wither away, by stripping away of elements of sovereignty reassigned to supranational institutions of monetary and other authorities.

The terms of this agreement were consolidated during 1958, highlighted by the keynote address of Dr. Leo Szilard to the 1958 second Pugwash Conference in Quebec. This address laid out the interdependent terms of Nuclear Deterrence and "New Yalta." The Anglo-American Liberal Establishment agreed to give up the economic and military strategic superiority of the West, and to award the Soviet empire a greater area than was given to it by the 1943 Yalta agreements, in return for Soviet agreements to participate in the scheme of "world government" laid out by Bertrand Russell and his associates.

Earlier, prior to 1953-55, the Atlantic Alliance had adopted Russell's proposal for "preventive nuclear attack" against the Soviet Empire. Russell had argued, that if the Stalin regime refused to submit to a world-government agreement, that regime must be forced to submit to this by military means, and that a nuclear attack on the Soviet empire should therefore be planned to occur prior to Soviet acquisition of nuclear arsenals. When the Soviets had acquired nuclear arsenals, during the interval 1949-53, Stalin's successors indicated their willingness to accept Russell's proposals for a system of "world government" composed of two imperial divisions.

So, the fate of Hungary and Poland in 1956, was sealed at the 1955 London Conference of Russell's association.

This agreement was put into effect as governmental policy only gradually, beginning with McGeorge Bundy's key role as National Security Adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. The agreements were virtually consolidated by actions of Henry A. Kissinger during the 1971-75 period, notably including the SALT and ABM treaties, and including the Vietnam negotiations and the 1973 Mideast War and ensuing petroleum crisis.

Under President Carter, the process entered the end-game phase of strategic chess-play. Carter completed the introduction of the monetary and economic policies which have destroyed the economic and military power of the Atlantic Alliance and its trading-partners from within. Excepting President Reagan's adoption of the SDI policy, the Reagan administration, thus far, has continued the policies set into motion by Bundy, Kissinger, and Carter. These policies, if continued now, ensure the monetary and economic catastrophe essential to Soviet strategic victory.

Although the Liberal Establishments within the Atlantic Alliance, including large chunks of intelligence services, are riddled with outright Soviet agents, it should not be assumed that the Liberals generally are simply Soviet agents. Russell and others have prescribed, that by paying the temporary price of awarding Moscow an enlarged Soviet empire, the preconditions are established for internal crumbling of that enlarged Soviet empire over a generation or so ahead, as all such empires have crumbled internally in known history. It is assumed by the architects of this Liberal Establishment policy, that the future crumbling of the Soviet empire will lead to the emergence of the kind of "international socialist" world-order prescribed by Russell, H.G. Wells, et al.

We must assume that the Soviet dictatorship has recognized and has also prediscouted such long-term ambitions of Russell, et al. In the Soviet view, these Liberals are as V.I. Lenin famously described them, "useful fools." Once their usefulness to Soviet ambitions is used up, the Soviets will exterminate them, as a precaution against those Liberals' resurgence to world-power in a future time.

So, the "New Yalta" agreement awarding the Soviets an enlarged empire, is the fruit of common but conflicting goals of the Liberal Establishment and the Soviet ruling-class, the *Nomenklatura* of the modern-day Soviet "Diocletians."

The historian must be reminded of certain Liberals of yore, the Chaldean financier families behind the Persian Empire who proposed to divide an enlarged world-empire into two parts, the one, the portion west of the Halys and Euphrates Rivers, to be ruled by King Philip of Macedon and his heirs. Philip, the Persian tool, was replaced by Alexander the Great, and the Persian Empire destroyed. Had Alexander not been assassinated by Aristotle's circle, in their second attempt at poisoning, the later reemergence of the Chaldean system of empire, in the successive, Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine forms, would have been prevented. Similarly, the Roman and Byzantine empires later made possible their own destructions through aid of destroying their economies and population-levels from within, and by what passed for very clever, "Metternichean," diplomacies in their time.

It is chiefly the Anglo-American Liberal Establishment, with its "world government" schemes, its policies of "Nuclear Deterrence," "Arms Control," and "post-industrial society," which has fostered the means of its own destruction, the internal ruin of the economic and military capacity of the Atlantic Alliance, in front of Soviet imperial insurgency.

Documentation: See *Appendix* for Russell, Szilard, and Kissinger citations.

3.2 The Northern Flank

"World War III will perhaps not be won on the Northern Flank, but it may well be there that it will be lost." This is a statement that is continually repeated—for right and wrong reasons—by Western strategists concerned with the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Northern Flank of Europe and the Atlantic. In this report, we will document why the statement above is absolutely and frighteningly true—why, in fact, as things now stand, the West, by its failure to address the weakness of the Northern Flank, both militarily and politically, has *guaranteed* the Soviet Union the ability to conduct the ultimate nuclear blackmail against the United States and thereby win World War III with an absolute minimum of losses to itself.

The starting point for our analysis will be to determine the value of the Northern Flank for the Soviet Union, i.e., what it wants in the Far North. From there, we can examine the various possible ways the Soviets have to attain their objectives, comparing their capabilities with ours.

What do the Soviets want?

To understand the military importance of the far northern reaches of Europe to the Soviet Union, we must—as always—return to the strategic "first premise" of Soviet military thinking and planning: the necessity to be able to fight and win nuclear war. In this respect, there is one feature of the northernmost region of Europe which more than any other determines its value: On the north side of the Kola Peninsula, along a strip of coastline barely 60 km long, the Soviet Union has built a gigantic complex of naval bases and military support installations, which constitutes the *biggest concentration of military power* anywhere in the world, ever (Maps 26-27).

These bases are the home of the Soviet Northern Fleet, the largest of the four fleets in the Soviet Navy and, most importantly, the fleet which contains more than 60% of all of the strategic missile-carrying submarines in the Soviet Navy. These are the nuclear missiles which are targeted on the United States and which represent the *second strike reserve* of the U.S.S.R. In the "maximum option" of the Ogarkov Plan for nuclear war against the West, an initial barrage of land-based nuclear missiles and submarine-based missiles off the U.S. coast would devastate the U.S. eastern seaboard at the same time that an assault is launched against Western Europe. In that scenario, it is absolutely essential that the Soviet

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Union has retained a second strike potential with which it can threaten the United States to refrain from any possible counterattack. The Soviet nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) of the Northern Fleet are that "trump card" which is essential to the entire scenario.

This is the way to approach the value of the Northern Flank. There are, of course, other reasons why the Kola complex is of strategic importance to the Soviets. As a forward position directly under the shortest flight path from the United States to the Soviet heartland, the Kola plays a vital role in Soviet strategic air defense. And, with the same logic, it provides one of the best bases for the Soviet strategic bomber fleet.

The other major role that is frequently ascribed to the Northern Fleet, and thus to the Kola, by NATO strategists—the interdiction of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) between the United States and its Western European allies—is, on the other hand, largely illusory. The idea that the fortunes of the West might depend on preventing the Soviet Northern Fleet from "breaking out" of its containment in the Norwegian Sea and intercepting U.S. reinforcements to Europe across the Atlantic is patently nonsensical in light of Soviet strategy. As we have outlined in detail in Part 1, on the Ogarkov war plan, every single U.S. East Coast port will be wiped out by Soviet nuclear strikes in the first minutes of war. There will be no ships and no cargo left to interdict.

The Northern Fleet is not going to try to "break out" of the Norwegian Sea. But it is going to do everything it can to prevent NATO from entering that area.

To repeat, then, it is the strategic nuclear-missile submarine force of the Northern Fleet that determines Soviet strategy in the Far North. Those submarines must be protected, *at all costs*. The first priority will be to secure total hegemony over the area of jeopardy to these submarines, an area including the Barents and Norwegian Seas—and the adjacent coast of northern Norway. Not only must no NATO hunter-killer submarines or surface anti-submarine vessels be allowed to enter this area, but NATO air forces must be totally denied the use of Norwegian airspace and air fields within range of Murmansk and the Barents Sea.

Denial of this area to NATO is the first priority of all Soviet planning for the Northern Theater. This strategic task has far-reaching implications for all of the countries on the Northern Flank—for NATO member Norway, as well as for neutral Sweden and Finland.

In wartime, the highest priority mission of Soviet Armed Forces in the Northern Theater will be to deny all use of the Barents, Greenland, and Norwegian Seas and northern Norway to NATO. For the Soviets, there are various options open to achieving this objective. Clearly, the optimum option would be to gain access to northern Norway, particularly the airfields located there. A Soviet presence on the land adjoining the Norwegian Sea would be of immense military value. The mere possibility of greater dispersal of their air and naval forces over this greater area would be a significant advantage.

Moreover, if Soviet aircraft were to be able to operate from bases in northern Norway or Sweden instead of from the Kola Peninsula, it is estimated that their combat value in the area just north of the so-called "GIUK gap" (the line from Greenland over Iceland to the United Kingdom, which also forms the southern boundary of the Soviet defense zone for the Kola) would be doubled. According to Swedish military researchers, a MiG-25 Foxbat, for instance, operating from current Warsaw Pact bases on the Kola or in East Germany, could patrol in this area for approximately 1.5 hours, or engage in combat for around 10 minutes.

From airfields in Sweden or Norway, the same plane could patrol for over 3 hours or fight for 20 minutes.

We will examine below the various options—both military and non-military—which are available to the Soviets for achieving this “optimum variant.” However, there is no reason to assume that in the context of a nuclear war, the Soviets would deem it worth the effort, and above all, the time, required to actually seize the bases for their own use. The far more likely alternative—one that would be infinitely quicker and more effective if the main goal were denial of the bases to the enemy, rather than own use—would be to “clean out” the entire area with nuclear and/or chemical weapons.

There can be no doubt about the Soviets’ capability to carry out this latter, considerably more brutal option. The 1984-85 edition of the Norwegian-language version of IISS’s *Military Balance* includes a table of Soviet nuclear weapons which could be used against the territory of the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland). The IISS figures (supposedly up to date as of July 1984) are conservative, especially as regards new generations of longer-range and more accurate missiles, and they totally ignore reload/refire capacity, not to mention MIRVing. Nevertheless, the overall conclusion is irrefutable: The U.S.S.R. has stationed a devastating nuclear force within range of every conceivable target in Scandinavia, with enough megatonnage to completely wipe out anything remotely resembling a facility of military use to the NATO enemy. In raw numbers, the next table shows the IISS figures on nuclear weapons within range of targets in Norway, Sweden and Finland.

Thus, within range of NATO’s Northern Flank, there are, by this highly conservative estimate, well over 10,000 Soviet nuclear weapons, not including nuclear artillery. The targets? Northern Norway has a total of five airfields; Sweden somewhat more. In addition, there are several key NATO surveillance installations on the Norwegian side. But whatever the total, it adds up to a relatively tiny number of vital military targets that could be taken out by this massive nuclear force on the Soviet side.

Now, it might correctly be pointed out that most of these weapons have other deployment options. But, on the other hand, it is debatable whether any of those alternative targets would have such great strategic value as the military objects that present a potential threat to Murmansk and the surrounding complex. And in a significant number of cases, the weapons are stationed in locations (e.g., the Kola Peninsula) so as to make them usable *only* against targets in northern Scandinavia.

In sum, the most efficient—and for that reason, the most likely—Soviet option to secure its SSBNs, is simply to launch simultaneous nuclear attacks against the targets in northern Norway and Sweden.

There are, however, other, less brutal options. In addition to its SSBN force and the vessels designed to protect those nuclear missile subs, the Northern Fleet has in recent years considerably beefed up its amphibious capability. Together with the combat-ready troops of the ground forces on the Kola, the Soviet marines of the Northern Fleet are trained for the mission of launching a surprise attack against northern Norway for the purpose of seizing the airfields and occupying the region as rapidly as possible.

According to Norwegian military experts, the Soviet scenario for such an attack would probably involve an offensive in two stages. The first phase would consist of a surprise attack by the Soviet forces already in place on the Kola Peninsula near the Norwegian border. To maximize

Nuclear weapons within range of targets in Norway, Sweden, and Finland

Type	Range (km)	Total number (July 1984)
Land-based		
ICBM		
SS-11 Sego mod 1/2	10/13,000	570 (combined)
mod 3	8,000	
SS-19 mod 2/3	10,000	360
IRBM		
SS-20	5,000	387
MRBM		
SS-4	2,000	224
SRBM		
SS-12 Scaleboard	900	100 (?)*
SS-1C-Scud	300	540 (?)
Frog 7	70	530 (?)
GLCM		
SS-C-1b Sepal	450	100 (?)
SSC-X-4	3,000	?
Total land-based missiles:		2,811
Nuclear-capable artillery		
M-55/D-20 152mm towed Howitzer	?	? 54-72 of each on Kola alone
M-1973/C-2-S 152mm self-propelled Howitzer	?	?
M-1975 203mm self-propelled gun	18	? 24 in Leningrad MD
M-1975 240mm self-propelled mortar	10	? 24 in Leningrad MD
Sea-based		
SLBM		
SS-N-5 Serb	1,400	45
SLCM		
SS-N-2 Styx	45	506
SS-N-3 Shaddock	450	296
SS-N-7	70	88
SS-N-9 Siren	280	200
SS-N-12 Sandbox	550	96
SS-N-19	500	88
SS-NX-21	3,000	?
SS-N-22	220	28
Total sea-based missiles:		1,347
Air-launched		
Bombers		
Tu-95 Bear B, C	12,800	100
Mya-4 Bison	11,200	43
Tu-16 Badger	4,800	410
Tu-22 Blinder	4,000	160
Tu-26 Backfire	8,000	235
Su-7 Fitter A	1,400	130
MiG-21 Fishbed	1,100	160
MiG-27 Flogger D, J	1,400	730
Su-17 Fitter D/H	1,800	850
Su-24 Fencer	4,000	630
ALCM		
AS-2 Kipper	200	90
AS-3 Kangaroo	650	(100)
AS-4 Kitchen	300-800	830
AS-6 Kingfish	250	820
AS-X-15	3,000	?
Total air-launched nuclear weapons:		5,288

* Question marks in IISS original

the element of surprise, these units would not have been reinforced in advance of the attack. With air and *spetsnaz* (special commando force) strikes, Soviet troops would first knock out surveillance facilities and move to seize the airfields. Simultaneously, the 45th Motorized Rifle Division—stationed in Pechenga (formerly the Finnish Petsamo), only 9.6 km from the Norwegian border—would move by land across the border into Finnmark.

Meanwhile, the elite 63rd ("Kirkenes") Naval Infantry Brigade would launch an amphibious assault in the same areas or further south.

Also further south, the second Soviet division on the Kola—the 54th Motorized Rifle Division, based in the Kandalaksha/Alakurtti area—would move westward, either 1) across Finland and up through the "Finnish wedge" (the part of Finland that extends deepest into Norway) to the Norwegian coastal town of Skibotn or 2) across Finland to Kiruna in Sweden, and on to the key Norwegian port of Narvik. The Swedish military estimates that the Soviets can send troops across this latter route at the rate of one division per day using the excellent new road from Kiruna to Narvik (completed in 1984 under protest by the military). Of course, both these alternative routes for the 54th would constitute a breach of the neutrality of either Finland or Sweden or both—*unless* permission were granted in advance (a possibility we will examine later in this report). In either case, the role of the 54th is to secure the entire northernmost parts of Norway.

In the second phase of the attack, the objective would be to take Norway as far south as Trondheim. Most of the remaining divisions of the Leningrad Military District (six more motorized rifle divisions, plus one airborne) could be deployed in this mission. The 76th Guards Airborne Division, based in Pskov, is ready for combat at all times. Its 7,000 men and equipment, including 300 armored assault vehicles and 30 assault guns, could be airlifted to the Kola within hours. Or, if the ability to overfly Swedish airspace were secured, the 76th could be airlifted directly across the Baltic Sea and Sweden to Trondheim, Norway. The other divisions could be transferred to the Kola by rail at a rate of around one division per day, or within hours by using the huge air transport facilities of the Soviet Air Force and its adjunct, the "civilian" airline, Aeroflot. The Kola has at least 16 all-weather airbases with runways of 2,000 meters or more.

These divisions could either be carried all the way up to the Kola to follow on the 45th Motorized Rifle Division across Finnmark, or be "dropped off" along the way, to use the well-developed Finnish rail and road network which conveniently connects onto the main Leningrad-to-Murmansk line on the Soviet side.

The capability for a surprise attack in northern Norway

Command and control

In contrast to the situation on the Central front of Europe, the Soviet command structure for its forces on the Northern Flank remains unclear. Although it might be argued that Scandinavia as a whole would be included in a large Western Theater together with Germany and the Baltic Sea, there are also strong reasons for hypothesizing the existence of a separate Soviet Northern Theater of Military Actions, or TVD North. Such a TVD would include the Soviet Leningrad Military District (LMD), all of Finland, and roughly the northern halves of Sweden and Norway.

The main reason for such a hypothesis is the very specific military mission of Soviet forces as outlined in the scenarios above. Secondly,

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even though the bulk of the forces in the LMD are geographically closer to the Baltic Theater than the Kola, it would appear that their priority mission is in the North. The LMD forces did not, for instance, take part in the crucial test of the Baltic Theater command—the *Zapad-81* exercise in 1981.

Finally, there are strong historical reasons why the Soviets might well draw a line across Scandinavia at the points indicated. In 1939, as part of the secret protocol of the infamous Hitler-Stalin Pact to divide Eastern Europe between the Russians and the Nazis, the entirety of Finland was given to the Soviets. But in addition, during the autumn of 1939 military maps were printed in both Germany and the U.S.S.R. which showed all of Sweden and Norway north of a line from Sundsvall on the Swedish east coast to Trondheim on the Norwegian coast as part of the Soviet sphere. (The southern halves of each country were defined as part of the Nazi sphere.) Then, as now, there was a specific *military* reason for drawing the dividing line at roughly that point. Even then, the defense of Murmansk was a paramount consideration.

If, then, there is a separate TVD North, it is intriguing to note that, in contrast to the other principal Soviet theaters, no commander has been publicly announced. There is a credible explanation for this. As we will see in the discussion below on force strength on the Kola, the Soviets have consciously pursued a policy of "low visibility" of combat preparations on the Northern Flank in order to enhance surprise attack capability and to minimize NATO response in peacetime. To announce the name of the wartime commander of the TVD North, as they have done for the Western, Southwestern, Southern and Far Eastern High Commands, would not be in keeping with this general policy.

So, there may well be a commander of a "High Command North." Who he is, however, is a matter of speculation. He would undoubtedly have the current rank of Army General (four-star general), and he should be a Central Committee member or candidate member. Within these criteria, there are two possible names:

1) Army General Mikhail Sorokin (born 1922) "disappeared" from public view in December 1981. There are indications that after that date he may have commanded the Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Otherwise, his qualifications for commander of the TVD North are striking: he is a Central Committee candidate member, and from 1976 to 1981 he was the commander of the Leningrad Military District. Thus, his background closely parallels that of Gen. Army Gerasimov (CINC High Command Southwest), Gen. Army Maksimov (CINC High Command South), and Gen. Army Tret'yak (CINC High Command Far East)—all three are former commanders of the principal military district in their respective theater commands.

2) Army General Grigorii Salmanov (born 1922) has not been heard of since he was replaced as commander of the Transbaikal Military District in late 1984. He is a full member of the Central Committee. From 1969 to 1975 he was commander of the Kiev MD, and in 1975-78 he was the deputy commander in chief of the Ground Forces for Combat Training.

The headquarters of the TVD North would in all likelihood be in Petrozavodsk in Karelia. This was the headquarters of the former Northern Military District of the U.S.S.R., which existed from 1951 to 1960, when it was formally disbanded and integrated into the Leningrad MD. That change was probably part of the "low profile" approach in the North referred to above. The Soviet decision to disband the Northern MD came not long after Norwegian Prime Minister Gerhardsen had pledged—in response to an inquiry by Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin—that Norway

would not receive, stockpile, or build launching ramps for nuclear weapons or delivery vehicles.

Force strength

The force composition and strength of the Soviet TVD North have been determined by two principal considerations. First of all, they are specifically designed for a surprise attack in an environment of a sparsely populated but physically rough terrain with a harsh climate, factors which place a premium on relatively small, but highly mobile forces. Secondly, it has been Soviet policy to keep *visible* force build-up on the Northern Flank to a minimum, while concentrating on measures that enhance a sudden "last-minute" capability directly prior to the attack. The low-profile approach is for political reasons: The Soviets have so far wanted at all costs to avoid a situation in which their own build-up might provoke NATO countermeasures that would threaten their all-important Kola installations.

The result of this policy is that nominal troop strength on the Kola has barely increased at all in the past 20 years, while an intensive qualitative upgrading has proceeded without interruption. Even at a relatively early stage of this qualitative improvement, the Soviets had an impressive ability to make quick reinforcements. They have, of course, done their best to hide this capability—it is never practiced openly. But in the crisis situation at the time of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, something of the real capability was revealed when they quickly increased ground forces on the Kola by 40%.

Looking, then, at the Soviet order of battle in the entire LMD, and not just the Kola, we can determine that the TVD North command has at its disposal around 840 aircraft, and between 8 and 10 divisions plus support troops. Most of the combat aircraft are normally based in the south of the LMD, but they could be flown up to Kola airfields in a matter of hours. Considerable preparations have been made in recent years to facilitate the rapid shift of forces northward. In the past 10 years, stocks of equipment and supplies have been prepositioned on the Kola for the LMD tactical air units. It was revealed in 1978 that hardened underground shelters had been built to accommodate around 500 aircraft. In 1981, NATO's Northern Command announced that expansion and hardening of the Kola runways, construction of camouflaged ammunition stores, and preparation of hardened fuel depots were under way.

As the air force case indicates, the Soviet policy on the Kola is to build up infrastructure to quickly receive reinforcements from the south. This also goes for helicopter complement of the ground forces, which represents a major improvement in offensive power. There are some 190 utility helicopters in the LMD, which significantly increase the ability to conduct rapid and large-scale tactical operations over the difficult terrain. There is also at least one regiment of attack helicopters (40 Mi-24 Hind D/E and 20 Mi-8 Hip E and Mi-17 Hip H) in the south, and indications that there are two attack-helicopter squadrons (14 Mi-24 Hind D/E and 16 Mi-8 Hip E) on the Kola itself.

The helicopters are not the only factor upgrading the Kola ground forces. Units are receiving the new generations of tactical missiles, with longer range and greater accuracy. Above all, the Soviet divisions are better prepared to fight in the difficult topographical and climatic conditions of the North. Units have been equipped with more tracked vehicles for traversing snow and marshy terrain. And the LMD divisions

have apparently been undergoing intensive training in arctic warfare. One alarming signal is the fact that recent issues of the Soviet Ground Forces' tactical journal, *Voyennyi Vestnik*, have been devoting disproportionate attention to 1) the Norwegian Army and 2) combat in arctic conditions. In 1984 alone, such articles included: "The Offensive in Arctic Regions," "Troop Protection in Arctic Regions" (on the specific behavior of nuclear radiation in cold climates!), "The Infantry Battalion of the Norwegian Army in Basic Forms of Battle," "Norwegian Land Forces," and "Combat in Arctic Regions" (by the First Deputy Commander of the Leningrad Military District). It seems unlikely that so many articles have been written for the edification of only two divisions stationed on the Kola.

Finally, there has been an alarming build-up of amphibious capability. The 63rd Naval Infantry Brigade has been nearly doubled in size since 1983, and has reportedly been engaged in "virtually continuous amphibious exercises," landing small sabotage groups and spearheads for larger assaults. In early 1984 it was learned that the Northern Fleet had received a squadron of the Soviets' new "Lebed" class air-cushion vessels which can be used to shuttle men and equipment ashore from larger landing craft at record speeds. "Lebed" have a top speed of 100 km/hr and can carry 35 tons.

Can NATO defend Norway?

After a review of the Soviet forces ready to move into northern Norway, it is of course justified and necessary to ask the question, what can NATO do to defend its member country, Norway?

The shocking facts of the matter are these: The total number of standing troops in all of Norway is roughly 6,000. In the critical Finnmark province closest to the Soviet border, there is an essentially symbolic unit of 1,500 men: a 450-man battalion at the border and a battalion group (1,000 men) in Porsanger. They face the 45th Motorized Rifle Division less than 10 km from the border on the Soviet side. The 45th has 13,500 men and 220 tanks (more tanks, incidentally, than the entire Norwegian army!). In the area of Troms, further south (at the tip of the "Finnish Wedge"), the Norwegians have a standing brigade of approximately 5,000 men. There are no non-Norwegian NATO troops on Norwegian soil.

In short, NATO has a grand total of 6,000 troops in the North; the Soviets have 30,000 to 40,000 in place, and the 76th Airborne can be there within hours.

Thus, in a surprise attack situation, there is no defense for Finnmark at all. NATO strategy is to simply give it to the Russians. The Soviets will not encounter serious opposition until Troms, where the 5,000-man Norwegian brigade has dug itself into a fortress in the high cliffs along the fjords. Since it is well-protected and also isolated, Troms is therefore a first-priority target for a Soviet nuclear strike. And outside of Troms, down to Trondheim—the southern border of the territory the Soviets want and need—there are only coastal defense installations.

Official Norwegian plans call for Troms to be reinforced after an attack by two more brigades mobilized locally. Another two brigades from the south of Norway are earmarked for Troms, but their arrival there presumes Norwegian control over the airfields where they are to land. But, even in the best case, this is all that could be pitted against the several divisions of Soviet troops that could be in the area after that same period.

A more serious threat to the invading troops than the mobilization brigades would be the Norwegian air force. There are two squadrons (18 aircraft each) of F-16 fighters stationed in north Norway in peacetime,

with another 36 F-16s and 35 F-5As based in the south which could be deployed in the north.

Compared to the Soviet adversary, however, it is obvious that the Norwegian forces are no match for an invasion force. NATO has drawn the same conclusion, and bases its defense strategy on reinforcements from outside Norway. The Allies could theoretically provide 10 squadrons of aircraft, plus various alternatives of air mobile and amphibious forces. But there are significant reservations in each individual case. The only unit of NATO reinforcements which is actually earmarked for Norway is the Canadian Air-Sea Transportable (CAST) brigade—but it requires a minimum of three weeks for deployment. Other theoretically designated units have alternative deployment options, and most have done little cold-weather training. The most highly publicized unit, the USMC marine amphibious brigade, a 10,000-man force which could be ready for combat in Norway in four to six days, has disappointed many observers by the indifference it has shown toward its mission in Norway. Its lack of enthusiasm appears understandable, however, when one learns that the brigade's pre-positioned heavy equipment is not in Finnmark, or in Troms—which is where the brigade would have to land if its intervention were to make any military sense in a fight for northern Norway—but in Trondheim, 805 km south of Troms!

In short, given the actual capabilities, one can only conclude that the current NATO and Norwegian strategy is to give up Finnmark without a fight, stage a heroic but rather meaningless "last stand" at the Troms fortress, and then, presuming the arrival of the U.S. marine brigade or other reinforcements, attempt to draw some sort of truce line around Trondheim—i.e., give the Russians roughly what they are prepared to take in any case.

This conclusion—as cruel as it may seem—is the only one that can be drawn. And this brings us to a discussion of one final Soviet option for gaining control of the Northern Flank—the one that may in the end prove to be the most likely of all. This final option is that of guaranteeing Soviet access to and control over northern Scandinavia *before* the war ever begins. To understand the details of such an option, we will have to extend the discussion to include not only Norway, but also Sweden and Finland.

Neutralizing the neutrals

In the context of a nuclear war with the United States, the Soviet Union has little interest in invading and occupying either Norway, Sweden, or Finland. Once continental Europe is under Soviet control, that can be done at the Soviets' leisure in any case. But in the immediate war situation, what the Soviet Union must absolutely do, as we have outlined earlier, is deny the military use of these countries' territory to the NATO enemy.

In the case of Finland, the possibility of a pro-NATO turn is minimal. Finland has since 1948 been bound by a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance to the Soviet Union. (That treaty was renewed for another 20 years in June 1983.) In the event of war, or even threat of war, Finland must assist, and accept the assistance of, the Soviet Union. Already now, Finnish military cooperation with the U.S.S.R. is extensive. In northern Finland, e.g., Kittila, new airfields have reportedly been built with the "expert guidance" of Soviet advisers. In the

spring of 1980 a Soviet delegation visiting northern Finland proposed the building of joint radar systems in that area to protect the Soviet Union from cruise missiles and low-flying aircraft; the proposal was repeated in 1983. As recently as May 1985, Marshal Akhromeyev spent five days inspecting Finnish military installations and discussing with the Finnish command. This is the only foreign country he has visited since becoming Chief of the General Staff.

For Sweden, the situation is more complex than for Finland, but the broad outlines of the Soviet policy are clear. Hitherto, the Soviets have pursued a classical "hard-cop/soft-cop" approach. Repeated violations of Swedish territory at sea and in the air are intended to show the Swedes that military resistance is hopeless. At the same time, in Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, the Russians have an asset unrivaled among Western politicians. There is overwhelming evidence of Palme's personal desire to strike deals with the Soviets, including ones that would mean sacrificing Swedish national interests for nothing in return. However, the real power in the Kingdom of Sweden lies not with Palme, but with the country's oligarchical elite, and it is more likely that they would drive a harder bargain with the Russians. For them, the Soviets might have to use stronger arguments than with Palme.

Failing all else, the Soviets might resort to rather brutal blackmail. The Russians could present the Swedish elites—and may well already have done so—with the following persuasive argument: "You Swedes know how very much we in the U.S.S.R. respect your neutrality. But in the present crisis, a problem has arisen. You have a very well-developed network of air bases in northern Sweden, dangerously within range of our own naval base in Murmansk. We Russians know that you would never dream of attacking us from those bases. But we just cannot depend on your being able to deny their use to NATO. We're sure you understand our concern. After all, our most important military base is at stake. Now, unfortunately, we—and you—have only two alternatives: Either we will have to use a few of our 10,000 nuclear warheads within range of Sweden to ensure that *nobody* uses those bases, or you can allow us—very temporarily—to use your airspace and possibly send a few troops across your territory. Once our problems with our NATO adversary are solved, we will leave and you will have your territory back. We are sure you will agree that the latter alternative is preferable."

How precisely and under what circumstances the Soviet negotiators would present those arguments to the Swedes is, of course, impossible to know. But there is no doubt that the approach is an effective one. Moreover, it is one that could also be applied to the Norwegians. In fact, it already has. The current Norwegian "no-defense-of-the-North" policy was adopted in response to precisely this sort of (at least) implicit blackmail: by prohibiting foreign bases and troops on its soil—a self-adopted Norwegian reservation on its NATO membership adopted in March 1949 in response to a Soviet question; by banning all nuclear weapons on its soil—a self-adopted Norwegian reservation on its NATO membership adopted in late 1957 in response to Soviet queries; by keeping Finnmark demilitarized—a self-adopted Norwegian policy since the war—Norway believes it can avoid "provoking" the Russian Bear.

In the more recent period, this policy of appeasement has reached the level of "compromise on top of compromise." A case in point is the compromise reached in Norwegian politics regarding the pre-positioning of heavy equipment for a U.S. marine brigade in northern Norway. The original plan was to have the brigade land and fight relatively far north, near Troms. Norwegian politicians of the Social Democratic left wing,

led by convicted KGB Col. Arne Treholt personally, opposed the stockpiling idea altogether, arguing that it would "upset the balance in northern Europe." The Norwegian right wing finally accepted a compromise: The equipment would be pre-positioned, but in a location over 800 km away from where the troops were supposed to fight! Thus, the original act of appeasement—to ban foreign bases and troops—was compounded by the second act of appeasement—moving the brigade's base so far south as to be thoroughly worthless.

The practical consequence of this kind of policy is that Norway has guaranteed the Soviet Union a total sanctuary for its main arsenal of SSBNs—all of which are targeted on the United States. Without that guarantee, the U.S.S.R. would never have dared build up the biggest of all its military bases only 50 km away from the border to NATO. It is merely one further logical step in this same line of thinking to grant the Soviets a total sanctuary on the Kola once and for all.

In 1940, the Nazis invaded Norway. A resistance movement was organized, and—albeit hesitantly—the British and French began to fight the Nazis in Norway. A few weeks later, in the Far North, in Narvik, the Allies had a crucial chance to deliver a major defeat to the Nazis and possibly open up the battle for the liberation of Norway already in the summer of 1940. Boxed up in Narvik by the English, French, and Free Polish forces, Hitler turned to the neutral Swedes and demanded that they allow Nazi reinforcements and supplies to be shipped to Narvik through Sweden, on Swedish railways, to reinforce his troops in Narvik. The Swedes gave Hitler what he wanted. Sweden remained untouched by the war. But Norway was thereby condemned to suffer five long years of Nazi occupation.

Today, the same sort of deals are in the making. Sweden may avoid nuclear devastation, and Norway may still keep part of its territory. But the price will be infinitely higher, for the deals made on the Northern Flank this time will be the guarantee that the Soviet Union can win World War III.

3.3 The Imminent Knockout of NATO's Southern Flank

On June 2, 1985, the Southern Flank of NATO disintegrated as the Soviet-controlled socialist government of Andreas Papandreou, riding on a wave of vote fraud, internal terror and intimidation, and backed by approximately 30,000 clandestine, paramilitary communist personnel, secured re-election. As of that date, Greece, nominally a member of NATO, is in fact the Soviet Union's Trojan Horse inside the Western alliance. Any future military or diplomatic action of Greece under Papandreou will be an integral part of Soviet strategic deployment.

In fact, the fall of Greece into the Soviet orbit is a unique case study affording the student of international affairs a special insight into the method by which the Soviet High Command is combining military, diplomatic, espionage, and political (overt and covert) means for prosecuting its war against the West, just below the threshold of general strategic assault.

This Russian Trojan Horse, the Soviet-dominated Papandreou government of Athens, is capable, on a mere nod from Moscow at the appropriate moment, of unleashing the dramatic endgame in NATO's Southern Flank debacle, in the form of a contrived military conflict with Turkey in the course of which NATO-member Greece requests military assistance from neighboring Warsaw Pact forces against NATO-member Turkey. This NATO planners' nightmare is now poised to be unleashed at a moment's notice. Moscow is positioned to get its long-sought prize, control over the Bosphorus and Dardanelle Straits.

NATO's Southern Flank had been crippled in June 1974 when Turkey, at the instigation of Henry Kissinger, invaded Cyprus. The invasion precipitated the collapse of the Greek military government of the time and caused Greece to withdraw from NATO. Greece did return to the Alliance in 1980 but, in October 1981, a socialist government under Andreas Papandreou, a Soviet-controlled asset, was brought to power by means of intense anti-NATO propaganda and vote fixing. Greece's relations with NATO remained in limbo until the spring of 1985, when Prime Minister Papandreou and his handpicked Joint Chiefs announced a drastic change in the country's national security doctrine: The Warsaw Pact was dropped as a potential military adversary, and NATO-member Turkey was identified as the sole "potential threat" to Greek national

security against which the Greek armed forces will be armed, trained, and deployed.

After the June 2, 1985 election, a re-elected Papandreou government announced a further important change in defense policy: Greece intends to seek military alliance with its communist neighbors to the north in case of conflict with Turkey. Thus, one of the two pillars of NATO's Southern Flank, Greece, formally no longer shares either the strategic interests or principles of the Alliance. The valuable United States military bases still in Greece have been given notice that they shall be removed by 1988—three years from now at the latest. Matters, however, are likely to deteriorate much faster than that: There is an immediate potential for an artificially induced military conflict between two formal NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, in the course of which one of these NATO members, Greece, requests the military assistance of the Warsaw Pact. What will happen in such a situation, which may materialize before the end of 1985?

The military value of the Southern Flank

The so-called Southern Flank of NATO, which consists of the territories, waters, and air space of Greece and Turkey, has, as its assigned principal strategic mission, to preserve the Mediterranean Sea under the military control of the NATO alliance. A strategic appreciation of this part of the world, therefore, depends on an estimation of the strategic value of the Mediterranean Sea both in peacetime and at war.

In peacetime, the Mediterranean Sea carries approximately 75% of all of Western Europe's international commercial traffic measured in tonnage. The military master of the Mediterranean is the absolute arbiter of the economies of the European part of NATO.

In wartime, whichever power controls the Mediterranean Sea, possesses the most efficiently centralized "interior lines of communication" which permit it to concentrate, amass, deploy, and redeploy great amounts of war materiel, supplies, and troops to any country of Europe, Africa, and Asia with shores on the Mediterranean. The ultimate fate of Napoleon's Egyptian expedition and Erwin Rommel's Africa campaign are classic demonstrations of the extremely high military value of the Mediterranean.

At this time in history, the defense of this great body of water depends on events influencing the life of two formal members of NATO, Greece and Turkey, which occupy the northeastern quadrant of the Mediterranean. It is there where the Strait of Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Strait of Dardanelles, "The Straits" (Map 28), connect the great Russian "lake," the Black Sea, with the Mediterranean. The reason that NATO to this day remains in control of the Mediterranean Sea is that its control over the Straits enables NATO to bottle up Russian naval power inside the Black Sea at will.

The fall of the Straits to Russia would reverse military fortunes throughout the Mediterranean and would make the rest of European NATO a hostage to Russia.

At the present time, the approximate naval comparisons in the Mediterranean stand as follows.

NATO naval forces, excluding the special case of Greece, are:

U.S. Sixth Fleet:	39 principal surface combatants
Italian Navy:	22 principal surface combatants
Spanish Med. Fleet:	11 principal surface combatants

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French Med. Fleet:	12 principal surface combatants
Turkish Navy:	15 principal surface combatants
NATO Total:	99 principal surface combatants 56 submarines

Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (at present):	14 principal surface combatants 10 submarines
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To which could be added, if the Straits fall under Soviet control, the following force of the Black Sea Fleet:

	80 principal surface combatants 24 submarines
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For reasons which should be obvious, a fall of the Straits into Soviet control will virtually automatically make the Greek Navy an ally of the Soviet naval force, thus adding a further

	21 principal surface combatants, 10 submarines,
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thus bringing the the Mediterranean naval balance to the following, assuming Turkey gets knocked out in a local conflict with Greece and her new-found friends:

Soviet-aligned force:	115 principal surface combatants 44 submarines
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NATO force:	84 principal surface combatants 40 submarines
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Apart from this theoretical result, emerging from a presumably localizable Greek-Turkish conflict of the aberrant type described here, the actual conventional force comparisons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the sector covered by the "Southern Flank" are as follows:

If Italy were to step in to fill the gap left by Greece, and if, generously, Yugoslavia, for its own national reasons, decided to side with NATO against the Warsaw Pact, then the NATO side would consist of the following non-naval forces:

Men under arms:	951,000
Tanks, all types:	6,902
Combat aircraft, all types:	1,178
Artillery, all types:	6,524

Poised immediately opposite this NATO-allied force is the Southwestern TVD of Marshal Ogarkov's "Western Theater," with the following conservatively estimated forces:

Men under arms:	1,123,000
Tanks, all types:	11,960
Tactical aircraft, all types:	1,670
Artillery, all types:	9,455

However, the NATO force in the Southern Flank (with Yugoslavia included), is not facing only General Gerasimov's Southwestern TVD. It is also threatened by General Maksimov's "Southern Theater," by Syria and by Albania (which is expected to side with Bulgaria against Yugo-

slavia). Syria and the "Southern Theater," of course, would move principally against Turkey. Thus, the total adversary force confronting the Southern Flank, would be, approximately:

Men under arms:	1,563,000 (plus 135,000, Greece)
Tanks, all types:	21,680 (plus 2,237, Greece)
Tactical aircraft:	3,163 (plus 303, Greece)
Artillery, all types:	19,055 (plus 1,096, Greece)

In short, the political takeover of Greece from within, has created a military situation in which the remnant of NATO's Southern Flank is faced with an adversary which enjoys a local, operational superiority of 2-to-1 in ground combat personnel; 4-to-1 in tanks; 2-to-1 in tactical aircraft; 3-to-1 in artillery. The further advantage of the tactical opposite numbers over the NATO's Southern Flank tactical force is that they enjoy tactical nuclear support from SS-20, SS-4, SS-5 and SS-22 launch sites. Local NATO forces have no such coverage. The anti-NATO force enjoys geographical continuity and tight cohesion of "inner lines of communication." The NATO allied force, Italy, Yugoslavia and Turkey, is fragmented both by water and by enemy territory.

In sum: With the fall of Greece under Soviet influence, Turkey and her Straits are indefensible unless the United States is willing to go to general thermonuclear war in defense of Turkey and the Straits (Map 29).

'Escalation dominance' and other Russian options

The "sanitized," i.e., declassified version of the CIA's "National Intelligence Estimate" for this year's Soviet force strength, presented to the U.S. Senate, lets slip through a uniquely important conclusion: that the purpose of the Soviet Union's unprecedented strategic nuclear arms build-up to absolute supremacy over the United States, "appears to be" to ensure that the United States will be unable to intervene in any "sub-nuclear" military conflict, "anywhere in the Eurasian landmass." In short, the CIA admits in public that it is its considered opinion that Soviet posture is what specialists call "escalation dominance." This term describes a situation in which the Soviet forces have attained absolute military supremacy at all possible levels of conflict, from low-intensity operations to limited tactical conventional engagement, to full tactical conventional engagement, to operational conventional, theater conventional operational, strategic conventional and strategic nuclear engagement. The implication is that the Soviet forces could at will initiate any limited conflict anywhere and be guaranteed to win it, if left within its original limits, thus leaving it up to the losing adversary to decide whether he will up the stakes and, in order to salvage a losing local situation, plunge into a losing regional or a losing strategic conflict.

All this, of course, is in theory. In reality, the CIA's formulation in this year's NIE is simply a suggestion that if we, the United States, leave the "Eurasian landmass" alone, we should not feel too uncomfortable with our existing strategic inferiority.

Would the Soviet Union's military force engage itself for the purpose of opening up the Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, which would lead it to naval supremacy in the Mediterranean? This question, posed without reference to the region's political realities, is pure speculation. The Soviet Union need not risk one soldier's bleeding nose to bend Turkey to its

will. Others, it is beginning to emerge, might do the bleeding for the Russians.

After the fall of Greece to Russian influence, the Achilles heel of NATO's Southern Flank is to the south of the Caucasus Mountains: the military roads from Stavropol and Krasnodar down to Batum, Tiflis, Kirovabad, Yerivan and the critical military junction of Nakhichevan, south of the point where the Turkish, Soviet and Iranian borders meet. From there, massed Soviet divisions would move down south into Iran, proceed to Tabriz, Maragheh and Kermanshah, turn around Lake Urmia to Urmia and Khey, and completely outflank Turkish defenses from Trebizond to Mount Ararat. From Urmia, Soviet troops could move east to Rawanduz, Mosul and link up with allied Syrian forces in Aleppo (Map 30).

The Soviet military-logistical capabilities to execute such a blitzkrieg, out of the Transcaucasian Military District, are being upgraded on a crash program basis to wartime requirements. In early 1985, the Russians began the crash construction of two railway lines in the Transcaucasus, in the Soviet Republics of Georgia and Armenia.

The first line, scheduled for completion at the end of 1987, starts 20 kilometers (12.5 miles) south of the Georgian capital of Tiflis, and proceeds southwest to near the Turkish border at Achalkhalaki, in mountainous terrain, opposite the Turkish provincial capital of Kars. Kars Province was part of the Tsarist Russian Empire until 1914, and was officially demanded by Josef Stalin in a postwar ultimatum to Turkey.

The second railway line, to be completed by the end of 1986, goes from the Armenian town of Idzhevan, southward to Razdan, across the high plateau west of Lake Sevan, to a point near the Turkish border.

Any Soviet invasion of Turkey would be preceded by a massive Soviet destabilization campaign. In the wake of the Soviet moves into northern Iran, the Moscow-financed Kurdish insurgency in Turkey will flare up into a veritable bloodbath. The Shi'ite insurgency in the region of the Turkish naval base of Alexandretta, well financed and coached by Syria's Hafez Assad, would move to link arms with Syrian troops. A Greek provocation in the northwest against Turkey and a Greek-invited Greek-Bulgarian military alignment, would force the Turkish leadership to a dramatic choice: either capitulate to the wishes of the Soviet command and turn over military control of the Straits to the Russians, or try to fight simultaneously against 1) domestic insurgency, 2) a Greek-Bulgarian military action in Turkish Thrace, and 3) a Syrian-Shi'ite action against the naval base of Alexandretta.

Given the political orientation of the Greek government, a situation may well arise which, while not directly involving the two superpowers, produces a military conflict between NATO-member Turkey on the one side and NATO-member Greece on the other, the latter aligned with Syria and Bulgaria. The local comparison of force strengths in mid-1985 would look as follows:

Regular Forces	Army	A.F.V	Airforce	Navy*
Turkey	500,000	3,532	458	16/13/2/14
Greece	135,000	2,545	303	10/14/7/18
Bulgaria	105,000	1,860	188	2/ 2/ 6
Syria	240,000	4,100	503	/ 12/20
	480,000	8,505	994	12/14/11/44

Reserves	Army	A.F.V	Airforce	Navy*
Turkey	700,000	66,000	70,000	
Greece	350,000	30,000	24,000	
Bulgaria	150,000	20,000	25,000	
Syria	460,000	?	2,500	
	960,000	50,000	51,500	

* subs/cruises/destroyers/frigates

Thus, Turkey, if she keeps her Cyprus contingent, would have an equal number of men under arms as her combat adversaries; would be outnumbered significantly in mobilizable reserves; would be outnumbered by a ratio of 2.5-to-1 in tanks; of 2-to-1 in combat aircraft; and would be significantly outnumbered in combat surface ships on her Mediterranean side. Turkey would, of course, suffer even more severe local tactical disadvantages, because a significant portion of her land, air and naval forces would be pinned down against the Kurdish insurgency and at the non-combat border areas with the Soviet Union and Iran, assuming that Moscow chooses to adopt a neutral posture and let her surrogates do the job.

In a local conflict of this type, Turkey would have to capitulate. The likelihood of its occurring is much greater than most imagine. It is almost bound to be triggered by the eventual death of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini.

Soviet political envelopments

Turkey is likely to be exposed to maximum pressure, in the context of the strategic crisis which is expected to erupt with the death of the aging Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran. The Soviet government, since the days of Yuri Andropov, has made it clear with official government statements that its national security interests will not permit the eruption of chaos in its neighbor Iran, and that she considers it within her treaty rights to move troops to occupy northern Iran as she had done, invoking the same treaty, at the end of the Second World War.

The recent completion of a third military railroad in the Transcaucasus region suggests that Moscow this time is planning a more permanent occupation of northern Iran. The same prospect is suggested by the massive infiltration of Azerbaijani-speaking Soviet operatives into northern Iran since 1979 and by the amassment of Azerbaijani-speaking divisions at the borders with Iran. Soviet units in Afghanistan would also have the option of moving into the eastern side of northern Iran. From on-the-ground reports, it appears that a Soviet-sponsored political rearrangement of Iran, now being arranged jointly by Soviet, Syrian and Israeli intelligence services, involves a mutilated southern Iranian "Islamic Republic" under Ayatollah Rafsanjani, or someone of his persuasion, at the helm, in close coordination with the Syrian and Libyan government. A leading Israeli political faction associated with Kissinger's friends around Ariel Sharon has been in secret negotiations with the Soviet Union via Edgar Bronfman, exploring the possibility of an Israeli-Soviet understanding based on 1) Israel's recognition of and adjustment to the fact of Soviet supremacy in the Middle East and 2) solution of Israel's grave demographic problem by means of Soviet-sponsored mass emigration to Israel of Soviet Jews.

This Israeli faction's strategic orientation, in addition to a rapprochement with the Russians, appears to include the following overall prospect: After the anticipated Soviet takeover of northern Iran, both Israel and Syria will continue to share the common objectives of emasculating Jordan and Iraq, and of making it impossible for their ally, Egypt, to render them any military assistance. Thus, both Syria and Israel will tend to both 1) increase their assistance to the Shi'ite fundamentalist forces of mutilated southern Iran and 2) place a premium on building up Kurdish insurgency into a considerable military threat. For the latter objective, both Syrian and Israeli planners concur that the best way of building a serious Kurdish threat against Iraq is to foment a powerful Kurdish movement in southeastern Turkey, which is already in progress.

Thus, by approximately the time of the Soviet military occupation of northern Iran after Khomeini's death, Israel, under the appropriate internal power readjustments, would enter into a Soviet-sponsored arrangement with Syria. The arrangement would provide for the 40,000 Syrian troops now pinned down in Lebanon—plus the far greater number of Syrian forces tied down between the Israeli-held Golan Heights and the nearby Syrian capital of Damascus—to be freed up for deployment against Turkey. *Such a redeployment of Syrian forces out of the Lebanon cauldron and away from the Golan-Damascus Front, would be the necessary precondition for Papandreu to move, with assistance from Bulgaria, for joint military action against Turkey, while Soviet forces in northern Iran have completed their envelopment of Turkey's eastern border armies.*

In this overall scheme of imminent politico-military envelopment of Turkey, NATO's last remaining bastion in the Southern Flank, the following broader considerations are brought to bear.

Soviet penetration and power projection

Incrementally since 1981, the Soviet High Command has built up an impressive military and quasi-military presence in the areas surrounding the "Southern Flank," both directly and through surrogates. One of the important pivots of this Russian military presence is the prepositioning of massive amounts of war materiel in the deserts of Libya and the stationing of Soviet Blackjack strategic bombers in both Libya and Syria. For all intents and purposes, Libya and Syria are de facto extensions of the Russian military establishment.

The number of Soviet/Warsaw Pact uniformed military personnel in the relevant areas is over 20,000 men, approximately distributed as follows:

Soviet and allied troops in Southern Flank-relevant locations:

	Syria	Libya	Ethiopia	N. Yemen	S. Yemen
U.S.S.R.	7,000	1,800	1,700	500	1,500
East Germany	210	400	550	—	75
Poland	131	—	—	—	—
Cuba	—	3,000	3,000	—	300
	7,341	5,200	5,250	500	1,875

Grand Total: 20,166

The presence of these forces backs up larger Soviet military deployments

secured by treaty agreements, both public and secret. During 1983 and 1984, the number of such treaties and agreements, in our estimate, was approximately 25. As a result, the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean has established major presence in Latakia, Syria, in Benghazi and Tripoli, Libya, in the island of Malta and in no less than five naval locations in Greece, including sovereign floating-dock naval facilities just outside the three-mile limit of Greek territorial waters, across from the NATO naval base at Souda Bay, Crete.

From August to December 1984, the following supplementary treaties were concluded:

A "friendship treaty" between Libya and Malta, providing for extensive military cooperation and presence of Libyan troops in Malta; secret Libyan-Greek treaty with a \$1 billion price tag; a secret Greek-Syrian treaty which includes clauses of joint Greek-Syrian military action against Turkey; a long series of treaties and agreements between Syria and Libya; a Libyan-Moroccan amalgamation treaty worked out by Kissinger's friends over the previous summer. A secret Syrian-Algerian-Maltese "Friendship Treaty."

All these treaties involve military and naval agreements, sharing of weapons and munitions, and special privileges and facilities for the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean. All military aspects of these treaties have been supervised by the Russian military at the highest level. Marshals Sokolov, Ogarkov and Akhromeyev deployed in the area more than once during 1984. These 1984 developments in the Mediterranean had been preceded by an impressive Warsaw Pact exercise during the month of March, codenamed *Soyuz 84*, whose objective was to practice a massed land invasion of Greece and Turkey along the following four axes: into Turkey down the Maritsa river in the directions Edirne-to-Gallipoli and Edirne-to-Istanbul; into Greece down the Vardar and Struma rivers. The maneuver indicated that it would take Warsaw Pact troops 24 hours to reach the Aegean coast of Greece and 42 hours to reach Istanbul (Map 31).

In the course of the *Soyuz 84* maneuver, the Soviets installed an unspecified number of SS-20s in Bulgaria's Pirin Plain, north of Nevrokop. At approximately the same time, the Turkish General Staff, having received reports that Syria's Hafez Assad had fixed the prospect of conquering the Turkish naval base of Alexandretta as a major policy commitment, conducted a study of Alexandretta's defense: It concluded that the Turkish Army cannot defend the port city for more than 72 hours, should the Syrian units now in Lebanon be freed up for redeployment.

3.4 Germany—the Key to Europe

The Soviet plan of conquering Europe has two basic variants:

1) *Military conquest.* In all likelihood, this would occur as a European or Western Theater conflict, subsumed under a Soviet global nuclear assault upon the United States and its NATO allies;

2) *A series of deals struck by the Soviets with leading European oligarchical families.* These would be negotiated through political party “cut-outs,” such as the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) of Egon Bahr and Willy Brandt, the Free Democratic Party of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, or foreign ministry cut-outs under Foreign Ministers Genscher, Andreotti, Howe, and Dumas.

Whether conquest occurs by war or peaceful capitulation, there is one invariant: The inclusion of West Germany as a Soviet satrap means the automatic incorporation of all Europe into the Soviet sphere of influence. Germany is the key to Europe, and the Soviets’ entire strategy for conquering Europe without firing a shot, is predicated on breaking West Germany out of the Atlantic Alliance.

Similarly, if Russia takes Europe by storm, the Central, or German Front will be the decisive Front within the European Theater of military action. Russian victory on the Central Front means that the Soviet Union need not incur further losses by fighting for every square kilometer of Europe. Once Germany and the Central Front are occupied, the “game” is over, Russia declares “checkmate,” and the rest of Europe capitulates.

Germany’s place on the map

Germany is the industrial hub and geographical center of Europe, the military mainstay in both troop contingent and geographical terms, for the defense of continental Western Europe. If Germany falls to the Russians, the economic relations of all Europe shift overnight into a Soviet-Comecon centered economy. West Germany itself would become, as East Germany has been for decades, a colony functioning as an industrial and high-technology “milking cow” for Mother Russia.

One glance at a map of Europe shows what becomes of Western Europe’s defenses should Germany fall to the Russians militarily. The Russian Army would stand at the Rhine, looking into a defenseless France, to say nothing of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. To the north, Denmark would be equally defenseless, and its fall would be followed by terms of capitulation being worked out with Norway and Sweden. To

the south, the loss of Germany would lead automatically to the Russians taking neutral, defenseless Austria, placing the Soviet Army at the Brenner Pass on the Italian border. It would be only a matter of time—and very little at that—before a Soviet “New Order” for Italy, and the entire Mediterranean, would be “negotiated.”

In recognition of the decisive role played by German territory in the defense of Europe, by far the strongest concentration of U.S. and NATO ground and air forces are deployed on German soil. The active NATO forces consist of 345,000 West German Bundeswehr Ground Forces, including 12 Armored and Mechanized Divisions; some 200,000 U.S. Ground Forces, in 5+ Divisions; 60,000 British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) troops; a 50,000-man French Army Corps in the Baden region in southwest Germany, and scattered combat units from the Canadian, Dutch, and Belgian Armies. All in all, some 700,000 Army troops on hand.

The role of the West German Armed Forces in the defense of the Central Front is decisive. The following figures, supplied by the 1985 *Annual White Paper* of the West German defense ministry, speak for themselves. The West German Armed Forces provide the following percentages of troops and equipment for the NATO Forces on the Central Front.

German share of NATO forces and materiel

	Percent
Ground forces	50
Main battle tanks	60
Ground/air defense	50
Combat aircraft	30
Naval forces in Baltic	70
Naval air forces in Baltic	100

In terms of raw numbers, the NATO forces deployed on German soil are, broadly speaking, sufficient to handle the situation. But numbers of troops in and of themselves do not win wars.

Wars are both deterred and won by abandoning illusions and consoling thoughts as to how one would wish a war to be fought. Rather, one studies carefully the Soviet enemy's actual, existing Order of Battle, his doctrine, his strategic policy goals, his build-up of troops and hardware, and how that fits with his doctrine and strategic policy goals. Then one draws the appropriate conclusions regarding both strengthening and deployment of one's own forces—no matter how chilling the reality becomes.

From this standpoint, the NATO Order of Battle in Germany and Central Europe is a deployment of forces based on cardinal illusions, starting with the widespread NATO premise that a European war would “start as a conventional conflict,” or with “limited use of nuclear weapons.” The same massive NATO forces in Germany become sitting ducks in a nuclear and chemical weapon shooting gallery, should a Soviet blitzkrieg ever be mounted across Germany.

Certain potentially fatal deficiencies must be rectified among the U.S. and NATO forces in West Germany, concerning especially types of nuclear arms (above all the urgent need for thousands of neutron artillery and neutron mines), operational methods, dispersal and hardening of air, missile, and ground units and readiness/alert status.

Soviet doctrine and the German Front

As with the Ogarkov Plan Maximum Option for thermonuclear assault on the United States, any Soviet assault on West Germany would be characterized by:

- 1) Surprise attack;
- 2) Pre-emptive nuclear and chemical precision first strike by missiles and aircraft, to eliminate all crucial military and logistical targets in the first hour of war. In the case of Germany, the Soviet high-speed offensive would follow the first-hour precision bombardment, as the Red Army marched into a Germany where the bulk of the massive NATO units no longer existed.

The assault on West Germany would begin with a Soviet barrage by hundreds of nuclear and chemical weapons. NATO would have a warning time of 5-10 minutes, the time from which the barrage is launched to the time that the nuclear and chemical warheads hit the hundreds of NATO military bases, logistical bases, airfields, missile bases, and nuclear weapons storage sites, that comprise their targets.

Five to ten minutes after launch, NATO would be battered by hundreds of low-yield (20-150 kt) nuclear and chemical warheads—low-yield in order to limit the blast and fire damage around the military and logistic sites being targeted. The purpose would be to maximize the damage to NATO military capability, while minimizing the destruction of civilian population and industrial facilities, which are to be occupied by the Red Army in the next days, and later become a Soviet zone of occupation.

The hundreds of low-yield nuclear and chemical warheads will be delivered by precision-accurate modern short- and medium-range missiles, the SS-21 (120 km), the SS-23 (500 km), the SS-22 (1,000 km) (Map 32). These new missiles have been deployed in full strength since the end of 1984 with the Soviet spearhead invasion forces stationed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland; as well as with their Second Echelon invasion forces stationed in Soviet East Prussia, the Baltic States, Byelorussia, and the Carpathian region.

During the first hour of war in Europe, additional hundreds of low-yield nuclear and chemical-weapon bombs would be dropped by Soviet long-range fighter-bombers, such as the modern Su-24 type—itsself forward-based for the first time during 1984—with precision accuracy over NATO military and logistical targets.

Every SS-21, SS-23, or SS-22 missile launcher deployed has quick reload capability. This means that every half hour another missile can be fired from the same launcher.

We must now look at that first hour of war on the Central Front, from the standpoint of a Soviet strategic planner. Marshal Ogarkov has his list of NATO targets in Germany and the Low Countries, that must be wiped out in that time-frame. The list is divided into the categories "hardened" and "soft" targets (the latter forming the overwhelming majority); and then, by type: unit barracks for the personnel of all NATO armored and mechanized divisions and brigades; armor, vehicle, and equipment storage areas; airfields, cruise and Pershing missile sites; air defense SAM sites; ammo and fuel depots; key military port facilities.

Let's take one simple example to illustrate how this would work. Every combat brigade (armored or mechanized) of the NATO Forces in West Germany sits on a non-hardened base. There are 36 German Bundeswehr brigades, some 20 American brigades, about 10 British and Canadian brigades, an equal number of French brigades, and a few Dutch and Belgian units. Let's say that at 4:00 a.m., when it's no longer pitch dark,

but when all the NATO troops are fast asleep, the SS-23s based in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, which can reach every corner of West Germany, open fire, aided by SS-21s to hit targets close to the border.

Five minutes after launch, the 80 or so targets that comprise the entire NATO ground combat capability in West Germany, no longer exist. The same strike would eliminate most NATO theater combat aircraft capability, and all "soft" military and logistical targets. Even assuming the best-case scenario—that the hardened Pershing missile sites escape unscathed—the United States could, at best, fire off each non-reloadable Pershing and then wait for the Red Army to arrive.

In addition, the Ogarkov Plan programs nuclear strikes to wipe out any U.S. or NATO European Theater capability based outside Germany and the Low Countries, that could effect or influence in any way the decisive battle on the Central Front. Thus, the French *Force de Frappe*—the Albion Plateau land-based missiles and the nuclear ballistic submarines in the Mediterranean and Atlantic—would be targeted for elimination by a MIRV barrage by SS-22s and SS-20s. Additional SS-22s would knock out the Air Force component of the *Force de Frappe* on the ground, before it could take off.

Similar SS-22 and SS-20 strikes would target the U.S. cruise missile bases in England and in Comiso, Sicily (here, SS-20s or SS-22s covertly stationed in Bulgaria would do the job).

The capability to match the doctrine

The Soviets, under the Ogarkov Plan, have developed and deployed an offensive capability—and, in particular, a nuclear and chemical weapons capability—to enable their Armed Forces to carry out their assignments dictated by the Ogarkov Plan, especially during the critical first hour of nuclear war.

The Soviet short- and medium-range Euromissiles were developed, starting in 1975, and deployed during late 1983 and throughout 1984, explicitly for the purpose of effecting the transition of the Soviet Armed Forces deployed in Eastern Europe and the Western U.S.S.R., to the point where they could deliver a surprise attack, a decisive knock-out blow on the Central Front, to take Germany with relatively minimal civilian destruction, and then occupy all Europe.

Before the new generation of SS-21s, SS-23s, and SS-22s were deployed, the Soviet Armed Forces could launch the same surprise attack, and devastate all of Germany, but had no precision-strike capability against hardened U.S. and NATO sites. The Soviets were not in the position to limit civilian casualties and industrial destruction, and thus occupy the new western territories of Russia's Eurasian Empire, as intact as possible.

The late 1970s development and 1980s deployment of the Su-24 long-range nuclear-capable fighter-bomber, gave the Soviet forces facing Western Europe a previously non-existent long-range aircraft nuclear-delivery system, for pin-pointed strikes on NATO targets. The force strength of deployed SS-21s, SS-23s, and SS-22s, as well as forward-based Su-24s, is more than sufficient for what is required to accomplish the tasks on the Central Front, mandated by the Ogarkov Plan for the first hour of war.

The deployment of SS-21s, SS-23s, and SS-22s missiles (in order of range) in Eastern Europe was announced by the Soviet Union, as "countermeasures" to the stationing of Pershing II missiles in Western Europe.

But at the time of that announcement, autumn 1983, these new missile systems were *already* deployed in the western Soviet Union. Here are the principal characteristics of these new weapons:

SS-22 SRBM. Range: 1,000 km. Three warheads, totaling less than 500 kt. According to the *Oesterreichische Militärische Zeitschrift* (OMZ) (No. 6, 1984), three SS-22 brigades were moved from the western U.S.S.R., into East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Thus, the two brigades in East Germany (72 SS-22 launchers) and the one brigade in Czechoslovakia (36 SS-22 launchers) represented unit-additions sent from Russia. There has been no report of the removal of Soviet "Scaleboard" units from either East Germany or Czechoslovakia, contrary to Soviet claims that the older units were being "replaced." The OMZ report anticipated the transfer of a fourth SS-22 brigade (36 launchers) from the western U.S.S.R. into one of the same two East European countries.

Several sources report that at least two more brigades of SS-22 units (72 launchers) are stationed on the former territory of East Prussia, now within Soviet borders, around the city of Kaliningrad (formerly Königsberg); here, two artillery divisions are stationed, which represent the highest concentration of artillery divisions (tactical-operational missiles) anywhere in the entire Soviet Order of Battle. These SS-22s target West Germany and Scandinavia.

SS-21 SRBM. Range: 120 km. Warhead: approximately 150 kt. The SS-21 is a considerable improvement over its predecessor, the "Frog," which had a range of only 70 km. Even if each SS-21 battalion only replaces one Frog battalion, this will enhance Soviet short-range nuclear missile capability by approximately 50%; a Frog battalion contains only four launchers, while an SS-21 battalion has six. On top of the increase in launchers, is the increased range and improved accuracy.

Every Soviet motorized rifle, tank, or airborne division has such a battalion. Thus, counting Soviet divisions in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, we can establish a minimal total of 168 SS-21 missile launchers targeting the Federal Republic of Germany, out of 210 launchers aimed at targets in Europe.

SS-23 SRBM. Range: 600 km. Warhead: approximately 150 kt. The deployment of SS-23s into Eastern Europe has been completed, so the number of SS-23 launchers can be no fewer than the previous number of "Scud" launchers. Scud brigades contained between 12 and 18 missile launchers each. Based on the strength of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, that gives a minimum total of 360 SS-23 launchers targeting Europe, of which 288 are aimed at West Germany.

Methodical blitzkrieg preparations

The Soviet deployment and build-up of short- and medium-range missiles plus fighter-bombers in the past two years has not occurred as an isolated case. During the same time-frame, their deployment was part of a clearly documented, meticulous build-up of forward-based ground, air, and amphibious forces, especially the ground and air forces based in East Germany, and the amphibious forces assigned for operations in the Baltic.

In the past two years, Soviet Forces in East Germany have grown from 400,000 to at least 470,000. The qualitative jump has been far more staggering, especially in tank strength, armored infantry combat vehicles, and artillery, including nuclear-capable artillery.

We begin by examining what has happened with the Soviet tank and motorized rifle divisions, the armored combat formations that will tear through Western Europe on "Day X," when the high-speed offensive begins. The crucial attacking formations will be those stationed in East Germany.

During 1984, the following hardware and troop additions occurred among the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (GSFG):

Tank strength

1) The strength of each of the 10 armored divisions of the GSFG increased from 270 to 415 tanks per division. This brought tank strength in the armored divisions of the GSFG up from 2,700 to 4,150.

2) Each of the nine motorized rifle divisions of the GSFG had one tank battalion added (45 tanks per battalion), which increased the tank strength of these motorized rifle divisions from 1,975 to 2,380.

3) Three independent tank regiments were added to the 2nd Guards Tank Army, facing northern Germany and Schleswig-Holstein. This added 405 tanks.

4) In December 1984, the Soviets began modernizing their tank forces in the GSFG with the T-80, the newest Soviet tank.

The tank strength of the GSFG thus stands at 6,935 tanks.

Artillery

1) Each of the 19 divisions of the GSFG received a fourth artillery battalion, bringing divisional artillery to 72 pieces per division, instead of 54. This comprises 36 152mm cannon and 36 122mm cannon.

2) BM-21 122mm multi-barrel rocket-launchers are being replaced with BM-27 240mm "Stalin Organ" multi-barrel rocket-launchers, each of which has 40 tubes. Each motorized rifle or tank division has one multi-barrel rocket-launcher battalion, containing 18 launchers. The 19 such divisions of the GSFG, therefore, have BM-27 240mm multi-barrel rocket-launchers. In addition, the GSFG artillery division, based at Potsdam, contains one artillery brigade, with at least 54 BM-27 240mm multi-barrel rocket-launchers.

3) Large increases have occurred in self-propelled gun strength, giving an increased battlefield nuclear punch. According to the *Oesterreich Militärische Zeitschrift*, the GSFG's artillery division has acquired a 203mm nuclear-capable self-propelled gun; sources report that the number involved is between 36 and 72.

4) GSFG conventional self-propelled gun (122mm and 152mm) and mobile howitzer strength reached the following levels:

- Division artillery regiments. The standard strength of a Soviet artillery regiment attached to motorized rifle and tank divisions is three artillery battalions; two are equipped with 18 122mm self-propelled guns, each, and the third with 18 152mm self-propelled guns. During the 1980s, the artillery regiments of GSFG divisions have been expanded to include four artillery battalions. An extra battalion of 18 152mm self-propelled guns was added. Division artillery strength now is:

19 × 36 = 684 122mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers;

19 × 36 = 684 152mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers.

Thus, in the 1980s, division artillery strength has increased by 342 152mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers.

- Army-attached artillery (in Soviet terminology). Recent increases have brought per-army artillery strength up to:

2 battalions (18 pieces each = 36) 130mm artillery pieces;

2 battalions (18 pieces each = 36) 152mm self-propelled guns or mobile howitzers;

1 battalion (18 launchers) BM-27 multi-barrel rocket-launchers.

That is the strength per army, of which there are five in the GSFG, for the totals:

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- 10 battalions of 130mm artillery = 180 pieces;
- 10 battalions of 152mm self-propelled guns = 180 pieces.
- 5 battalions of BM-27 multi-barrel rocket-launchers = 90 pieces.
- The artillery division at Potsdam has one brigade of 152mm self-propelled guns = at least 54 pieces.
- Grand total for GSFG artillery:
 - 918 152mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers;
 - 684 122mm self-propelled guns and mobile howitzers;
 - 180 130mm artillery pieces;
 - 486 240mm BM-27 multi-barrel rocket-launchers.

Motorized and armored infantry, infantry combat vehicles

The Soviets customarily equip the motorized rifle regiments in tank divisions with the BMP-1 infantry combat vehicle, while only one of the three motorized rifle regiments of each motorized rifle division is equipped with the BMP-1. The rest are equipped with the BTR series of armored personnel carriers. The BMP-1 is heavily armed in contrast to the BTR; it has a 73mm gun (an APC does not) and anti-tank wire-guided missiles.

The exception to the rule is the GSFG, where not only the motorized rifle regiments of tank divisions, but also two (instead of the standard one) out of the three motorized rifle regiments in each motorized rifle division, are equipped with the BMP. This exception to the rule was revealed in *Jane's Defence Weekly* (Dec. 17, 1984).

GSFG figures on BMP-1s (108 per motorized rifle regiment) show an increase by 972 BMPs during the recent force beef-up:

- 1) Before: 10 tank divisions, each with 1 motorized infantry regiment = 1,080 BMP-1s. After: Same.
- 2) Before: 9 motorized rifle divisions, each with 1 motorized rifle regiment equipped with BMP-1s = 972 BMP-1s. After: 9 motorized rifle divisions, each with 2 motorized rifle regiments equipped with BMP-1s = 1,944 BMP-1s.

Logistics and war stockpiling

Here we can cite the 1985 *British Government Defence White Paper*, which reflects the stand of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces as of the end of 1984:

Warsaw Pact stockpiles of ammunition, fuel, and tactical pipelaying equipment in East Germany and Eastern Europe can now allow operations to be sustained for 60 to 90 days. . . . This period is about twice as long as that of only 5 years ago, due to considerable improvements in the sustainability of the Soviet Ground Forces facing NATO.

The U.S.S.R. is also establishing a new pipeline brigade, equipped with pipelaying machinery to supply Soviet troops with fuel in wartime. Pipelayers towed by tractors can lay 427 meters of pipe in 8.5 minutes, and can carry 70 sets of 70 meter-long pipe.

Baltic amphibious capabilities and rail ferry

An enormous boost in the logistical-resupply capabilities of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact Armies in Central Europe will occur with the official opening on Oct. 7, 1986 of the Soviet-East German Rail Ferry, running from Memel (Klaipeda) in Soviet Lithuania, to Mukran on the East German Baltic island of Rügen, a distance of 273 nautical miles. The project is modeled on the Soviet-Bulgarian rail ferry, completed in 1981 and providing service across the Black Sea.

Six rail ferries are being built for the new line—three East German and three Russian. Each can hold 108 railway cars. The ferry will operate continuously, with a ferry leaving each end of the line every eight hours.

This military-logistic project demonstrates Soviet insistence on adopting proven East German work organization methods, wherever possible. The East German party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* reported on the project on June 7, 1985: "In Klaipeda, the Party leaderships of the various construction [project] amalgamations were at first working separately from one another. The advantages [of construction methods] in Mukran were convincing, so the Klaipeda workforce copied their experiences." Amid indications that the project is behind schedule, *Neues Deutschland* also reported that in Autumn 1985, a Soviet "construction brigade of welders, carpenters, and masons" would spend two weeks in Mukran, for on-the-job-training in East German construction methods.

Mukran will have a 1,345-meter long harbor mole. Round, pre-fabricated concrete casings, each 13 meters in diameter, have been sunk to form the piers. Mukran will be outfitted with broad-gauge rails of the Soviet rail system, as well as the standard-gauge rails. One-third of a total length of 100 km of track has been laid at Mukran.

Besides the rail ferry, the Soviets are acquiring other components of an amphibious operations capability in the Baltic Sea, of the dimensions required to rapidly capture Schleswig-Holstein, Jutland, and the Danish Islands, and neutralize southern Sweden.

1) One Landing Ship Dock (LSD). The "Ivan Rogov": Since the "Zapad" maneuvers of Autumn 1981, this prototype ship, capable of carrying 500 fully-equipped naval infantry and their vehicles, has been in service with the Baltic Fleet.

2) 26 Landing Ships Tank (LST), of which there are three classes: the new "Ropucha," under construction at the Gdansk shipyards in Poland; the "Alligator" (built 1966-77); the "Polnochny" (built 1961-73).

The Baltic Fleet has:

- 4 "Ropucha" class LSTs;
- 2 "Alligator" class LSTs;
- 20 "Polnochny" class LSTs;
- 30 smaller landing ships and boats.

3) The Baltic Fleet also has a sizeable number of roll-on/roll-off ships, officially registered with the Soviet Merchant Marine; and the majority of the following listing of Soviet Navy hovercraft-type vessels, all built since 1969:

- 16 Aist class hovercraft (as of summer 1984);
- 20 Aist class hovercraft (as of summer 1985);
- 17 Lebed class hovercraft;
- 36 Gus class hovercraft.

The Aist hovercraft can carry 100 tons of equipment: for example, two T-72 tanks plus either four PT-76 light amphibious tanks or four BMP-1 APCs, together with half a company of naval infantry. The rate of production of Aist was doubled in mid-1984, resulting in the ability to put at least four into service per year. Sources have linked the accelerated Aist program with the huge construction project at Rügen, on the East German Baltic Sea coast, which will be a huge supply depot, including barely concealed, covert military stockpiling. Aist-class hovercraft based in Kaliningrad (Königsberg) or Klaipeda (Memel), with a speed of 60-65 knots per hour, could reach Rügen within four hours, during a nighttime operation to seize Danish territory or Schleswig-

Holstein. Soviet hovercraft can travel over the Baltic ice in the winter, and over swamp, marsh stretches, and sandbars, and need not worry about the water being too shallow. For the same reason, they are impervious to underwater obstacles, and mines. All these advantages are of enormous importance, especially in a Baltic environment.

Finally, in 1984, the Soviets began testing a sea-skimming transport plane that would be "a quantum leap forward in amphibious warfare," according to the *Sunday Times* of London (July 29, 1984).

Battle commands

In that same 1983-84 time period, the five Armies comprising the GSFG underwent a thorough reorganization of units and commanders, with the clear purpose of preparing for a war that would begin with a nuclear and chemical weapon bombardment, and a mass armored high-speed offensive pouring into West Germany.

The reorganization greatly increased tank, nuclear artillery, and armored vehicle strength on the crucial breakthrough front facing Hanover-Braunschweig. In this region, the Soviet 3rd Shock spearhead Army, with its headquarters at Magdeburg, was transformed into an all-Armored Division Army of four Armored Divisions. The tank strength of the Soviet Armies facing North Germany was more than doubled.

In the past two years, the Soviets have built up their war-fighting logistics capabilities to the point where the British government now admits in its 1985 *Defence White Paper* that Warsaw Pact forces have the munitions, fuel and supplies on hand for sustained war-fighting for 60-90 days.

It is important here to add that the Soviet forces now facing West Germany—impressive as they may seem—are not to be seen as the final troop and unit strength that would exist on the eve of war. Defense-related sources in West Germany have noted with alarm—again over the past few years—an accelerated military construction program in East Germany, to build airfields, depots, barracks and other "troop accommodations." Thus, shortly before war, tens of thousands of Russian troops would be flown in, or brought in otherwise, covertly. They would "hook up" with their pre-positioned equipment and supplies, and become part of the high-speed offensive.

NATO may indeed have pre-positioned stocks of equipment and supplies. However, the troops to man them, unless they were on location in Europe before the Soviet blitzkrieg, would never arrive, once the war actually got under way.

The other "sure-fire" proof of the intent behind the build-up is the new wave of Army commanders for the GSFG brought in during 1983-84, as discussed in Part I of this report. That chapter also documents the maneuvers conducted by the tremendously reinforced units of the GSFG during 1984 and up to the present in 1985, where the art and execution of a surprise attack with no advance warning or physically observable "tip-offs" are given to the U.S. and NATO surveillance.

By year's end, a witness of these practices such as the London *Observer's* James Adams would be compelled to write that Army Gen. Zaitsev's innovations in the GSFG had rendered obsolete NATO's newly proclaimed Follow On Forces Attack (Fofa) doctrine, which provides for deep strikes into attacking Warsaw Pact forces to disrupt second-echelon reinforcements. "The latest Soviet tactical revisions have already made Fofa out of date," acknowledged the *Observer*.

Highlights of this series of exercises were:

- 1) In the exercises of June 28-July 5 1984, the crescendo occurred on

July 4. On that day, without any prior notice or warning, the following Soviet troop movements occurred:

- All four Soviet divisions belonging to the 2nd Guards Tank Army which faces West Germany from the Baltic to the Mittellandkanal in the Hannover region, left their barracks and moved close to the border.
- Three of the four Soviet Armored Divisions comprising the 3rd Shock Army, facing the Hannover area of West Germany, were moving to positions near the border.
- All four Soviet divisions of the 8th Guards Army in Thuringia took up positions in close proximity to the Hessen frontier opposite Fulda.
- Soviet forces on maneuvers concentrated in the Western part of Czechoslovakia, west of Pilsen, near the West German border, and west of Prague.
- 60,000 Soviet, Hungarian, and Czech troops remained in the Sopron region of Hungary, along the Austrian border, two days after the official July 2 "termination" of the "Danube-84" exercises; 16,000 of the 60,000 troops are Russians, and the exercises involved Soviet Mig-24 "Hind" Helicopter gunship units, with MiG 23 fighter escorts.
- The Soviet 7th Airborne Division, based at Kaunas, Lithuania, was airlifted into East Germany.
- Soviet Marines landed on the Lithuanian Baltic coast north of Memel (Klaipeda).

2) The Soviet-Czech maneuvers in Czechoslovakia (May 26-31, 1985) demonstrated the ability to launch tens of thousands of troops into a simulated offensive action, without any prior physical sign that anything "was up." The Soviet and Czech troops, overseen by Marshal Ogarkov personally, conducted the exercise in areas very close to the West German border.

Preparing 'Ivan' for war

No military preparation to attack West Germany would be complete without a full-scale "political education" campaign to prove to "Ivan" that a "German threat" exists, which could require Russian pre-emptive action. This type of campaign has also been launched during the past 18 months.

The wave of maneuvers to rehearse and perfect the art of surprise attack in 1984-85, was immediately preceded by a campaign begun in the Soviet military press against so-called German Revanchism, with the particular twist, that this phenomenon had permeated the Bundeswehr and the government of Chancellor Helmut Kohl. *Krasnaya Zvezda* told its military readership the Big Lie that the "Revanchists" sit at the center of power, run the West German military, and are posing, as before "Operation Barbarossa" on June 22, 1941, a direct security threat to Mother Russia. On July 12, as the maneuvers concluded (though numerous Soviet units remained in place and left Western intelligence people guessing, what would happen next), Soviet government issued a *démarche* against the West German government for "violation of the Potsdam Agreements"—the 1945 accords under which the Soviet Union reserved the right to march into West Germany in the event of a Nazi revival there.

The "anti-Revanchism" campaign is aimed to destabilize the CDU government of Helmut Kohl, and bring to power—by the 1987 federal

elections in West Germany at the latest—the neutralist/capitulationist German Social Democratic Party, led by Willy Brandt and the public advocate of a West German “security partnership with the Soviet Union,” Egon Bahr.

To recast an old phrase of Stalin’s: Soviet Party General Secretaries come and go, but, the policy of courting the SPD and bringing it to power remains. Regardless of who sat on the Kremlin throne, the SPD has been assiduously courted. The very first Western delegation invited to meet with Chernenko in early 1984, was that of the SPD, led by Bahr and Brandt. The same “honor” awaited Bahr and Brandt after Gorbachov came to power.

This does not count the myriad of meetings, channels and contacts established over the past two years between the West German SPD and the ruling SED of East Germany.

While Gorbachov has courted the SPD, he has promised summit visits to every major European country—but not West Germany. The Soviet snub has been further magnified by Gorbachov’s acceptance of a summit even with Reagan, who otherwise is the object of so much Soviet hate propaganda. For Kohl, not even the “time of day” is offered.

The Soviets hope that the SPD can come to power in 1987, and “negotiate” the surrender of West Germany. Barring that, the Russian “legal” case to supply a pretext for invading West Germany is being manufactured, should a “limited option” invasion be called for.

The Russians suddenly “discovered” a takeover by “revanchists” in the West German Armed Forces, right before they began their massive 1984 prewar upgrading of their forces in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Last summer, right after their huge maneuvers in late June-early July 1984, they suddenly “discovered” that West Germany was “guilty” of “violation” of the postwar Potsdam Agreements.

Thus, barring surrender, West Germany could be assaulted and conquered with or without the Soviets going to the trouble of concocting a “legal” argument.

However, it will be of as little comfort to the West German citizens to be attacked and conquered after a campaign of self-righteous statements and charges by the Soviet Union “justifying” their invasion, as it was in the past for the victims of Hitler’s invasions and occupations.

3.5 The Socialist International-Comintern 'Popular Front'

Since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Soviet grand strategy for world domination has always been based on bringing Germany under Moscow's control. With the industrial potential of Germany at its command, the Soviet position of power in Central Europe assures Moscow of early domination of all of continental Europe and the Mediterranean. Therefore the strategically most significant deployment of the Socialist International, as Moscow's Western flunky, is to deliver Germany to the Russians, like a fatted calf. If the Socialist International, and particularly its West German branch, is not stopped, all of Western continental Europe is in imminent danger of falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. In that case, and with the help of the Socialist International's Mediterranean branch, particularly through the efforts of Greek Socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, the United States will be reduced to control of about 15% of the world's industrial potential. There will be, then, only one superpower in the world, Moscow's Empire.

The Socialist International's Central European operations, aimed at bringing about de facto Soviet domination of West Germany, have over the recent period reached a degree of blatancy that is impossible to ignore, or mistake for anything other than an end-game attempt to break Germany out of the Western sphere of influence once and for all. Looking at the most recent period alone, from May through July of 1985, one sees that in that brief time-frame, the Socialist International has given public voice to its alliance with the Soviet Union, has re-established the old Popular Front under Moscow's direction, and has revealed the standing, secret negotiations between its West German branch and the East German ruling party for the purpose of pulling the Federal Republic of Germany out of NATO. In doing all this, the Socialist International has demonstrated that it no longer cares to hide its position as the Soviet Union's direct instrument for the subversion of the West.

The sequence of events has been extremely rapid, as we outline below.

The Bahr Plan

On May 26, 1985, Socialist International General Secretary Willy Brandt, the former West German Chancellor who also heads the German Social

Democratic Party (SPD), went to Moscow for a three-day visit, accompanied by his closest collaborator, Egon Bahr. Brandt and Bahr first had a three-hour meeting with Soviet Communist Party head Mikhail Gorbachov, then-Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, and senior Central Committee members Boris Ponomarev and Vadim Zagladin. This was followed by a private meeting, lasting over five hours, among Brandt, Bahr, Gorbachov and Gromyko. The two Germans also met privately with the chief of the Soviet Armed Forces, Marshal Akhromeyev.

From public speeches following this intense series of discussions, what emerged was the mutual adherence of both sides to the old Socialist International-SPD concept of a "security partnership" between Western Europe and the Soviet Bloc. The policy was first officially voiced by the SPD in a party document issued in early 1983, but its origins go back at least another ten years to the so-called "Bahr Plan." The existence of that Bahr Plan was leaked in 1973 by noted German intelligence specialist Walter Hahn in an article published by *Orbis*, and has been confirmed publicly by Bahr himself on numerous occasions.

The content of the Bahr Plan, as revealed by Hahn and Bahr, includes four principal points—which spell out the gist and aim of current Socialist International activities. These are, 1) recognition of East Germany as a separate state; 2) establishment of a German-German accord pledging non-use of force; 3) on the basis of the normalization of German-German relations, initiation of negotiations for mutual reduction of U.S. and Soviet armed forces in East and West Germany; and, as the final coup de grace, 4) establishment of a non-nuclear "collective security system in *Mitteleuropa*." At this stage, the Plan held, both the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would be dissolved.

Bahr's most recent allusion to this game-plan was made just nine days before his departure to Moscow. Speaking at Tutzing Academy in West Germany, he said that the German question was "cemented" (insoluble) as long as the Federal Republic of Germany stayed with NATO. Bonn should rather concentrate on "joint initiatives for arms control and peace with East Germany," he said, and cease "thinking in terms of military blocs," replacing this with "a security partnership with the Eastern neighbors. . . . German partition and NATO membership are siamese twins."

Willy Brandt's chief public message while in Moscow was that Europe needs a "security partnership" with the U.S.S.R. In contrast, he attacked the United States on all fronts, blasting the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and U.S. defense policy generally (accusing President Reagan, for example, of "cheating the people at Geneva"), as well as American policy in Central America and the Third World overall, and American economic policy. He proposed that the Soviet-Western European security partnership consist of, for starters, a design for a Europe "free of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons," that would see its Eastern and Western parts "collaborating in science, economics, technology, and ecology." Gorbachov replied with lavish personal praise for Brandt and his efforts in the New Ostpolitik, rightly pointing out that "you, Mr. Brandt, and we" see entirely "eye to eye" on all matters.

Gorbachov also alluded to then-ongoing negotiations for organizational collaboration between the Socialist International and the Communist parties as a whole: "In spite of all remaining ideological differences," he said, "Communists and Socialists should collaborate in finding the solution to the most essential problems in our time."

Finally, Brandt and Gorbachov reported on their agreement to form a joint working group of the SPD and the Soviet Communist Party, as the highest level of the Socialist International-Soviet partnership. The

group will set joint policy and initiatives on questions of disarmament, opposition to the SDI and chemical warfare, and Third World policy. Its first session will be held this coming September in Bonn, with delegations headed by the ubiquitous Egon Bahr, for the Socialist International side, and Boris Ponomarev for the Soviet Union.

The new Popular Front

While Brandt and Bahr were conspiring with the Soviets in Moscow, two carefully prepared meetings were taking place in West Berlin and Paris, respectively, to put in place the organizational working relationship between the Socialist International and the communist movement in the West, i.e., the re-creation of the old Socialist-Communist Popular Front.

This was a process actually begun in March, under the auspices of the two most important Western representatives of the Socialist and Communist sides: the German Social Democrats and the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

In March, the SPD and PCI held what they termed a "leadership conference" in Rome, attended by the chief executives of both parties. At the end of this summit, the SPD and PCI announced that "now is the time once and for all to end the historic division of the European labor movement"—words echoed later by Gorbachov—and shift into a mode of unifying policy for the "Socialist" and "Communist" wings of the "labor movement." This would be done, as reported at the post-conference press briefing, around the development of a "European program" to separate European from American policy in four areas: 1) economic, monetary and financial matters, 2) technological and scientific matters, 3) military and national security matters, and 4) prevention of the militarization of outer space (the SDI). In other words, European-American decoupling.

This pilot arrangement, led by the PCI and Brandt's SPD, went through a second organizational step before being raised to the entire Western European Socialist International leadership the weekend of May 26 in Paris. That step was the consolidation of a special relationship between the SPD and the government of France.

On May 21, five days before departing for Moscow, Brandt and Bahr traveled together to Paris to meet with the head of the French Socialist Party (PSF), Lionel Jospin, and the rest of the party leadership. The French Socialist government of President François Mitterrand, of course, is playing a leading role in attempting to sabotage European participation in the SDI, to the extent of announcing, on April 7, a counter-SDI project code-named "Eureka." Eureka would differ from the U.S. effort in two vital areas: it would exclude the United States from the project, and exclude, too, any military application of the research. Moscow has therefore happily embraced the program, and East German President Erich Honecker has gone so far as to propose—on June 8, a few days before the French Defense Minister was due to arrive in East Berlin—that there should be "trans-European" collaboration in Eureka, including the Soviet Union.

On May 21, then, Brandt and Bahr met with the leaders of the French branch of the Socialist International, and adopted what they termed a common platform. As with the SPD-PCI meeting, the Franco-German Socialist platform consisted of a denunciation of the SDI as an attempt to "militarize space," and a call for a "European alternative in defense

and economics, and monetary and technology policies." The joint document they drew up denounced the SDI as "fomenting technologies that destabilize the strategic balance." Speaking to journalists on the new Socialist International document, Brandt and Jospin called for "greater European independence from the U.S. in economics, technology development, and industrial policy," with Brandt adding that he would "confer" on the platform with Gorbachov while in Moscow.

These decisive pre-arrangements having been completed, the entire European Socialist International leadership gathered in Paris the following week. As reported to the press at the time, the meeting took up "European self-assertion against the dollar" (point one of the PCI-SPD, SPD-PSF agenda) and "alternatives to the SDI" (points 2, 3, and 4 of the Rome agenda). The new Popular Front was in the offing.

German-German negotiations

On May 10, after winding up a two-day meeting in East Berlin with the East German ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), the SPD made the dramatic announcement that it had been conducting secret negotiations with the SED over a period of one year. Karsten Voigt, a member of the SPD senior negotiating team, termed the latest round "historic," and made the astounding revelation that the West German foreign ministry—i.e., Brandt's close political ally and co-conspirator, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher—and the U.S. State Department had been kept briefed on the negotiations throughout their duration.

Two days later, the SED sent to Bonn a delegation headed by the powerful SED Central Committee member Hermann Axen, to participate in the first-ever joint press conference between the East and West German Socialist-Communist parties. The agenda of the press conference, in which Bahr himself was spokesman for the SPD, was to present a draft resolution for a chemical-free zone in Europe, to begin with the two Germanies and Czechoslovakia and later include Poland and the Benelux. The draft had been finalized at the previous week's East Berlin meeting, with Voigt reporting that the SED and SPD had achieved "a historic breakthrough . . . a practical step towards security partnership. . . . We are pioneers for the government."

As can be easily demonstrated by the partial enumeration below of the SPD's activities during the period of SPD-SED negotiations, the full content of those talks was nothing less than the activation of the Bahr Plan. In other words, treason against the West German Constitution and American strategic interests—with the complicity of the State Department.

The growing deviation from the West German Constitution on the part of the SPD made its appearance in a party position paper published in November 1984, approximately five months after the SPD-SED negotiating round had begun. The paper was a statement of support for the so-called "Gera demands," first made by Erich Honecker in October 1980. In it, the SPD, more explicitly than in any previous policy statement, separated the question of German national unity, from that of German reunification.

Honecker's Gera demands, which the SPD was now backing, called for the abolition of the Salzgitter Central Registration Agency, which monitors the German-German border, the solution of the Elbe border dispute, and the transformation of the West German Permanent Missions into full-scale embassies. The core of the Gera demands, however, on

which Honecker placed the greatest emphasis, was for West German recognition of East German citizenship. In sum, the demands were, and are, for West German recognition of East Germany as a sovereign and separate state. SPD support for the Gera package placed the party in violation of the reunification pledge of the West German Constitution of 1949, the 1972 Basic Treaty between the two Germanies, and the 1973 Constitutional Court ruling reaffirming the commitment of all constitutional bodies in West Germany to work toward reunification.

Developments between the SED and SPD came fast and furious after that.

- In December 1984, the SPD and SED held a joint seminar in Bonn on "Peaceful Coexistence and Security Partnership," the concept elaborated by the SPD in 1983 on the basis of the Bahr Plan. The seminar was part of the public side of the secret SPD-SED negotiations then ongoing. The idea of a security partnership is firmly linked to the Socialist International's call for a "second Ostpolitik," as announced by Brandt in March 1985. It is based on the concept of a "European peace order" from the Atlantic to the Urals, stipulating increasing European cooperation between East and West in the framework of such a "security partnership" that does not question existing borders.

- In January of 1985, the SPD published a document attacking the version of Ostpolitik practiced by Chancellor Helmut Kohl, demanding an end to the "fruitless discussions of the openness of the German question."

- In February, the SPD refused to sign a joint resolution on the state of the nation (essentially, the text of Christian Democratic Chancellor Kohl's State of the Nation speech). The Social Democrats instead drew up their own resolution, calling for, 1) West German respect for East German citizenship (the Gera demands), and 2) removal of the 1955 German Treaty and the 1973 Constitutional Court ruling from the foundations of inter-German policy (the Gera demands again).

- That same month, Hermann Axen visited Bonn for the latest round of SPD-SED secret negotiations.

- In March, the SPD issued a report by its legal experts backing the Gera demands from a legalistic standpoint, affirming that the disputed frontier between the two Germanies ran along the middle of the Elbe river, and not along its northern bank, as the West German government and courts maintain.

- In a May article authored for *Der Spiegel*, Egon Bahr proposed to the French and British that they strike a deal with Moscow to make American nuclear weapons in Western Europe "expendable," a precondition for the creation of the "nuclear free Mitteleuropa" stipulated in the Bahr Plan. He also wrote that this was to be one of the topics on the agenda during his and Brandt's visit to Moscow later that month. As is typical for all leading members of the SPD whenever they discuss military matters, Bahr of course spent a hefty portion of his article in virulently attacking the American SDI project.

- In mid-March, another of Willy Brandt's closest collaborators in the SPD leadership, Horst Ehmke, penned an open letter, claiming that "all present problems in Europe" could be "traced back to the fact that the German workers movement of the 1920s was split into Social Democrats and Communists." This, he said, "paved the way for Hitler," and thus for World War II and Europe's postwar partition into East and West. Resuming the dialogue between Social Democrats and Communists, Ehmke wrote, would therefore help to overcome Europe's problems of today.

- At about the same time, on March 17, Bahr issued a statement

International espionage networks

that, "The Soviet leaders show more commitment to nuclear disarmament than the Americans," and said he was giving the green light for his party section (the state of Schleswig Holstein SPD) to open official relations with the neighboring party sections of the SED. SPD-SED negotiations at the top, meanwhile, had already been ongoing for over half a year.

Although the Socialist International's activities in West Germany are the most important among its world-wide operations, due to West Germany's decisive position in Western Europe and in NATO, Socialist International operations of equal intensity and subservience to Soviet interests could be detailed for practically every nation on the globe.

The so-called Palme Commission, officially named the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, is paradigmatic of Socialist International operations and their interface with other treasonous networks and individuals throughout the world. The Commission was founded in the summer of 1980, almost as soon as it became clear that Ronald Reagan might be the next president of the United States, and following urgent consultations between the Olof Palme, now Swedish Prime Minister, and Zagladin and Ponomaryov in Moscow. Its triumvirate of founding members was comprised of Palme, former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Soviet General Mikhail Milshtein. One month later, the Swedish publication *Göteborgs Handels och Sjöfartstidning* embarrassed all by identifying General Milshtein as a KGB officer. Palme's office did not bother to deny the report, but from that point on, the commission described Milshtein as a "scientific adviser to the commission," rather than a secretariat member.

Other prominent members of the Palme Commission are, Georgii Arbatov, director of the U.S.A.-Canada Institute, a spinoff of the IM-EMO intelligence institution charged with profiling of, and operations against, the United States; Egon Bahr of the SPD; David Owen, foreign secretary in Britain's last Labour Party government, representing the British branch of the Socialist International; and Leslie Gelb, a protégé of Cyrus Vance as director of political-military affairs at the Vance State Department, former *New York Times* correspondent, and a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Since its founding, predictably, the Palme Commission has functioned as an important channel for the conduiting of Soviet policies into the West. One particularly clear-cut example of this has been the commission's sponsorship of the "northern nuclear free zone" idea, for which it has organized for years. The proposal would de-nuclearize the already extraordinarily weak northern flank of NATO, a policy that would leave this crucial flank open to either Soviet military assault or more subtle political pressure and blackmail. The immediate result, in either case, would be a finlandized northern flank, leaving the way open for any possible Soviet assault on the Central European heartland.

As came out at the trial of convicted KGB agent Arne Treholt, sentenced as a Soviet spy on June 20, the "northern nuclear-free zone" policy originated with Treholt's KGB controller. Treholt (then a highly-placed official in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry), conduited the proposal through Socialist International circles in Scandinavia to the Palme Commission, which picked it up as its own.

The Palme Commission also acts as a platform for attacks against Western economic interests, mirroring in this the work of another Socialist International institution, the Brandt Commission on Third World policy. Both commissions have publicized and aggressively organized internationally against scientific research and development, both in the

advanced sector and, in the case of the Brandt Commission especially, with respect to the Third World. This Socialist International organizing against scientific research and economic development has been one of the organization's most persistent activities, and gone hand in hand with Socialist International backing of such Soviet-funded assets as the "environmentalist," terrorist-linked Green Party in West Germany, the Nazi-Communist, terrorist PAN party in Mexico, and others. The utility, indeed decisive importance, to Moscow of such organizing has been extraordinary.

Economic decoupling

This in turn is coherent with one of the key activities of the Socialist International today: its involvement in promoting Western European economic decoupling from the United States. Back in April 1984, the Soviet Union sponsored a meeting of the Joint German-Soviet Economic Commission in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on "perspectives for commercial use of the ECU [European Currency Unit] as an international reserve currency to replace the dollar." Since that time, the Socialist International has become one of the major spokesmen for such a policy, alongside other treasonous elements in the West involved in cutting deals with Moscow to the detriment of Western policy interests and Western civilization as a whole.

Without reviewing the enormous strides which the ECU has made since 1984 in becoming an institutional alternative to the dollar in international trade, such as the March 1985 decision of the Bank for International Settlements to become a "clearing house" for the ECU, it is sufficient to point out some of the activities of leading Socialist International members, to indicate the backing which the organization has given to the Soviet proposal. The French Socialist president of the European Community (EC) Commission, Jacques Delors, is using his position in the Community to organize extensively for conversion of the ECU into a full-fledged currency to replace the dollar in European-related trade. It was Delors, together with former Social Democrat West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who at the April meeting of the EC Finance Ministers, for instance, carried through a general agreement to take preliminary steps to creating "a fully privatized ECU."

Schmidt, who has suddenly become a fervent spokesman for the ECU, on April 27, 1985 gave a particularly radical speech, from the standpoint of European-American economic decoupling, at the Interaction Council meeting in Paris. Taking the decoupling line further than it generally has been taken in public, Schmidt called for the creation of a European Central Bank, centered around the ECU, which would have an independent money supply, independent interest rate policies, and protectionist monetary intervention capabilities against the dollar. He outlined a 15-point plan to transform the ECU into a full-fledged, European-wide currency, proposing it be used to denominate private-sector loans, with legal restrictions on private use abolished, and ECU coins and checks introduced. (The plan was later published in May by the British Royal Institute for International Affairs.) The real intent of the plan is to integrate the Western European and Soviet Bloc economies. Already the primary use of ECU-denominated transactions is for East-West trade and credit activities.

3.6 Syria and Israel Within the Soviet Strategic Sphere

In late 1982, Israeli intelligence sources reported to *EIR* that then-Defense Minister Ariel Sharon made a secret trip to Greek Cyprus to meet with two ranking officials of the Soviet GRU, the military intelligence service. The subject of those secret discussions was an Israeli-Soviet *quid pro quo* to drive the United States out of the Middle East. In exchange for Israeli complicity in a series of anti-American covert diplomatic and low-intensity military operations, the Soviet Union would "guarantee" Israeli control over an expanded piece of eastern Mediterranean turf, fulfilling the "Greater Israel" designs of the faction associated with Sharon; and would gradually allow for the emigration of a large number of Russian and Eastern European Jews to colonize the West Bank of the Jordan River, thus *de facto* consolidating Israel's 1967 land grab.

This "Greater Israel" scheme prefigures a parallel emergence of a "Greater Syria," constituting the second satrap of the future Soviet domination of the eastern Mediterranean. The dismantling of Lebanon and the virtual extermination of the Palestinian population in successive genocidal campaigns by the Israeli Defense Force, the Syrian Army, the Syrian-backed Abu Musa radical Palestinian front, and the Amal Shi'ites of Lebanon—also agents of the Alawite Brotherhood ruling Syria—demonstrated on the field of battle the potential for Hobbesian coexistence between "Greater" Syria and "Greater" Israel.

While no published sources have corroborated the particulars of the reported Sharon-GRU session and the strategic deal consolidated there, subsequent events have clearly demonstrated that Israel is no longer America's "leading ally" in the Middle East, despite continuing howls to this effect from U.S. State Department, Eastern Establishment, and Zionist Lobby voices.

Three factors, representing a dramatic change in direction and control over Israeli politico-military policy, provide the backdrop to the emerging Tel Aviv-Moscow-Damascus pact:

- 1) *The demographic shift within the Israeli population.* Over 50% of the Israeli population is now Sephardic, Middle Eastern-born. The shift from a Western European, Judeo-Christian cultural matrix to an Oriental, Semitic cultural matrix has been identified by recent Israeli writers as a repudiation of Western values and a reemergence of a Jewish "kabalistic"

brand of fundamentalism. This shift has been aggravated by the fact that over one-third of the Israeli citizenry, predominantly Ashkenazi pre- and postwar European emigrés, have left Israel and returned to the United States or Western Europe, thus drawing out of Israel some of the leading scientific and technological strata of the population. A radical, fundamentalist peasant caste has thus emerged in recent years as a prominent political force, providing the social base for Ariel Sharon's drive for power under the slogan "Arik, Arik, King of Israel."

This "Oriental" shift has been augmented by the emergence of a Russian-Jewish-dominated New Right movement in Israel, heavily penetrated by the KGB. This New Right is in a prominent position within the Jewish Underground, or, Temple Mount movement, which has revived a Khomeinist brand of Judaism preaching the rebuilding of the Third Temple of Solomon. The other predominant grouping within the Temple Mount conspiracy is a powerful and wealthy community of Syrian-born Jews from the Turkish border region of Aleppo, who reportedly maintain deep but quiet ties to the Alawite Assad leadership of Syria, also Aleppo-based.

2) *The collapse of the Israeli economy.* Whereas Israel's inflation rate was 20% in 1975, it is now an astounding 180%, with interest rates on certain categories of loans over 210%. While exports of citrus and other real economic products have collapsed and overall exports stagnated, official Israeli arms exports have increased sixteenfold over the last decade. Official exports of arms and diamonds in 1983 accounted for 60-70% of Israel's total exports. The unrecorded smuggling of drugs, diamonds, and weapons has massively increased, placing Israel in a leading position within the overall worldwide "unofficial economy"—i.e., the arms-for-drugs black market.

Within this arms-for-dope bazaar, Israel has entered into documented barter dealings with Khomeini's Iran, providing spare parts for U.S. equipment originally sold to Iran during the reign of the late Shah, in clear and brazen violation of U.S. law. Through Lebanese channels centered around the Chouf Mountains-based Chamoun clan, the Sharon faction additionally entered into cooperative business ventures, including massive West Bank land scams, with the Bulgarian foreign trade bank Litex. The latter arrangement was consummated in an October 1982 meeting at the Chamoun family Chouf mountain retreat at approximately the same time that Sharon was cavorting with the GRU on Cyprus.

The singular focus on building Israel's arms industry was expressed in clear anti-American terms in the 1981 Meridor Memorandum, drafted by Ya'acov Meridor, a member of former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's cabinet. The memorandum was ostensibly part of the U.S.-Israeli letters of understanding: "We shall say to the Americans: 'Don't compete with us in Taiwan . . . South Africa . . . or the Caribbean or in other areas where we can sell weapons directly. . . . Let us do it. Sell the ammunition using a proxy, Israel will be your proxy.' "

From its current status as the world's seventh-largest arms exporter, Israel's defense sector has mapped out an ambitious program to place Israel in the number three spot over the next several years. At the heart of this drive has been an extensive lobbying effort into the Reagan administration and the U.S. Congress, to force the release of previously classified stealth and other technologies to Israel for the production of the Lavie jet, a joint Israel-Republic of South Africa production venture. This would give Israel the additional delivery system capabilities, as well, for the rapid development of an independent intermediate-range nuclear capability.

On repeated occasions, this particular Israel-South Africa connection has been caught funneling state-of-the-art U.S. computer technologies to the Soviet Union.

3) *The Lebanon invasion of 1982 and its aftermath.* In June 1982, Ariel Sharon launched the Israeli Defense Force invasion of Lebanon on the pretext of assaulting Palestinian terrorist bases behind the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador in London, Shlomo Argov. The action marked a decisive breach in U.S.-Israeli relations that accelerated Sharon's openings to Moscow and Damascus. Sharon launched the operation on the basis of personal assurances from then Secretary of State Alexander Haig that the United States would fully support the Israeli invasion. When the United States—already at that moment caught in the ringer of the Malvinas War—harshly rebuked the Israeli move and President Reagan took the unprecedented step of firing Haig, Sharon wrote off the United States as an “unreliable ally,” and took his business to Moscow and Damascus, where more “practical” minds supposedly prevailed.

When every effort from inside Israel to dislodge the butcher Sharon from power failed, a deep cultural pessimism took hold in the country that merely accelerated the radical fundamentalist drive to impose a Sharon dictatorship.

Beginning in 1984, a more open phase of diplomatic dealings with Moscow began, through the personal “shuttle diplomacy” of Edgar Bronfman and Armand Hammer. Both men made a series of trips to Moscow during the Andropov and Chernenko periods, to negotiate a broad-based Moscow-Tel Aviv rapprochement involving Jewish emigration and anticipated official recognition of Israel by the Soviet Union. According to Canadian sources, this was paralleled by an increasingly public role of the Bronfman family, particularly Charles Bronfman, as the semi-official channel between the Canadian and East German governments. Privately, Canadian intelligence sources have told EIR that this Bronfman-East Germany channel is directly into Gen. Marcus (“Misha”) Wolf, the number two man in the East German Ministry of State Security (MfS). The son of a German-Jewish Communist Party official who fled to Russia during the Hitler period, Wolf has been identified as the single most powerful figure in the MfS and a close personal associate and protégé of Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov.

The Sharon Plan to destroy Lebanon, and divide the spoils between Syria and Israel, slaughter the Palestinian population there, transfer the dirty-money operations previously based in Beirut into the Israeli banking system, and convert the West Bank into a Russian emigré populated real estate boondoggle, was, in fact, a corollary to the Kissinger Doctrine elaborated by the former Secretary of State at a July 23-24, 1982 secret meeting at the Bohemian Grove in California. In that address, Kissinger called for the United States to strategically withdraw from 75% of its global commitments and assume a more modest role within a concordat of Western nations modeled on the Holy Roman Empire of the post Treaty of Vienna period.

Convinced by the Reagan administration's failure to fully support the invasion of Lebanon, that the United States must be punished by humiliating setbacks within the eastern Mediterranean, the Sharon group in Israel provided consistent aid and comfort to the Shi'ite terrorist offensive against the United States, beginning with the February 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut that wiped out the entire U.S. CIA station for Lebanon.

The Tel Aviv-Damascus Hobbesian deal with Moscow's blessings was

consumated during April-June 1985 through the following sequence of events, that culminated in the TWA 847 hijacking.

- In early April 1985, Israeli forces entered southern Lebanon and rounded up over 700 Shi'ites, trucking them across the Israeli border into a detention camp. The mass hostage-taking was aimed by the Sharon group, now strongly allied with Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, at forcing Amal leader Nabih Berri to reach a security pact with Israel assuring the permanent elimination of Palestinians from southern Lebanon. On April 5, the Reagan administration denounced the Israeli move as a violation of the Geneva Convention and demanded the unconditional release of the "hostages."

- On May 14, a top Israeli intelligence official met with the head of Amal intelligence, a known Syrian intelligence asset, in southern Lebanon, soliciting a negotiating package that would lead to the release of the Shi'ite hostages inside Israel. The terms proposed by the Israeli official reportedly called for an Amal action against the United States that would provide Israel with an "excuse" for releasing the 700 Lebanese Shi'ites.

- On May 17, the Mossad leaked a story in the *Washington Post* blaming the CIA for a March 8 car-bombing in Beirut that killed 80 Shi'ites. Despite the fact that the Lebanese secret unit that carried out the car bomb attack was acting under direct Mossad orders, Israel's "proxy" status for U.S. actions inside Lebanon, in effect since the humiliating American withdrawal from Lebanese territory in 1984, served as blackmail leverage against the Reagan administration's revealing the facts of the case. The *Washington Post* story was widely circulated in the Shi'ite press inside Lebanon, building a revenge climate against "CIA terrorists."

- On May 20, a second secret meeting in southern Lebanon between the Mossad official and other ranking members of the Amal military command took place. Allegedly, this meeting spelled out a detailed arrangement between the Amal and the Israelis, involving policing responsibilities for the border zone with Israel, the release of the Shi'ites, and the staging of the TWA hijacking. The secret accord was ratified first by the head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon before the plan went operational in early June with the Athens hijacking.

The conclusion: The TWA hostage incident marked the consolidation of a process begun with the 1982 Lebanon invasion, which fundamentally realigned the eastern Mediterranean into a Damascus-Tel Aviv-Moscow controlled zone, in which, barring a dramatic shift in policy from Washington, the United States is no longer a prominent player.

Count Bennisen and the 'Islamic Card'

When terror by Islamic fundamentalist groups, against innocent citizens from the United States and other countries, escalates with new hijackings and murders, one would hardly expect to hear the old argument of the 1970s voiced in Washington, that Islamic fundamentalism should be welcomed as a counterthrust to communism in Central Asia.

But Professor Alexandre Bennisen, late of the University of Chicago and now based at the Sorbonne in Paris, is still in action. He makes the rounds on Capitol Hill. He gets a forum in the U.S. Information Agency's *Problems of Communism* to vent his enthusiastic hope for the spread of Islamic revolt ("Mullahs, Mujahidin and Soviet Muslims," *Problems of Communism*, Nov.-Dec. 1984). This scheme, that the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in West Asia would inspire turmoil in Soviet Central Asia and trepidation in the Kremlin, was the stuff of Bennisen's frequent congressional testimony and academic dissertations, which fueled the doomed "arc of crisis" policy under the Carter administration. The continuing popularity of Bennisen, the author of *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet Union*, demonstrates the dangerous persistence in Washington—

among professed conservatives as well as around the State Department—of fascination with the “crumbling of the Soviet Empire,” even as the Russians count their gains in areas near and far from their borders.

In the 1970s, Carter's national security chief Zbigniew Brzezinski proclaimed that Islamic fundamentalism would be a bulwark against Communist insurgencies along an “arc of crisis,” stretching from the southern borders of the Soviet Union, through the Near East and into North Africa. In Iran, the keystone of the arc, the Carter administration abetted the overthrow of the Shah by the mullaharchy of the insane Ayatollah Khomeini. The Islamic revolution, the hope was voiced, would ultimately sweep into Soviet Central Asia, whose inhabitants would rise against their Russian overlords simultaneously with the peoples of Eastern Europe. The U.S.S.R. would crack open like a walnut.

The results in the late 1970s, when this view was policy, were somewhat different. The Soviet Union achieved such a striking increase of power in the region, that Brzezinski subsequently suggested, in a June 1983 speech at Harvard University, that the United States might as well abandon the Middle East, along with Western Europe, and search for allies in the Pacific Basin.

The so-called Rejection Front of radical Arab states under Soviet tutelage, was consolidated out of the rage engendered by the Camp David pact. In this alignment, Libya and Syria were joined by Iran—after the Khomeini revolution brought down the Shah. Khomeini sits astride the Persian Gulf oil routes, scarcely veiling his threats to call in Satan Number 2 (the U.S.S.R.), if Satan Number 1 crosses him; and the Soviets have invested heavily in both infrastructure and political assets in Iran. Syria is armed to the teeth with Soviet weapons. What is left of Lebanon teeters on the brink of becoming an “Islamic state” under the domination of Soviet-armed Syria, with the added benefit of Khomeini's “moral guidance” for the one million Shi'ite Lebanese. Saudi Arabia is being told by Moscow that the time has come for a Soviet-Saudi diplomatic thaw, under the threat of a Khomeini-proclaimed “holy war” to be triggered by terrorist assaults on the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia. Between 100,000 and 200,000 Soviet troops are in Afghanistan. Soviet-backed ethnic and religious insurgencies threaten to break Pakistan into pieces.

The national security of the United States and of the targeted nations of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Indian Ocean littoral demands, that the widely shared fantasies of the Jesuit-trained Brzezinski and ideologues like Bennisen be put aside, and the truth admitted: Moscow has mastered the “Muslim card,” and turned the arc of crisis into a Soviet arc of opportunity.

The Soviets have their own program for “Islamic culture” and, through East Germany, an alliance with Hitler's old Nazi networks in the Middle East to spread terrorism. In an August 1980 article, the Moscow Institute of Orientology director, Academician Yevgenii Primakov, gloated that policy-makers in the West had no grasp of religious factors in the Middle East, since they mistakenly viewed Islamic uprisings as a short-lived “explosion of fanaticism,” while underestimating the “anti-imperialist direction of the growing movement for Islamic solidarity”—that is, the Soviet ability to turn it to advantage.

Geidar Aliyev and the Tashkent nexus

The master of the Soviets' “Islamic card” is Geidar Ali-Reza ogly Aliyev, the career KGB officer of Shi'ite Muslim origin, promoted in 1982 to be

First Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and a full member of the Politburo. Before coming to Moscow at that time, Aliyev operated for 15 years out of Soviet Azerbaijan, first as its KGB chief and then as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan.

He was located in Baku, the Caspian Sea oil town that is the capital of Soviet Azerbaijan. It is second only to Tashkent, Soviet Uzbekistan, as a military command center for the U.S.S.R.'s southern flank—what now comes under the High Command South, commanded by General of the Army Yuri Maksimov, a member of the Politburo of the Uzbekistan Communist Party since 1981. In both the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, the two foci of the Soviet Muslim population, the local party machine and the Islamic establishment are integrated under the political-military command.

In wartime, their special capabilities come into play. For instance, before the December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, thousands of Soviet Uzbek and Tajik cadre were infiltrated across the border into the areas of Afghanistan where the population is Uzbek and Tajik, to carry out *spetsnaz* sabotage activities in advance of the invasion. More recently, Iranian sources have observed the transit of persons from Iran's north-eastern province of Turkmenistan, on Iran's border with Afghanistan, into the Soviet Union; after military training in the U.S.S.R., they slip back into Iran.

Soviet and Comintern officials, from the early 1920s on, conceived of Tashkent as a jumping-off point for power throughout south Asia, just as certain Slavophile-linked geopoliticians—like the Buryat Mongol mystic, arms merchant and court intriguer Badmayev—had counseled the late-nineteenth-century Tsars to seize the Himalayas, thence to take British India. Leon Trotsky, in August 1919, declared that "the road to Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal." In May 1919, the newspaper *Zhizn natsionalnoy* (Life of the Nationalities), published by the Central Bureau of the Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, editorialized, "Without active assistance from the outside by the fresh untapped forces of Russia's Muslims, it [the revolution in Asia] can once again fall into a lethargic sleep of spineless inertness and apathy. Let Britain, which has always been afraid of the spectre of a Cossack lance on the peaks of the Himalayas, now see this historical lance in the hands of Russia's Muslim-proletarian coming to the aid of his brothers in Persia, India and Afghanistan."

Such extreme—or rather, frank—statements are today termed by oh-so-scholarly Soviet specialists, evidence of "leftist, adventuristic tendencies." The Tashkent-based Communist University for Toilers of the East was repeatedly purged. But the views of the "Islam-Marxists" forged Soviet policy and capabilities in the region. By the late 1920s, the Comintern's Third World operations were reshaped to emphasize the building of individual communist parties, but the role of the Azerbaijani Communist Party, with its heritage from the Islam-Marxist Nariman Narimanov, stayed strong. The party's approach, later perfected by Aliyev, was to exploit indigenous belief structures, but to tame them away from disruptive excesses and tool them into a means for the outward expansion of influence. Azerbaijan supplied organizers and administrators to Soviet Central Asia proper, making Baku a point from which Soviet influence radiated into the Islamic world. The Turkish, Iranian, and Iraqi communist parties were organized from Baku; the Communist Party of India, from Tashkent.

The Soviet state and cultural establishment, meanwhile, built up the image of Tashkent as a developing-sector boom town and crossroads of

Asia, by staging major events there. The late Uzbek party chief, Sharaf Rashidov, hosted many events like the 1983 Seventh Conference of the Afro-Asian Writers Association. In 1966, Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin propelled Tashkent into world headlines, when he invited the prime ministers of India and Pakistan to come there for reconciliation talks after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965. Not long after that, the Soviets readied another diplomatic coup for Tashkent, but did not succeed in bringing it off. The late Egyptian President Anwar Sadat revealed that the Soviets had invited him to come negotiate with Israel after the 1967 war, and asked, "I wonder what would be the position of the Soviet Union, if the accord we signed at Camp David, had been signed at Tashkent?"

The Islamic establishment

Alongside the overt and covert activities of the state, the four Spiritual Boards of the Soviet Muslim establishment, revived during World War II on the base of a hierarchy first set up by Catherine the Great in the eighteenth century, have developed diplomatic prowess paralleling that of the Russian Orthodox Church/Moscow Patriarchate.

The organization of Soviet Islam today proceeds from the 1943 concordat signed after discussions between Stalin and the Mufti of Ufa, Abdurrahman Rasulayev, which revived the Central Muslim Spiritual Board that first functioned in the eighteenth century. There are four boards, or Spiritual Administrations, each headed by a Mufti or Sheikh, which cover: 1) Central Asia and Kazakhstan (Tashkent), 2) Transcaucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan), 3) European U.S.S.R. and Siberia (Ufa, Bashkir A.S.S.R.), and 4) North Caucasus (Makhachkla, Dagestan A.S.S.R.).

The Muslim boards were encouraged to expand in the 1960s, when the Soviets upgraded the social sciences and all manner of cultivation of what they call "cultural factors."

In 1968, the Tashkent board began to publish the quarterly *Muslims of the Soviet East* in English, French, Persian, Arabic, and Uzbek, to propagandize to Mideast readers what a great life their Muslim brothers in the Soviet Union enjoy. The same year, Soviet Muslims first went abroad, and a Soviet mullah on the annual Hajj to Mecca became an established custom. These travels allow propaganda interchange with Muslim leaders from all over the world.

Soviet mullahs are trained at one of two schools in Central Asia. Primary is the Bukhara madrasah, to which Soviet Muslims come from all over the U.S.S.R. Bukhara has a "work-study" program so that the budding mullahs can teach at nearby mosques while getting their degrees. The best students go on to the Imam al-Bukhari Islamic Institute of Tashkent, or take further training in Damascus or Cairo.

The propaganda thrust from Tashkent, Baku, Ufa and the Caucasus is by no means limited to showcasing the material advantages of Soviet Muslims. *Muslims of the Soviet East* participates in some very precisely targeted operations, such as the Jerusalem Temple Mount scenario for sparking religious war by a Jewish and Christian fundamentalist threat to the holy shrines of Islam in Jerusalem. On April 16, 1982, mullahs throughout the U.S.S.R. preached on the threat to these Islamic holy places, arising from "brigands' attempts to undermine this sacred mosque which is being allegedly perpetrated with a view to finding Solomon's temple."

The fraud of Bennigsen

Before Zbigniew Brzezinski ever heard about Soviet Muslims, Alexandre Bennigsen was the authority on them. He shaped the field of Soviet Central Asia studies, training dozens of specialists at the Sorbonne and at Chicago. One Central Asia specialist, who has followed the spread of Bennigsen's gospel on the potential for Soviet Muslim revolt, observes: "Bennigsen has had an absolutely horrendous effect on American strategic estimates (in that area of the world). I can't tell you how many times he has traveled to Washington to testify before Senate committees and meet with people."

The Muslim population of upwards of 44 million, living within the U.S.S.R., makes it the fifth largest Islamic country in the world. Contrary to Bennigsen's myths, the interesting question is not whether at some point in 40 or 50 years those Muslims will threaten Russian rule. An overriding strategic question will be answered, in this decade, long before Muslim demography transforms the Soviet Union: Will Moscow destroy U.S. power worldwide and preside over its ultimate empire? As for Soviet Muslims, will they or won't they serve Soviet imperial aims during this crisis?

Bennigsen systematically blacks out this strategic reality. At a March 1983 conference on Soviet Central Asia, the professor expounded his fixed theme in typical fashion: "The question of 'identity' among Soviet Muslims is of critical importance. Without trying to be overly dramatic, the ultimate cohesion of the U.S.S.R. could be at stake."

Bennigsen does acknowledge that Soviet Muslims have served as a foreign policy asset, stating that Soviet Islam's goal of appearing as a part of world Islam desirous of contacts abroad—for the sake of "its own survival and protection—conveniently parallels Moscow's desire to appear to Third World Muslim nations as 'one of them'." But in a 1983 book co-authored with his daughter, Marie Broxup, Bennigsen asserted that Soviet Muslims had become drastically less effective in foreign operations, since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. "The period of co-operation between the Soviet Islamic establishment and Moscow . . . seems to have come to an end with the invasion of Afghanistan." After *EIR* exposed this as a systematic cover-up of the deployments by the Soviet Muslim Boards, Bennigsen attempted to clean up his record. "Without doubt," he said in the recent *Problems of Communism* article, "the official Soviet Islamic establishment is once again entrusted with an important high-level diplomatic mission. Moscow's aim in sponsoring the official Islamic establishment is both transparent and highly successful. . . . The message they bring to their co-religionists abroad may not be very different from official Soviet propaganda . . . but it is accepted with a certain sympathy because it is presented by authentic Islamic scholars. . . . Thanks to the activity of these representatives, Moscow managed to neutralize to a certain degree the disastrous propaganda image of the Afghan genocide."

Bennigsen admits all that, but refuses to abandon his main line: "One might well ask now long the Soviets can play the sophisticated but dangerous game of supporting Islam abroad, while trying to destroy it at home." The answer may be: As long as anybody in the United States is foolish enough to follow the advice of Bennigsen, who hails the "Islamic Revolution" of the fanatics in Iran, even as they commit more atrocities.

3.7 China vs. Japan and Vietnam Under Soviet Strategic Hegemony

In the fall months of 1983, a series of events and processes were unleashed throughout Asia signaling that the Soviet Union had moved to a more advanced stage in its drive for world power domination. In August, the nation of Pakistan broke out into near civil war, as the Soviet-backed Movement for the Restoration of Democracy launched a drive to overthrow the regime of Zia ul-Haq. The MRD movement, localized mainly in the province of Sind, functioned as the protective umbrella for a far more dangerous game: the growth of insurgent separatist movements in Baluchistan and Sind, also openly backed by the Soviet Union. Within a week after the first full-scale demonstrations in Pakistan had begun, Filipino opposition leader Benigno Aquino was murdered on Aug. 14, and the full-scale destabilization of the Philippines was in progress. Despite a divided opposition, a major point of attack for the Filipino opposition is the demand that the U.S. military installations at Clark Field and Subic Bay must be removed.

On Sept. 1, in an event that shocked the entire world, the Soviet Union, under the direction of Far East Commander Vladimir Govorov, now Deputy Minister of Defense, shot down without warning the KAL-007, murdering all 269 on board. In speeches justifying this action, the then-Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Ustinov exclaimed that any aircraft that violated the "holy soil of Mother Russia" would meet with the same treatment. Approximately five weeks later, on Oct. 9, the world was shocked again when *spetznaz* (special forces) deployed by North Korea carried out a terrorist bombing against the government of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan in Rangoon, Burma, murdering 17 people, including four members of the South Korean cabinet, and narrowly missing President Chun himself. This act of war against South Korea reportedly not only involved the insane North Korea regime of Kim Il Sung (the country's 100,000 *spetznaz* forces are under the control of his son and designated successor, Kim Chong-il), but also East German intelligence. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the event, Moscow propaganda stood solidly behind North Korea in its self-justifying enraged diatribes against the Chun government.

With these operations, particularly the last two, the Soviet Union was proclaiming a new policy of *Schrecklichkeit* toward Asia. More importantly,

Moscow was announcing, in the starkest terms possible, that the Soviet Union had arrived in the region, and was now undeniably filling the growing vacuum left by the steady strategic withdrawal of the United States from the region since 1975. In the nearly 24 months that have passed since then, each country of the region—U.S. ally or no—has had to redefine its foreign policy to take into account the emerging reality: Unless U.S. withdrawal is reversed, each nation is forced to cut its course between two major empires in the region—the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

This chapter will leave to one side the required measures to be taken in U.S. policy in order to reverse the current and actual strategic domination of the region by the Soviet Union, but will examine that domination and its implications.

As in the case of the Middle East, so in Asia, the Soviet Union has acquired its strategic gains without ever bloodying the nose of one Soviet soldier. The gains have been won by default. The U.S. strategic withdrawal, as well-informed Asians verify, began not with the fall of Saigon in 1975, but with the 1969 enunciation of the so-called Guam Doctrine of Henry Kissinger. The Guam Doctrine functioned parallel to the irresponsible doctrine of flexible response toward Western Europe. As the doctrine was spelled out by Richard Nixon at a press briefing in Guam in July 1969: "The United States is going to encourage and *has a right to expect* that defense will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves . . . [Military involvement and aid] will recede." The inexorable result of this doctrine was the withdrawal without honor from Saigon and Phnom Penh in 1975.

Kissinger covered the planned U.S. withdrawal from the region by means of the China Card. Under this idea, the United States would increasingly hand over its strategic responsibilities in the region to the People's Republic of China as the effective counter against the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, the China Card was also the primary motive for the "Pakistan tilt" carried out by Kissinger, which permitted the Soviet Union to make major diplomatic headway into India, the major power of the subcontinent.

As the China Card held sway, the U.S. political and military presence in the region continued to deteriorate. Under the Kissinger domination of foreign policy during the Carter administration, the United States refused to offer any concession to the appeals of Vietnam for relations, creating the conditions under which Vietnam, under increasing pressure from the China-sponsored Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, signed a Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union in 1978, allowing the Soviets to occupy the U.S.-constructed deepwater port at Cam Ranh Bay. Today, it is acknowledged that Cam Ranh Bay is the "largest forward base" the Soviet Union possesses.

U.S. withdrawal reached such proportions that the Carter administration, by 1979, was actively preparing for U.S. military withdrawal from South Korea, abandoning the front line of defense for Japan.

As for Southeast Asia, the U.S. attitude in practice toward its allies in this region is effectively summarized by Henry Kissinger's unabashed announcement in a speech delivered in Hong Kong in October 1983: "Southeast Asia has, as far as the United States is concerned, governments that are neither allies nor are they—considered strictly—countries with which we have a friendly relationship."

Kissinger and his "China Card" colleagues such as Zbigniew Brzezinski

have been arguing since 1983 that the United States should abandon Western Europe for the greater rewards of a Pacific-oriented policy. The argument is a hoax; the United States has already nearly completed withdrawal from the Pacific.

Given the strategic significance of the Indian and Pacific Oceans Basin, U.S. policy over the last 15 years is patently insane. Two-thirds of the world's population is concentrated in the Indian and Pacific Oceans basins, making the region the world's richest concentration of manpower, raw materials, and food. Furthermore, led by Japan and South Korea, the national economies of the region have weathered the current world depression far better than economies elsewhere, holding onto respectable growth rates while other nations have been slipping into collapse. Asia is rapidly becoming the engine of the world economy.

For the Soviet Union, imperial domination over the region guarantees control of world trade and permits Moscow to dictate the transfer of wealth and raw materials to the Soviet heartland on terms the Russians find suitable, under conditions in which Moscow otherwise has little to offer to its trading partners. Strategic domination is also a *sine qua non* for forcing the United States into the status of a third-rate power. Furthermore, given the Pacific's strategic function as a line of defense for the U.S. continent, Soviet domination over the Pacific effectively check-mates the United States itself.

Granted a strategic backdown of the United States, the Soviet Union would be faced only with China as a power to contend with in the region. The final withdrawal of the United States from the region would precipitate the collapse of ASEAN, with Thailand leading one faction to become subsidiary states of China, and Indonesia leading the other to become subsidiary states of Moscow aligned with Vietnam. Japan and Vietnam would be permitted to subsist as nominally independent states and as the only forces in the region capable of acting to check the inherently expansionist drive of China.

The Soviet build-up

The events of fall 1983 suddenly awoke various policymaking circles in the United States to the fact that while the United States was suffering under the media-induced Vietnam Syndrome, the Soviet Union had been carrying out a massive military build-up in the region.

While much attention has been paid to Soviet SS-20s in Eastern Europe, little has been said concerning the escalating presence of SS-20s in the Asian theatre. Since October 1983, the Russians have increased the SS-20 placement from 115 to approximately 150-160 today. The Soviets are also seeking to place SS-20s in North Korea.

In addition, as of this moment, the Soviet Union enjoys military superiority in the Pacific. This has been won through the acquisition of two capabilities: the build-up of the Soviet Pacific fleet and the forward base capabilities given the Soviets through Cam Ranh Bay.

1) *The Soviet Pacific Fleet.* The Soviet Pacific Fleet is today the largest fleet out of the four the Soviets possess, and is superior to the United States Seventh Fleet, charged with responsibility for the same area. The comparison is as follows:

Soviet Pacific Fleet:

- 31 ballistic submarines and ballistic nuclear submarines
- 102 other submarines (including 90 attack subs)
- 88 principal ships, including two aircraft carriers
- 18 amphibious units

- 84 principal auxiliaries
- 340 combat aircraft, including 120 bombers
- 1 naval infantry division
- 1 naval special force (*spetznaz*)
- Facilities in Vietnam, South Yemen, and Ethiopia, with
- Soviet bases in Vladivostok and the Kurile
- Islands off the northern coast of Japan.

United States Seventh Fleet:

- 20 diesel submarines and nuclear submarines
- 3 aircraft carriers
- 22 surface combatants
- 6 amphibious units
- 8 support ships
- Facilities in Japan, Philippines, Diego Garcia, and Guam.

In addition, the United States has approximately 391 combatant aircraft deployed in the region at Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Guam through the Air Force.

The Soviet-U.S. submarine ratio is 2:1. Analysts expect further Soviet deployments in the Far East to include fourth-generation MiG-20 Fulcrums and Su-27 Flanker fighter jets to Etorofu on the Kurile Islands, plus long-range Blackjack bombers and Su-24 Fencer fighter bombers to complement the nuclear-capable air force.

The predominance of the Soviet Pacific Fleet permits the Soviet Union to shut off the crucial chokepoints in the Pacific sea-lanes, which function as the lifelines to U.S. allies, particularly the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan. This includes the La Perouse Strait between Hokkaido in Japan and the Sakhalin Islands; the Korea Strait between Japan and South Korea; the Luzon Strait through Luzon, Philippines and Taiwan in the South China Sea; and the Malacca Strait between Indonesia and Singapore-Malaysia through which all traffic passing from the Indian Ocean into the South China Sea must flow.

2) *Soviet Forward Base—Cam Ranh Bay.* In Cam Ranh Bay, it is now estimated that the Soviets have stationed there 26 ships, including 2 mine sweepers, 2 frigates, and 3 submarines. In early 1985, the Soviets also stationed 14 MiG-23s, along with 10-20 Badger long-range bombers and a half squadron of Bears. The acquisition of Cam Ranh Bay has given the Soviets two new capabilities. First, the Soviets now have the ability to carry out full fleet presence in the region without forcing ships to go all the way back to Vladivostok for servicing. Second, Cam Ranh Bay also gives the Soviets a strike capability throughout Southeast Asia and even to Guam and the Trust Territory of the Pacific, site of crucial U.S. testing installations.

The Soviets are also currently building up port installations for basing at the Cambodian port of Kompong Som, bringing Soviet forces right into the Gulf of Thailand.

3) *Result: Soviet Strategic Positioning.* United States strategic security in the Pacific theatre has been based on securing the island nations off the Asian land-mass—Japan and the Philippines, and ensuring the security of South Korea. The Soviet military build-up over the last decade has cut a strategic path to 1) break up the U.S. strategic perimeter and 2) encircle China.

The Soviets have carried out a major build-up on Sakhalin Island, on the northwest tip of Japan. In the spring of 1984, MiG-31s, the most advanced MiG fighter in the Soviet inventory, were stationed on South-

ern Sakhalin. On the northeastern tip of Japan, a few miles away from the Hokkaido coast, the Soviets have built airbases on the two southernmost Kurile Islands, Etorofu and Kunashir with five runways for TU-16 Badger and TU-95 Bear long-range bombers. In the fall of 1983, the Soviets stationed 20 MiG-23 fighters on Etorofu, raising the number to 40 in the spring of 1984.

Moving southwest toward the Korean peninsula, the Soviet Union in the last year has tightened its military-strategic alliance with the North Korean regime of Kim Il-Sung. A reading on how close this relationship has become was given by reports May 5 of this year that pairs of Soviet bombers from the maritime province of Siberia had flown through North Korean air space along the demilitarized zone, from east to west three times over the last year. The flights included two Badgers. Military specialists speculate that North Korea has given the Soviets a new route from the U.S.S.R. mainland to Cam Ranh Bay (see below for further details of Soviet-North Korean cooperation).

Cam Ranh Bay itself gives the Soviets a forward naval base in the South China Sea, a move designed to outflank U.S. bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines.

The Soviets have also moved, with aid of the Socialist International, British Commonwealth governments of Bob Hawke of Australia and David Lange of New Zealand, to close off the outer perimeter of U.S. strategic capabilities in the Pacific. In late 1984, the 1951 Anzus Pact (among Australia, New Zealand and the United States), was jettisoned when New Zealand's newly elected prime minister, David Lange, affirmed his campaign promise to discontinue ports of call by U.S. nuclear-fueled or nuclear-carrying vessels. U.S. standing policy is to never divulge the nuclear or non-nuclear status of a ship. When the U.S. refused to state the status of the USS Buchanan, New Zealand refused the port of call.

The New Zealanders were encouraged in their stance by the lack of protest coming from Australia. Instead, on March 4, the Hawke government announced it was indefinitely postponing the next scheduled Anzus meeting because the treaty had become a "dead letter." The Socialist International, along with full-fledged agents of the Soviet KGB, have been active in promoting the idea of a "nuclear-free zone" in the South Pacific. The ostensible aim of this operation is to force a halt to French nuclear-testing in New Caledonia and Mururoa. The more precise target is to disrupt U.S. presence on the Marshall Islands, the Marianas, Micronesia, and Palau by fostering anti-U.S., anti-nuclear insurgencies and so-called "independence movements." The Kwajalein Atoll, for instance, next to the famed testing site of Bikini Atoll, is the site for U.S. testing for the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets have also gained their own little toehold in this area. In 1979, the former New Hebrides became independent from Great Britain and France. Today, this island off the eastern coast of Australia, is headed by an Anglican clergyman, Walter Lini, who proclaims that Vanuatu is an ally of Cuba.

In sum: Through primarily political means, the Soviet Union has been able to steadily erode the U.S. strategic position in the Pacific, even to the point of beginning to make advances into areas once deemed out of bounds for Soviet strategic interests. The net effect of this process is to isolate U.S. forces in the region, turning the Philippine, Japanese, and South Korean bases, from points of concentration in a U.S.-dominated region, into points of defense in an increasingly hostile or neutralized environment.

Flashpoints for confrontation

There are three areas that constitute flashpoints for Soviet military action in the region: the Korean peninsula, Indochina, and a Soviet move toward Pakistan from Afghanistan. In each of these three areas, the Soviets are building up a military superiority designed to give them the advantage at any level of warfare.

1) *The Korean Peninsula.* In the last year, the Soviets have tightened their ties with the Kim Il-Sung regime, a shift in policy announced with the Soviet declaration in favor of Korean "reunification," a North Korean formulation the Soviets had hitherto eschewed. After the visit of Kim Il-Sung to Moscow and Eastern Europe in early 1984, the Soviet Union went through with delivery of MiG-23s to Pyongyang, and have offered T-72 tanks. In early December 1984, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa was in Pyongyang, where he worked out "border arrangements" between the Soviet Union and North Korea. Specifically, this included the agreement to carry out trade by means of railway, a measure that has obvious military implications. In late December, the Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun* reported that Moscow had also asked the North Koreans for three other military measures: 1) placement of SS-20s in North Korea; 2) placement of Soviet military advisers in North Korea; 3) the use of two North Korean ports for the Soviet Pacific fleet.

According to sources cited by *Sankei Shimbun*, the North Koreans agreed to the first two of these demands, but refused the request for port of call.

None of these measures would appear to be defensive in character. There are currently at least 5,000 Soviet technicians in North Korea. The Soviets have supplied Pyongyang with an unspecified number of scud missiles of 300 kilometers in range. In early December, the North Koreans moved three divisions forward toward the vicinity of Kaesong just northwest of the demilitarized zone. The North Koreans began in fall 1984 constructing three more underground fortifications near the DMZ, equipped with electricity generators and food storage facilities. According to testimony before Congress by Admiral William J. Crowe, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command, in March 1985, North Korea is becoming increasingly capable of launching a surprise attack on the south.

For the Soviet Union, acquisition of South Korea, the one Asian country closest to following Japan to become a fully industrialized nation, is as beneficial as Soviet effective acquisition of the Federal Republic of Germany. South Korea also functions as the front line of defense for Japan. Under the current strategic conditions, South Korea and the United States are in no position to adequately defend the southern half of the peninsula against a Soviet-backed and aided invasion from the north (See table on North Asian Theater).

2) *Indochina.* The Vietnam Armed Forces comprise by far the most significant military force in the region, as proven by the total failure of China's 1979 attempt to "teach a lesson" to the Vietnamese for their invasion of Cambodia. The Chinese were unable to defeat Vietnamese reserve forces. If the simmering conflict in this region were to become full-scale war, the Vietnamese would require Soviet logistical aid. This is now in preparation, with the Soviet build-up of the Cambodian port of Kompong Son, and Soviet building up of transport infrastructure in central-west Cambodia.

There are also consistent rumors of Soviet placement of intermediate-range missiles in both Cambodia and Laos, but even without this, it is

North Asian Theater

Country	Forces	Submarines	Aircraft
North Korea	784,000	21	740
U.S.S.R.	50 divisions*	133	340 +
Japan	245,000	14	440
South Korea	622,000	—	351
United States	61,500	20	366 +

*on Sino-Soviet border

the estimate of most military authorities, that in a full-scale confrontation between Vietnam and ASEAN countries, backed by the United States, the ASEAN countries, notably Thailand, would lose. If the United States were forced out of the Philippine bases, then this area would automatically revert to the Soviet Union and China (See table below).

3) *Pakistan-Afghanistan*. Within the last months, the Soviets have conducted a policy of consistent bombings of villages inside Pakistan along the Afghan border, killing civilians, in preparation for a policy of hot pursuit by troops into Pakistani territory. In this year alone, there have been over 60 MiG bombing-strafting attacks on Pakistan from Afghanistan, compared to 61 for all of 1984. In early June, the Soviets warned Pakistan that they knew of every location of rebel guerrilla camps, warning: "So far, we have not come across the border in hot pursuit."

In October 1984, the Soviets escalated their presence in Afghanistan, with the placement of 60,000 troops, bringing the total to 150,000 troops. On Oct. 2, 1984, the Pakistani newspaper Nawa-e-Waqt further reported that the Soviets were installing SS-22 missiles in Afghanistan, 150 kilometers from Herat, at Soviet air force and army bases in Shindand and Jalalabad. Teheran, Mashhad, Islamabad, and Quetta are all within range of these missiles.

The Soviets are moving fast to secure their southern flank on the Afghan border. In May, the Soviets launched a campaign to end the rebel siege of the fortification at Barikot, an operation successfully completed by mid-June.

For the Soviets, the Pakistani theatre is crucial to realize the long-standing Russian dream for a warm-water port, a goal closer in reach

Indochina Theater

Country	Forces	Aircraft
Vietnam	1,277,000 (57 divisions)	290
U.S.S.R.	—	340 (with Pacific fleet)
Indonesia	281,000	90
Malaysia	124,000	34
Philippines	104,800	82
Thailand	235,300 (7 divisions)	203
United States	9,100	366 (Philippines)

with the Russian 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. The area around the Pakistan-Indian-shared territory of Kashmir is also a strategic juncture joining the borders of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the People's Republic of China. The Chinese and the Pakistanis seek to hold a strategic corridor joining their two countries, the Krakoram highway, which is interrupted by Indian-held Kashmir. This May, the Soviets, according to the Pakistani newspaper *Mashriq* installed surface-to-air missiles in the Pamir Plateau in Afghanistan, adjoining the Chinese-Pakistani border. The Soviets are also opening a tunnel in the militarily sensitive region of the Vakkan Valley and a missile-equipped base close to the Krakoram highway near northern Pakistan.

For the Soviets, there are two conditions which would permit immediate Soviet intervention into Pakistan: an Indo-Pakistani war and total destabilization of the Zia regime by separatist movements in Sind and Baluchistan, who would call in the Soviets for military "help." In the first case, it is presumed that Pakistan would lose the war, given the proven inferiority in force and quality of the Pakistani armed forces. The refusal of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to press ahead for a war with Pakistan, over the suspected building of a Pakistani nuclear capability, may have been one of the prime motivations for the Soviet involvement in her assassination in October 1984.

Asia under the Chinese and Soviet empires

The Soviet Union seeks domination over Asia, including the right to set the terms of raw materials and manpower transfer from the region to the U.S.S.R. Of the greatest economic importance to Moscow is Japan. The Soviet Union has consistently demanded that Japan sign a "non-aggression pact." The terms of Japanese surrender to Soviet *Schrecklichkeit* policy are 1) the severing of defense ties with the United States, specifically an end to all potentials for Japanese cooperation with the Strategic Defense Initiative; and 2) Japanese recognition of Soviet title to the Kurile Islands—that is, acceptance of a permanent Soviet military blackmail threat at Japan's door. In return, the Soviets seek Japanese assistance in the exploitation and development of Siberia.

The current advances for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement are a barometer of the power balance in the region. Now that the Kissinger China Card policy has removed the United States as a power in the region, the Chinese leadership turns away from the United States to open relations with the Soviet Union. On June 10, the Soviets and the Chinese signed a five-year trade deal, which is expected to increase trade five-fold. The Chinese are more interested in long-term power trends, than they are with pressing the points of their three conditions for normalization of relations: removal of Soviet troops from the Sino-Soviet border; removal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia; and removal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

It is no contradiction (and certainly not for China) that this rapprochement with Moscow is being taken right at the point that the People's Republic is relaunched its economy down the "capitalist road" under the leadership of arch capitalist-roader Deng Xiao Ping, the protected asset of Kissinger partner, Chou En-lai. It was Deng who argued in 1965 that the escalation of U.S. intervention in Indochina warranted an immediate rapprochement with the Soviet Union. At the time, the majority of the CCP leadership agreed with Deng. Mao's Cultural Revolution was in part launched in order to outflank the Deng control of

the party on this strategic issue. To this day, informed Asian sources report, Deng maintains very good connections to the Soviet Union.

But with the removal of the United States from the region, China automatically becomes the major challenge to Soviet hegemony in the region. Although the Soviets have the strategic preponderance over China at the current moment, it is doubtful that the Soviet Union could conquer and militarily occupy the territory of the Middle Kingdom. Even if the Soviets were to launch nuclear warfare against China, this would not guarantee submission to Soviet domination. Nuclear war is a contingency the Chinese are prepared for, not militarily, but as senior officers of the People's Liberation Army view it, the Soviets can destroy China's cities, but not her countryside, where 80% of the population lives.

Inside the military councils of the Kremlin, it is an accepted point of strategic doctrine that it is imperative to liquidate the United States as a world power and conquer Europe so that the industrial potential and population of the latter continent will be at the disposal of the Soviet Union for the inevitable moment of the final settling of accounts with China, a war Soviet strategic planners expect to occur some twenty years in the future.

China is meanwhile content to let the Soviet game play itself out, while taking the short-term route of securing its long border with Russia, while the Russians take care of the United States. But the withdrawal of the United States from this region is a strategic disaster for China as well, by denying China the potential for the outside technological and scientific intervention required to sustain its 1 billion-plus population. A China going into the twenty-first century, lacking a radical and major upgrading of its infrastructural and industrial base, will be a China required by its internal conditions to expand outward to settle its population. The case of Cambodia 1975-79, indicates the tendency that can be expected to erupt under such conditions.

This will pose a grave problem to the Soviet Union. For this reason, it is expected that in order to hold the inherently expansionist tendencies of China in check, the Soviet Union will be forced to maintain a nominally independent Japan and a nominally independent Vietnam as military forces in their own right.

3.8 The Anglo-American Liberal Establishment and Its Massive Penetration by Soviet Intelligence

The overwhelming evidence of the systematic, long-term Soviet build-up and preparedness to wage war begs the question: How is it still possible for anyone in the West to talk of "preserving parity" with the Soviet bloc? How can the Strategic Defense Initiative, or any attempt at bolstering Western defenses, be called "a danger to the arms control process" and treated by various Western governments and media as an unfair design "to upset and tilt the balance of forces" between the U.S.S.R. and the United States?

This section will present the reader with the genesis of willful delusions of the U.S. State Department and "arms control mafia" and their Western European co-thinkers, concerning Soviet strategy and intent; how the policy originated in British circles before being adopted by the U.S. Eastern Establishment; and how the Anglo-American Establishment's doctrine necessarily calls for the destruction of the superpower status of the United States.

How is it that the West's principal institutions—including NATO—have failed to even acknowledge, let alone publicize, the breach in "parity" that has increasingly characterized the balance of strategic forces for over a decade? Public debate on the widening chasm between Eastern and Western capabilities would blow the lid off the Big Lie of arms control. To take but one example, the unveiling by American intelligence of the Soviet development of the Krasnoyarsk phased-array battle-management radar system in 1984 was crucial to bolster evidence of Moscow's gradual phasing in of components of a complete ABM system. But the publication of the evidence was delayed for several months upon intervention of the U.S. Department of State, and the British government even rejected the "interpretation" of the American finding. British and Soviet authorities were at one to protect the 1972 ABM Treaty and cover up a major Soviet violation.

The British protest was timed with repeated calls from the prime

minister and other officers of the Crown urging resumption and early success of the very arms control "process" behind which the Soviet build-up has been allowed to occur and accelerate unimpeded. After the Czar-in-the-wings Mikhail Gorbachov visited London in December 1984, the quality of relations established with Mrs. Thatcher—"I like him. We can do business together"—emerged in public view with Thatcher's stormy Camp David talks with President Reagan. There she tried to impose a Four-Point Program against the SDI. Only research, she said, and no development. Any development should be conditioned by consultations with (unwilling) allies, and any deployment by negotiations with the Russians. The doctrine and practice of deterrence should be preserved. No "uncontrolled arms race in space" must be allowed. Should that program have been followed, or should it be in the future, there would be no SDI at all.

The matter was made worse in March 1985 by British Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe, whose much-publicized speech at the Royal United Services Institute of London called the SDI a "new Maginot line in space," which "could wreck prospects for an agreement at the Geneva arms talks." The minister complained, "We must take care that political decisions are not pre-empted by the march of technology," and talked of preventing "research [from] acquiring an unstoppable momentum of its own. . . ." His conclusion was that the allies should better ask themselves "how best to enhance deterrence, how best to curb rather than stimulate an arms race." Said Howe, "I attach importance to *convincing the Soviet leadership that we in the West are indeed serious in our aim of maintaining strategic stability at significantly lower levels of nuclear weapons*" (emphasis added).

The fetish of arms control is the linguistic disguise for appeasement. It did not arise suddenly—the last 30 years of "arms control, disarmament, and détente" are what generated today's "New Yalta" surrender.

The doctrine of arms control and disarmament came to the United States principally from Britain, starting with the development in the early 1950s by senior British military officials of the notion that nuclear weapons "have abolished global war." The concept of "deterrence" was born out of the thought that global war having been made "impossible," the aim of warfare was to be "to prevent war," which of course brought diplomacy and strategic manipulation to the fore. The British defense ministry's *Global Strategy Paper 1952* stated the policy and gave birth to the belief that "mutual vulnerability" was the sole way of avoiding war.

With a lag-time of a few years, the same ideas were made into U.S. strategic policy. The announcement in London that "global war is not the Clausewitzian continuation of policy by other means," was followed by the statement that "the overriding consideration in all military planning must be to prevent war rather than to prepare for it." As numerous British commentators have conceded, "British atomic weapons were always in a sense a diplomatic weapon against the United States," one designed to allow the Whitehall mandarins a place in the negotiating process.

The new-born conceptions, however, needed to be translated into hard strategic facts. The Era of Détente was initiated when British Prime Minister Sir Anthony Eden invited Nikita Khrushchov and Marshal Bulganin to pay the first visit to the West of the Soviet leadership since the 1917 Revolution—to London in April 1956. The state visit was reciprocated in February 1957 when Prime Minister Harold Macmillan went to Moscow for the first peace-time visit there of a top Western leader since the Bolsheviks had taken power. The policy-content was

exemplified by Macmillan's unsuccessful search for a non-aggression pact and a nuclear test-ban with Moscow.

In December 1962, when Macmillan met President Kennedy in Nassau, Bahamas, he opened the talks by evoking "the awful prospects of an indefinite arms race" to motivate his demands. At the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Macmillan sent a letter to Khrushchov suggesting that "the resolution of the Cuban situation *would open the way for a test ban agreement*" (emphasis added). The crisis was being used to manage the transition of U.S. and NATO strategy into the realm of arms control. "I therefore ask you to take this action necessary to make all this possible. This is an opportunity we should seize," Macmillan wrote Khrushchov. While Macmillan was in thrice-daily telephone conversation with Kennedy to advise on the Cuban crisis, he was telling Khrushchov to use the crisis to enforce the control of armaments!

It was later Macmillan who successfully engineered the convening in Moscow in June 1963 of the tripartite (U.S.A., Britain, U.S.S.R.) conference which resulted in the first arms control treaty to be signed after 1945, the Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (which the British prime minister wanted to complement with a Non-Aggression Pact and a Non-Proliferation Treaty, the latter of which did come about a few years later). Macmillan's chief Western accomplice was U.S. negotiator Averell Harriman, who remained an inspiration behind the later arms control treaties (SALT I and II, ABM, etc.). This provided the Soviets with the curtain of official lies behind which their own breathless arms build-up could occur.

Once disarmament, arms control, and détente had become the central subject in international affairs, the British government discreetly withdrew from the foreground, leaving it to the McNamaras and the Kissingers to haggle the nitty-gritties with the Russians.

When Margaret Thatcher assumed the prime ministership in 1979, her flamboyant anti-Soviet rhetoric earned her a now-eroded reputation of anti-communist hard-liner. She has since been gradually, but completely absorbed by the consensus view in Whitehall and has made the opening of a "new dialogue with the East" her fundamental foreign policy priority. From her early 1984 sojourn in Hungary, and the ensuing string of visits of British officials and unofficial envoys to Moscow and other Warsaw Pact capitals, while a thin veneer of "Atlantic Solidarity" has been maintained, the policy has been to seal "a real and lasting improvement in East West relations" with a Russia committed to world domination by 1988!

Intense diplomatic and intelligence traffic between London and Moscow permanently lays the basis for the strategic agreement that targets the instrument—the SDI—and the policy—saving Western civilization. While aiming to deny Europe its only possible anti-missile defense, Britain is calling for an early reshaping of the strategic map, which we have dubbed the "New Yalta." In London, one hears in high places that "the Americans do not know how to play the diplomatic game. The Europeans, with their foreign services that are hundreds of years old, know how to play the diplomatic game—this is Metternich's old policy. The only ones in America who understand and practice *Metternichism* are the State Department."

Among the leading practitioners of the New Yalta game of balance, we find in London the Royal Institute for International Affairs (RIIA), also known as Chatham House, and its specialized branch the Anglo-Soviet Round Table, which regularly and quietly associates top Soviet Western hands and British experts on Soviet affairs. Together with the

Edinburgh Conversations, held for the same purpose, they provide an institutional forum for policy-coordination. Chatham House is organically linked to the Foreign Office, from which policy trickles down into the media, an array of think tanks and private organizations, including the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). These in turn create reflections in the media, the BBC, Reuters, the London *Economist*, the *Financial Times*, etc., which "set the tone" internationally. All share the same passionate concern for "preserving parity" and condemning "the arms race."

Delays of one day to one week generally obtain between the airing of such views in London and their appearance in the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and other leading U.S. liberal media. Initiatives and ideas created at the RIIA or the Anglo-Soviet Round Table are echoed in America by the Dartmouth Conference, the State Department, the Office of Technological Assessment, the GAO, and by a series of congressional and senatorial organs which promote arms control.

It would be wrong to consider the U.S. Eastern Establishment as an entity distinct from its aristocratic British cousins. The East Coast blue-bloods have for generations craved recognition as full-blooded members of the British nobility, and, by pedigree, from their Tory ancestors in the American Revolution and the War of 1812, their Civil War conspiracies against the Union as well as the fortunes their families acquired in the British East India Company's drug trade, are to be considered as a colonial extension of British policy-making circles.

The leading figures in the Eastern Establishment, from the early arms control negotiator Harriman to his chosen successor as "chairman of the Eastern Establishment," McGeorge Bundy (Kennedy's National Security Adviser), freely confess their debt to London. Bundy, a vocal opponent of the SDI and champion of a pledge to Moscow of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, co-founded under the supervision of Britain's Lord Zuckerman the top East-West policy-coordination organization, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria. IIASA is a neo-Malthusian think tank devoted to controlling and slowing down technological development inclusively in the domain of armaments. Zero-growth policies were imposed through the Club of Rome, a sister-organization co-founded by KGB Gen. Dzhermen Gvishiani, the late Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin's son-in-law and deputy chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology; and by Italy's Aurelio Peccei and Britain's Dr. Alexander King, former OECD director-general for Science, Technology, Industry, and Education.

Bundy inducted into the U.S. National Security Council the British-trained Henry Kissinger, a protégé of Chatham House's Sir John Wheeler-Bennett. Kissinger told his Royal Institute audience, on May 10 1982, the truth about the so-called Special Relationship between Britain and America:

Fortunately, Britain had a decisive influence over America's rapid awakening to maturity in the years following [World War II]. . . . Britain has rarely proclaimed moral absolutes or rested her faith in the ultimate efficacy of technology, despite her achievements in this field. Philosophically, she remains Hobbesian: She expects the worst and is rarely disappointed. In moral matters, Britain has traditionally practised a convenient form of ethical egoism, believing that what was good for Britain was best for the rest. . . . In the 19th century, British policy was a—perhaps *the*—principal factor in a European system that kept the peace for 99 years without a major war.

American foreign policy is the product of a very different tradition. . . . American attitudes until quite literally the recent decades have embodied a faith that historical experience can be transcended, that problems can be solved permanently. . . . It was therefore a rude awakening when in the 1960s and '70s the United States became conscious of the limits of even its resources. . . .

During the 1920s, the U.S. Navy Department still maintained a "Red Plan" to deal with the contingency of conflict with the British fleet. It was not until the war with Hitler that the gap closed permanently. . . . The Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty, while formally American initiatives, were inconceivable without British advice and British efforts. . . . [Foreign Minister Ernest] Bevin shrewdly calculated that Britain was not powerful enough to influence American policy by conventional methods of pressure or balancing of risks. But by discreet advice, the wisdom of experience and the presupposition of common aims, she could make herself indispensable, so that American leaders no longer thought of consultations with London as a special favor but as an inherent component of our own decision-making. . . .

Our postwar diplomatic history is littered with Anglo-American "arrangements" and "understandings," sometimes on crucial issues, never put into formal documents. . . .

The British were so matter-of-factly helpful that they became a participant in internal American deliberations to a degree probably never before practiced between sovereign nations. In my period of office, the British played a seminal part in certain American bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union—indeed, they helped draft the key document. In my White House incarnation then [as National Security Adviser—ed.] I kept the Foreign Office better informed and more closely engaged than I did the American State Department. . . . It was symptomatic. . . .

It was lawful therefore that when both Kissinger and British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington were both retired from public office, they should establish together the Kissinger Associates consulting organization, which in turn returned some influence to Kissinger in Washington after his business partner became Secretary General of NATO, a job that imposes some restraints on public rhetoric, but affords its holder with considerable influence in shaping transatlantic relations. Delegations of parliamentarians from NATO member countries that make the pilgrimage to the Brussels headquarters of the Atlantic Alliance often return startled by the brash anti-SDI language used privately by Carrington, while his official pronouncements affect the carefully-balanced cant of the Foreign Office, supporting Mrs. Thatcher's Four Points against the SDI and similarly talking of the "new perspectives for improved and stabilized relations with the Soviet Union."

The fundamental view held by the British policy-elite was summed up by Harold Macmillan, when advising a young British colleague on how to "run" the Americans: "Permit your American colleague . . . the feeling that he is running the show. This will enable you to run it yourself. We . . . are Greeks in this American Empire. We must run [the Americans] as the Greeks ran the operations of Emperor Claudius."

In this way, the Great Deal proposed by Lord Bertrand Russell to Khrushchov in 1955, to divide the world in two great empires and demolish national sovereignty within the Western camp, while promoting zero-growth, became "American" policy under Harriman, Bundy, Kis-

singer, and Jimmy Carter's Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a member of the pro-disarmament Palme Commission. The organization established by Russell, the Pugwash Conference, became the nerve center of the war against technological progress and its driver, military technology, beckoning a series of arms-control treaties on its way.

In the meantime, H.A.R. "Kim" Philby, Guy Burgess, Donald Maclean, Alan Nunn May, Klaus Fuchs, Anthony Blunt and other spies were deployed to ensure "parity." While Pugwash slowed to a virtual halt the progress of military and general technology in the West, Russia's status and abilities were enhanced by "unconventional means."

The schemes for an "Anglo-Soviet Condominium" over Europe first canvassed in Foreign Office documents dated 1942, are now entering the implementation phase—and the consensus prevailing in Britain among the Thatcher Conservatives, the Liberals, and Labour in opposing the SDI is the most blatant illustration of it.

It was therefore lawful that Gorbachov should choose London as the point of the wedge he started driving between Europe and America in December 1984. The tone and substance of the Thatcher-Gorbachov talks have been the common plank of all Western appeasers in their rejection of the SDI, from the Bonn, May 1985 OECD summit refusal to even mention the SDI, to the NATO foreign ministers' meeting in Lisbon, which urged the United States to give priority to arms control and disarmament at the Geneva talks.

Lord Carrington and his faction have no qualms about exploiting the most intimate features of the Anglo-American "special relationship" in order to cement their supposed deal with Moscow. One of the features of the said "special relationship" is the routine delivery by American agencies of masses of top-secret material, including codes and code words, to the British. It has been standard British practice, especially by the British Admiralty, to regard the "dumb Americans'" secrets as the stuff of barter with the Soviets. During the Malvinas War of spring 1982, it became clear to certain sectors of the U.S. intelligence community that the British were transferring vital strategic information and codes to the Soviets on a wholesale basis, especially in regard to U.S. fleet dispositions and movements. There was for a time the possibility that British culpability might be used as a factional weapon by U.S. intelligence factions who were opposed to making American military forces into a toady of British imperialism. The British response was to cover their treachery by arresting fall-guy Geoffrey Prime, a former employee of the British military communication facility, on charges that he had leaked official secrets to the Soviet bloc. Prime was the key component in an official British "explanation" of how the damaging leaks had occurred. To top off the damage-control operation, Prime was sentenced to a long prison term. But British betrayal of U.S. secrets has gone on, up to and including the June 1985 TWA flight 847 hostage affair.

Carrington has not publicly stated that NATO should be disbanded, and has even paid stiff upper lip service to a "conventional build-up" of the Alliance. Thirty years of détente and betrayal by the British elite have shown just how seriously his statements should be taken.

4. The Build-Up of Soviet Absolute Superiority

4.1 The Soviet Military Build-Up's Two-Fold Role

The Soviet empire's principal weapon of political influence is by no means "Marxism," but rather the ideological persuasiveness of masses of Soviet tanks and missiles. The key to the continuing growth of Soviet political influence, is the perception that Soviet power is unchallengeable, and Soviet victory inevitable. Soviet KGB and related recruitment among the highest-ranking layers of Atlantic Alliance and developing nations, is based upon the disposition of the cowardly to align themselves with the "winning side." On this basis, in large part, the Soviet KGB and GRU have recruited the apparatus of the "ultra-right," the Nazi and Synarchist international networks, as a principal instrument of Soviet subversion, terrorism, and sabotage internationally.

The most important, and indispensable aspect of Soviet peaceful subversion of the West, is the calculations of military advisors of governments, political parties, and financial interests, to the effect that the Soviets have an absolute superiority in war-fighting power, a superiority now rapidly approaching the capacity of the Soviets to launch, to survive, and to win a general thermonuclear assault, with degrees of losses acceptable to the Soviet dictatorship.

On this latter account, the amount of military capacity which the Soviets require to intimidate the West into peaceful submission is exactly the same capacity needed to launch, to win, and to survive a general thermonuclear war. Whereas Atlantic Alliance "deterrent" capacity has been developed only for "show," rather than actual war-fighting, in the Soviet case, the capacity is developed with more or less equal effectiveness for either option. In short, the Soviets do not bluff with an empty hand.

The Soviet Order of Battle: offensive forces

A nation's "Order of Battle" is the totality of its combat forces, logistical forces, and other auxiliary forces so positioned and arrayed, as to conduct combat for the purpose of achieving the ultimate objectives of the state. The physical components of the Order of Battle, i.e., weapons systems, ammunition, logistical stockpiles, combat and administrative personnel, are brought to life by the strategic doctrine which combines them into a meaningful organism with the assistance of combat training, admin-

istrative indoctrination, and a system of command, control, communications and logistical flows, so designed as to realize the objectives set forth by the strategic doctrine.

What may be known, but is usually ignored or denied, about Soviet doctrine and objectives, was the subject of the preceding chapters of this report. What is known in the West about the Soviet Order of Battle, is at the same time enormous in scope, and pitifully little.

A great number of weapon-counts are made and circulated in unclassified form, by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), NATO, the Congressional Research Service, and other institutions. The actual gatherers of this information are the electronic surveillance means of the Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency.

Not one Soviet source of comprehensive information on the subject exists. The Soviets have never even divulged any of it at the strategic arms negotiations. Typically, the Soviet negotiators walk into those sessions and refuse to report the size of their arsenals, on grounds that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. states that disclosure of such information, for any purpose, is legally treason. The SALT/START talks have therefore been based on the following procedure: The American side presents a paper, in which it states what the U.S. believes the Soviet arsenal to be, based on data gathered by the American so-called "national means of surveillance," i.e., satellites and electronic surveillance. The Soviet side, initially, rejects the American estimate, without disclosing the nature of their objections. The American side then submits a second draft estimate. The Soviets reject that, too. Further American estimates are produced, until one estimate is proclaimed acceptable by the Soviets.

It is ultimately this Soviet-approved estimate, submitted to the Soviets by U.S. intelligence, which finds its way into the publications of IISS, the CRS, et al. Those estimates rejected by the Soviets are consigned to secrecy.

In addition, before presenting comparison of U.S. and Soviet forces in certain crucial areas, we stress again, that the build-up guided by the Ogarkov War Plan entails not only the amassment of sheer force, but the reorganization of Soviet society to fight war without a period of mobilization during war. Respecting manpower, infrastructure, and all kinds of materials, therefore, the U.S.S.R. has large, ready capabilities that become part of the Soviet war machine the moment the Supreme Defense Council declares them to be such, although they appear in no table of military forces.

Missile forces

ICBMs

The U.S. Department of Defense pamphlet, *Soviet Military Power 1985*, counts the following Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs):

	Number Deployed	Warheads	Max Range (km)	Launch Mode
SS-11				
Mod 1	100	1	11,000	Hot
Mod 2		1	13,000	Hot
Mod 3	420	3 MIRVs	10,600	Hot
SS-13				
Mod 2	60	1	9,400	Hot

(continued)

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	Number Deployed	Warheads	Max Range (km)	Launch Mode
SS-16	???	1	9,000	Cold
SS-17	150	4 MIRVs	10,000	Cold
SS-18	308	10 MIRVs	11,000	Cold
SS-19	360	6 MIRVs	10,000	Hot
SS-24	None	10 MIRVs	10,000	Cold
SS-25	None	1	10,500	Cold
Total ICBMs	1,398			

(MIRV = multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle)

The SS-16 is a three-stage, long-range version of the SS-20, which the Soviets pledged, under the SALT II treaty, not to deploy. It has been observed, however, deployed at Plesetsk in northern Russia. A statement entered by Sen. Jim McClure in the *Congressional Record*, April 27, 1983 ("Covert Strategic Reserve ICBM Force: Another Soviet SALT II Violation"), cited intelligence estimates of 100 to 200 SS-16 launchers deployed at Plesetsk.

To these must be added the SS-20 itself, since this IRBM, if based in far northern Siberia, has intercontinental range—as the Soviets have demonstrated in tests. In April 1984, during huge naval maneuvers in the North Atlantic, the Soviets fired 6 SS-20s on a flight path that would have ended in the United States; the missiles were brought down in the Barents Sea. The SS-20 is normally equipped with three warheads. Its range is enhanced, if the missile is armed with only one or two warheads.

Soviet Military Power 1985 counted approximately 400 SS-20s; when strategic arms talks resumed in March 1985, U.S. officials stated the number of SS-20s as 414. According to sources quoted in *The Daily Telegraph* of London, Nov. 27, 1984, the Soviets drastically accelerated SS-20 deployments in 1984, after they claimed to have frozen them in the western part of the country. During 1984, the report said, the Soviets had started construction of ten new SS-20 bases, in both the western and eastern parts of the Soviet Union—the largest number of SS-20 bases begun in any one year, since the SS-20 was first deployed in 1977.

Taking a conservative estimate of SS-16s and the probable SS-20 force for the end of 1985, the count of Soviet ICBM launchers at the ready rises:

	Number Deployed	Warheads	Max Range (km)	Launch Mode
SS-16	100	1	9,000	Cold
SS-20	500	3 or 1	5,000 8,000	Cold
Total ICBMs	1,998			

In October 1984, *Defense Daily* reported that the SS-25 ICBM, a heavy missile which the Pentagon describes as "nearing deployment," was being deployed among launch sites for the SS-20—a maneuver which disguises the true numbers of both ICBMs and IRBMs on Soviet launch pads detectable by U.S. satellites in space. A month later, U.S. officials in Brussels said that the Soviets were "vigorously" building SS-20 bases and converting others of them "apparently for the deployment of ICBMs."

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The Soviets, meanwhile, have claimed that the SS-25 is merely an upgrade of the older SS-13, since both are three-stage, solid-fueled missiles. But the SS-13 is a fixed-silo, single-warhead ICBM; the SS-25 has been described in intelligence reports as housed in a truck-mobile canister with a sliding roof. With the first reports of the SS-25s testing, there was also some controversy among defense experts, over whether it might have not a single warhead, but as many as 6 MIRVs. As with all the mobile Soviet missiles, it is virtually impossible to make an accurate count of the SS-25s, since their mobility allows for concealing them in practically any building or tent.

According to several sources, who cited information channeled from the Pentagon that did not, however, make its way into *Soviet Military Power 1985*, the ambiguous SS-25 or SS-20 bases already house 40 or 50 SS-25 launchers. These must already be added to the running total:

	Number Deployed	Warheads	Max Range (km)	Launch Mode
SS-25	40	1	10,500	Cold
Total ICBMs	2,038			

But, as we reported in Part 1, by the end of 1985, the Soviet Union will have at least 460 operational SS-25 mobile ICBM launchers. The rate of production of this missile is unprecedented; whereas the Soviets have been building SS-20 launchers at the rate of approximately one per week in the last years, the SS-25s are rolling off the line at the rate of *one per day*. The West German Defense Ministry, in a White Paper released in June 1985, projects a total deployment of 520 SS-25s, which it describes as replacing the SS-11; the Soviets, however, give no guarantees that they will dismantle SS-11s as the more powerful SS-25s are deployed.

The West German Defense Ministry also anticipates the deployment of 150 of the gigantic new, rail-mobile MIRVed ICBM, the SS-24, by the end of 1986. Thus, very conservatively:

	Number Deployed	Warheads	Max Range (km)	Launch Mode
SS-24	100	20 MIRVs	10,000	Cold
SS-25	420 more	1	10,500	Cold
Total ICBMs	2,558 by 1986			

This figure represents merely the number of ICBM launchers, ready to be fired. The comparison with the United States is the following:

U.S.S.R.	2,558 ready ICBM launchers
U.S.A.	1,026 ready ICBM launchers

Summing up the warheads, with which these ICBMs are armed, gives the most conservative estimate:

U.S.S.R.	9,300 ready ICBM warheads, not counting the SS-24 and SS-25
U.S.A.	2,100 ready ICBM warheads

If we amend this picture to take into account: 1) that the SS-18 can carry 14 MIRVs, rather than just 10; and 2) the SS-24's capability, based on its size, of carrying more than 20 MIRVs, not just 10—then the count of ready warheads by 1986 goes off the charts:

U.S.S.R.	12,992 ready ICBM warheads, including SS-24s and SS-25s
U.S.A.	2,100 ready ICBM warheads

That still omits the unconfirmed possibility that the SS-25, the "one-a-day brand" missile, is not a single-warhead missile, but armed with up to 6 MIRVs—which would raise the Soviet total of ready warheads in 1986, by another 2,300.

When we look at what Soviet and U.S. ready ICBMs and SLBMs (the submarine-launched missiles, to be surveyed below), are able to deliver combined—their so-called throw weight, this comparison becomes even more disproportionate:

U.S.S.R.	12.4 million pounds not counting SS-24 and SS-25
U.S.A.	4.4 million pounds

All of the above figures and comparisons refer only to the ready Soviet ICBM force. They omit a major area of Soviet build-up, in which the United States has nothing at all—their *strategic reserve of ICBMs, for reloads, for second or subsequent launches*.

As we reported in Chapter 1, the Soviet missiles whose production was decided on in the mid-1970s are all mobile; with the exception of the SS-19, they are also cold-launch missiles. This means that the missile does not blow out its own silo or mobile launcher during firing, so the launcher may be reloaded again, almost immediately, for another volley.





Each SS-20 launcher, for example, is known to have two to three reloads. The Soviet strategic reserve force, including missiles on hand for reloading and missiles based at test ranges, has been estimated to include 3,350 ICBMs, capable of delivering 9,300 warheads (Quentin Crommelin, Jr. and David S. Sullivan, *Soviet Military Supremacy*)—again, not counting the new missiles, SS-24 and SS-25. The United States has *zero ICBM launcher reloads or warheads in reserve*.

Not content with this overwhelming margin of superiority, the Soviets are testing two more ICBMs and another long-range IRBM. The SS-X-26 and SS-X-27 are both gigantic missiles, bigger than the SS-18. According to Crommelin and Sullivan, intelligence monitors have determined that "the SS-X-26 will have a five ton payload with extreme accuracy to a range of 7,000 nautical miles." There is also an SS-X-28, a second-generation SS-20.

SLBMs

The accompanying bar diagrams compare Soviet and U.S. strategic missile launchers, warheads, throw-weight and reserve launchers. Besides the ICBM component of these forces, they incorporate submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

Although the SLBM force is supposed to be the strong leg of the U.S. "triad" of nuclear forces, the Soviets are bringing new classes of submarines on line at a rapid rate. The Soviets have more nuclear-armed submarines, although fewer warheads, than the U.S.; but the Soviet warheads are more powerful and the Soviet SLBMs more capable in range and accuracy, than the corresponding U.S. forces.



These graphics exaggerate U.S. capability, by counting the missiles and warheads on all SLBMs in the fleet—as few as 3 submarines might be at sea and able to receive commands during war. The warhead comparison takes the most conservative estimate of Soviet warheads. (See text.)

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	Number Deployed	Number Launch Tubes	Type of Missile	Number of Warheads	Range (km)
Yankee-I	22	16	SS-N-6	Mod 1: 1 Mod 2: 1 Mod 3: 2 MRVs	2,400 3,000 3,000
Yankee-II	1	12	SS-N-17	1	3,900
Delta-I	18	12	SS-N-8	Mod 1: 1 Mod 2: 1	7,800 9,100
Delta-II	4	16	SS-N-8	Mod 1: 1 Mod 2: 1	7,800 9,100
Delta-III	14	16	SS-N-18	Mod 1: 3 MIRVs Mod 2: 1 Mod 3: 7 MIRVs	6,500 8,000 6,500
Delta-IV		16	SS-NX-23	In testing	
Typhoon	3	20	SS-N-20	9	8,300

The above nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) are the 62 allowed under the SALT I agreement. As described above, they are armed with 1,536 warheads on 948 missiles.

But, as usual, that is not the whole story. In addition, the Soviets have older SSBNs and SSBs in the fleet, also armed with SLBMs.

	Number Deployed	Number Launch Tubes	Type of Missile	Number of Warheads	Range (km)
Golf-II SSB	13	3	SS-N-5	1	1,400
Golf-III SSB	1	6	SS-N-8	Mod 1: 1	7,800
Hotel-II SSBN	2	3	SS-N-5	1	1,400
Hotel-III SSBN	1	6	SS-N-8	Mod 1: 1	7,800

This brings the total to 79 submarines, armed with 1,593 warheads on 1,005 SLBMs. This does not count the 11 Yankee-I class subs that the Soviets have "removed from service as ballistic missile submarines," but not scrapped; these Yankee-I's are in service as attack subs or carrying cruise missiles.

The Soviet SLBM force, compared with the U.S.:

	Number of Submarines	Number of SLBMs	Number of Warheads	Throw Weight
				at least
U.S.S.R.	79	1,005	1,593	2.5 mn lbs
U.S.A.	35	592	5,344	1.9 mn lbs

Not to be omitted from the round-up of Soviet submarine-launched missiles, is the sea-launched cruise missile program described in Chapter

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1, which is only a few years old. The conversion of Victor-, Akula- and Sierra-class submarines into cruise-missile launching subs is well under way; the Soviet sea-based cruise missile force is already estimated at 575 cruise missiles (Crommelin and Sullivan). The United States has 3 cruise-missile submarines, carrying 12 sea-launched cruise missiles.

Other types of missiles

Missile comparisons

	Range (km)	Number Deployed
IRBMS		
U.S.S.R.		
SS-4	2,000	224*
SS-20	5,000 +	500(end 1985)
U.S.A.		
Pershing II	1,800	48
Tomahawk cruise missile	2,500	64
SRBMs		
U.S.S.R.		
Scud/SS-23		640
SS-12 (Scaleboard)/SS-22		216
Frog/SS-21		620
U.S.A.		
Pershing-I		90
Lance		90

* or fewer, if some retired

Source: IISS, *The Military Balance 1984-85*, except for the Scaleboard missile and its replacement, the SS-22, where EIR's estimate is based on the number of SS-22 brigades reported by West German and Austrian sources to have been deployed in Eastern Europe.

(See Chapter 3.4 of this report, for outline of dramatic Soviet build-up of short-range nuclear missiles in the crucial, central area of Europe, including characteristics of the SS-21, SS-22 and SS-23.)

Air Force

Long-Range Bombers and Fighter-Bombers

	Combat Radius (km)	Number Deployed
U.S.A.		
B-52G and B-52H	6,000/8,000	240
B-1B	7,500	1
FB-111	2,350	61
U.S.S.R.		
Tu-95 Bear B/C	8,300	125
Mya-4 Bison	5,600	48
Tu-16 Badger	3,100	556
Tu-22 Blinder	2,900	174
Tu-26 Backfire	5,500	265
Blackjack	4,500	in development for 1987/88

Source (U.S.A.): IISS, *The Military Balance 1984-85*.

Source (U.S.S.R.): *Soviet Military Power 1985*; *Aerospace America*, April 1985.

With the production of the Backfire bomber in recent years, at the rate of 30 per year, the development of the Blackjack, and the early-1980s reopening of production lines for new versions of the Tu-95 Bear bomber (originally produced in the late 1950s), the Soviets redressed a lag—relative to other branches of weaponry—in bomber production.

Of the planes listed above, over one-third are assigned to Naval Aviation. Basing of these aircraft overseas has extended the area in which the Soviets can stage attacks in the initial hours of war. "Soviet bomber and strike aircraft . . . can fly from airfields not only in the U.S.S.R., but also from bases overseas in Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Libya and Vietnam," observed Norman Polmar in the April 1985 issue of *Aerospace America*. "Considering all possible theaters of operation, even Cuba becomes a potential base for Soviet strike aircraft under certain scenarios. The U.S. has already accepted the presence of Bear targeting (D model) and antisubmarine (E model) aircraft."

The Su-24 Fencer

With respect to preparations for the Western Strategic Direction of the Ogarkov War Plan, the single most disturbing Soviet Air Force deployment of 1984 was the massive forward-basing of the Su-24 Fencer, a long-range nuclear-capable fighter-bomber. The Su-24 is the Russian approximation of the U.S. FB-111.

It has been confirmed that at least 300 Su-24s are now deployed facing Western Europe, divided into two groups (each group of 150 aircraft consists of 5 Su-24 regiments of 30 planes each). One group is headquartered at Vinnitsa in the Western Ukraine, which until 1984 had been the the only region where this Su-24 group was based. Then, in summer 1984, one Su-24 regiment of 30 planes was moved forward into Hungary.

The second group of 150 planes is headquartered at Lignica in Silesia, Poland. All of this group is forward-based, mostly in Poland; but one 30-plane regiment was reportedly forward-based in the Cottbus region, in southeastern East Germany. Sources monitoring this deployment emphasize the importance of the current East German construction of a fighter-bomber-capable military airfield at Laage, near Rostock, in the Mecklenburg region of northwestern East Germany, which is being readied to handle the Su-24. This will position them for take-off on strikes against targets in Schleswig-Holstein, West Germany, and in Denmark and Sweden. If the goal is a surprise attack, the sources observe, a shift from fighter-bombers having 25 minutes of flying time from targets and a flying time of only 10-15 minutes, "makes all the difference in the world."

These long-range aircraft are poised to strike in two principal directions: against Western Europe and Great Britain, and against the Mediterranean region. Their role is to eliminate key NATO military and logistical targets, on land and sea, with nuclear and chemical strikes in the first half-hour to one hour of war.

The Soviet Navy in the Ogarkov Plan

The necessary insight into the strategic priorities assigned to the Soviet Navy under the Ogarkov Plan will be found in looking, not only at the deployments of the SLBM fleet, but at the enormous priority the Russians have given in the past 18 months, to conducting and perfecting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) during naval exercises. By ASW, we mean more than operations against enemy submarines as such.

The Ogarkov Plan requires maximal success of the Soviet nuclear first strike against U.S. missile, other military, and logistics capability. From

this goal follows the priority of protecting the Soviet Union's means of delivering an effective, crippling first strike.

The sea-based component of the Soviet nuclear first strike force is formed by the Delta-class ballistic missile submarines and cruise missile-armed subs off the U.S. coast, and the Typhoon and Delta-III-class SSBNs, which operate from Soviet "home waters"—the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk (Map 33). Based on observations of Soviet naval maneuvers in recent years, it has been hypothesized that the Kirov-class multi-purpose cruiser, the largest non-carrier ship in the Soviet fleet, has an assigned anti-ballistic missile (ABM) role. (The Kirov operates with the Northern Fleet; the Frunze, the second Kirov-class cruiser, was destined for the Pacific Fleet, which is responsible for the Sea of Okhotsk.) SLBM bastions formed in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk would be defended against missile attack, by means of a mobile ABM platform—the Kirov-class ships. The Kirov carries the SS-N-19 supersonic cruise missile in 20 launch tubes and 96 SA-N-6, in 12 vertical launch batteries, each holding eight missiles. The Kirov's missiles are adaptations of the SA-10 and SA-12, both of which have limited ABM capability. In the 1970s, Soviet military literature discussed the advantages of this kind of defense of SLBM submarines.

The other strategic task of the Soviet Navy, in conjunction with elements of the Strategic Rocket Forces (the SS-20s in particular), is to take out as much of U.S. sea-going nuclear capability as possible in the first hour of war. To consider the feasibility of such a Soviet attempt to eliminate or minimize the possibility of a U.S. retaliatory strike—by the pin-down effect on U.S. ICBMs and bombers of the sustained nuclear bombardment of the U.S. mainland and an assault on U.S. SLBM-armed submarines—requires us to understand the limitations on deployment of such American submarines in the first place. Crommelin and Sullivan aptly sum up the situation: "Less than 50% (about 15 subs) of our much reduced submarine force of only 35 SLBM submarines is on patrol at any one time. And even more alarming is the fact that reportedly only three patrolling subs carrying a total of 48 SLBMs may be in communication with the National Command Authority at any one time, and hence at this very moment only this very small force may be actually capable of retaliation to a nuclear strike."

Having set this scene, we proceed to review the past 18 months of Soviet naval maneuvers, from the standpoint of their purpose in the Ogarkov Plan.

Soviet naval maneuvers

The naval maneuvers of March-April 1984 were the largest scale rehearsal of the naval component of the Ogarkov Plan yet conducted.

On March 27, 1984, the U.S.S.R.'s Northern Fleet and Baltic Fleet simultaneously left their bases and moved into the North Atlantic. Three surface task forces were involved:

1) The first, from the Northern Fleet, was led by the 28,000-ton nuclear-powered cruiser Kirov, the largest non-carrier surface warship in the world. This task force operated in the middle of the Norwegian Sea. With the Kirov were:

- 4 Kresta II class ASW cruisers, equipped with the modern SS-N-14 ASW missile
- 1 Sverdlov class cruiser
- 7 guided-missile destroyers, including the two most modern classes, the Sovremenny and Udaloy (ASW)

- 1 minelayer
- 1 landing ship

2) The second task force, also from the Northern Fleet, operated in the area of Jan Mayen Island (Norwegian) and eastern Greenland above the Arctic Circle. It consisted of:

- 4 Krivak class ASW missile frigates
- 1 supply ship

3) The third task force, from the Baltic Fleet, sailed through the North Sea to the area of the Shetland Islands, where it joined the exercises. The Kynda class cruiser Grozny was accompanied by:

- 4 Krivak class ASW missile frigates
- 2 fleet tankers.

All three task forces, carrying out ASW exercises, were joined by naval aviation from the Northern Fleet. Squadrons of long-range Tu-16 Badger bombers and Tu-22M Backfire bombers carried out extensive attacks against targets at sea; it was the greatest operational exercise in history involving the Backfires and Badgers. By means of mid-air refueling, one observer reported, these planes achieved "a much bigger radius than in any previous exercise." (The Backfire's operational radius is *de facto* further extended by the plane's having been fitted with As-15 Air-Launched Cruise Missiles, whose range is 2,000 km.)

All three task forces simulated a wartime defense against over 20 nuclear and conventional attack submarines, of the sort whose mission would be to target and take out the Soviet SSBNs in the Barents Sea. During the maneuvers, the Barents Sea submarine force simulated a nuclear strike on the U.S. The exercise also had Soviet nuclear missile submarines, stationed off the U.S. East Coast, simulate a pin-down barrage. Elements of global coordination were introduced, as in the great *Okean-75* exercises of the previous decade, by simultaneous maneuvers of Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean, the South China Sea, and the Caribbean.

These exercises thus tested the integration of the surface fleet's activities with nuclear missile submarines, naval aviation—and also, with land-based missile units nominally under the command of the Strategic Rocket Forces, the SS-20 IRBMs. Timed with the arrival of the three task forces at battle stations in the North Atlantic, at least six SS-20s were test-fired from "bases west of the Urals in a northwesterly direction," according to the *Oesterreiche Militaerische Zeitschrift*. This move must be seen as a test of the SS-20s in their role as area ASW weapons.

There are multiple reports of Soviet breakthroughs in techniques for the detection and targetting of submarines. In January 1983, *Defense Electronics* reported that "the Soviets appear to have achieved a breakthrough by taking advantage of a natural phenomenon known as bioluminescence, an illuminating property exhibited by plankton [microscopic ocean life] when disrupted by ship movements that expose the sea life to rapid thermal changes." The Salyut-7 orbital space laboratory was subsequently reported to be carrying sensors for this purpose, a process which U.S. officials quoted in the January 1983 report said they "do not completely understand." Otherwise, Soviet work in lasers of the blue-green range of the spectrum is significant for the development of underwater detection capabilities.

With a radius of 5,000 km in its 3-warhead mode, the SS-20 is well-suited to bombard not only U.S. SLBM submarines in the North Atlantic

or the North Pacific, but also U.S. hunter-killer submarines and surface ship concentrations.

Comparing the range of the SS-20 as stationed, with the battle stations assigned the Soviet Northern and Pacific fleets during their simulation of war, we perceive that an SS-20 shield is in effect for the fleet. The addition of the Kirov (500 km anti-ship missile radius) and the Sovremenny class destroyers (110 km anti-ship missile range), Soviet ASW task forces have an added belt of protection for carrying out their missions. All Sovremenny class destroyers built so far (6) and all of the 6 most modern, Udaloi class ASW destroyer have been assigned to the Northern Fleet.

Pacific tests

April 1985, mid-Pacific ASW exercises

One year after the grand-scale Atlantic naval exercises, in April 1985, the Soviet Union conducted their first-ever large naval maneuvers in the mid-Pacific. The focus of the exercises, 900 miles northwest of Midway Island, was on ASW capabilities, with emphasis on protecting the Soviet missile submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk.

1) One task force was led by the Kiev-class ASW carrier, the Novorossiisk. With it were:

- 3 Kara class ASW cruisers
- 1 Kresta II class ASW cruiser
- 2 Krivak class ASW frigates
- 2 oilers.

2) Another task force, consisting of 12 ships and led by a Kara-class cruiser, operated to the south of the carrier task force.

The Novorossiisk carrier task force left Vladivostok, and sailed south through the Japanese Tsushima Straits in late March, then on to its mid-Pacific stations. A U.S. defense source said at the time, "It indicates they intend to simulate wartime missions, including protection of their ballistic missile submarine operating areas in the northwest Pacific and the Sea of Okhotsk."

On April 13, they were 900 miles northwest of Midway, moving northwest, stopping at irregular intervals to conduct maneuvers. On April 14, they were 1,150 miles northwest of Midway, and by the next day, some 525 miles southwest of Soviet Kamchatka. Thus, at all times, they formed a screen between the U.S. mid-Pacific possessions and the Sea of Okhotsk. By April 16, they were 55 miles off Cape Shiretoko, the northeast extremity of the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido.

September 1984, Sea of Okhotsk ASW exercises

These marked the first exercises in the Sea of Okhotsk to be led by the Kiev-class ASW carrier Novorossiisk (the Novorossiisk only arrived in the Pacific in 1984). With the carrier were:

- 1 Kara class ASW cruiser
- 1 Kresta II class ASW cruiser.

On September 29, 1984, this task force sailed through the La Perouse Strait between Hokkaido and Sakhalin, into the Sea of Okhotsk. *Jane's Defense Weekly* (Oct. 13, 1984) reported that the Novorossiisk was painted light grey on its upper half, a camouflage "not seen on Soviet warships

since the War." The exercises were marked by the first large-scale flights in the Pacific, of Backfire bombers in formations of 20 and more.

ASW priority in naval construction

The enormous attention devoted by the Soviet Union to ASW is directly traceable to the adoption of the Sokolovskii Doctrine during the 1960s. Reviewing the new classes of major surface warships built by the U.S.S.R. since 1966, the overwhelming emphasis on ASW functions is obvious.

The table below gives an overview of two decades of Soviet naval shipbuilding: The Cruisers, Destroyers, and Frigates cited in the Table are all Guided Missile Cruisers, Destroyers and Frigates.

	Total in Service	Post-1965 Classes	Post-1965 Classes, ASW
Carriers	6	4	4
Guided-missile cruisers	42	22	17
Destroyers	50	12	6
Frigates	32	32	32
Total	130	74	63

The most recent Soviet naval exercises in the Atlantic, in May-June 1985, clearly show a new type of carrier task force, made possible by the Northern Fleet's acquisition of three Sovremenny-class destroyers in from 1981-83. The carrier task force, which first engaged in Mediterranean manoeuvres, and then in the North Atlantic, near the Shetlands, was led by the ASW carrier, Kiev. It was accompanied by:

- 2 Kresta II class ASW cruisers
- 1 Krivak class missile frigate
- 3 Sovremenny class destroyers (110 km missile range).

The modern destroyer classes, Sovremenny and Udaloj, have been entering service at a rate of over 1 per year.

Cruise missile subs and anti-ship attack subs

No discussion of ASW warships would be complete without mentioning the role of the Soviet hunter-killer nuclear attack submarines. There is a remarkable parallel between the characteristics of surface ships currently under construction, and of submarines, respecting ASW capabilities.

Soviet Oscar-class submarines will be capable of firing missiles against ships as far as 500 km away. The Oscar carries the same SS-N-19 missiles as the Kirov-class cruiser. As with the Kirov, there is one Oscar sub in service with the Northern Fleet and one with the Pacific Fleet. The modern attack submarines would form the front-line anti-ship pickets (against U.S. carrier task forces), far out in the Atlantic and the Pacific, deployed between the Soviet surface task forces and the U.S. home-waters Atlantic and Pacific naval concentrations. They would also form an anti-ship screen for the Soviet subs stationed off the U.S. coasts.

The Soviet priority on ASW capabilities is even more starkly seen, upon examination of the submarine construction program. Three classes of modern ASW nuclear attack subs, successors to the Alpha- and Victor-classes, are under construction:

- Sierra since 1981
- Mike since 1981
- Akula since 1983

The submarines deployed off U.S. coasts, to inflict pin-down barrages during a first strike, are Delta-I and Delta-II SSBNs and the Victor-III nuclear attack submarines. The 18 Victor-III subs are being fitted with SS-N-21 cruise missiles (2,000 km range). At least one Yankee-I former ballistic missile submarine has been reconverted into a cruise missile sub, firing the SS-N-21. All Alpha-class nuclear attack subs have also had SS-N-21 cruise missile firing capability installed. This represents a major augmentation of the Soviet nuclear attack capability.

Soviet ground forces

The headlong build-up of Soviet fighting strength on the ground is best seen in our account of developments in the main potential TVDs, in Part 3.


With the war in Afghanistan, the Soviets have been combat-testing their weapons, as well as their troops, which would be used in other theaters of combat. The Mi-24 ("Hind") helicopter gunship, for instance, widely deployed in Afghanistan, is the main attack helicopter provided to Soviet forces facing off with NATO in Europe. A new attack helicopter being tested now, the Mi-28 ("Havoc"), will have a third again as long a combat radius (240 km) as the Mi-24, and will be armed with automatically-homing anti-tank missiles that can be fired from out of range of NATO anti-aircraft and surface-to-air missiles, according to *International Defense Review*.

The Ground Forces are also being supplied with an improved version of the T-80 tank, which itself was new as of approximately 1982. *Jane's Armor and Artillery 1984-85* reference book described the T-80 as a challenge to NATO aircraft in the period immediately ahead. As many as 1,400 T-80s are deployed with the Soviet Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe, according to intelligence estimates, although the tank has yet to be seen in public in any Red Square parades. According to leaks in the West German weekly *Der Spiegel*, U.S. Army Major Arthur Nicholson was attempting to photograph the T-80—in an area of East Germany where the Potsdam-based U.S. military mission has the right to travel without restriction—when he was murdered by the Soviets in March 1985.

The Soviets are adding tanks, as well as artillery, armored personnel carriers, etc., to their Western Theater forces at an accelerated rate. Gen. Cor de Jager of the Netherlands, chairman of NATO's military committee at the chiefs of staff level, said in May 1985, that of 12,000 new tanks added by Warsaw Pact Forces in the last decade, more than a quarter of them, 3,500, were acquired during 1984. (That was the year of maneuvers to rehearse the high-speed offensive in Central Europe.) During the same ten years, de Jager said, NATO acquired a total of 1,500 new tanks.

The roughest of comparisons depicts the overwhelming Soviet superiority in ground forces (Map 34):


Graphs of "relative trends in main battle tanks and artillery," appearing in *NATO and the Warsaw Pact Force Comparisons (1984)*, a NATO publication.



MAIN BATTLE TANKS (MAIN ARMAMENT 90mm AND ABOVE)

	Ground Combat Divisions	Tanks	Artillery: Guns & Howitzers
Total worldwide			
U.S.S.R.	193	51,000	34,000
U.S.A.	16	12,023	5,140

(continued)



**ARTILLERY/MORTARS
(TUBES 100mm AND ABOVE
INCLUDING ROCKET
LAUNCHERS)**

Soviet military manpower

	Ground Combat Divisions	Tanks	Artillery: Guns & Howitzers
In Europe			
Warsaw Pact	133	43,980	
NATO	42	9,736	

Source (worldwide): IISS, *The Military Balance 1984-85*. A Soviet division has fewer men, but more firepower, than a U.S. division.

Source (Europe): IISS, *The Military Balance 1984-85*. In this table, the figures are sums of forces in the Warsaw Pact and NATO member countries that lie fully or partially within the domain of the Marshal Ogarkov's High Command West: Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, U.S.S.R. (Baltic, Byelorussian, Carpathian, Kiev, Leningrad and Odessa Military Districts, and the Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe); United States (divisions actually stationed in Europe), Great Britain, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark and Norway. The comparison generously overstates NATO forces, because it includes countries, which ordinarily do not list their military forces as part of NATO (France, Spain) and others, whose availability during war is highly questionable, for reasons stated in Part 3; also, division-equivalent forces were counted for countries whose armies are not organized into one or more full division (Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands). With 48 to 72 hours of mobilization time, however, the nations of continental Western Europe could double or triple the size of their armies. To be prepared for a Soviet high-speed offensive, they must bring their forces up to mobilization strength, in advance.

The accompanying bar diagram, reproduced from the NATO publication *NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Force Comparisons (1984)*, dramatizes the precipitous Warsaw Pact build-up in Europe as a whole, as against NATO stagnation, even though it significantly overstates NATO capabilities and understates those of the Warsaw Pact, for several reasons: 1) failure to show the 1984 surge in Warsaw Pact tanks, reported by Gen. de Jager, 2) inclusion in the NATO totals, of U.S. divisions, which would be prevented, under the Ogarkov Plan maximum option, from ever reaching Europe, and 3) omission of the Leningrad Military District from the Soviet/Warsaw Pact side.

Military Personnel—1984

	U.S.S.R.			U.S.A.		
	Active	Ready Reserve	Sum	Active	Ready Reserve	Sum
Strategic & Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces	923	1,646	2,569	141	24	165
Air Force	433	699	1,132	481	193	674
Ground Forces/Army	3,020	5,080	8,100	781	995	1,776
Navy	436	700	1,136	545	190	735
Naval Infantry/Marines	16	21	37	197	89	286
Militarized Security Forces	590	1,010	1,600	0	0	0
Total	5,418	9,156	14,574	2,147	1,491	3,638
Since 1974	655			24		

Source: John M. Collins and Patrick M. Cronin, *U.S./Soviet Military Balance, Statistical Trends, 1975-1984*.

The Soviet Armed Forces have begun to draft women, in a push to bring additional manpower into the active military. A U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet decree of March 18, 1985 provided for women to be registered for the military draft, if they have "medical and other specialized training." Women aged 19 to 40 meeting these criteria could be "accepted on a volunteer basis into active military service."

Also of importance for the bolstering of Soviet military manpower is the reform of the Soviet school system, proclaimed on Jan. 4, 1984. The

"Guidelines for the Reform of the General Education and Vocational School" outlined a far-reaching reform, designed to make the U.S.S.R. a full-fledged garrison state like ancient Sparta. Students are to be forced into the workforce at an earlier age, with only a small minority admitted to the universities. Rigorous military training, including field exercises and attendance at militarized summer camps, is instituted across the board.

The principles of the report may be found in Marshal Ogarkov's 1982 book, *Always Ready to Defend the Fatherland*, in which he emphasized the importance of educating young people for the needs of defense. Ogarkov called for: 1) an expansion of elementary military training in schools, 2) sports activities with military significance, 3) upgrading Russian language training, and 4) instilling patriotism in youth.

Each of these four points was incorporated in the 1984 school reform legislation, in addition to other measures. The existing general education secondary schools are to be merged with vocational schools, leading ultimately to universal vocational training for young people. The school entrance age will be lowered from age 7 to age 6, making it possible to move teenagers into the work force at an earlier age. In order to facilitate this, the restrictions on child labor in the Soviet Union are being loosened.

Col. S. Konobeyev, deputy head of the Defense Ministry's program for military training in schools, pushed for an even more radical militarization of the schools than proposed. In a Feb. 1, 1984 article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, he proposed the following additional steps: Every Soviet school should have a vice-principal in charge of military training of pupils; 50% increase in hours devoted to elementary military training; 6 full days of military field exercises for each pupil in the final 2 grades of high school; a program of summer "defense-sport" camps for youngsters of 15 and over; a 30% salary hike for military instructors in the schools; each school in the Soviet Union to have its own armory, weapons storeroom, firing range, drill fields, and other facilities, built by the students themselves; and tracking of students into a particular branch of the Armed Forces already in their school years.

Chemical and biological warfare (CBW)

Determining the levels of chemical and biological agents produced and stockpiled by the Soviets for military use is hampered by the secrecy of this entire, major area of activity. The Soviets lie that they, like the United States, adhere to the 1925 Chemical Warfare Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention—assertions which are disproved to the point of absurdity, by the testimony of defectors who served in the chemical warfare departments of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, by the 1979 mass outbreak of anthrax after a biological storage facility accident in Sverdlovsk, by the visible effects of CBW agents in Afghanistan, and by the flamboyant demonstration in practice, by the Bulgarian secret service, of fast-acting toxins for assassinations.

Crommelin and Sullivan enumerate CBW facilities and weapon stockpiles as follows:

	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.
Modern chemical weapon production facilities	14	0
Biological weapon production facilities	8	0
Chemical weapons	700,000 tons	2,700 tons

Source for Soviet figure on chemical weapons: Crommelin and Sullivan, *Soviet Military Supremacy*, estimate of minimum tonnage of stockpiled modern chemical weapons. Source for U.S. figure: Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Chemical Weapons: an Imbalance of Terror," in *Strategic Review*, Summer 1982;

(continued)

estimate of what portion of the aging U.S. CW stockpile that is in usable condition. Higher figures often seen for the U.S. stockpile are misleading, because they state tons of munitions, rather than tons of active agent.

Soviet forces normally train for operation in areas of atomic-biological-chemical contamination. Most Soviet missiles, bombs, artillery, grenades and other weapons are capable of being armed with CBW warheads, as easily as with nuclear explosives.

Recent Soviet comments on biochemical warfare agents, reported on by Joseph D. Douglass and H. Richard Lukens in *Strategic Review* (Fall 1984), emphasize materials with greatly enhanced (as much as quadrupled) toxicity, compared with older agents. The current edition of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia*, quoted by Douglass and Lukens, describes these substances: "Neurotropic toxins are toxic proteins which are primarily byproducts of the life cycle of microorganisms. . . . The neurotropic toxins are the most toxic chemical substances of all known toxic agents. Their harmful effect is based upon their capacity to inhibit the membrane receptors responsible for nerve impulse transmission. Under combat conditions, they can be used as an aerosol or in a solid or liquid state in mixed elements or ammunition; they can also be used for sabotage purposes."

William Kucewicz, a journalist who has researched and written on Soviet CBW, explained in a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty interview (May 1984), how these supertoxins work: "A lethal germ could be packaged in a rather innocuous virus. People would get the flu, and you wouldn't think too much of getting the flu. As you were recuperating from the flu, your body would begin producing the poisons. The toxic genes in the virus would start telling your body to start making these toxins, just like the genes tell a cobra to make venom." Kucewicz identified laboratories of the Academy of Sciences at Moscow, Leningrad, and Novosibirsk, as centers for this work on the military use of genetic engineering.

Consistent with Ogarkov's insistence on having "civilian" facilities of all types in a state of war-level mobilization, the *Military Encyclopedia* also notes that, "The rapidly developing industry in microbiology can be switched over from its peacetime mission of producing antibiotics, vitamins, enzymes, proteins, amino acids, and microbiological organisms for protecting plants, to the production of pathogenic weapons."

In the United States, Sen. Jake Garn said on June 3, 1985, "We have not tested masks or tanks being affected by chemical weapons for at least 13 years." The plan to build a chemical warfare testing center at the Dugway Proving Ground near Salt Lake City, Utah, was blocked by decision of Federal Judge Joyce H. Green, who ruled favorably on a suit by arms-control advocates, on grounds that the environmental impact had not been properly investigated.

The Soviet space program

Recent pronouncements by the top space scientists of the Soviet Union are classic examples of a tried-and-true habit of Russian language and culture: the bald-faced lie, told to someone who knows it is a lie and whom the speaker knows, knows it's a lie, in tones of finality that defy any attempt at contradiction. Like the salesgirl who sullenly states, "We have no sausage today," to a customer who is looking at a whole row of sausages, Soviet Academy of Sciences officials Aleksandrov and Velikhov and space-program designers Glushko, Mishin, Belotserkovskii, Nadi-radze and Chelomei, in 1983 signed an open letter "to all the world's scientists," attacking the United States for the "militarization of space,"

and calling on the world's scientific community to endorse the latest Kremlin peace-in-space proposals, aimed against the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy* stated, that "the modern concept of the theater of military operations may include the entire territory of a belligerent or coalition, whole continents, large bodies of water, and extensive regions of the atmosphere, including space."

The Soviet space program has been controlled by the military from Sputnik on. The main institutions that guide the space program are those of the military and the defense-economy sectors—the Defense Industry Department of the Central Committee staff, the government's Military-Industrial Commission, the State Committee for Science and Technology, the Ministry of General Machine-Building (it builds ICBMs as well as space rockets), and the Ministry of the Machine Tool and Tool-Making Industry. Yet R. Sagdeyev, director of the U.S.S.R.'s Institute for Space Research, tours the United States to present "scientific" arguments against the SDI.

The Strategic Rocket Forces, under Chief Marshal of Artillery V. Tolubko, oversee both military space flights and those described as non-military, launched from the cosmodromes at Baikonur (Tyuratam), Plesetsk, and Kapustin Yar, just as they oversee strategic rocket tests. In the other direction, a defense industry manager, who in 1961 won his Hero of the Soviet Union medal "for outstanding service in the development of rocket equipment and guaranteeing a successful flight of Soviet man in space on the spaceship Vostok," went on to become U.S.S.R. Minister of Defense—Dmitrii Ustinov.

Besides this obvious overlap, there are patterns of Soviet space-launch coordination with other branches of the military. Jane's *Space Directory* notes that in July 1976, the crew of the Soyuz-21 spacecraft were engaged in a sort of joint maneuver with forces on the ground, by taking observations of large-scale land, sea, and air maneuvers in Siberia, in order to study the ability of a manned spacecraft to monitor and participate in such operations in the future.

"The Problems of Using Outer Space for Military Purposes was a subhead in the first two editions of Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy*, in the section entitled, "Methods of Conducting Modern War." The Soviet military authors outlined a wide array of military activities in space, most of which were subsequently conducted or tested by the Soviet space program. These include reconnaissance, navigation, communications, electronic countermeasure (ECM) satellites, "space bombers," etc.

In May 1985, Soviet Defense Minister Marshal Sokolov acknowledged the Soviet military space program, claiming that it was strictly defensive—a matter of "the perfection of space early warning, reconnaissance, communications, and navigation systems. . . ."

The Cosmos series of Soviet satellite launchings, of which there have been well over 1,600 since 1962, is almost entirely for military purposes.

ASATs

By 1971, the Soviets had demonstrated an operational anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) capability, by means of the "killer satellite" technique. Here, one satellite is launched into orbit, to intercept and destroy another, by exploding in its vicinity.

The Soviets now have at least four ASAT programs in various stages of development, according to a review by U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency analyst James Hanson, published in *International Defense Review* (November 1984):

- the basic ASAT weapon, described above;

- an ASAT battle station;
- an ASAT laser weapon;
- a high-altitude geosynchronous ASAT system.

The first ASAT battle station test was observed in 1981, when the 15-ton Cosmos-1267, which can fire projectiles at other satellites, docked with the Salyut-6 space station. In March 1984, *Aviation Week & Space Technology* reported the view of U.S. military men, that the Soviets were "developing a large laser-equipped prototype military spacecraft, . . . that could be used for the type of heavy unmanned prototype directed-energy weapon now known to be under development." This version of a laser ASAT, as well as the possibility of a high-altitude geosynchronous ASAT weapon, depend on the new generation of Soviet booster rockets.

The Soviets have repeatedly tested ASATs in combination with the offensive and defense means of waging total thermonuclear war, as with summer 1983 simultaneous tests of an ASAT, two ABM missiles, ICBMs, and an SS-20, reported in *Defense Electronics* (May 6, 1985).

FOBS

Soviet tests of Fractional Orbit Bombardment Systems, or FOBS, occurred 18 times between 1966 and 1971. These were "space bombs," fired into orbit and then slowed by retro-rockets so that they would reenter the atmosphere and strike targets on earth, before the completion of one orbit. By this means, the Soviets might attack the United States by the "back door," traveling three-quarters of the way around the globe via the South Pole, instead of on the shorter, more closely monitored North Pole route.

Early-warning satellites

The huge Soviet network of early-warning and reconnaissance satellites undergoes constant upgrading, such as the development of highly precise laser radars to supersede infra-red detectors. According to Jane's *Space Directory*, The Soviets are trying to "harden" their early-warning satellites by shielding them against jamming.

Ocean surveillance system

For years, the United States had no counterpart at all to the Soviet ocean reconnaissance satellites known as Electronic Intelligence Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (EORSATs) and nuclear-powered Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellites (RORSATs). These are designed to detect, locate, and target ships for destruction by various anti-ship weapons.

The reported Soviet experiments in tracking submarines are an extension of this capability into the realm of anti-submarine (ASW), which figures in the Soviet plan to wipe out U.S. sea-based ballistic missiles.

Navigation

The U.S.S.R. informed the International Telecommunications Union that the Global Navigation Satellite System (Glonass), similar to the U.S. Global Positioning System (Navstar), entered service in 1982. The Soviets described Glonass as designed for "worldwide aircraft radio navigation," but it is believed to have been developed by the military for both military and civilian use. There has been informed speculation, that Glonass might be designed to intercept and process signals from Navstar.

Communications

The Molniya system of communications satellites was continuously upgraded during the 1970s. The newer system, Intersputnik, covers the U.S.S.R., Cuba, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

Espionage satellites

Soviet spy satellites customarily return film to earth, for high-resolution photographs (as opposed to data-imaging)—with detail as fine as 0.2 cm.

U.S. intelligence reports hint that beam-splitter mirrors have been used on some Soviet spy satellites to photograph U.S. ICBM sites in laser light, to pinpoint them with an accuracy of 15 to 30 m.

The next phase

With all this activity, the Soviet Union zoomed ahead of the United States in space launches. From 1966, when each country carried out 70 launches, the U.S. plummeted to 20 or fewer each year during the 1980s, while the U.S.S.R. today is making over 100 space launches per year.

There is no sign of any slowdown. The next projects in the Soviet space program are:

- *Large, modular space stations*, as the successor to the Salyut space-labs. In 1981, Academy of Sciences President A.P. Aleksandrov said that the Soviets were looking ahead to "orbital stations . . . equipped with one or several docking bays, which would permit new units and equipment to be docked to the station." In December 1983, Ukrainian Academy chief V. Paton said it was time for a shift "from longterm orbital stations, which are periodically visited by different crews, to a permanent orbital complex."
- *At least one space plane*. The Soviets have conducted tests of a small, unmanned space plane. This is generally described, including in *Soviet Military Power 1985*, as a one-third scale model of a larger, manned space plane like the U.S. Shuttle. However, James Oberg, a close observer of the Soviet space program and author of *Red Star in Orbit*, has advanced the hypothesis that the unmanned plane is itself a finished (potential) weapons system, having been tested for approximately four years, that would be a new generation FOBS system of enormously enhanced maneuverability.
- *A heavy-lift booster*. The Soviets are developing a booster of at least the power of the U.S. Saturn V (no longer produced, the Saturn V was the Apollo-project rocket that sent men to the moon); to match the Saturn V's 3.5 million kg of thrust, will be to more than triple the power of the U.S.S.R.'s most capable rockets. Soviet space officials have publicized their new booster project as chiefly aimed at acquiring the capability to launch the components of their space station, but it has the additional military significance of being able to launch ASATs into the geosynchronous, high-earth orbit where critical U.S. warning and communications satellites are. Some specialists believe that the Soviets aim to out-power the Saturn V by a substantial margin, achieving 5.5 million kg of thrust.
- *A manned mission to Mars*, as early as 1992. The Soviets intend to send a plasma experiment to a moon of Mars, and have stated that their goal is a manned landing on the planet. It has been posited, that the long-duration missions about the Salyut-Soyuz complex have been preparation for such an undertaking.

4.2 Active Defense: the Soviet 'Star Wars' Program

The Soviet Strategic Defense capability and program is made up of a "High Frontier" component and a "Star Wars" component. The Soviet "High Frontier" strategic defense (so labeled after General Daniel Graham's eponymous proposal which attempts to build an anti-missile defense based principally on conventional, non-laser technologies), is extensive and has been in existence since the 1970s. The directed-energy-weapons-based "Star Wars" capability of the Russians, is at least 10 years ahead of the American Strategic Defense Initiative; as of the end of 1984, it had completed its "research" phase and had entered its development and deployment phase. It is expected that the Russians might deploy their first, crude, space-based anti-missile laser weapons some time toward the end of 1985.

Soviet Strategic Defense is the assigned combat mission of a branch of the Armed Services which has no equivalent in the United States Table of Organization, called the Air Defense Troops (*Voiska Protivo-vozdushnoi Oborony*, formerly called National Air Defense, or PVO Strany). The PVO has approximately 550,000 men under arms, 7,000 radars, over 3,000 interceptors, over 13,000 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) launchers (most with reload capability), a great number of early warning satellites, integrated battle management radar stations, and other capabilities.

Within the PVO are two subdivisions which, though established in the mid-1960s, are little discussed and maintain a low public profile because their very existence violates the 1972 anti-ABM Treaty. They are the Anti-Space Defense (PKO) and the Anti-Rocket Defense (PRO).

The more than 13,000 Russian SAM launchers service 12 different types of surface-to-air missiles deployed to defend an estimated 400 to 500 strategically important locations. These defended locations are, primarily, the land-based ICBM sites, all primary and secondary command-and-control centers, major industrial and major political/administrative assets. The different combat-ceiling altitudes of the various SAMs provide a kind of layered area defense which can operate from exoatmospheric altitudes all the way down to altitudes expected to be used by low-flying cruise missiles. The Soviet SAMs most versatile, and most appropriate for anti-missile defense appear to be the 54-foot, 22,000-pound, nuclear-

tipped SA-5s, deployed in an estimated 100 different sites in numbers of approximately 2,000 launchers.

Since 1981, the Soviets have developed and deployed six new types of surface-to-air missiles, all of them designed to intercept either intercontinental missiles or low-flying cruise missiles. Of these, the versatile, blazing speed SA-10 is considered by the Soviets as the "critical PVO weapon of the 1980s." For lower-altitude defenses, it is complemented by the SA-11. Faster, higher-flying and electronically more sophisticated and more maneuverable, also more reliably integrated in the Soviet early-warning and radar system, are the more recent SA-X-12, SH-04 and SH-08.

The earlier-generation SA-1, SA-2 and SA-3 launchers, which during the 1970s constituted the backbone of Soviet strategic air defense, are reported to be in the process of being replaced by the modern, reloadable, ABM-capable SA-10.

These systems and the Soviets' known anti-satellite systems are the backbone of their "High Frontier" strategic defense, as distinct from the directed-energy based, budding "Star Wars" capability. How much effective, active defense the Russians' dense surface-to-air missile deployment can offer against incoming ICBMs, is a matter of speculation. The only realistic assumption one can make under the present strategic circumstances, is that the most difficult task these forces would have to face would be to defend Soviet assets after a Soviet first strike against U.S. land-based ICBMs. If the American ICBMs are caught on the ground and killed, and if (a generous) half of the American nuclear missile submarines are able to launch their weapons, the Soviet SAM force will have to seek and destroy approximately 2,500 nuclear low-yield, not very accurate, not very long-range warheads.

At this time, the Soviets appear to have something like two nuclear-tipped SAMs for every one of these warheads, ready to launch. If the American retaliation is organized in successive salvos and not in one instantaneous barrage, then the Soviet strategic defenses would be able to reload and thus deploy more than two SAMs per American warhead. If Soviet anti-submarine operations succeed in pinning down or otherwise neutralizing American nuclear missile submarines, the ratio of defending SAMs against incoming American warheads would further improve for the Soviet defenders.

The Soviet anti-missile missile capability, however, is only a small portion of the Soviet Strategic Defense program. Its space-based, directed energy BMD program, during 1984 and 1985 has been growing by leaps and bounds:

Jan. 16, 1984: *Aviation Week and Space Technology* reports that, according to a high administration official, "What seems clear is that there is in progress a pattern that places Soviet activity very close to the line in terms of a breakout. . . . We might find this year that we have zero time to respond to an ABM Treaty breakout by the U.S.S.R. with no way to provide in a timely way a parallel capability."

March 28, 1984: U.S. Admiral Elmo Zumwalt testified before the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, "The Soviet Union is 10 years ahead of the United States in anti-ballistic missile defensive capabilities. The Soviets may, in just another year's time, be able to defend over one-third of both their population and offensive forces from the U.S. retaliatory deterrent. The Soviets may also at any time launch the first anti-ballistic missile battle station in space, where they have long been superior in anti-satellite capabilities."

April 2, 1984: *Aviation Week* reports that the Soviet Union has launched

an intensive program at the Lebedev Physics Institute and the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy to develop a nuclear-pumped x-ray laser. Progress is also reported in computerized guidance systems, laser communication with submarines, and laser optics.

July 25, 1984: Cosmonauts aboard the Salyut-7 space station take a space-walk and test a 66-pound industrial laser.

Soviet progress in BMD during 1984 was summarized by the planning chief of the West German defense ministry, Dr. Hans Ruehle, in a January 22, 1985 article in the daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, headlined "Chernenko's Star Wars." Dr. Ruehle wrote:

While the Soviet missile programs silently continued, the American activities were buried formally and *de facto* by the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Thus, this treaty prevented any progress towards an efficient American missile defense system, without stopping Soviet research programs and modernization measures.

Since the 1960s, the Soviet Union has been undertaking an impressive military research and development program in the field of beam weapons. . . . On the basis of this work, one has to assume today that the Soviet Union has the potential and the technology for building militarily efficient beam weapons.

This is true especially for laser weapons, where the Soviet Union has invested three to five times as much as America has done. They have 12 big research centers and six big testing facilities. In Troisk, they have built plants for the production of laser weapons. In Sar-yshagan, a huge ground-based laser has been under construction since 1971. . . .

No less alarming are the massive research programs in the field of producing radiofrequency beams and particle beam weapons. . . . It can be taken for granted that the Soviets are ahead. . . .

They are also in the process of building heavy transport rockets. In the works is a rocket of 100-meter length with a transport capacity of 150 tons. This would enable the Soviet Union to transport very heavy weapon systems into space within a very short period, without engaging in any complicated assembly work.

Approximately one month after Dr. Ruehle's report, American government defense intelligence analysts announced that the Soviet Union had completed the technology-research phase of its high-energy laser program and had now begun developing prototype laser weapons. Some are of the view that . . . Soviets might deploy at least one such prototype space-based weapon in 1985. Their ground-based laser point defense capability is suspected to be much more advanced. For example, during the June 1985 flight of the U.S. Space Shuttle, a Soviet ground-based laser "painted" the American spacecraft for approximately five minutes, thus demonstrating sophisticated targeting and tracking capabilities.

During 1984, the Soviet space budget was over \$22 billion and had been growing at a rate of 15% per year. Though the Soviet laser weapons program was placed under strictest secrecy classification in 1977, numerous unconcealable features were made known since then. It is known to employ over 10,000 scientists in 12 major research facilities and at least six testing and development facilities. From 1983 onward, the Soviet space-laser weapons program conducted a number of spectacular experiments in outer space which were deliberately underplayed by Western government and news agencies. The Salyut 7 space station is known to have repeatedly conducted laser experiments, including one with electron beams conducted by cosmonauts Dzhanibekov and Savitskaya.

The existence of the Soviet program for space-laser defense is not exactly a secret. In fact, the existence of the Soviet beam-weapon program has even been officially admitted by then Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko who, in answering a direct question from Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti, acknowledged that the Russians are indeed building beam weapons. Andreotti's response was to propose that the matter be taken up at the summer 1985 international scientific discussions held at Erice, in Sicily. Gromyko's admission, which was widely reported in the Italian press, has caused no change whatsoever in official Soviet propaganda, which continues to refuse to admit the Soviet exertions going on in this field.

What is secret are merely the various detailed features of the Soviet program and its proximity to a strategically significant "breakout." Marshal Sokolov, for example, the new Soviet Defense Minister after Ustinov's death, reported in one of his first public statements in May 1985: "The U.S.S.R. is conducting scientific research in space, *including for military application*" (emphasis added). This statement was made in a lengthy interview to TASS which was published in the May 5, 1985 issue of the military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda*.

On an earlier occasion, Marshal of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Kolodunov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air Defense Troops, boasted that his troops "are equipped with cruel weapons and the most modern combat technologies capable of tracking and destroying present as well as future weapons of air attack in all heights, day and night, in any weather."

To estimate just how advanced the Soviets are on their way to a "breakout" from the 1972 ABM Treaty, we shall take into account two sets of considerations: First, what are their known technological breakthroughs, and second, what are the military/doctrinal imperatives which propel them to acquire Ballistic Missile Defenses based on "new physical principles."

On the first: The exact state of progress by the Soviet researchers is not available in the open literature in either this country or the Soviet Union, but the following facts are known:

- 1) The Soviet Union has developed a land-based laser capable of "blinding" U.S. surveillance satellites. Using an intense beam of visible light, the Soviet weapon can overload the sensitive cameras in the spy satellites, and, in some cases, can destroy the delicate optics. This weapon has been available for at least the last six years.

- 2) The Soviet Union has developed a land-based high-powered laser capable of destroying pilotless, subsonic aircraft. These experiments have been observed by Western reconnaissance for several years.

- 3) The Soviet Union has now available extremely high-energy power sources ideally suited for beam weapons use. As the Department of Defense has put it, "They have developed a rocket-driven magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) generator which produces 15 megawatts of short term electric power—a device that has no counterpart in the West."

- 4) The Soviet Union has developed a high-energy microwave technology that has been used for ionospheric modification. An exotic weapon using beam technology, this microwave generator would enable the Soviet Union to "tailor" the upper atmosphere so as to block radio transmissions, destroy radar reception, and conduct electronic warfare on a global scale.

- 5) The Soviet Union has tested a plasma beam weapon that generates discrete plasma "bullets" capable of long-distance travel. Similar to ball lightning, these plasmoids carry large energies in an electromagnetic field-plasma complex sufficient to destroy a ballistic missile.

6) The Soviet Union has tested a high-energy iodine laser, which has successfully downed a ballistic missile. This experiment was a test of a strategic beam weapon, not intended for battlefield use as an anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapon, but as a ballistic missile defense system.

Soviet doctrine committed to beam weapons

On the second consideration, the military/doctrinal reasons for which the Soviets have always been committed to development of high-energy laser strategic missile defense, the following should be reiterated:

The seminal 1962 book by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii, titled *Military Strategy* and employed as the basic textbook for the selection, formation and training of Marshal Ogarkov's current generation of Soviet military leaders, made unmistakably clear the role assigned to strategic defense by the Soviet High Command. Following are some of the most important pronouncements of the Sokolovskii book's 1962 and 1963 editions (now withdrawn from circulation):

An anti-missile defense system for the country should obviously consist in the following: long-range detection of missiles using powerful radar [ground and airborne] or other automatic technical equipment [on artificial earth satellites] to assure the detection of missiles during the boost phase [at the moment of lift-off or while the engines are operating]; working out the coordinates of the flight trajectory of the missiles; timely warning, and application of active measures; anti-missile batteries; jamming devices to assure deflection of the missile from its intended target and, possibly, to blow it up along its trajectory.

Possibilities are being studied [back in 1962!—ed.] for the use, against rockets, of a stream of high-speed neutrons as small detonators for the nuclear charge of the rocket, and the use of electromagnetic energy to destroy the rocket charge in the descent phase of the trajectory or to deflect it from its target. Various radiation, anti-gravity and anti-matter systems, plasma ball lightning etc., are also being studied as a means of destroying rockets. Special attention is devoted to lasers; it is considered that in the future, any missile and satellite can be destroyed with powerful lasers. All this work which is being conducted in other countries deserves great attention.

The creation of a reliable system of antispace defense became an important task in modern conditions. . . .

Ballistic missiles employed en masse are still [i.e., 1962—ed.] practically invulnerable to existing means of PVO and their employment is almost independent of weather conditions. Only as special instruments of PRO are developed will it be possible to combat the massive use of missiles in the air. . . .

On March 31, 1967 (a few weeks after President Lyndon Johnson went public with Robert S. McNamara's project to conclude an ABM treaty with the U.S.S.R.), General Major N. Zavyalov reiterated, in an article published in the military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda*:

Soviet military doctrine does not leave out of account the possibilities of defense. . . . In this, it should be stressed that we recognize not passive, but active defense, built on a new technical foundation, brought to life by the appearance of modern means of conducting war; a defense directed above all against the enemy's

nuclear means of attack. Such a defense takes on extraordinarily important state, strategic significance.

In contrast to Moscow's present pious denunciations of President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, the Russian military command has always been outspoken in preserving its prerogative of developing strategic defense systems. Major General N.A. Talenskii, theoretician of the Soviet General Staff, is such a representative spokesman:

Anti-missile systems are purely defensive and not designed for attack. It is quite illogical to demand abstention from creating such weapons in the face of vast stockpiles of highly powerful means of attack on the other side. Only the side which intends to use its means of attack for aggressive purposes can wish to slow down the creation and improvement of anti-missile defense systems. . . . The creation of an effective anti-missile system enables the state to make its defenses dependent chiefly on its own possibilities, and not only on mutual deterrence, that is, on the good will of the other side. And since the peace-loving states are concerned with maximum deterrence, in its full and direct sense, it would be illogical to be suspicious of such a state when it creates an anti-missile defense system, on the grounds that it wants to make it easier for itself to resort to aggression with impunity.


Some say the construction of anti-missile defense systems may accelerate the arms race. . . . Such a development is not at all ruled out. . . . In any case, there is this question: What is more preferable for security as a result of the arms race, a harmonious combination of active means of deterrence and defense systems, or the means of attack alone? (N.A. Talenskii, "Anti-Missile Systems and Disarmament," written before 1972 and printed in English in *The Future of Soviet Military Power*, ed. L. Whetten. New York; Crane, Russak and Co, 1976)

But did such Soviet statements on the feasibility, nay desirability, of ballistic missile defense cease after the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty? No, they did not. Soviet military writers still write quite frankly about warfighting and war-winning, including "defense of the homeland."

The crucial element was "new technologies." In this realm, excluded from specific limitations by the ABM Treaty, the Soviets saw the future. In 1974, two years after the ABM Treaty was signed, the Mir (Peace) Publishing House in Moscow issued in English a pamphlet by N. Sobolev, entitled "Lasers and Their Prospects." In an ample chapter on military applications, from which the drawing in this section is taken, Sobolev explained rudiments of ground-based beam-weapon defense against nuclear missiles:

To destroy an enemy missile, not to let it reach the target, it is sufficient to put its control system out of action. This can be done by burning through the missile shell or rudders by a laser beam. This will cause vibrations in the missile and result in its complete destruction.

Figure 81 shows a block diagram of an anti-missile system based on the use of lasers. Such a system must have a receiving unit for processing the signals incoming from the early warning and target tracking radar stations. These signals contain information on the coordinates of the approaching missile. The tracking station must aim at the target an optical radar in which a laser serves only for determining the distance to the missile.



This diagram of an anti-missile system comes from a book by N. Sobolev titled Lasers and their Prospects, published in 1974 in Moscow.

EIR Special Report/Global Showdown

Such an optical radar can furnish very precise data on the coordinates of the target, and these data are used to actuate another system employing a high-power laser, designed for destroying the target. The optical radar will focus and aim the powerful laser beam during the period of time required for a hole to be burned through the missile. . . .

Another possible anti-missile laser defense system is a project of an orbital space station equipped . . . as well with lasers. . . .

This text leaves no doubt as to the purpose of the phased-array, battle-management radar now under construction in the locality of Krasnoyarsk, Siberia—it is designed for use as part of a beam weapon defense system against United States ICBMs.

4.3 Passive Defense: Survival After War

The principal tasks of civil defense are to ensure the required conditions for normal activity of all governmental control agencies during the course of the war and the effective functioning of the national economy. . . . All the civil-defense measures are so intertwined, that they cannot be separated from the overall problems of the organization or the control of the nation and its economy.

—Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii, *Military Strategy*

In the summer of 1972, when the ink was scarcely dry on the SALT I and ABM treaties, the Chief of Rear Services and the Chief of Civil Defense in the Soviet Union each became a deputy minister of defense. The new occupants of those posts, appointed at that time, were Army General (now Marshal) Semyon Kurkotkin and Army General Aleksandr Altunin, respectively. These two officers hold the same jobs today.

Both these areas of responsibility are essential to the Soviet war plan. War is won, the Soviets hold, not just by the clash of arms and taking of territory, but by the ability of the victorious side to survive as a functioning society after the war. The Soviet civil defense program, tightly integrated with the economy as Sokolovskii prescribes, is the starkest testimony to the Soviet intention to accomplish this.

Civil defense considerations figure in economic planning, not just training and shelter-building. This is reflected in the dispersion of industry outside of large cities, and the development of entire regions, such as Siberia. (On the development of Siberia to be economically self-sufficient, see Chapter 4.4.) The late Marshal Andrei Grechko called for dispersion of industry, in order to make it "less vulnerable" during nuclear war. Selective hardening of industrial plants in the Soviet Union has been reported, but is difficult to detail, because many of the facilities most probably affected are off limits to foreigners.

Soviet civil defense forces are organized as the Troops of Civil Defense, which are trained at the Moscow Higher Command School of Road and Engineer Troops. Formerly the Moscow Military School of Civil Defense, this institution was renamed in 1975—a year in which the Soviet high command moved to impose secrecy on several vital areas of its war planning, including General Shavrov's new strategy textbook, and aspects of civil defense.

Besides the Troops of Civil Defense, Altunin oversees a huge network of civil defense chiefs of staff, assigned to regional and municipal juris-

dictions of the U.S.S.R. Moreover, every factory or other economic enterprise has people assigned to the organization of civil defense preparations and practice.

The training of the population is serious, and begins early. The introduction to a 1983 teacher's manual for elementary schools, entitled *Civil Defense*, states:

Study in the general education school is the basic preparation of pupils for defense against weapons of mass destruction. It helps the military-patriotic education and moral-psychological preparation of the younger generation.

The handbook outlines the course of training for schoolchildren at each grade level, beginning with first grade. Older students, according to a military instructor at a high school in Lithuania interviewed on the radio, are supposed to learn "the destructive properties of nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons of the armies of foreign states, means of protection against them; civil defense signals; use of means of individual and collective protection; . . . use of radiation and chemical detection equipment," and so forth.

By their early teens, Soviet children will not only continue to get civil defense and military training in school, but may join the DOSAAF, the Volunteer Society for Cooperation with the Army, Air Force and Navy. This mass organization, which has over 100 million members, is chaired by a high-ranking military officer. Since 1981, he has been Fleet Admiral Georgii M. Yegorov, formerly the Commander of the Northern Fleet and First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Soviet Navy. His predecessor, from 1972 to 1981, was Marshal of Aviation A. I. Pokryshkin, who had been Deputy CINC of the Soviet air defense forces (*PVO Strany*). Through DOSAAF-organized clubs and sports events, Soviet youth learn diverse military schools. The magazine published by DOSAAF, *Military Knowledge*, is also the main journal of civil defense.

Soviet print and broadcast media continuously propagandize the value of civil defense, in coordination with the organization of practices in factories, schools and residential areas. The Turkmenistan party daily, *Turkmenkaya Iskra*, to take a typical example, wrote on March 19, 1985:

[Civil defense] will preserve lives, ensure the steady operation of governmental bodies and protect agricultural productions from destruction, making it possible to hold out in a nuclear missile war. It is therefore important that all persons responsible for this should unswervingly implement engineering-technical measures of civil defense in building and reconstructing national economic installations. The local authorities and managers of economic and public organizations must display more initiative in tackling these important tasks.

Our scientific research and design institutions have created reliable plans for shelters to protect people from the effect of the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The preparation of protective structures is a matter of great state importance.

In cities, all kinds of underground structures, including the subway system, movie theaters, and garages, are designed to double as bomb shelters. An April 1983 radio report on civil defense training at the Kuibyshev Civil Engineering Institute in Moscow described the shelters, which are to "protect the country's population from the modern methods of inflicting defeat upon one's opponent," as "designed to protect people from shock wave, light radiation, hard radiation and radioactive con-

tamination at the time of a nuclear explosion, . . . from noxious substances and bacterial weapons, as well as from the high temperature of harmful gases." (Translation by BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts*.)

The location of supershelters for the top classes of the Soviet *Nomenklatura* is top secret.

In the mid-1970s, Soviet writings on civil defense began to emphasize the role of shelters for nuclear war survival, in addition to the more widely propagandized method of mass evacuation into the countryside; evacuation, obviously, takes more lead time.

While all this is going on, so is massive Soviet disinformation about its policy on civil defense. In December 1983, Soviet plasma scientist Yevgenii Velikhov and three other Soviet scientists participated in a forum on the nuclear freeze, convened by U.S. Senators Edward Kennedy and Mark Hatfield. "Both the Soviet and American scientists," reported the *New York Times*, "said civil defense measures and technology that envisioned countering nuclear missiles with laser weapons could not conceivably halt the destruction of a nuclear war and that entertaining such ideas could be dangerously destabilizing."

The attempt by the Reagan administration to relaunch a national civil defense program, with a seven-year, \$4.2 billion plan, touched off a storm of controversy in 1982. (Federal government spending on civil defense had come down to the level of \$115 million per year, at the end of the Carter administration.) Ironically, the Reagan plan—a Crisis Relocation Plan—was drawn up on the basis of T.K. Jones's studies of Soviet civil defense; it called for mass evacuation of the population from American cities into the interior, and presumed some days in which to accomplish this. The Crisis Relocation Plan gained no ground. By March 1985, Federal Emergency Management Agency officials described it as defunct. The Reagan administration has proposed to cut civil defense from \$181 million in FY1985, to \$119 million.

In 1982, Radio Moscow's English-language overseas service was quick to broadcast an analysis of the U.S. civil defense scheme as "paranoid delusion." Meanwhile, the Soviets had supplemented their long-standing evacuation plans with increased construction of shelters and continued build-up of independent economic zones all over the U.S.S.R.

ОРУЖИЕ МАССОВОГО ПОРАЖЕНИЯ ИНОСТРАННЫХ АРМИЙ



ЯДЕРНОЕ ОРУЖИЕ
ОСНОВАНО НА ИСПОЛЬЗОВАНИИ
ВНУТРИЯДЕРНОЙ ЭНЕРГИИ, ВЫДЕЛЯЮЩЕЙСЯ
ПРИ ЯДЕРНОМ ВЗРЫВЕ

ПОРАЖАЮЩИЕ ФАКТОРЫ ЯДЕРНОГО ВЗРЫВА

УДАРНАЯ ВОЛНА

Сильнейший поразжающий фактор.
Представляет собой область
сильно сжатого воздуха, распро-
страняющегося от центра взрыва
во все стороны со сверхзвуко-
вой скоростью

СВЕТОВОЕ ИЗЛУЧЕНИЕ ПРОНИКАЮЩАЯ РАДИАЦИЯ

Представляет собой
поток лучистой энергии,
возникающей в момент
ядерного взрыва



Радиоактивное заражение местности, воды
и воздушного пространства возникает в ре-
зультате выпадения радиоактивных веществ
из облака, образующегося при ядерном
взрыве



Очаг ядерного поражения - территория, на
которой под воздействием поражающих
факторов ядерного взрыва возникает раз-
рушения, радиоактивное заражение и по-
вреждения людей

ХИМИЧЕСКОЕ ОРУЖИЕ ОТРАВЛЯЮЩИЕ ВЕЩЕСТВА И СРЕДСТВА ИХ ПРИМЕНЕНИЯ

Группы 08

Нервно-паралитического действия Зарин, V-газы
Дополнительного действия Синильная кислота, миромин
Кожно-нарывного действия Иприт
Удушающего действия Фосген
Психохимического действия БМ-38Т
Раздражающего действия СМ-3С

СРЕДСТВА ЗАЩИТЫ

Защитные сооружения, средства индивидуальной за-
щиты, медицинские средства защиты и профилактики



Очаг химического поражения - территория, пределов которой
в результате воздействия ОВ произошло массовое пораже-
ние людей, сельскохозяйственных животных и растений

БАКТЕРИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕ (БИОЛОГИЧЕСКОЕ) ОРУЖИЕ

Основано на поражающих действиях бо-
лезнетворных микроорганизмов (Зак-
терий, вирусов, риккетсий, грибов)
и токсинов (ядов)



Очагом бактериологического пораже-
ния считается территория, на ко-
торой в результате воздействия биологиче-
ских средств поражения произошло
поражение людей, сельскохозяйственных
животных и растений

Model posters shown in the 1983 manual for
Soviet school instructors, *Grazhdanskaya
oborona v obshcheobrazovatel'noi shkole*
(Civil Defense in the General Education
School).

Characteristics of atomic, biological and chemical weapons.

СРЕДСТВА ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНОЙ ЗАЩИТЫ

ПРЕДНАЗНАЧЕНЫ ДЛЯ ЗАЩИТЫ ЧЕЛОВЕКА ОТ РАДИОАКТИВНЫХ, ОТРАВЛЯЮЩИХ ВЕЩЕСТВ И БАКТЕРИАЛЬНЫХ СРЕДСТВ

ПРОТИВОГАЗЫ

Обеспечивают защиту человека от попадания в органы дыхания, глаза и на лицо радиоактивных, ОВ и бактериальных средств




ТАБЛИЦА ДЛЯ ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЯ РОСТА МАСКИ И ШЛЕМ-МАСКИ

Высота лица, мм	1	2	3
99 - 109	1	2	3
109 - 119	2	3	4
119 и более	3	4	5

Масса лица, мм	1	2	3	4	5
До 63	1	2	3	4	5
63,5 - 65,5	2	3	4	5	6
66,0 - 68,0	3	4	5	6	7
68,5 - 70,5	4	5	6	7	8
71 и более	5	6	7	8	9

РЕСПИРАТОРЫ И ПРОСТЕЙШИЕ СРЕДСТВА ИНДИВИДУАЛЬНОЙ ЗАЩИТЫ ОРГАНОВ ДЫХАНИЯ

Применяются для защиты органов дыхания от радиоактивных веществ и бактериальных аэрозолей

РЕСПИРАТОР Р-2

ТАБЛИЦА ДЛЯ ОПРЕДЕЛЕНИЯ РОСТА ПОЛУМАСКИ

Высота лица, мм	1	2	3
99 - 109	1	2	3
109 - 119	2	3	4
119 и более	3	4	5




СРЕДСТВА ЗАЩИТЫ КОЖИ

Простейшие средства защиты кожи обеспечивают защиту кожных покровов от заражения радиоактивной пылью, бактериальными средствами, а при пропитке - и от паров ОВ



СПЕЦИАЛЬНЫЕ СРЕДСТВА ЗАЩИТЫ КОЖИ



ПРОСТЕЙШИЕ СРЕДСТВА ЗАЩИТЫ ОРГАНОВ ДЫХАНИЯ




СРЕДСТВА КОЛЛЕКТИВНОЙ ЗАЩИТЫ

УКРЫТИЕ ЛЮДЕЙ В ЗАЩИТНЫХ СООРУЖЕНИЯХ - ОСНОВНОЙ СПОСОБ ЗАЩИТЫ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ


У Б Е Ж И Щ А

ОБЕСПЕЧИВАЮТ ЗАЩИТУ ЛЮДЕЙ ОТ ВСЕХ ПОРАЖАЮЩИХ ФАКТОРОВ ОРУЖИЯ МАССОВОГО ПОРАЖЕНИЯ


ВСТРОЕННОЕ



ОТДЕЛЬНО СТОЯЩЕЕ



ВНУТРЕННЕЕ ОБОРУДОВАНИЕ УБЕЖИЩА






У К Р Ы Т И Я

ПРОТИВОРАДИАЦИОННЫЕ

Укрытия обеспечивают защиту в них людей от проникающего и прямого излучения ядерного взрыва

ПРОСТЕЙШИЕ

Защищают людей от воздействия светового излучения и ослабляют воздействие ударной волны и проникающей радиации




Means of personal protection, including gas masks and protective clothing.

Shelters.

СПАСАТЕЛЬНЫЕ РАБОТЫ-

РАБОТЫ В ОЧАГАХ ПОРАЖЕНИЯ И ЗОНАХ ЗАТОПЛЕНИЯ
ПО ОТЫСКАНИЮ ПОСТРАДАВШИХ ЛЮДЕЙ,
СКАЗАНИЮ ИМ ПОМОЩИ И ИХ ЭВАКУАЦИИ

ВИДЫ СПАСАТЕЛЬНЫХ РАБОТ



Разведка маршрутов
выдвижения и участков
работ



Локализация и тушение
пожаров




Разыск и извлечение по-
страдавших из зараженных
убежищ, спасение людей из
разрушенных и горящих зданий




Вскрытие заваленных убе-
жищ, подача воздуха в них



Оказание первой медицин-
ской и первой врачебной
помощи пораженным, эва-
куация их в лечебные уч-
реждения



Вывод (вывоз)
населения из опасных
мест в безопасные
районы




Санитарная обработка людей, дезактивация средств
защиты и одежды,
обеззараживание территории и сооружений, продовольствия и воды

Rescue activities, including fire-fighting, clearing of rubble, medical aid, and
decontamination procedures.

РАССРЕДОТОЧЕНИЕ И ЭВАКУАЦИЯ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ

РАССРЕДОТОЧЕНИЕ - организованный вывод (вывоз) и размещение в загородной зоне рабочих и
спутников
ЭВАКУАЦИЯ - организованный вывод (вывоз) за пределы зон возможных разрушений нерабо-
тающего населения



ПРИНЦИПИАЛЬНАЯ СХЕМА
ЭВАКУАЦИИ

СИГНАЛЫ ОПОВЕЩЕНИЯ ГРАЖДАНСКОЙ ОБОРОНЫ

НАИМЕНОВАНИЕ	ПОРЯДОК ПОДАЧИ	ДЕЙСТВИЯ НАСЕЛЕНИЯ
ВОЗДУШНАЯ ТРЕВОГА		
ОТБОЯ ВОЗДУШНОЙ ТРЕВОГИ		
РАДИАЦИОННАЯ ОПАСНОСТЬ		
ЮБИЛЕЙСКАЯ ТРЕВОГА		

СПЕЦИАЛЬНАЯ ОБРАБОТКА

ЧАСТИЧНАЯ САНИТАРНАЯ ОБРАБОТКА
людей - удаление радиоактивных
веществ, обеззараживание или уда-
ление об, бактериальных средств
с кожных покровов людей, а так-
же с надатых средств индивиду-
альной защиты, одежды, обуви
ДЕЗАКТИВИРОВАНИЕ - удаление радиоак-
тивных веществ с зараженных по-
верхностей



ДЕЗАКТИВИРОВАНИЕ ИЛИ
УДАЛЕНИЕ ОБ с зараженных по-
верхностей



ДЕЗАКТИВИРОВАНИЕ БОЛЕЗ-
НЕПЕРЕНОСИТЕЛЬНЫХ МИКРОБОВ И РАЗРУШЕНИЕ
ТОКСИНОВ




Evacuation procedures, alarms and area decontamination.

П Р И Б О Р Ы


РАДИАЦИОННОЙ. ХИМИЧЕСКОЙ РАЗВЕДКИ
И ДОЗИМЕТРИЧЕСКОГО КОНТРОЛЯ

НАИМЕНОВАНИЕ И НАЗНАЧЕНИЕ ПРИБОРА




ИЗМЕРИТЕЛЬ МОЩНОСТИ ДОЗЫ .РЕНТГЕНОМЕТР.

Предназначен для измерения уровней гамма-излучения и радиоактивных заражений различных предметов по гамма-излучению.



ВОЙСКОВОЙ ПРИБОР ХИМИЧЕСКОЙ РАЗВЕДКИ

Предназначен для определения ОВ в воздухе, на местности и на различных предметах.



ПРИБОР КОНТРОЛЯ РАДИОАКТИВНОГО ОБЛУЧЕНИЯ

Предназначен для измерения дозы внешнего облучения людей, находящихся на местности, зараженной радиоактивными веществами.

Т И П П Р И Б О Р А

ДП-5А	ВПХР	ДП-22В
ДИАПАЗОН ИЗМЕРЕНИЙ		
0,05 м Р/ч	—	2-50 Р/ч
М А С С А , К Г		
2,1 (7,6)	2,3	5,5
П И Т А Н И Е		
1,6 - ПМЦ -Х-105	—	1,6 - ПМЦ -У-В

Meters for measuring ABC contamination.

Р А З В Е Д К А -

ВАЖНЕЙШИЙ ВИД ОБЕСПЕЧЕНИЯ ДЕЙСТВИЯ СИЛ ГРАЖДАНСКОЙ
ОБОРОНЫ. ОНА УСТАНАВЛИВАЕТ ХАРАКТЕР ПРИМЕНЕННОГО ОРУЖИЯ,
МОЩНОСТЬ ДОЗЫ, ТИП ОВ, СТЕПЕНЬ РАЗРУШЕНИЙ, НАЛИЧИЕ
ПОЖАРОВ, ИХ ИСТОЧНИКИ, ХАРАКТЕР ЗАБОЛЕВАНИЯ ЛЮДЕЙ

ТРЕБОВАНИЯ, ПРЕДЪЯВЛЯЕМЫЕ К РАЗВЕДКЕ

НЕПРЕРЫВНОСТЬ	АКТИВНОСТЬ	ЦЕЛЕУКАЗАННОСТЬ	ОСВЕДОМЛЕННОСТЬ	ДОСТОВЕРНОСТЬ
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ВИДЫ РАЗВЕДКИ



НАЗЕМНАЯ



РЕЧНАЯ МОРСКАЯ



ВОЗДУШНАЯ

ПОСТ РАДИАЦИОННОГО И ХИМИЧЕСКОГО НАБЛЮДЕНИЯ



ЗАДАЧИ ПОСТА

Своевременное обнаружение применения противником оружия массового поражения и установление района ядерного взрыва и направления движения облака взрыва. Определение мощности дозы и типа ОВ в районе наблюдения. Осуществление постоянного контроля за изменением мощности дозы.

ВЕДЕНИЕ РАЗВЕДКИ

При обнаружении радиационного заражения наблюдатель докладывает начальнику поста, переводит в боевое положение средства защиты и по команде подает сигнал оповещения о радиационном заражении. При появлении признаков отравляющих (ядовитых) веществ наблюдатель подает сигнал химической тревоги, переводит в боевое положение средства защиты и докладывает начальнику поста.

ВЕДЕНИЕ РАЗВЕДКИ В ОЧАГАХ ЯДЕРНОГО ПОРАЖЕНИЯ

Разведка устанавливает наиболее удобные подступы к объектам спасательных работ, определяет мощность дозы, отыскивает завалы, выявляет пожары, отсыкивает повреждения и аварии на коммунально-энергетических сетях.



ОСНАЩЕНИЕ ПОСТА



Intelligence-gathering deployments.

4.4 The Build-Up of the Soviet War Economy

Remember, comrades: Our prewar generation was faced with the task of having to accomplish in just a few decades what it took other countries 100 years to do, because our country was in a critical situation. Even then, we had the sense that the threat to our socialist country was the top priority. We didn't manage to get everything done that time, but we basically succeeded, and that was the foundation of the victory of '45. Well, today we again have a long road to travel, but we have to do it in a short time.

—Mikhail Gorbachov, speaking to members of the Communist Party organization in Leningrad, May 17, 1985

On March 13, 1985, one day after Mikhail Gorbachov was named General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Radio Moscow proclaimed that the policy goal under the new leader would be to "economically surpass the United States." In the years immediately ahead, announced Radio Moscow, *the Soviet Union will become the No. 1 economic power in the world.*

Gorbachov is the man on whom Marshal Ogarkov and the rest of the Soviet High Command are counting, to provide what they up to now have lacked, but urgently require, in order to be fully prepared for war: a functioning and efficient economy.

In the period since the military build-up for global supremacy was launched, after the Soviet Union's 1972 victory in crippling the U.S.A. through SALT I and the ABM Treaty, the Soviet military leadership became acutely, increasingly aware, that the Soviet economy—especially since that same early 1970s period—has continually lagged behind the pace of the war build-up. Marshal Ogarkov and his colleagues found themselves near a point, at which the U.S.S.R. "militarily" would be ready to wage war, but would not have the economic base to make the final "surge" required to ensure superiority. This discrepancy between military needs and actual performance in the economy was the subject of the stinging attacks leveled against the Brezhnev leadership by Marshal Ogarkov and the Russian military leadership in the 1970s and early 1980s.

In early June, with great fanfare, the Soviet Defense Ministry published Marshal Ogarkov's latest book, *History Teaches Vigilance*. Here again, Ogarkov emphasizes that the U.S.S.R. can only win a war by "strength-

ening its economic and military potentials and those of its allies." The big difference between the new book and Ogarkov's previous writings, however, is that it appears when the Kremlin is occupied by a General Secretary who has both the inclination and, by all indications, the ruthlessness, to address the problems of the Soviet economy to the satisfaction of the military High Command.

Nowhere has Gorbachov more shown his dedication to the goals stated by Ogarkov, than in his June 11 speech at a specially convened Central Committee conference in Moscow, on the theme of introducing scientific and technological progress into the Soviet economy. Gorbachov insisted that the economy will be radically restructured. Together with the release of Ogarkov's book, this speech signaled that the Soviet Union is entering the decisive phase of its transition to an all-out war economy.

This June 11 speech by Gorbachov was one of the most extraordinary Soviet policy documents ever, on a par with such historic speeches as Stalin's famous March 1939 "Chestnuts Out of the Fire" speech before the 18th Party Congress, which signaled the upcoming Hitler-Stalin Pact. He began by stressing the urgency of modernizing and restructuring the economy, in view of the military-strategic situation:

The decision of the Central Committee's Politburo to hold this meeting in advance of the 27th CPSU Congress is motivated by the need to take urgent measures in [accelerating the country's socio-economic development on the basis of scientific-technical progress].

In putting forward the task of accelerating socio-economic development, the Central Committee has in mind not just an increase of economic growth rates. What is at issue, is a new quality of our development, rapid progress in the strategically important directions, a structural rebuilding of production, a transition to intensive methods and effective forms of management, and a more comprehensive solution to social problems.

Gorbachov declared that this recasting of the economy was necessitated by the international strategic situation, the framework for domestic considerations:

The need to accelerate socio-economic development is determined by our internal requirements. . . . In the early 1970s, certain difficulties began to be felt in economic development. The main reason is that we did not display in time, perseverance in reshaping the structural policy, the forms and methods of management, the very psychology of economic activity. . . .

At the same time, *the need to accelerate socio-economic development stems from external circumstances*. We are forced to invest the necessary funds for the country's defense.

The High Command's Five-Year Plan

Gorbachov proceeded to tell the audience of Central Committee members and specialists, that the Five Year Plan draft for 1986-90, just submitted by the State Planning Commission (Gosplan), was inadequate and would be returned for improvement. Since Soviet economic policy is set in the form of the economic five-year plans, somebody serious about changing the direction of the economy would move to overhaul the next plan. Gorbachov said:

Now that the party is approaching its 27th congress, that the

programmatic documents of the congress are being prepared, it is important to realize that we cannot do without accelerating scientific-technological progress. Therefore, all of these documents, above all the basic guidelines for the country's economic and social development for the 12th Five-Year Plan [1986-90] and up to the year 2000 must contain new approaches to ensure a sharp turn towards the intensification of the economy.

The Central Committee's Politburo recently discussed the draft of the guidelines and has on the whole supported the target figures and objectives outlined in it. Yet, serious criticism was expressed, which necessitates that work on the draft be continued. The draft does not yet include measures ensuring for a number of industries, a transition to the rails of predominantly intensive growth and balancing all indicators. Work on the draft must be continued, and the target figures of increasing the effectiveness of production should be viewed as minimum ones.

What followed was the announcement of the most sweeping structural changes in the Soviet economy since the industrialization-collectivization drive of the 1930s. Gorbachov proclaimed the following specific economic guidelines—to maximize production increases during the next few years' final "surge" phase of war production:

The main emphasis will be put on the *technical reequipping of plants*, the saving of resources, and ensuring a drastic improvement in product quality.

On a nationwide scale, *the share of funds channeled into reconstruction, in the overall volume of capital investments, should be raised from one-third to at least one-half within the next few years. . . .* We cannot do without new construction. But projects under construction should be given serious attention: some of them should be speeded up, others suspended or mothballed. [This implies that, through the combined effects of suspended projects and the growing automation of large plants—the constantly stressed modernization of existing industry, a large portion of the workforce is to be made superfluous in its present location and available for redeployment elsewhere.—ed.]

Machine building is playing the main, key role in the scientific-technological revolution. In the 12th Five-Year Plan period, its growth rate should be raised by 50 to 100%.

Capital investments in machine building should be increased, through partial redistribution, by 80-100%, and the volume of supply of modern types of equipment sharply raised.

It is a task of special importance, to *commence mass production of new-generation equipment, capable of assuring a manyfold increase in labor productivity* and opening the way to automation of all states of the production process. . . . Microelectronics, computer science and instrument-making, and the entire information industry, act as catalysts of technical progress. They need to be developed at an accelerated pace.

The problems of production infrastructure have come to the fore at the present state of economic development. The lag in transport, communications, material and technical supplies and other branches adds up to great losses. It is necessary to find additional opportunities for solving this acute problem in the national economy.

Top priority: R & D

If President Reagan were to lift from Gorbachov's speech the discussion of research and development, and commit the United States to the same levels of funding for R & D crash programs as the Soviet boss did, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the other big defense labs would be opening champagne by the case, and the question of America's survival would not be the perilous cliffhanger it now is.

Imagine a declaration by the President of the United States, that said the following (*mutatis mutandis*):

The development of fundamental science should be given priority importance. It is this science that acts as a generator of ideas, makes possible breakthroughs into new fields, and shows ways of reaching new levels of efficiency. Here we must enhance the role of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. We must sharply turn the Academy's institutes toward expanding research of a technical directness and enhance their role in and responsibility for creating the theoretical bases of fundamentally new types of machinery and technology. . . . According to existing estimates, institutions of higher education are capable of increasing the volume of research they conduct, by 100-150%.

Reviewing the points outlined by Gorbachov, the reader should think back to the principles of war economy, which Lagovskii formulated nearly three decades ago and Lagovskii's student, Marshal Kurkotkin, reiterated in 1984. Gorbachov has his mandate to whip the economy into shape. Already on Dec. 10, 1984, three months before becoming party General Secretary, Gorbachov charted his course, with the keynote report to the All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference on the Improvement of Developed Socialism and the Party's Ideological Work in Light of the Decisions of the June (1983) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee:

Profound transformations must be carried out in the economy and in the entire system of social relations. . . .

Life sets us a task of tremendous political significance—that of bringing the national economy up to a qualitatively new scientific, technical, organizational, and economic level and of achieving decisive progress in the intensification of social production and improvement of its efficiency.

The course of intensification is dictated by objective conditions and by the entire course of the country's development. There is no alternative. Only an intensive economy, developing on the latest scientific and technical basis, can serve as a reliable material base for increasing the working people's prosperity and ensure the strengthening of the country's positions in the international arena, enabling it to enter the new millennium fittingly, as a great and prosperous power. . . . The process of intensification of the economy must be given a truly nationwide character and must have the same political resonance as the industrialization of the country once had.

Gorbachov's reference to the industrialization drive of the 1930s, particularly its "political resonance," must fill many people with dread—for that was the period of brute force industrialization, of forced collectivization, of the mass deaths and oppressions of the Stalin regime. Evidently, that is exactly the mood the space-age Stalinists of the Andropov Dynasty wish to invoke. When L.A. Voronin, a former high official in the Ministry of the Defense Industry who is now Deputy Chairman of Gosplan, recapitulated the policies laid out at the June 11 Central Committee meet-

ing, in a July 4 feature in the military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda*, he concluded on this grim note:

To overcome all the obstacles on the path of introducing the achievements of science and technology into production, and thus to accelerate the rate of socio-economic development, is no easy task. *But this task, without doubt, will be solved, just as, in their day, the grandiose tasks of industrializing the country, collectivization of agriculture, and the cultural revolution were carried out, under the leadership of the party.*

The critical sectors

A February 1982 EIR study of the Soviet economy found, that the burden of military spending—which, by uncovering the military component of the economy hidden both by Soviet statistics and by Western “add-up” estimating techniques, we estimated to be substantially higher than anybody else would say—would be sustainable only if pre-1975 and higher productivity growth rates were restored to the Soviet economy as a whole. That is precisely what the Gorbachov program sets out to accomplish.

The team to do it comes, not surprisingly, from the military sector of the economy. If the tightest bottleneck in the Soviet economy is the inability to transfer technological breakthroughs from the defense sector into the civilian sector, the Andropov/Gorbachov team is attacking it by putting defense-sector leaders in charge of key civilian industries—the point being, that the latter are themselves of crucial military significance, when the entire country is being mobilized for war. This is what Gorbachov means by the “strategically important directions.”

They are: energy, infrastructure, and the machine-tool sector.

Already under Yuri Andropov, the promotion of the Andropov Dynasty of party cadre—often those with an engineer’s or industrial manager’s background, as we reported in Part 2—was coupled with the elevation of experienced defense industry managers to government ministries that are central to these decisive sectors. The following changes took place in 1983:

- | | |
|---------------|--|
| April 9, 1983 | Sergei A. Afanasyev became Minister of Heavy and Transport Machine Building. Since 1965, Afanasyev had been in charge of the Ministry of General Machine Building, which builds strategic missiles and space ships. |
| June 15 | Boris V. Bal’mont , Minister of the Machine Tool and Tool-Making Industry, was elevated from candidate to full membership on the CPSU Central Committee (at the June 1983 “Andropov” plenum, along with the First Deputy Chief of Staff, Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev , and the Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments, Army General V.M. Shabanov). Prior to 1981, Bal’mont had worked in the defense industry as First Deputy Minister of General Machine Building. |
| Aug. 1 | A Soviet government decree named Yevgenii Kulov chairman of a newly-created State Committee for the Safe Conduct of Work in the Atomic Power Industry. Until then, Kulov had worked in the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, which is responsible for “military applications of nuclear energy,” i.e., warheads and bombs. |

This occurred soon after a far-reaching shake-up of

the nuclear industry and related construction authorities. In July 1983, a government decree named **Gennadii Sharashin**, a first deputy minister in the Ministry of Power and Electrification, as responsible for the nuclear power program. Deputy Prime Minister **Ignatii Novikov**, an old Brezhnev ally and head of the national construction authority, was scapegoated for problems at the Atommash nuclear-reactor production complex, and forced into retirement; his deputy **Gennadii Fomin** was fired from the State Committee for Civil Construction and Architecture, for failures in the planning, design and construction in Volgodonsk, the city where Atommash is located.

In 1984, during Konstantin Chernenko's dying days, the purge of industry resumed:

Sept. 7, 1984 **Yakov Ryabov** became Deputy Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R. Evidently for byzantine political reasons, Ryabov has bounced around from Gosplan to the Central Committee industry departments to the State Committee for Foreign Economic Ties (which handles arms exports, among other things); he has always been involved with the defense sector. Like **Nikolai Ryzhkov**, the new Politburo member and chief of the CC Economics Department, Ryabov formerly directed the huge Uralmash machine tool plant in Sverdlovsk.

Under Gorbachov, in 1985, the purge resumed. Again, the key sectors are affected:

March 23, 1985 **Pyotr Neporozhnyi** retired as Minister of Power and Electrification after 23 years, at the age of 74. His successor is **A.I. Maiorets**, the Minister of the Electrical Equipment Industry. Maiorets' deputy **Gennadii Voronovskii**, originally from the Elektrosila power equipment plant in Leningrad, succeeded him.

May 8 **Vladimir Brezhnev**, 53, replaced 76-year-old **Ivan Sosnov** as Minister of Transport Construction, which ministry is responsible for construction of railroads, bridges, tunnels and subways in ports, national highways, and airfields.

Scientists called into action

On June 10, the eve of the Central Committee meeting on science and technology, the state daily *Izvestia* carried an interview with Anatolii P. Aleksandrov, President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. The 82-year-old physicist, dean of Soviet science, outlined a perspective for tightest coordination between the scientists of the Academy, and the leadership of industry. The need for this, he said, was defined by the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative:

These steps by the U.S. demand that we not only strengthen our defenses, but also move to raise the efficiency of our national economy in all directions as fast as possible and independently from the West.

At the Central Committee meeting, Aleksandrov elaborated the approach he is calling for. The Academy president, according to *Pravda*:

stressed the great significance of basic scientific research, for the solution of national economic tasks and the modernization of important technologies. Expenditures on basic science, which is the source of *revolutionary shifts in technology*, pay for themselves many times over. And it is difficult to agree with some of those who have spoken, who underrate the role of basic science for applied goals. In the 1930s, I.V. Kurchatov, with his first work on nuclear energy in full swing, was criticized at a meeting of the Academy of Sciences, for working on a problem "having no relation . . . to practice. . . ."

Further, the president of the academy discussed problems of the quality and reliability of equipment and machinery produced. . . . *It is necessary to monitor all bottlenecks, to pool the efforts of science and producers. This is a central task. And only in this way, will it be possible really to overcome the shortcomings. The scientist dealt with the need for a unified economic and scientific and technological policy, in the decisive areas of scientific and technological progress. He proposed a sharper concentration of forces in the area of electronics, computer technology and the information industry as a whole.*

Representatives of the defense industry and leading lights from the Andropov Dynasty in the communist party leadership spoke at the session. L.A. Voronin, the Gosplan official who hails from the defense industry, reported that the new Gosplan draft will devote "special attention . . . to the selection of those directions of scientific and technological progress, which give the greatest effect in the framework of the entire national economy. . . . In the long term, the increase in efficiency of production is connected with the creation and widespread utilization of fundamentally new technologies—laser, plasma, radiation, membrane, biotechnical and others."

Another speaker was A.G. Aganbegyan, Director of the Institute of the Economy and Organization of Industrial Production—the institute at the Novosibirsk-based Siberian Division of the Academy, where during Andropov's tenure, economists circulated a controversial call for the overhaul of planning and elimination of the middle layer of the bureaucracy. The significance of the prominence of the Siberian economists and scientists is that Novosibirsk, headquarters of the Siberian Division established in 1957, has been a command center for Soviet scientific programs central to the defense build-up, done on a "crash program" basis (including major aspects of the Soviet directed-energy beam program).

State Committee for Science and Technology Chairman G.A. Marchuk, former head of the Novosibirsk complex, took the floor to say that, "The main condition for this linkage is through-and-through planning, from the scientific research work to the broadscale assimilation of advanced technology and serial production of new technology."

Vitalii Vorotnikov, prime minister of the Russian Republic, hailed "the fruitful activity of the Siberian Division of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences." In order that the Soviet Union may occupy "the most forward scientific and technological positions in the world," declared Vorotnikov, "*fundamental shifts in the economy, on the basis of the modern achievements of science and technology, are an objective necessity.*" Politburo member Vorotnikov also made a point of greatest importance for the Soviet attempt to implement the *Plan B* of economic mobilization, discussed in this report; he called for a massive campaign, addressed to the population:

Here, it is important to create an atmosphere of general interest

in the rapid development of science and technology. For this purpose, it is necessary to activate the work of the mass media and propaganda in a significant way and to effect a cardinal turn from passive edification, to the introduction of effective forms of giving the entire population access to contemporary knowledge.

Velikhov's projects

The activity of Yevgenii P. Velikhov, Vice President of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, gives a preliminary image of what the Gorbachov war-economy mobilization is supposed to accomplish. Indeed, judging by Gorbachov's June 11 speech, the role of Velikhov and of other top scientists, will rise; Gorbachov demanded a transformation of the very nature of Gosplan, from a year-by-year bureaucratic planning agency, to a policy-making powerhouse, run by scientists:

[We have to] create an integrated management and control system of the economy. It is necessary to start from the upper echelons. We will have to implement in practice, Lenin's idea of turning the State Planning Committee into a scientific-economic body employing prominent scientists and leading specialists.

Velikhov, otherwise known for his contributions to the Soviet beam weapon program and his propagandizing abroad, against the West's developing such defensive technologies, has initiated and led several large-scale pilot projects on science and the economy, in recent years. He outlined their main principles, in his own presentation to the Central Committee science and technology meeting:

All Soviet society, including scientists, has been presented with a broad and realistic program for the improvement of the technical base of our national economy, a program for the real transformation of science into a powerful productive force in society. . . . Only on the basis of such a decisive transformation, is it possible to solve the social and economic tasks facing the country and to sharply raise the efficiency of our national economy and the productivity of social labor. . . .

In science, too, *decisive qualitative changes should occur*, so that its structure and organization may correspond to the new tasks. . . . For today, we are talking precisely about revolutionary transformations and fundamentally new inventions, and therefore special significance is given to the development of basic science and its direct and immediate connection with production and education.

There must also be a new understanding by each researcher, of the responsible nature of the historical moment and of his own role in this nationwide campaign. . . . A very important problem in the efficiency of the utilization of the potential of Soviet science is the most rapid, that is speedy, completion of the whole cycle—from draft to production. And therefore, we fully support the timely and fundamental solution of this problem, which was proposed in [Gorbachov's] report—the creation of interagency centers. The Academy of Sciences is prepared to serve as the catalyst for organizing them. . . .

There is no greater happiness for the scientist . . . than to see his ideas brought to life in real undertakings and products, which are of use to the people. We understand the historical importance of the moment and we will not let anybody down.

The idea of using big projects as the sparkplug for the introduction of new technologies, bringing with them increases in productivity, is not new in Soviet economic debates. In August 1980, economist V. Lebedev

proposed to set up large projects, which would pioneer advanced industrial technologies and serve as beacons to guide enterprises all around the U.S.S.R.—a means for “centralized leadership of scientific and technical progress and the whole economy.” A year later, economists N.P. Fedorenko and D.S. Lvov argued the case that only a fundamental change in investment policy could open the bottleneck behind which innovations in industrial technology get stopped up; instead of letting 70% of capital investments go to rebuilding facilities at their original, obsolete technological level, they said, the bulk of new investments should serve as “vehicles for new scientific and technological innovations.”

“The number of technological innovations introduced in 1981 was 4% smaller than in 1980, and the quantity of new models of machines, equipment, apparatus, and instruments shrank by one-fifth during the past decade,” wrote Academician P. Bunich in March 1983, “And the old machinery quite happily lives and gets along, although it is obsolete. The annual rates of writing it off are so low, that it takes more than a decade for complete turnover.” The only solution, this economist wrote, was the establishment and prioritization of nation-wide programs.

One of those programs, already in existence and administered by the Academy of Sciences, was the program for “Creation and Production of Laser Equipment and Technology for the National Economy,” headed by Academician Velikhov.

In 1977, a team of scientists from the Academy of Sciences and the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy began to build a beam technologies laboratory, using the resources of Moscow’s Likhachov auto plant (known as ZIL), one of the very largest industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union. They would work on the construction of laser, electron-beam and plasma devices for commercial applications, thus benefiting the Likhachov firm directly, while at the same time, expanding the resources of the beam-technology research program far beyond anything done previously. Velikhov was put in charge of the program, whose national significance is denoted by the ZIL laboratory’s classification as “a basic laboratory of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.”

Explaining his program in the Novosibirsk economics journal, *EKO*, Velikhov said:

When you are dealing with a totally new technology, it is vital to proceed as quickly as possible from the idea to its implementation. . . . There have been a great number of different opinions by prominent specialists on the future of the laser. Some even said that there was no need for the laser in the shops. It was precisely at that point, that the engineers of the Likhachov auto plant foresaw an important task, associated with problems of welding, which could be solved with the help of lasers. We subsequently, together with the plant specialists, built a laser device in two years and introduced a new system of automation. . . . The firm did not take a narrow consumer approach to the problem. They did not merely consider the short-term results, but looked also at the long-term perspectives of laser technology. We have now built a special laser lab, whose work is being carried out on the basis of the full range of engineering services of the company.

Welding, of course, is a process of critical importance not only for industrial performance, but for any number of defense technologies. When reports of Soviet breakthroughs in directed-energy beam development first broke into Western industrial and defense publications in 1977, the

experiments in question were powered by a technology called *pulsed magnetohydrodynamics* (MHD), by which a burst of electrical energy containing the energy equivalent of millions of pounds of TNT is released in a fraction of a second. The Soviets were reported to be practicing pulsed magnetohydrodynamics inside a huge steel chamber with three-meter thick walls. The chamber could be manufactured, and stay in one piece, thanks to the development of *explosive flux welding*, which was pioneered at the Institute for Hydrodynamics in Novosibirsk, by the first director of the Siberian Division, Academician Mikhail Lavrentyev; this process was first developed to solve problems in maintaining, by conventional welding techniques, the rail system in frigid Siberia.

Plasma physicist Velikhov has been involved in such matters for many years, as a leader of Soviet work on MHD.

By the spring of 1983, Velikhov would report, in the Central Committee weekly *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, that the laser program was under an interagency scientific and technological council run by the Academy and the State Committee for Science and Technology, and that around the "basic laboratories," located at ZIL, there were grouped a Scientific Research Center for Technical Lasers (under the Academy), a Scientific Training Center for Laser Technology (at the Bauman higher Technical School), and laboratories at factories in Moscow, Leningrad, Tula, and elsewhere.

More recently, as reported at an Academy of Sciences meeting in November 1984, by corresponding member I.M. Makarov, Velikhov has designed a national program for the development of computer technology up to the year 2000. This he did in his capacity as Academy Vice-President for the Applied Physical and Mathematical Sciences, and academician secretary of the Academy's Information Science, Computer Technology, and Automation Department. In February 1985, Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov stated that such a program had been approved by the Politburo.

The national computer program is important for the rapid development of the machine tool sector. Bal'mont, the former missile-builder who is Minister of the Machine-Tool and Tool-Building Industry, has vigorously pushed the production of computerized numerically-controlled machine tools, including large "flexible production systems," that are programmable to produce several of the components a given factory needs to turn out. In the last three years or so, the words "industrial robot" and "micro-electronics" have appeared in the Soviet and East German media as many times as "peace movement" and far more often than "proletarian internationalism." The Soviet economic bloc, Comecon, has agreed on the goal of placing 200,000 industrial robots in operation by 1990. In Chelyabinsk, the southern Urals industrial city whose tractor plant earned the name of "Tankograd" during World War II, the plan for 1986-90 is to replace one-third of all jobs by means of "the introduction of flexible, automated production systems, robotized assembly lines, manufacturing centers and machine tools." This rate of automation is extremely important to the Soviets, in view of the deep trough in new members of the labor force, occurring in the 1980s.

Crash mobilization

What has the Andropov Dynasty accomplished in the economy, so far? We can point to several crucial areas, which involve both the drive to generalize high-technology achievements and thus raise productivity throughout the economy, and certain short-term measures of direct military significance.

Nuclear power

Only one year ago, Soviet nuclear plant construction was at a record low. In two and a half years, only three plants had been completed instead of a planned number of ten.

After the managerial shakeup of summer 1983 and a further, emergency meeting on the problem by the Soviet leadership, in late summer 1984, the results have begun to show. Between July 1, 1984 and June 30, 1985, eight big plants (with a total capacity of 8,000 MWe) were commissioned. According to Gennadii Sharashin, the Deputy Minister for Power and Electrification, "The principal line of development in the future is to be the construction of stations based on fast-neutron reactors [breeder reactors] of 800 to 1,600 MW, and this will mark an important stage in the long-term creation of the fuel base for nuclear engineering."

The military daily *Krasnaya Zvezda*, on June 9, 1985, publicized the military's direct involvement in the nuclear program. The paper printed an unusual report on an "exchange program" between Atom mash, the world's only facility for the serial production of atomic reactors, and the nuclear submarines of the Pacific Fleet. The point was, that training in this branch of the economy serves as training for military service, and vice versa.

A heightened pace of nuclear plant construction is in evidence throughout the Soviet bloc. By 1990 or 1992, even Poland, which today has no nuclear power plants, will have its first such capacity, the result of a U.S.S.R.-Polish agreement signed in April 1983. Czechoslovakia will quadruple its nuclear power capacity from a current 1,320 MW, to 5,280 MW by 1990. East Germany will triple its capacity, from a current 1,760 MW, to 5,520 MW. Hungary will double its nuclear power capacity from a current 880 MW to 1,760 MW. Bulgaria will add 2,000 MW of nuclear power capacity.

Seen in percentage terms of national power supply, the increases are also significant. Czechoslovakia will jump from a current 10% of its energy capacity being nuclear, to 34% by 1990. In Hungary, it will double to 25% of national energy capacity, and in Bulgaria, jump from a current 26%, to 40% of the nation's energy capacity. In East Germany, it will go up from a current 12% of energy capacity, to over 30% by 1990.

Eastern Europe now has 6,720 MW of nuclear energy capacity. By 1990, if plans are met, it will have 18,320 MW, nearly a three-fold increase. The breakdown is as follows:

Nuclear energy capacity		
Country	1985	1990 Plan
East Germany	1,760 MW	5,520 MW
Czechoslovakia	1,320 MW	5,280 MW
Bulgaria	2,760 MW	4,760 MW
Hungary	880 MW	1,760 MW
Romania	0 MW	1,000 MW
Poland	0 MW	0 MW

The quicker tempo in Eastern Europe, compared to the U.S.S.R., is dictated by Soviet strategic planning, which insists on drastic reductions of Eastern European use of Soviet-supplied fossil fuels (oil and coal) wherever possible. This not only frees Soviet supplies for Western export

markets and Soviet internal consumption, but also eases strains on the Soviet transportation system.

Transport

In 1977, when Nikolai Ogarkov became Chief of the Soviet General Staff, extensive studies were made concerning Soviet logistical requirements for a war in the European Theater, and also for a global war with a European Theater division. Central to the study was the question of remedying the deficiencies in both the Soviet and East European rail and road systems.

The military responsibility for the task of ensuring that the Soviet Union's transportation system can handle both the current war build-up and actual wartime requirements, lies with Marshal Semyon Kurkotkin, the Chief of the Rear Services since 1972. During Yuri Andropov's time in office, a Politburo member, as well, was designated to oversee this area; it was Andropov's protégé and fellow KGB pro, the Muslim-born Azerbaijani, Geidar Aliyev. The assignment of this portfolio to Aliyev, who otherwise has large responsibilities with respect to Soviet operations in the Middle East, reflected a decision at the highest levels in the Kremlin, that the U.S.S.R.'s underdeveloped, inefficient and sometimes decrepit transportation system was a major obstacle to the war mobilization. There was also some dawning understanding, expressed in the writings of some Soviet economists, of the role of infrastructure (or its lack) in the economy—that millions of rubles invested in the machine-building sector will come to naught, if the economy remains infrastructure-poor, like a body without a circulatory system.

Soon after Kurkotkin was named to run the Rear Services, Moscow decided to construct the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM) railway, a 3,100 km railroad from east of Lake Baikal to the Soviet Pacific coast, parallel to, and to the north of, the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR). Until the completion of the BAM in late 1984, the TSR was the only rail line linking Russia with the Soviet Far East. Militarily viewed, the TSR is far too exposed to instant interdiction in wartime, as it hugs the Soviet-Chinese border for most of its length.

The BAM, given its distance north of the border, is more secure and adds enormously to the Soviet military-logistical capability in the Soviet Far East. It provides freight-handling capacity for the region far in excess of any imaginable tonnage requirements for current civilian or military purposes. This vast capacity, now a surplus of sorts, corresponds to what tonnage requirements would be in the aftermath of a general war, when the Soviet Union would be engaged in the mass resettlement of population and equipment from devastated areas to "clean," or non-contaminated territories.

The first great transportation-infrastructure project after the 1972 SALT and ABM Treaty watershed, the BAM marked the onset of total war planning by the Soviet Union. The decision to build it was in 1974, construction began in early 1975, and the route was completely tracked by late 1984. In 1984, Aliyev made an inspection tour of the BAM, accompanied by the CINC of the High Command Far East, Army Gen. Ivan Tret'yak.

1978-1990: rail & road arteries of the Ogarkov Plan

In approximately 1978, the Soviet leadership decided to go ahead with a more massive program of rail and road modernization, plus the con-

struction of militarily crucial additions to the transport system in each future Theater of Military Actions.

The areas of deficiencies in the rail system were:

- the level of automation in train routing and switching systems;
- bottlenecks at the Soviet/East European border stations arising from the difference in the Russian and European rail gauges;
- lack of double trackage on some main rail lines;
- need for heavier rails to handle larger trains with heavier freight loads;
- need for increased electrification of all main East European trunk lines;
- lack of any high volume rail ferry service direct from the Soviet Union to the Warsaw Pact's forward "springboard" areas of East Germany and Bulgaria (the other two "springboard" countries, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, are landlocked).

1978 saw the start of modernization of existing trackage and the first projects for huge new facilities, to remedy these deficiencies.

The first showpiece was the rail ferry between the Soviet Ukrainian port of Ilyichovsk and Varna, Bulgaria. Its first phase was finished in 1981, with two ships in operation. By 1983, four ships were in continual service. Russian freight cars can be offloaded in Varna, as containers, from their broad-gauge chassis, and loaded on to Bulgarian European-gauge rail under-carriages.

In 1978, the Comecon economic bloc launched a 10- to 12-year program to upgrade every rail trunk line running from European Russia through the East European satellites, as well as the main north-south lines in Eastern Europe. This mammoth program is still under way. A total of 14,000 km (8,750 miles) of east-west rail trunk lines, running from the Ukraine and Byelorussia into and through Eastern Europe and East Germany, are being modernized and upgraded. The north-south lines slated for upgrade comprise 4,000 km (2,500 miles) of track.

The pace of this rail modernization program is extremely intense. In the month of May 1985, alone, for example, the East German daily *Neues Deutschland* reported:

- Completion by Poland of double-tracking of the trunk rail line running 350 km along the Oder River, from Wroclaw (Breslau) to Szczecin (Stettin);
- Completion by East Germany of the program to electrify the trunk rail line from East Berlin to Rostock, the main East German Baltic port.

We reported in Chapter 4.3 on the progress of the biggest military-logistical project on the Western Front, the rail ferry complex connecting Klaipeda (Memel), Soviet Lithuania, with Mukran on the East German Baltic island of Rueggen.

In addition to the 18,000 km of railroads affected by this program, the Russians, in the early 1980s, very rapidly completed a broad-gauge rail line from Soviet Byelorussia, through the Soviet-Polish border town of Brest-Litovsk, and then 397 km deep into Poland, to the Upper Silesian coal and steel center of Katowice. The first broad-gauge railroad ever built deep into Europe, this line gives the Russian broad-gauge trains the ability to go far into Poland without any stop at the border.

The Soviets have added new and modernized old rail lines on their Northern Flank. Here, the most important measure was recently completed double-tracking of the line from Leningrad to Murmansk line.

pleted double-tracking of the line from Leningrad to Murmansk line. This main, north-south line has several spurs running west to the Finnish border, where each of them hooks up with the Finnish rail system. Since it was part of the Tsarist Empire till 1917, Finland's rail system already has broad-gauge track like the Russians. The military significance of upgrading these rail lines is discussed in 4.3.

Aliyev's role

Geidar Aliyev, the former KGB and party chief in Soviet Azerbaijan, was put on the case of the Soviet transportation system not as planner, but as enforcer. Among his first jobs was to lead a special Soviet government commission, to oversee completion of the BAM ahead of schedule, despite the projects having been plagued by delays. His tour of inspection, with Tret'yak, occurred in June 1984, when the Soviet press was writing about widespread hold-ups in the construction. But under Aliyev's ruthless pressure, the BAM link-up was made in October 1984, as the military desired. *Krasnaya Zvezda* had devoted much attention to the matter of the BAM's prompt completion. The Soviet Railroad Troops, a section of Kurkotkin's Rear Services commanded by General Colonel of Technical Troops M.K. Makartsev, were active in building the BAM, as they are in maintaining the Soviet railroad system as a whole. The Railroad Troops, since World War II, are closely tied to the Central Administration of Military Communications, which plans and organizes the movement of military supplies by rail, ship and aircraft.

The improvement of rail lines in the Transcaucasus, reviewed in Part 3, occurs in Aliyev's old base of operations. The new lines in Soviet Armenia and Georgia, terminating near the Turkish border, are scheduled for completion in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In 1985, the Soviets began to build a railroad across the Caucasus Mountains, from Ordzhonikidze in northern Georgia to the Georgian capital of Tiflis. This engineering feat, which will have 21 major bridges, is supposed to be completed in the year 2000.

In the third Transcaucasus republic, Aliyev's home republic of Soviet Azerbaijan, the Soviets electrified the railway leading from Djulfa on the border between Soviet and Iranian Azerbaijan, to Tabriz, the capital of Iranian Azerbaijan.

With the occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, the Soviets also began large-scale infrastructure construction out of Soviet Central Asia, to beef up lines of control into Afghanistan. A new rail and road bridge connects the river port of Termez in Soviet Uzbekistan with Afghanistan on the other side of the Amu Darya (Oxus) River. From this rail bridgehead, a rail line is being built in northern Afghanistan, which ultimately will connect Soviet Uzbekistan with Kabul.

Road programs

Alongside rail modernization, the Soviet Union is carrying out large-scale highway construction and improvement:

- The U.S.S.R. plans to have all major cities connected by modern highways by the year 2000;
- Highways are being constructed and improved throughout Eastern Europe.

Again, this effort includes projects of obvious military significance, such as the new east-west highway running the length of Czechoslovakia, or the Soviets' modernization of the main east-west road from Moscow through Minsk, Byelorussia, to the Polish capital of Warsaw.

Comparing the rail and road networks of the Soviet Union and its satellites ten years ago, at present, and what will be added in the next

few years, forces a reaction of, "Aha, now I see what they've been up to." In each potential theater of military operations, Russia's logistical capabilities have grown by leaps and bounds, toward a level where they fulfill wartime requirements.

Siberia's 'autonomous' development

The biggest project in the Soviet war-economy mobilization is the development of Siberia. From the first expansions of the Russian empire, Siberia was envisioned as the main girder of "fortress Russia." The Slavophiles, particularly, developed a geopolitical view of Siberia as the heart of the world and of the power of the Great Russians.

Today, sparsely-populated, but energy- and resource-rich Siberia is a heavily garrisoned area, in the economic life of which the military plays a major part. Its 12,766,000 square km territory is a strategically positioned landmass, from which Soviet forces confront the United States (with ICBMs, as well as across the Bering Straits), Japan across the Soya Straits, and China across the Amur-Ussuri River boundary. Siberia's highly-dispersed population (many Siberians live in houses made of logs, which would require no special materials for post-war reconstruction), its heavy industry, energy production (oil, gas, hydroelectric), vast fresh water reserves, and scientific-technological elite (in Novosibirsk) define for Siberia a key role in Soviet plans to survive world war. In Soviet military thinking, Siberia as a whole constitutes a major strategic reserve.

The High Command Far East was the first of the new wartime commands to be established, and has been designed so that its HQ in Chita could function with a high degree of independence, if cut off from Moscow. Siberia's economic development, too, exhibits planning for autonomy. Marshal Kurkotkin, the war-economy chief, has voiced enthusiasm about the creation of so-called Territorial Production Complexes (TPCs), industrial concentrations which may be centered on certain raw materials deposits, but include all the branches of basic industry required for an economy to function. The three main development zones of Siberia each comprise one or more TPC. The zones are: 1) the West Siberian oil and natural gas fields; 2) the Angara-Yenisei river basin in central Siberia; 3) the land along the north side of the BAM, in Eastern Siberia.

At the June 11 science and technology conference, Gorbachov said, "The State will further stint no money on the development of Siberia."

Siberian economic development is led from the Academy of Sciences' Siberian Division, established in Novosibirsk in 1957, the year of Sputnik. Besides its center in Akademgorodok, which functions as an economic command center for all Siberia, the Siberian Division has branches in all the main towns of the region. Aganbegyan, the head of its Institute of Economics and the Organization of Industrial Production, is a vigorous advocate of TPC development, which he compares with the 1930s Ural-Kuznetsk project run by Stalinist industrializer V. Kuibyshev.

Energy self-sufficiency

The exploitation of west Siberian fossil fuel deposits on a large scale dates only from the 1970s, but already in the 1976-80 period, oil from this vast expanse of forest, lakes and swamps above 50 degrees N latitude accounted for 90% of the increase in Soviet petroleum extraction. Over 2% of total Soviet investment in industry went into the West Siberia oil and gas complex. By 1983, Siberia was contributing 60% of the U.S.S.R.'s output of oil and gas condensate, 51% of the natural gas, more than one third of the coal and 40% of the hydroelectric power.

Since 1978, the Soviet press has been writing almost uninterruptedly about the problems of the Tyumen (West Siberia) oil and gas region. The 1981 26th Party Congress marked a change in emphasis: The era of "extensive" development of Siberia was over and the course would be for "intensive" development. This was the watchword of the military's economic specialists and of Andropov.

Vladimir Kuramin, a Deputy Minister of Construction for the Oil and Gas Industry, wrote in March 1984, about the necessity of putting the construction base in Western Siberia "on a fully *self-sufficient* footing," which would require a four or five-fold expansion of the volume of work being undertaken at present. At the same time, he called for an influx of people into Tyumen Oblast.

In central Siberia, the Yenisei-Angara river system powers a series of 12 huge hydroelectric dams that are in place or under construction, including the 6,400 MW Sayano-Shushensk dam, the biggest in the world. Around it is the Sayano TPC, which is to contain an aluminum plant, machine-building and light industry.

In the same central region is the Kansk-Achinsk TPC, based on strip-mining the largest prospected Soviet coal deposit, which contains 72.6 billion metric tons of lignite. Soviet officials have boasted, that this region will become "a new Ruhr," a center of heavy industry to rival the old German steel belt.

The BAM, whose military-logistical significance was noted above, gives access to the vast east Siberian deposits of coal, iron ore, asbestos, aluminum, copper, lead, molybdenum and other strategic raw materials. One hundred towns are eventually supposed to spring up in the 11 TPCs of the BAM zone. The spur that connects the TSR to the BAM and then runs north to the coalfields of Neryungri is already the focus of dense economic activity. There are plans to extend this 500 kilometers northwards, to the as-yet unexploited natural gas fields of Yakutsk.

Even in advance of Siberia's greatest project, the planned diversion of Siberian river flows for irrigation in Central Asia, Soviet policy is to make Siberia self-sufficient in food. General Colonel I.D. Isayenko, Chief of the Central Food Supply Administration (again, under Kurkorkin), not only procures food for the Armed Forces, but supervises military *sovkhozy* (state farms) throughout the Soviet Union. The number, location and size of these farms is a military secret. Many of them are in Central Asia and Siberia.

Assistance from foreign industry

The Soviet economy builds itself a margin of increased industrial capacity, on the basis of donations from the countries within the Soviet empire and from East-West trade.

The Comecon member countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, are subject to every-tighter "socialist integration" with the Soviet war machine. A Soviet party Central Committee plenum in December 1983, according to Radio Moscow, decided:

Trade among the CMEA (Comecon) countries will grow by almost 19% in 1984 and the CMEA share of U.S.S.R. trade will reach 61%, versus 53.7% in 1980, testimony to deepening socialist economic integration. . . . In the long term, integration will become even deeper, all-embracing and effective.

Soviet trade figures for this decade show the results of this decision to hook the East European economies more tightly to the Soviet wagon (see table).

The Soviets are setting up particularly tight bonds with the high-

Trends in Soviet foreign trade, 1981-84

	1981	1982	1983	1984
		(millions of rubles)		
Total Soviet trade	109,740	119,576	127,480	139,711
Within the CMEA ¹	52,186	58,702	65,261	72,752
Among socialist countries ²	57,944	64,952	71,409	80,326
With capitalist countries ³	35,359	37,414	38,372	40,924
With developing sector ⁴	16,447	16,883	17,698	18,461

	1981	1982	1983	1984
		(by percentage)		
Total Soviet trade	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Within the CMEA ¹	47.6	49.8	51.2	52.1
Among socialist countries ²	52.8	54.3	56.0	57.5
With capitalist countries ³	32.2	31.6	30.1	29.3
With developing sector ⁴	15.0	14.1	13.9	13.2

¹ The countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (or Comecon) include the Soviet Union, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam.

² Includes the Comecon countries, plus China, Yugoslavia, and North Korea.

³ Includes Finland.

⁴ Includes Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, and client states, such as Libya, South Yemen, Syria, Ethiopia, and Angola. Dropping these countries from the developing-sector category, and putting them into the socialist category, would make even more stark the picture of socialist country autarchy, and collapse of trade with the developing sector.

technology heavy industry firms of the Comecon's industrial powerhouses, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. In a report on East German exports to the Soviet Union in 1984, Radio Moscow said:

The proportion of the following will increase: machine tools, presses, forging equipment, electronically-controlled metalworking lines and tools, plus electrical and industrial chemical goods. The German Democratic Republic will supply: complete rolling mill plants, equipment for production of cable and stranding machines, equipment for crude petroleum reclamation and processing, cranes, open-pit mining equipment, excavators, road construction machinery, equipment for the construction industry, for the printing industry, ships, textile machinery, agricultural machinery, and railroad cars.

With Czechoslovakia, the Soviets have signed an agreement to set up "Robot," an International Scientific-Technical Association (STA), to design and produce industrial robots for use in Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R. and third countries. Vladimir Čop, Deputy Chairman of the Czechoslovak State Commission on Scientific, Technological, and Investment Development, acknowledged in the Soviet weekly *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, that a primary goal of the "Robot" joint endeavor, is to ensure the highest-quality input from Czechoslovakia to the U.S.S.R.:

It is anticipated that the portion of Czechoslovakia's exports to the U.S.S.R., prepared under the aegis of 'Robot,' will increase. . . . This provides a good, long-term guarantee for the export of Czechoslovak machines and equipment of the highest technical specifications.

Trade with the West: no upturn, but Soviet gains

In the case of East-West trade, recent reports in Western financial dailies, about an alleged "upturn in the making" have been exposed as false, by a recent EIR review of the real state of affairs (July 2, 1985).

Since trade is the movement of goods—not Politburo members and high-level trade delegations—across national borders, the only "upturn" to be found is in the realm of Soviet promises to Western Europe, that if those countries decouple from the United States and reject the American Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), then Mother Russia will reward them bounteously.

Where there is a rise in Soviet purchases from the West, this is accounted for by 1) Soviet requirements for prewar stockpiling of goods, as in the 1984 grain purchases from the United States, which account for 90% of U.S.-Soviet trade, and 2) the need to overcome critical bottlenecks in the Soviet economy. Purchases of grain and agricultural products form the overwhelming portion of Soviet trade with Canada, Australia, and Argentina, and, an increasing portion of Soviet trade with countries of the European Community, such as Great Britain and France.

The spring 1985 award of 1.3 billion deutschemarks in orders to France for petroleum industry equipment—the only recently signed European-Soviet deal of any magnitude—is accounted for on both these political and strategic-economic grounds. France, which is now spearheading European opposition to the SDI, was "rewarded" with a few pieces of silver, while Russia received urgently needed plant and equipment for its oil industry, which has been repeatedly chastised by Gorbachov and other leaders, for its stumbling performance.

The Italian government was recently told by Soviet foreign trade officials, that unless Italy agreed to step up high-technology exports to Russia, the Soviet Union would start cutting back its purchases of Italian goods.

4.5 The U.S. and Soviet Economies Since MAD

Eclipse of U.S. world power

MAD and monetarism

The continuing impact of the economic policies associated with Jimmy Carter and Paul Volcker has reduced the United States to the status of a global second-level power armed with the weaponry of a superpower.

This assertion is true in comparing present U.S. economic performance with what was achieved in the past. It is also true in comparing U.S. productive capacity with the other world superpower, the Soviet Union. The United States is in grave danger of losing the economic might that gave content to the nation's status and responsibilities as a global political and military superpower pre-eminent.


The case of steel




Comparisons of production of raw steel, and the capital goods manufactured from raw steel, in the United States and Soviet Union from 1972 to 1982, encapsulates the national security problem as a whole. It is impossible to run a modern economy without steel. It is impossible to maintain a national defense establishment without steel. Without steel a nation cannot produce pipe and tube, forgings, cast wheels and axles, excavating machines, bulldozers, railroad locomotives, and so forth.

In 1972, the United States outproduced the Soviets in raw steel by about 3 million tons over the year. During the four-year period between 1972 and 1976, U.S. production declined by over 4 million tons, while the Russians increased their output by about 28 million tons. Since 1976, Russia's production has remained roughly constant, at about 147 million tons per annum. The United States, to the contrary, has gone into an accelerating decline, down to the 100-million-ton per-annum level, and then further to under 70 million tons in 1982.

In the products made from steel the pattern is similar.

In production of steel for railroads, both the United States and Russia increased out-put between 1972 and 1976, but then the United States declined to half the level reached at that point, Russia maintained the level reached, and thus outproduced the U.S. four to one.



Rail Steel**Seamless Steel Tubing****Welded Steel Tubing**

In steel forgings the United States has stagnated at a level higher than the Russians.

In production of wheels and axles, Russia has advanced from a lead of three to one in 1972, to nearly ten to one in 1982.

In welded tubing Russia produced nearly twice as much as the U.S. in 1972, and increased that advantage. In seamless tubing, the advantage remained at about 2 to 1 for the entire period.

Such is the situation in intermediate goods; in finished capital goods, it is much worse. Russia was out-producing the United States in tractors over 2 to 1 in 1972, and increased the advantage to nearly 8 to 1 by 1982. Russia's lead in the production of excavating machines was increased from about 10 to 1 in 1972, to over 20 to 1 in 1982, and in bull-dozers from two and a half times as many to five times as many.

Some may argue that the quality of Russian capital goods, for example, their tractors, is much lower than the comparable item in the United States. Russian tractors are said to have a service life of about two years, against ten years of useful life for a tractor in the United States. Though there may be truth in such arguments, the plain fact is that the United States no longer produces the goods which, like tractors, it is claimed we produce so well.

Since the period 1957-63, the partisans of Mutually Assured Destruction, following Bertrand Russell and Leo Szilard, have insisted that the existence of thermonuclear-tipped intercontinental missiles has made warfare certain suicide for whichever of the great powers initiates such.

For them, war thus became impossible. But if war was impossible, then the in-depth logistical and industrial capabilities which backed war-fighting capabilities were also unnecessary. Standing armies were unnecessary, functioning navies were unnecessary.

Steel and steel-workers, machine-tools and machine-tool producers, had become a thing of the past, and could be consigned to the garbage heap, for recycling along with the political system of the nation-state, and the heat-powered machine that had produced them.


The Soviet Union, however, never accepted this doctrine for its own practice, only for the United States. Now the United States regularly reports the growth of selected categories of weapons' production, and argues that its own forces are being modernized to remain at parity. But the destruction of basic, old-fashioned heavy industry, on which such production depends, remains unaddressed.

The crumbling of steel

Half of the steel the United States produces is recycled scrap. 30% of the total is produced in small, so-called mini-mills in electric arc furnace mode. The industry claims, coherently with the fanatical perception, that they produced 90 million tons on a capacity of 130 million tons. Meanwhile, remaining Basic Oxygen Process steel capacity is down to an estimated 70-million-tons capacity, and produces only 50 million tons. Somehow, we lost 50 million tons of steel-making capacity, and the Russians in 1982 were outproducing us by 80 million tons a year.

The United States reduced its capacity to produce raw steel, imported ingots and slab steel from such countries as Mexico and Brazil for finishing, built up its capacity to melt down the defective products of the automobile industry, cushions and all, and continued to claim it had a steel industry.

Now, the U.S. produces automobiles from imported parts to be eventually melted down as scrap for our steel industry. By 1982, the Russians

Steel Wheels and Axles

were producing more than twice our output of raw steel, seven times our output of steel for railroads, ten times our output of wheels and axles, eight times our production of tractors, twenty times the number of excavating machines, five times the bulldozers.

The Russians have not only overtaken the United States in these areas. More broadly, the nations of the Comecon system outproduced both the United States and its European allies. By 1982, the margin of advantage was about 5 million tons per year of raw steel. The same Comecon countries produced 12% more welded tubing, 38% more seamless tubing, three times the forgings, four times the steel wheels and axles, and twice the amount of steel for railroad construction.

By 1982, steel production in the Western economies was being cut back under the impact of the Davignon Plan. It was argued that there was too much steel capacity to supply available demand. By 1984 and 1985, blast furnaces, inside and outside the United States, were being blown up and dismantled. The Soviet Union, and its alliance partners, continued to grow modestly at the indicated levels above the Western partners' capacities.

While the Russians and the Comecon nations were continuing to produce capital goods to maintain basic economic infrastructure—transportation equipment, for example—in the Western nations, led by the United States, this capability was being taken down.

The case for steel, and the industrial commodities that are produced from steel, exemplifies the argument to be made as a whole.

Russia's secret weapon


In 1964, the United States, and its alliance partners in Western Europe and Asia (Japan and South Korea), made up 26% of the world population of 2.5 billion, not including China. The same allied nations provided employment for 46% of the approximate total of 225 million industrial workers worldwide, and produced 47% of the world's energy supply of 41 thousand trillion kilocalories per annum. Against this, Russia and the nations of the Comecon had 15% of the world population, 25% of the world's industrial workers, and produced 24% of the world's energy.

Energy, productivity, and employment


Such global pre-eminence as then the Western nations had attained was based on the productivity of the labor force. Since the early 1960s that productivity has been consistently under attack. This is seen most clearly in comparing the ratio of goods producing workers in the Western nations, to non-goods producing workers, and to the population as a whole.

The goods-producers, like the physical goods they produce, are a declining percentile, of both the labor force, and the population as a whole. It is estimated, for example, that there were by 1982, approximately 80 million goods producers within the leading Western nations, the United States, West Germany, France, Italy, the U.K. and Japan, against a potential of 130 million, if employment levels of the 1950s were once again attained. That is, approximately 40% of the potential of the Western nations, in labor terms alone, is criminally wasted.


By 1981-82, the population of the United States and its allies had declined to less than 17% of the world total of 3.5 billion, not including China. The industrial workers employed within the economies of the Western nations had fallen to 37.6% of the world total of 333 million, according to the World Bank. The energy produced within the same

Electricity Consumed


Industrial Workers



Steam Turbines



Agricultural Tractors



Western nations had fallen also, to less than 38% of the world total production of 80 thousand trillion kilocalories in the year.

The population of the Soviet Union and its satellites also fell as a percentage of the world population as a whole, to 12.5%. The same countries increased their share of the world's industrial workforce, to nearly 27%, and increased their share of the world's energy production to over 25%.

Such comparisons make clear that the problem is not that the Soviets are building up so relentlessly, though they are, but that the West, as the gap in steel production and the shift in employment ratios indicate, is collapsing itself, and is pulled down by the policies of the United States. At the same time the nations of the developing sector, the uncounted "balance" in these figures, have been prevented from participating in economic development. Such is also reflected in the charts which compare the energy production and consumption, of the two super-powers.

The United States has permitted its industrial workforce to stagnate in number, while degrading the technological content of employment. In this case, the Russians have expanded industrial employment faster than the growth of the population as a whole.

The United States, though stagnating, continues to lead the world in energy and electricity production. But only one-third of the total of either energy or electricity production is consumed by industry. One-third of the rest is consumed by that growing portion of the workforce which is not productively employed, and which, opposite to the Russians, has been permitted to grow at rates exceeding the growth of the population as a whole.

The stagnating levels of total production and consumption in the United States become a steady, though marginal decline, set against increases in the productivity of energy production and consumption in the Soviet Union, in the order of 25%.


If the United States and its allies were to reinstitute employment policies comparable to those which prevailed in the 1940s and 1950s, the productive capacities and potentials of the Western nations would still be unchallengeable. The energy resources would still be available to power such a transformation. While now, the greater availability of energy within the United States and the Western world as a whole, is being wasted in powering the expansion of unnecessary costs of overhead employment, parasitism, and waste.

The United States is about 50% dependent on imports of consumption goods. The United States does not produce them itself, but depends on foreign skills and foreign capacities, for its consumption requirements. Without productive capacity the United States cannot even produce consumer goods. But the productive potentials of the western nations have been transformed into servicing extensions of United States consumption requirements.

This is the consequence of decisions made especially in 1982, when, gutlessly, the current administration left Paul Volcker to continue the work of destruction he had unleashed under Jimmy Carter, and the fraudulent recovery was launched on the basis of "free trade" and the "magic of the marketplace."

The "free-traders" and the "magicians" overlooked the fact that the goods they buy and sell, speculate in, and demand debt service on, do have to be produced somewhere. That "somewhere" is no longer the United States. They bubbled the dollar to suck in the production of

Excavating Machines



others, to compensate for capabilities which no longer existed in the United States. Then, they claimed that United States might had been restored. All the while, the United States became weaker than ever before.

An economic Pearl Harbor

The effect of Mutually Assured Destruction, and Carter and Volcker, on U.S. heavy industry, and the productivity of the industrial worker, could usefully be compared with Soviet nuclear bombardment of the continental United States, or regions within the continent, such as the area around Pittsburgh. United States economic policies, even the cost-benefit analysts would agree, are cheaper for the Soviets, than full-scale war would be, though more protracted in time.

And if the Soviet efforts to decouple the United States from its allies were to succeed?

Then a Soviet Union exercising imperial sway over U.S. allies in Europe and Asia would command 40% of the world's population, not including China, 54% of the world's goods-producing labor-force, 38% of the world's energy production, and 46% of the world's energy consumption.

The United States would be left alone with 7.4% of the world population, 11% of the world's goods-producing workers, about 24% of world energy production, and 28% of energy consumption. The United States would be far weaker in the world balance than the Soviets were in the 1950s. Soviet policy is directed to that end, whether the proponents of MAD wish to believe it or not.

4.6 What Are 'Acceptable Losses' for the Russian Command in a Global Nuclear War?

Soviet military doctrine in the nuclear age was developed around the task of solving the problems of "fighting and winning general thermonuclear war." In Soviet military and civilian strategic thinking "deterrence" signifies the establishment and deployment of a military force capable to so "fight and win general thermonuclear war" in a fashion so demonstrable that any potential military adversary of the Soviet state will be "deterred" from employing military means of state policy.

The Soviet concept of "winning" such a war includes the capacity to preserve, more or less intact, the Soviet state, its power base, its assets, and its capabilities of exerting dominion over the world after all its potential adversaries and challengers have been crushed.

Any decision, on the part of the Soviet High Command, to go to war, would be the result of a meticulous, cool calculation which would weigh the possible losses to the Soviet state if it decides not to go to war, against the expected losses to be incurred by fighting a general nuclear war. The present configuration of the nuclear powers' arsenals is such that no margin of doubt exists about the fact that in the event of nuclear war, the United States would be completely obliterated in the sense that after the successive nuclear salvos of the Soviet forces, not one blade of grass would be able to grow on the North American continent for at least one hundred years, whether such a war were to be initiated by the United States or by the Soviet Union.

Under the present configuration of forces, the same cannot be said about the Soviet Union. Some time in early 1984, some American military researchers warned that the combined active and passive Strategic Defense programs of the Soviet Union would soon be able to protect approximately one third of the Soviet Union's strategic, political, industrial and other principal assets. We do not have a current, mid-1985 status evaluation of the increased effectiveness of Soviet strategic defenses. Last year's "one third" survival estimate, presumably was based on the assumption of a U.S.-initiated "first strike" against the Soviet homeland.

The chances of survivability of Soviet assets increase dramatically if

one assumes a successfully executed Soviet "first strike" or "preemptive strike." Under certain circumstances, "nightmare scenarios" have been examined, according to which, the Soviet Union might launch a preemptive or first *counterforce* strike against American ICBMs, strategic bomber bases and whatever nuclear missile submarines they can catch, leaving intact any other American assets. To do this, the Soviets would need to expend only a tiny fraction of their land-based ICBM force which they could replenish within two hours by reloading their launchers. This would leave the American command authority with a choice of a) capitulating or b) launching the surviving remnant of its SLBM force against Soviet territory. However: any American President who decides to launch would know that his retaliation would trigger the complete annihilation of all forms of life on the North American continent within 20 to 40 minutes after he issues his order. His alternative, of course, would be to formally declare the dissolution of the United States of America.

Such a peculiar, but otherwise much discussed "scenario" would never come about in real life, unless the Soviet command had already taken such measures that would assure it could reasonably "handle" any damage caused by the surviving American submarine-launched nuclear force. If possible, before such action, the Soviet command would prefer to secure means of "making up" for its potential losses *before* it incurred them. Their experience in the Second World War, in this matter, is not irrelevant: the much lamented loss of 20,000,000 Soviet citizens in the course of the war had, in Stalin's own cool calculations, been "made up" by the absorption of an equal number of Poles into the Soviet state during the partition of Poland in 1939.

This episode sheds a certain amount of light into the reasoning by which the Soviet high command "ranks" its "assets" according to relative importance to the state, in order to make its calculation of "acceptable loss levels."

Ranking highest, in Moscow's valuation of state assets, is the leadership of the state: in various locations around the country, there are numerous deep underground "hardened" bunkers reserved for the political and military leadership. The most notorious such facility is in the northern outskirts of Moscow, where no fewer than seven deep underground bunker complexes are ready to house approximately 150,000 senior functionaries of the state and their functions. These bunkers are securely protected from any nuclear explosion of any warheads now in the inventory of the United States; they are also connected with the Kremlin by means of a deep underground rapid transit train. In addition, of course, Moscow is officially, in accordance with a relevant provision of the 1972 ABM Treaty, protected by an antiballistic-missile system of no fewer than one hundred ABM missile launchers with reload capability.

The fact that the Soviets chose Moscow as the site to be protected by the one ABM system permitted by the treaty is merely symptomatic of the fact that the functions of the state are considered as the most highly valued assets of the state by Soviet military planners.

The second most valued set of assets is the principal means for conducting strategic war, the ICBM missile fields. Every one of these is known to be currently protected by extensive deployments of SAM batteries made up of SA-5s, SA-10s and SA-12s, primarily.

The third layer of priority assets for Soviet planners consists of certain critical industrial, engineering and production facilities on the one hand and the racial stock of ethnic Great Russian populations on the other. The systematic "dispersion" and "decentralization" of major industrial enterprises, which has been an invariant constant of Soviet military and

economic planners since the 1950s, is designed to improve the protection of both these two types of assets: industrial engineering facilities and Great Russians.

Of course, special emphasis on the preservation of the Great Russian racial stock is motivated by a great dose of typical Russian racism and sentimentality on the part of Russian military planners. It is also, however, based on a certain amount of political realism: The Soviet Union as a state is in fact nothing but the political empire of the Great Russians, a minority among the subject nationalities of the U.S.S.R. Should this Great Russian ethnic core of the state be destroyed or mauled to the point that it is not capable of exerting dominion over the other nations of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet state will disappear and thus, the war will end with its defeat, even though many of the "sinews of war" might happen to remain intact but in the hands of, say, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Turkemens, Tartars, and so forth.

The present Soviet leadership frequently boasts that the "Soviet people" are ready to suffer "any sacrifices" for the cause of an eventual victory in nuclear war. In January 1985, the Soviet Foreign Ministry's chief spokesman Vladimir Lomeiko, in order to impress his impressionable American counterparts that Moscow could, if it had to, assign low thresholds to its "acceptable damage" estimates, was quoted as having said that "whatever the price, the Soviet Union is ready to face all challenges." The "Soviet people have shown" declared Lomeiko, "that they are able to resist and to win in conditions more difficult than today, the 20 millions dead of the last war should not be forgotten. . . ."

Lomeiko would not be making such boastful assertions if he had reason to believe that American nuclear arsenals included super silo-busting nuclear warheads from which the Soviet leadership's hardened bunkers could find no protection. Or if he knew that a few heavy-megaton "dirty" cobalt bombs would descend upon the main national home bases of the Great Russians in the very first minutes of a Soviet-provoked war.

For the present Soviet leadership, "acceptable losses" might include the majority or, perhaps even the totality of all non-Great Russian populations of the U.S.S.R. and of the industrial assets situated in their territories, provided that their loss could be replenished by immediate or simultaneous conquests in Western Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere.

What is not an "acceptable loss" for them is the loss of their system's existing political leadership and its Great Russian political base.

4.7 The Religious Factor: Call to Arms for 'Holy War'

Those who are familiar with the thousand-year history of the Russian Church know that fighting for the greater glory of Russia, has always been and remains an indispensable part of her mission. This was well expressed in the Message of his Holiness Patriarch Pimen and the Holy Synod on the 600th anniversary of the Victory at Kulikovo Field:

In the accomplishment of the heroic national feat—the Great Victory of the Russian arms at Kulikovo—of special significance was the power of the grace of the Christian Faith, the spiritual and moral influence and patriotic service of the Russian Orthodox Church, which has never remained apart and indifferent to the historical lot of the nation. From the very beginning of her existence, now a millennium, she helped establish Russia's culture, nationality, and state (*Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate*, February 1983).

The 1,000th anniversary of the Christianization of Russia will be in 1988, and the signs of a celebration being prepared by an Empire—the Muscovite present-day successor to Byzantium—with its three-sided leadership of Party, Army, and Church, are in full evidence. The media have started conditioning the Soviet population for the magical 1,000-year date.

This is not the first time that such anniversaries have played a central role in guiding Soviet Russian expansionist policies. Stalin's target date for the acquisition of Greece and Turkey was 1948—the 500th anniversary of the Russian Orthodox Church as an autocephalous church. With the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the United States blocked the Russian Empire's attempt to incorporate Greece and European Turkey, including Istanbul (Constantinople)—the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarch of the Orthodox Church, and a prize coveted by Muscovy for centuries.

The importance of the 1988 millennium celebrations of the Christianization of Rus', is that Kievan Rus provides the chief "blood" link for the Muscovites, in the theory of Moscow's succession to the power of Rome.

During a June 1983 visit to West Germany, Archbishop Pitirim, head of the Moscow Patriarchate's publishing department, stated Russia's doctrine of continuity:

The history of the Russian Orthodox Church is an unbroken one. . . . The ROC has a 1,000-year history. In 988, the Russians in Kiev, which was the principal city of the Great Russian principality, accepted the Christian belief that decided many pages of further history of the state and its culture. In 1988 we will celebrate the 1,000th-year Jubilee of this memorable event. . . . The Russian Orthodox Church sees its destiny clearly. We want to attain our goal of seeing the results of our spiritual activity.

By 1988, the Moscow Patriarchate will have set up new headquarters in the huge Danilov Monastery complex in the middle of Moscow, only four kilometers from the Kremlin. Special workers and student brigades have been brought in to complete the massive task in time. Similar work brigades are busy throughout the European part of the U.S.S.R. restoring and reconstructing old Russian monasteries, church frescoes, and icons.

From at least the start of the "post-Brezhnev era" launched by Yuri Andropov, the speeches of Soviet Communist Party leaders abound with references to the millennium and with language lifted from the Russian Orthodox Church liturgy.

Mikhail Gorbachov, in his speech of Dec. 10, 1984, vowed: "The Soviet Union will do everything it can to ensure the strengthening of the country's position in the international arena, enabling it to enter the next millennium fittingly, as a great and prosperous power."

In June 1983, the late West German Deputy Foreign Minister Alois Mertes, who was fluent in Russian, was amazed to hear then-Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko say, "Security is the *svyataya svyatykh* for the Soviet Union." This expression is taken straight from Russian Church liturgy. When the Orthodox priest emerges from the Ikonostas and shows the Sacrament to the congregation, he says: "*Svyataya svyatykh*"—Holy of Holies.

When Gromyko nominated Gorbachov as the new leader of the Communist Party, he said the nominee deserved to be made party General Secretary, because he upholds "the *svyataya svyatykh* for us all in fighting for peace and maintaining our defenses at the necessary level."

Military and church: one policy

Marshal Ogarkov's military cohort exhibits the same ideology at every opportunity. These Soviet officers, who miss no occasion to accuse Ronald Reagan of waging a "crusade" against socialism, themselves employ crusader's language about "holy wars."

In his November 1984 article in *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (*Communist of the Armed Forces*), "The Unfading Glory of Soviet Arms," Ogarkov himself wrote:

The path of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces to Victory in the Great Patriotic War was long and difficult. It lasted nearly four years and led through very bitter and bloody battles, through very grave experiences. . . . But the Soviet people were not defeated in spirit, and did not lose the will for victory over the invaders. In an extremely difficult situation, in an extremely short time, the Communist Party mobilized for holy war, the powerful forces of Soviet society, which Great October had given it, and transformed the country into a monolithic war camp. . . . [Today] the aggressive forces of imperialism have to reckon with the growing weight and influence of our forces, with the power of the united armed forces of the Warsaw Pact. . . . It is the sacred duty of the Soviet Armed Forces to reliably defend the conquests of socialism and peace on Earth.

In this article, Ogarkov praised Stalin and the role played by him and his high command, the Stavka, in the last war.

Since Gorbachov's installation as party chief, the Stalin revival has produced some dramatic moments. On May 8, Gorbachov was speaking on the 40th anniversary of V-E Day. He said again, "The mortal danger overhanging the homeland and a tremendous force of patriotism raised the entire country to a people's war—a holy war." But when Gorbachov recalled, that "the gigantic work at the front and in the rear was guided by the party, its central committee, and the State Defense Committee headed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin," the response was electric. The audience of veterans, party officials, and officers applauded, and would not cease applauding, for several minutes. Soviet television captured the moment, and broadcast it all over the U.S.S.R.

On the same anniversary occasion, the Russian Orthodox Church/Moscow Patriarchate joined in the renewed praises for Stalin. The *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* reprinted the appeal to the Russian people to rise to the defense of Mother Russia, which had been issued by Metropolitan Sergei—to be elevated to Patriarch two years later—on June 22, 1941: "Our Orthodox Church blesses all the Orthodox to rise in defense of the sacred borders of our Motherland. The Lord will grant us victory!" The journal explained:

Thus in wisdom and farsightedness, Metropolitan Sergei anticipated our ultimate victory on the first day of the war. . . . Metropolitan Sergei issued a number of other messages, and so did his closest associates. . . . [They] appealed to pastors and believers on Soviet territory temporarily occupied by the Nazis, to the Slavonic peoples and Christians of other countries, urging them to help in the sacred struggle against the common enemy. . . . In 1942, in the foreword to *The Truth About Religion In Russia*, Patriarch Sergei wrote: "The fascist crusade has already swept over this country, flooding it with blood, desecrating our shrines, destroying our historical monuments, and committing monstrosities against defenseless civilians. . . ." The book convincingly shows that the Russian Orthodox Church entered the war in unity and unanimity with the Soviet people. Right from the start, the Church rose in defense of the Motherland. The documents published in the book, demonstrating the nationwide upsurge of patriotism among the believers and clergy, are of vital importance for later generations. . . .

The *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* began to come out at a difficult time; the war was at its height. . . . *Let us thank the government for its considerable attention to church needs.* . . .

The article went on to recall how, upon receiving Patriarch Alexii in 1945, Stalin exhibited "complete understanding and wholehearted approval and promised us support in the future," which "attested to the normal and benevolent relations between Church and State and helped us to take advantage of the opportunities provided us" in the postwar period.

Metropolitan Juvenalii of Krutitsii and Kolomna, interviewed by the Vienna-based Catholic Information Agency (Kathpress) on the occasion of Soviet Armed Forces Day, Feb. 23, 1985, demonstrated how close coordination is today between church and military:

The millennium in 1988 will be a great spiritual festival, and in this connection we shall be reminding the Russian people of their

ancient traditions of striving towards God and spirituality. . . . This Jubilee will be the celebration of our Holy Faith and Mission.

It is the sacred duty of our Armed Forces to guard the frontiers of our country. Therefore our Armed Forces are always prepared to repel any danger threatening us. Should the Church tell the Army not to defend our holy borders? Should we tell our armed forces to neglect their sacred duty? Under no circumstances would we do so. . . . To hold our Army back from its duty would, in our eyes, be as senseless as the demands made on our government to make unilateral concessions when it has already stated that it would not make a first strike. It is the holy duty of the Church to pray that there will be no attack for us to repel. . . . [However] we are secure, as we see the continuing fulfillment of the Word of Christ in our country, that the Gates of Hell shall not prevail against the [Russian Orthodox] Church. Therefore we are untroubled about the future.

Juvenalii, Patriarch Pimen, and their colleagues speak with the same voice as the Soviet high command, in attacking the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. On Feb. 1, 1985, Pimen told the Soviet news agency Novosti that, "it is the sacred duty of all religious people" to halt the Strategic Defense Initiative. Pimen was one of the earliest major figures in Russia to decry the development of beam weapons, at a Moscow Patriarchate-sponsored world "peace" conference in 1982, eight months before President Reagan announced the SDI.

ROC's war on the Vatican

Russian Church and State accuse both Reagan and Pope John Paul II of launching a "crusade" against the Soviet Union: Reagan for his Strategic Defense Initiative, and the Pope for his crackdown against the "Liberation Theology" and related wings of the Roman Catholic Church that work hand in glove with the Russian Church and political leadership to undermine the West.

The preparations for the 1988 anniversary of the Christianization of Kievan Rus have been marked by a constantly escalating hate campaign against the "Western" Roman Catholic Church and the Papacy.

There are many evil elements nesting in the Vatican, including the Venetian patriarchate and the various Catholic monastic orders, the Benedictines, the Dominicans, the Jesuits, who deal with Moscow from the standpoint of discussing redrawing the world map between the Western and Eastern (Soviet) Empires. This, however, is not what Moscow, smelling world domination, is attacking. The goal of the Russian campaign against the Vatican, is the elimination of the Vatican and the Papacy as policy-making authorities.

In March 1985, in an interview with the Italian Communist Party daily *Unità*, Metropolitan Filaret (Vakhromeyev) of Minsk threw down the gauntlet to the Vatican, declaring that "Liberation Theology is the policy of the Russian Orthodox Church."

Such war cries against the Roman Church have been more and more frequent since mid-1984. For example, a major part of Metropolitan Filaret (Denisenko) of Kiev's June 1984 speech in Czechoslovakia, was devoted to denouncing "fabrications" by Catholic scholars, concerning alleged Western influence on the origin of Christianity in Kievan Rus. He blasted the "Catholic scholars and their cohorts, the Ukrainian Uniates," for maintaining that the early Russian Church—before it betrayed the Popes and went under the jurisdiction of the Constantinople Patriarchate—was Christianized by Latin missionaries and thus canonically linked with Rome. Referring to the "Latin missionaries" in Russia, Filaret

of Kiev said: "One should not forget that this was the time that the Roman Popes were already carrying out the fight to expand its realm to the East, and in part to Russia. . . ."

The shock value of this speech can be imagined, considering that most Czechs are Catholic.

According to Vatican sources, one of the main themes discussed at the Feb. 27, 1985 meeting between Pope John Paul II and Andrei Gromyko, Soviet foreign minister at that time, was the situation of Catholics in the Soviet Union. In view of the Pope's avowed concern about the plight of the Ukrainian Catholics of the Eastern Rite, also known as the Uniates, whose Church was banned by Stalin in 1946, it is believed that during the private talks the "delicate" issue of legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church was discussed. The Uniates live in the Western or "Little" Ukraine, in territories which for the most part belonged to prewar Poland, contiguous to the present Polish and Czech borders.

It is believed that Gromyko repeated the "hands off" warning concerning the Uniates, made earlier by Patriarch Pimen. In his letter of Dec. 20, 1980 to Pope John Paul II—six months before the Bulgarian-connected attempt on the Pope's life—the Moscow Patriarch indicated that any moves by the Vatican to call into question the results of the Synod of Lvov outlawing Uniates could "negate" all the progress made in improving relations between the Roman Catholic and Russian Orthodox Churches and would be "against the spirit of ecumenicalism."

Just before Gromyko's visit to the Vatican, the Russian Orthodox Church in January 1985 commenced the first reprint of the 1946 Stalin-era state tracts (drafted with Church blessing) outlawing the Vatican-affiliated Uniate Church. This decision to reprint is a major escalation in the anti-Papacy conditioning of the Russian population for the big, imperial anti-Western 1988 Russian Millennium.

During Patriarch Pimen's imperial foray in 1984 to Warsaw Pact and neighboring Slavic countries—Poland, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia (Serbia)—he declared that the "duty of all Christian and other religious believers in the Socialist countries . . . is to support the State." After this tour, Soviet and East bloc government media unanimously intensified their attacks against the Pope, especially during his South American trip, culminating with an official Soviet Government statement blaming the Polish Roman Catholic leadership—and thus, not so indirectly the Pope—for the situation which produced the murder of the Polish priest Popieluszko.

The Pan-Slavic dimension emerges

Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev's June 1984 speech at the Jan Hus Theological Seminary in Prague, Czechoslovakia, "On the Meaning of the Christianization of Rus and its 1,000th Anniversary," defined the planned Millennium more broadly as a pan-Slavic, racist celebration of empire:

We the representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church in your country always feel that we belong to one blood and soil—having deep ancient ties to Slavic scholars—the brother saints Cyril and Methodius. At present, we are united not only with the historical past but with present-day goals. . . . In 1988, the Russian Orthodox Church is preparing to celebrate the 1,000th anniversary of the Christianization of Russia. . . . The Christianization of Russia was an outstanding historic event not only in the history of our Church but our nation. It crowned the earlier labors of Cyril and Methodius. . . . For the Russian Orthodox Church, it was the beginning of its official existence. It gave the spiritual meaning of the unity of Ancient Rus. It influenced the bettering of relations between the

Kievan princes, helped unite the principalities and unite the realm, strengthened and expanded ties of Kievan Rus with many European rulers, above all with Byzantium and Bulgaria. . . . With Christianity, Russia took with it the developed forms of societal organization of Byzantium, its cultural and spiritual revival. It saw the emergence of the monasteries in Russia which became centers of learning. . . . Monasticism is an unbreakable part of Russian life.

The Russian Orthodox Church is continuing its 1,000-year mission under new social conditions. The experience of our Church in socialist society has convinced us that no matter what the ideological differences between believers and non-believers are, being conscious participants in the new society gives us the opportunity to conduct our savior mission. Deriving from our Orthodox tradition, we will try to give our share toward securing and strengthening our security. . . . Our Church calls on and inspires its sons and daughters to continue and realize their patriotic and peace-making history.

In line with Filaret's stress on Bulgarian and Byzantine roots, the Moscow Patriarchate has already announced plans for 1988 joint celebrations with brethren Orthodox Churches—which are to unite the entire Slavic and Byzantine Orthodox realm. For example, the millennium of the Christian Kievan Rus coincides with celebrations of the Russian Orthodox Monastery St. Panteleimon, in the Mount Athos complex in Greece.

Also this year, preparations to celebrate the 1,100th anniversary of the death of St. Methodius—a project launched by Todor Zhivkov's Bulgaria—are being coordinated and conducted by every single Warsaw Pact country with an Orthodox majority or a minority. When Gorbachov in his acceptance speech upon his appointment as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, stressed that the Soviet Union's "first commandment" is to strengthen the unity of Warsaw Pact countries, he was speaking not only from the political, economic, and military standpoint, but also from the deeper religious-cultural one.

By 1988, in the middle of Moscow, four kilometers away from the Kremlin, the Danilov Monastery will be the new headquarters of the Moscow Patriarchate. At a branch of the State Bank in Moscow, a special account was opened for the Moscow Patriarchate's use under the title, "Construction and Restoration of the Danilov Monastery of the City of Moscow." The monastery was built at the end of the 13th century under the first Moscow prince, Danilov, later canonized as the "Heavenly Protector Saint of Moscovy Russia."

After the October Revolution, it was taken over by the state. Under the new political relationship, it was a residence for many Russian bishops, and until the death of Patriarch Tikhon, represented a *modus vivendi* between State and Church.

In August 1983, shortly before the shoot-down of the Korean Airlines jet, Danilov was officially returned to the Church. Soviet TV and radio prominently played up the event, including Patriarch Pimen's "thank you" message to Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov. The *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* wrote:

[The Danilov Monastery complex] has waited for its time to come, and now, seven centuries after its foundation, it is going to become the spiritual center of the Russian Orthodox Church. . . . The rebirth of the Monastery of Saint Prince Danilov is a work of godly prophecy. . . . In a renewed form, this Holy Monastery, the cradle of the United Russian Nation-State, will be witness to the 1,000-year celebrations of the Christianization of Russia.

5. Soviet Strategic Sabotage and Assassination Programs

5.1 Andropov's Rise in the KGB: Warsaw Pact Enters International Drugs-and-Terrorism Business

Enshrined and institutionalized in the senior councils of the Soviet state during 1967 was an entirely new capability of statecraft, associated with Yuri Andropov assuming the chairmanship of the KGB, and the grooming of what later became the "Andropov Dynasty" which now rules the U.S.S.R. This "new capability of statecraft" involved the expert employment of terrorism, both under the guise of "national liberation" and of simple "sociological phenomenon," cultivation of ethnic tensions and manipulations both worldwide and inside the Soviet Empire, drugs, pornography, mystical cultism, and other forms of cultural warfare.

From the outset of Andropov's tenure in the KGB, major long-term commitments were made to cultivate and unleash throughout the world the twin weapons of drug trafficking and international terrorism. Contrary to what most counter-terror analysts believe, drug trafficking and terrorism were not unleashed as independent branches of subversive activity, but as subordinate, though important, elements of a far-flung cultural warfare against the Western alliance. This Andropov project was undertaken in conjunction with similar subversive cultural policies launched in the West by America's "Eastern Establishment" and its "elected head," McGeorge Bundy, then still National Security Advisor to President Lyndon Johnson.

During 1967, McGeorge Bundy, whose role in the assassination of President Kennedy has yet to be clarified, promulgated the military doctrine of "Flexible Response," whose most important feature was its separating the defense of Europe from that of the United States, thus overthrowing America's earlier military doctrine, which asserted that militarily, the territories of the United States and Western Europe must be treated as a single indivisible entity if they were to be defensible.

During that same year, McGeorge Bundy founded a joint project with Yuri Andropov of the KGB, the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis in Laxenberg, Austria, whose principal purpose was intelligence sharing and intelligence coordination for what then appeared to be a joint "Eastern Establishment"-KGB project, namely the imposition

of a cultural "paradigm shift" over the populations of Western industrial nations. The new cultural paradigm, Bundy and other senior representatives of the Eastern Establishment agreed with the KGB, was to be the "post-industrial society," the "Age of Aquarius," "counterculture," and the replacement of the nation-state by ethnic separatist and integrist movements.

Andropov's KGB poured enormous resources into this project over the next two decades. Most of the financial resources were derived from international drug trade. Most of the political-ideological-cultural guidance was supplied by the KGB-run Institute of Ethnography of the Soviet Academy.

The European "black" nobility, with its great taste for ethnic separatist/integrist movements and culturally degenerate projects, from the outset was Moscow's leading partner in this affair. It also became Moscow's leading business partner in the international guns-for-drugs bazaar which constitutes the infrastructure of all international terrorism.

At a December 1980 West Berlin conference of the Mont Pelerin Society, Baron Max von Thurn delivered a keynote speech advocating the legalization of all forms of black-market economy, citing the international drug and arms trade as one of the few "growth areas" in the world economy during the 1970s. A review of the Thurn und Taxis banking and commercial empire's interface with the Bulgarian Kintex and Foreign Trade Bank is an example of East-West collusion in the \$400 billion per year guns-for-drugs business.

According to a former Bulgarian State Security (KDS) official named Sverdlev, at a Moscow meeting of the interior ministers of all of the Warsaw Pact nations in 1980, orders came down from the KGB, to "accelerate the disintegration of Western society" through support for the drug trade. Toward this end, the Bulgarian KDS created a number of state-owned trading companies, foreign-exchange banks, tourist services, and trucking companies to interface into the already thriving heroin and other hard-drug-smuggling networks in the West.

By 1970, Sofia had already emerged as the commercial center of the guns-for-drugs trade, absorbing under the Kintex export-import company the remnants of the old Vichyite "French connection" heroin ring, and the Turkish-Syrian mafia responsible for the Middle East hashish trade and for the laboratory refining of Far East "Golden Triangle" opium.

It was not until Nov. 23, 1982, when Italian authorities raided the Milan headquarters of Stipam International Transports, a subsidiary of Kintex, that a serious dent was made in investigating the "Bulgarian connection." Documents carted out of the Stipam offices revealed a worldwide "barter" arrangement accounting for tens of billions of dollars in drugs and guns per year, dating back to 1967, when Stipam director Henri Arsan set up the Milan operation out of a villa in Sofia that was provided to him by Kintex. The Stipam connection funneled tons of sophisticated arms into the hands of such diverse terrorist groups as the Red Brigades, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Turkish neo-Nazi Grey Wolves, the Italian fascist New Order, factions of the Lebanese Falange linked to the Nazi International, the Sandinistas, the Pinochet government of Chile, the Afghani Mujahadeen, and the Khalistani (Sikh) separatists.

It was through this drugs-for-arms-for-terrorists triad that the Agca assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II on May 13, 1981 was carried out from beginning to end. It was on a forged Sikh passport in the name Yoginder Singh that Mehmet Ali Agca traveled to Sofia,

Bulgaria in the summer of 1980 to receive instructions and the initial payment for the assassination plot. And it was through the Thurn und Taxis-linked Bayerische Vereinsbank that the Bulgarian funds were transferred into West Germany for Agca's use.

Beginning with the Khomeini coup in Iran in February 1978, the focal point of international opium production dramatically shifted from the Far East to the "Golden Crescent" region of Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and sections of the Punjab region of India, center of the Khalistani (Sikh) insurgency. All of these areas were either under direct Soviet control or under the control of "separatist" elements linked to Aliyev's "foreign nationalities" division of the KGB and to the Nazi International. With the Iran-Iraq war consuming enormous quantities of military hardware, Teheran became a principal stop on the dope-for-arms underground railroad, and Iranian territory became a preferred training ground for foreign nationals—including Western Europeans—receiving terrorist instructions from top-level Soviet military personnel at 12 camps inside Iran. The continuing involvement of the British and Israeli governments in the sale of enormous quantities of arms to Khomeini served up until late 1984 as a "blinder" to the fact of extensive Soviet GRU operations inside Iran—with the blessing of the inner circles around Khomeini.

Recent U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) studies have underscored the role of the Soviet guns-for-dope trade in Western Europe in providing reconnaissance and logistics for terrorism, especially through "nationality" cutouts such as the North Koreans, the Bulgarians, and the East Germans.

Vesco and the Cubans

Simultaneous with the expansion of the drugs-for-arms infrastructure into all the major capitals of Western Europe, a Bulgarian-Cuban interface with the old Meyer Lansky-run Caribbean drug syndicate was achieving enormous increases in the narcotics flow within the Western Hemisphere. Here again, the unmistakable imprint of Marshal Ogarkov's doctrine of "pinprick warfare" gave the narco-terrorist offensive a "Made in Moscow" stamp of approval.

Immediately upon the November 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, the Cuban government, with KGB consultation, prepared an insurgency program called "Plan Bravo," according to CIA sources. The plan called for flooding with cocaine Miami, New York City, New Orleans, and other urban centers of the U.S. eastern seaboard. The revenues were largely plowed back into the buildup of a narco-terrorist infrastructure throughout the hemisphere.

Plan Bravo was facilitated by the recruitment of two allied capabilities.

First, U.S. drug and dirty-money kingpin Robert Vesco was co-opted into the Cuban intelligence service, probably through previous Vesco ties into the Bulgarian smuggling networks, including the Stripam group. Now residing on an island villa just outside Havana, Vesco brought over to the Cubans a Caribbean-U.S. apparatus of dirty banks and other money-laundering facilities originally built up through the Swiss and British Rothschild family-sponsored Investors Overseas Service (IOS). This apparatus included a criminal infrastructure inside the United States operating at least in part under the cover of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, whose national chairman Kenneth Bialkin helped create the IOS hot-money sieve; the direct interface with the Colombian centered Ibero-American cocaine mafia through Vesco's business partner Carlos Lehder; and blackmail files on prominent political figures in every American administration from the period of Richard Nixon through the Carter administration of "Billygate" fame. Vesco, it should be recalled,

was the original "back channel" between the Carter White House and Libyan dictator Qaddafi.

Before landing in his Havana villa, Vesco spent much of 1981-83 shuttling between the Bahamas, Nicaragua, and Panama, overseeing the creation of the financial linkups between the burgeoning cocaine families of the continent, the Cuban intelligence services, and the Sandinistas.

Meanwhile, the second allied capability, the "Bulgarian connection," was sinking deep roots into South America. In 1979, Colombian President Alfonso López Michelsen, who had just finished his term of office, made an extended visit to Bulgaria, and established personal relations with Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov, his daughter Lyudmila Zhivkova, and her husband Ivan Slavkov. Lyudmila, a Bogomil mystic, facilitated the buildup of the cultist and narco-terrorist Gnostic church throughout Ibero-America, while her husband Ivan Slavkov became the principal contact point for Bulgarian guns-for-dope transactions into the Western Hemisphere, operating through a West German national, Peter Mulack, in Miami. Among the recipients of Slavkov-Mulack arms, according to an April 1984 report on Danish television, were: the Colombian M-19 terrorists, the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, and the Chilean DINA (secret police).

With the Bulgarian connection penetrated into the Western Hemisphere, Nicaragua was further transformed into a central dispatch station for all international terrorist operations in the region. By the early part of 1983, the Iranian embassy in Managua was functioning as the bursar's office for insurgency efforts in Central America, Mexico, the United States, and parts of South America. Training operations and safehousing were being provided to European and Middle Eastern terrorist groups, with a direct linkup to the West German pro-terrorist "scene" through Hamburg resident and frequent Managua visitor Philip Agee. The German links to the narco-terrorist activities in South America were further established last year when a Green Party delegation traveled to Peru to join support networks of the fanatical killing cult Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso); and when Vesco partner and avowed neo-Nazi Carlos Lehder, the head of one of the three largest cocaine organizations in Colombia, and reputedly one of the creators of the MAS "death squads," announced that he was financing the formation of a Green Party affiliate in Colombia.

During the spring of 1984, in preparation for a renewed activation of terrorism in Italy, the Red Brigades also deployed numbers of exiled members from Paris to Managua to facilitate deeper operational ties to other international terrorist cells.

The importance of the Western Hemispheric component of the Russian-directed terrorist international is underscored by the continuing personal role played by leading French government official Régis Debray. Author of *Revolution in the Revolution*, a handbook of urban insurgency that spelled out the modus operandi of the first generation RAF and Red Brigades, and founder in 1966 of the Havana-based Tricontinental Congress, Debray has been the responsible figure in the Mitterrand government for the current status of Paris as the leading terrorist safehouse in continental Europe.

U.S. and French intelligence officials have privately stated that the assassination of René Audran by the RAF was approved within the Elysée by the Debray apparatus—as a message to any leading French military figure committed to backing the U.S. SDI program. The assassination of Audran, 24 hours after his return from a high-level diplomatic mission to the Federal Republic concerning French-West German cooperation on military R & D matters, has prompted an alert around the French-

German joint laser installation in Alsace, one of the most important military research centers in Europe.

Despite Debray's Cuban connections (he was a professor for several years at the University of Havana), his former membership in the French Communist Party, and his key role in the present Euro-terrorist upsurge, it would be an error to label Debray a "KGB agent." Debray is acting on behalf of Soviet Russian state policy because his controllers within the French Synarchist circles are acting out their strategic deal with Moscow. (The Synarchy was the secret racist organization which spawned both the Nazi and communist movements in France in the 1920s, '30s, and '40s.)

The most prominent among the "old families" directing Debray's treachery is the Schlumberger family, Swiss Protestants who founded the 16th-century Banque Schlumberger, Neufliz, Mallet, and one of the principal financial backers of the Mitterrand presidential campaign. The Schlumbergers have been a controlling factor in every "jacobin" movement in France since the time of the French Revolution, including the French Communist and Socialist parties today. Nevertheless Schlumberger heiress Dominique Schlumberger de Menil, a resident of Houston, Texas, is a converted Sufi dervish and a leading patroness of avowed Hitler-lover and Muslim Brotherhood fanatic Ahmed Ben Bella. Madame de Menil's deceased husband, Jean de Menil, was a board member and shareholder in the Perminex Corporation of Montreal, named as the masterminds of the 1963 assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and a proven funding conduit for the Synarchist Secret Army Organization (OAS) assassination plots against French President General Charles de Gaulle throughout the early 1960s.

The terrorist core

The terrorist apparatus unleashed against the population of Western Europe by Moscow is operating on three distinguishable, but interfaced levels.

1) *The control.* The precision targeting of critical components of the NATO command is being accomplished through detailed intelligence beyond the capacities of the terrorist underground acting alone. This intelligence—typified by the access to the NATO secret pipeline map and the identification and profiling of Audran and Zimmermann—is the kind of information only accessible through *state* security services with the depth of operational capabilities of a KGB or Stasi.

Next to the Warsaw Pact intelligence services themselves, the most important official intelligence service exerting control over the European targeted terrorist infrastructure is the Syrian. Deeply interpenetrated into Geidar Aliyev's "Islamintern," Syrian intelligence was also the postwar product of the Lausanne, Switzerland-centered Nazi (Malmö) International, through Alois Brunner, the number two figure in the Syrian foreign ministry and a wartime Nazi SS official.

Through the Syrian-Turkish opium mafia colony in Aleppo on the Turkish border, a tight interlock exists to the Bulgarian-Turkish black market route into Eastern and Western Europe and to the Swiss dirty-money centers. Aleppo is also a point of intersection with sections of Israeli intelligence linked to former Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. Through this channel, Israeli arms sales to Ayatollah Khomeini have been facilitated and "mutually beneficial" terrorist operations conducted by Syria and Israel. Exemplary of the latter is Syria's ongoing assassination spree against the Saudi-backed moderate faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) associated with chairman Yasser Arafat.

U.S. intelligence specialists are projecting an increasing role by sections

of the Israeli Mossad in Moscow's terrorist deployment against NATO. Since December 1984, when Soviet asset Armand Hammer made a visit to Tel Aviv en route to Moscow, the Soviet-Israeli back-channels have been burning up in preparation for a fundamental shift in relations between the two countries. Hammer and Sharon, according to Israeli sources, are seeking to work out a *modus vivendi* between Russia and Israel. In early January, an unusual summit took place quietly in Teheran between top officials of the Soviet KGB, the Mossad, and British intelligence, concerning detailed plans to shut the United States out of the Persian Gulf.

The potential for such an Israeli double-cross has grave implications for the European terrorist efforts. The Mossad has virtual *carte blanche* to operate in the Federal Republic of Germany, literally controlling the Frankfurt International Airport, running the pornography district of Frankfurt, and enjoying the right to kill with impunity on West German soil. The number-two man in East German intelligence, Marcus Wolf, is believed to have close ties to the Mossad.

2) *The "terrorist scene."* In September 1984, at the outset of the NATO Autumn Reforger maneuvers, the West German "peace" movement, in one 24-hour period, cemented shut nearly every "shape charge hole" in every bridge and tunnel in the Federal Republic. The holes are part of the defense of Europe against a Warsaw Pact invasion, permitting quick demolition of key bridge and tunnel access of Russian tank and armored personnel carrier columns into West Germany.

This sabotage action starkly illustrates the link between the broad-based terrorist and pro-terrorist "scene" and the Soviet *spetsnaz* ("special designation") units.

During the spring of 1984, European newspapers reported that Soviet and Bulgarian specially equipped TIR trucks, driven by *spetsnaz* drivers, had conducted a thorough profiling of the highway, bridge, and tunnel system of continental Western Europe, as part of the Kremlin's updating of its invasion plans. It is virtually certain that the TIR surveillance-reconnaissance missions provided the intelligence data for the "peace movement" sabotage.

The broad-based pro-terrorist "scene" has 2,000-10,000 members capable of being mobilized for actions ranging from demonstrations to low-grade bombings and other sabotage. These activists provide a cover for KGB operations and ensure that Western counterterrorist resources are stretched to the limit. The role played by West Germany's Green Party in these pro-terrorist networks is central; indeed, the toleration of an East bloc-dominated neo-Nazi movement within Western Europe is the single greatest breach of NATO security.

3) *The spetsnaz teams.* It is the Soviet professional sabotage and assassination teams which are carrying out the most sophisticated terrorist attacks, including the Audran and Zimmermann assassinations and the pipeline bombings. Local pro-terrorist circles are normally kept in the dark about operational details.

While the past year's exposure of the Soviet *spetsnaz* squads served a valuable educational purpose, one dangerous false impression was communicated, particularly through a Soviet defector source code-named Viktor Suvorov. That was the false report that *spetsnaz* training and membership is restricted to Russian nationals and predominantly to Slavs.

Under the Aliyev "foreign nationalities" program, foreign nationals have been fully integrated into the *spetsnaz* apparatus.

Within this effort, *spetsnaz* "cells" are known to be operative within the IRA, the ASALA, and the Basque ETA. Since the 1983 car-bombing of the U.S. embassies in Beirut and Kuwait, at least a section of U.S. intelligence has viewed the Islamic Jihad group as a virtual "key and code" for Middle East-based units of the expanded *spetsnaz*.

5.2 Soviet Surrogates Provide 48 Months of Pre-War Assassinations and Sabotage

The Soviet capability to perpetrate assassinations and sabotage is not limited to the professional cadres of the *spetsnaz*, or even the Third World liberationists with their diplomas from Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. When Marshal Ogarkov asks, as he did in a November 1984 article with reference to the President of the United States, "Are there no forces in the world capable of tying the hands of these maniacs, who hang the sword of death over the world?"—the forces ready to respond are many more, and more far-flung, than those.

These forces comprise old communist networks carried forward from the Communist International and now embedded within the so-called peace movement; the capabilities of Syrian intelligence and Libya's Muammar Qaddafi; layer upon layer of cultish groups, which may be identified as *gnostic* or *synarchist*; surviving "Old Nazi" networks, adopted and cultivated by Soviet agencies after the war; countless societies—more often than not, sponsored by the Benedictine Order—agitating in favor of the rights of "indigenous" or "endangered" peoples; and so forth.

Their capability is to carry out not just 48 hours of sabotage at military installations, but 48 months of assassinations and blind terror, which by disrupting governments and terrorizing populations, is every bit as much a prewar deployment as the proverbial "last minute" *spetsnaz* operation before a military attack. In the early 1980s, we have witnessed wave upon wave of this terrorism, which is a vital component of the Ogarkov Plan.

We stress: What is involved is *by no means* the mere recruitment of terrorists and cycling of them through Moscow, or Leipzig, or Tashkent—as much of that as does go on.

When Geidar Aliyev, the Shi'ite Muslim-born Politburo member, calls for improved exploitation of "spiritual factors" in Soviet society (applicable also abroad), he is talking about what the Russian Empire has learned and manipulated over centuries of expansion. The Soviet Institute of Orientology, whose director, Yevgenii Primakov, sneered at the West-

ern mis-estimation of the Iranian Revolution as a short-lived "explosion of fanaticism," dates from the eighteenth century.

Thus, to fathom the Soviet role in any given terrorist atrocity—the assassination of Indira Gandhi, for instance—and to identify, for the purpose of prevention, the potential for new terrorist acts, it pays to begin with a look at what the Slavophiles and the Occult Bureau of the Okhrana (Tsarist secret police) were doing in the relevant region during the nineteenth century, and how those activities intersected those of the continental European and British oligarchy. The institutions, groups, and individuals whose pedigree is tracked from such an investigation, are the greatest, least-noticed component of the Soviets' hidden capability for terrorism. These are the personnel, who conduct what is known to insiders of the intelligence craft as "derivative operations."

"Derivative operations" are the domain of a special kind of organization, which has grown up out of the underworld of "back channels," which thrive in the cracks between the Western and Soviet bloc intelligence services. The massive participation of the Bulgarian intelligence services—and the KGB itself, according to the latest statements of the gunman, Mehmet Ali Agca—in aiding the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II in 1981, was a product of such a "derivative operation," a plot in the cracks between certain powerful Western oligarchs and the Bulgarian government. In the Gandhi assassination, the "derivative operation" lay between the cracks of British and Soviet intelligence, in Sikh separatist Jagjit Singh Chauhan's travels between Britain and Tashkent, during the 1970s; and it began with the "Great Game" of British and Russian empires in Southwest and South Asia a hundred years ago.

The case of the Middle East

In the Middle East, the secret source of Soviet capabilities is the *Nazi-Communist* alliance: Soviet financing and deployment of old Nazi networks were preserved and expanded after World War II. The suicide bombings throughout the region, the assassinations of statesmen and politicians, and even the main tensions—the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict—remain a mystery, until it is understood that at the center of these events lies the Nazi International, alive and well. Coordinated and financed from Switzerland, these Nazi networks are fully integrated with Soviet deployments, giving the Soviets a range of capabilities still enormously underestimated both by Western intelligence agencies and by nations in the area.

This Soviet use of Nazis is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, official U.S. Embassy documents report that by no later than 1951, the Soviet Union was coordinating closely with "a secret international organization composed of former SS officers and partially financed by the Soviets. They are supposed to work with the Russians against the Western orbit" (quoted by Glenn B. Infield in *Skorzeny: Hitler's Commando*).

In turn, the Nazi networks interface the other crucial component of Soviet capabilities—the shared networks of the British Secret Intelligence Service's (SIS) Arab Bureau. British circles, of the same oligarchical faction as Lord Carrington today, protected leading Nazis from hanging at Nuremberg, and redeployed them into the Middle East after the war.

A few dramatic cases illustrate this ugly Soviet-Nazi-British Arab Bureau connivance.

One of the top Middle East controllers for the Nazi International is François Genoud, active in the area since his work for German military intelligence, the Abwehr, beginning in 1936. Genoud's lawyer, Jacques Verges, has been a KGB operative since his early days as a communist in the Anti-Colonialist Student Union in Paris in 1950. Verges is cur-

rently also the lawyer for Klaus Barbie, the Gestapo butcher recently extradited from Latin America.

One of Genoud's leading associates from the Abwehr days, a fellow Swiss who converted to Islam, Ahmed Huber, frequently travels to Leipzig, East Germany, one of the main training centers for Soviet bloc operations in the Arab world. For many years Huber was the accredited correspondent of ADN, the official East German news service, in Berne, Switzerland.

The chief Soviet client state in the Middle East, Syria, was entirely organized in the postwar period by leading SS and Gestapo officials, including by means of one coup run by SS Col. Skorzeny, Hitler's Sabotage Division chief. The top adviser to Syrian intelligence and the Assad brothers has been SS Hauptsturmfuehrer Alois Brunner, also foreign affairs adviser to the neo-Nazi Parti Populaire Syrien (PPS), founded by Hitler-admirer Antun Saadeh.

A top Arabist in the Soviet Foreign Ministry after the war, responsible for the 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal contracted through Czechoslovakia, was Dr. Fritz Grobba, a convert to Islam who had previously been the leading Mideast specialist for the *Auswärtiges Amt*, Hitler's Foreign Office, beginning in the 1930s and continuing throughout the war. In 1941, Grobba was on-the-scene adviser to the pro-Nazi coup of Rashid Ali Geilani in Iraq. After his post-war stint in Moscow, Grobba returned West and resided in West Germany.

From the mid-1960s on, one of the Soviet gamemasters for the Middle East has been KGB General Kim Philby, son of top British Arabist St. John Philby. Philby, like his father, was notorious as a Nazi sympathizer in Britain and in his pro-Franco coverage of the Spanish Civil War, at the same time he was an operative of the OGPU, predecessor of the KGB.

Lebanese Communist Party chief George Hawi, who consults regularly with Boris Ponomarev, Soviet Central Committee Secretary in charge of the International Department of the Soviet communist party's Central Committee, otherwise travels in the company of Abdullah Saadeh, head of the fascist PPS, and son of its founder.

At United Nations-sponsored events on the Middle East, top Soviet specialists on the Islamic world, Vladimir Vinogradov of the Foreign Ministry and Soviet Orientology Institute head Primakov, have been observed fraternizing with such figures as Salam Azzam of the London-based Arab Bureau front, the Islamic Council of Europe; with Nazi-financed radicals of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); and with the "highly respectable" members of the Geneva-based Islam and the West organization, one of whose founders was Marouf Dawalibi, chief aide in Berlin from 1941-45 to the top Nazi Arab agent, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem.

Ahmed Huber, the alumnus of *Abwehr Division II* (Sabotage) during the war and some-time employee of the East German telegraph agency, has spoken of a great commonality of interests, between the old Nazis and the "peace-loving" Soviets.* He participated, according to records of French intelligence, in a July 1982 meeting of predominantly North African Muslims in Paris. The pictures on the wall set the tone of the

*Review the careers of the Grand Mufti, of Skorzeny, of Genoud and his network—bearing in mind all the while, that the Third Reich was consciously modeled on the "Third Rome" ideology of Russian imperialists—and the essence of Nazi-Communist terrorism begins to emerge.

gathering: a large picture, of Ayatollah Khomeini and of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hitler's main Arab ally.

The perspective of Nazi-Communist Huber, according to reports of journalists who spoke with him in 1983, was that the coming year "should see the real Muslims taking over the Islamic world. We have to do away with the corrupt and the unbelievers like Arafat, Saddam Hussein, Mubarak, and the hypocrites of the Saudi monarchy who claim to represent Islam. Today the Iranian Islamic revolution of Ayatollah Khomeini is the true inheritor of the ideas of the Grand Mufti. We have to work for a universal community of Believers!"

By the spring of 1985, Huber's vision had come a long way towards realization. In the first week of March, a "World Council of the Islamic Revolution" was created in Teheran, with the stated purpose of reuniting the Sunni and Shi'ite branches of Islam—on the basis of the irrationalist Islamic fundamentalism, which produces the drivers of car-bombs on suicide missions. The 1980 book *Hostage to Khomeini*, written by EIR's Middle East desk staff, provoked an outcry, with its assertion that the secret, British-created Muslim Brotherhood cult organization of Hassan al Banna was the key to the Ayatollah Khomeini. The Muslim Brotherhood is a Sunni organization, some criticism ran; it could have no influence over a movement that was predominantly Shi'ite. After all, the difference between Shi'ism and Sunnism is the equivalent of the split between Catholicism and Protestantism.

But our point was, that so-called Islamic fundamentalism is essentially a pre-Islamic, irrationalist cult, created on the basis of ancient Sufi belief and brainwashing structures insinuated into Islam. Moreover, this revived Sufism is the key to a broader "fundamentalist" revival, affecting Christianity as well. The common goal of this revived Sufism, whether in Islamic or Christian garb, is the destruction of the modern nation-state. Sufi, or—more broadly—gnostic, irrationalism is the unifying philosophical basis of agreement among the Nazis, British SIS Arab Bureau, and the Soviet players of the "Islamic Card," under the Shi'ite Geidar Aliyev.

Where Sufism is involved, Nazis will not be far behind. (Heinrich Himmler, in establishing both a training program and a belief structure for the SS, consciously modeled the order on the Jesuits, themselves directly modeled on the Sufi brotherhoods of the Middle East by Jesuit founder Ignatius Loyola, from the time of his training in Paris under the gnostic crusader order, the Hospitallers of St. John. A leading strain of Nazi theory—race "science"—was adopted in large measure from the writings of self-styled Count de Gobineau, author of *Philosophy in Central Asia* and a leading Sufi propagandist.)

While Huber's 1982 meeting was taking place, printing presses were already active in several parts of the Islamic world producing in Arabic, Turkish, and other languages, the latest editions of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, scores of which had been found by the Israelis in certain quarters in Beirut after the June, 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. In February 1983, Soviet asset Muammar Qaddafi, the dictator of Libya, told the French daily *Le Matin*: "Hitler was right! He understood that the Jews were a deadly threat to the German nation. He had to eliminate them."

Soviet sponsorship of assets calling for a Hitler revival and a "final solution" for the Jews is not some side effect of the Soviet use of these assets, but a lawful outcome of the Soviets' own beliefs and policy. Every Qaddafi statement on killing the Jews, every old Nazi longing for the final solution, is directly encouraged by Soviet leaders like General A.

The Soviet cult-masters

Yepishev, commissar of the Soviet Armed Forces, who promote a revival of Great Russian chauvinism with all its worst features, including vile anti-Semitism.

The master at pointing all kinds of religious fervor and blood-and-soil cultism in "an anti-imperialist direction" is Aliyev. But with the upgraded exploitation of "spiritual factors" by the Andropov-Aliyev KGB, many more elements of the old Communist International apparat and the Soviet Academy of Sciences institutions have come into the fray.

Andropov, Aliyev & Co., cultural warfare experts, draw heavily on the legacy of the Communist International's Baku Congress, described in Part 3 of this report.

The legacy of Baku found its way into Western Europe, too, where we find Soviet operatives, once again, sharing tea with the European "black" oligarchy. Cominternist Karl Radek went from Baku to attend the founding conference of a League of Oppressed Peoples in Berlin, with the German Graf von Reventlow, a "monarcho-marxist" whose wife, Fanny von Reventlow, ran a group called Children of the Sun, in Ascona, Switzerland. For Radek, this kind of liaison was nothing out of the ordinary; of all the Bolsheviks, he was the closest to a prototype of a "Nazi-Communist" and he hand-picked the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), which was to help the Nazis come to power. Fanny Reventlow's Ascona center was attended not only by the Anthroposoph leader Rudolf Steiner and the future Nazi Rudolf Hess, but by a prominent French Sufi mystic, Louis Massignon—later the teacher of Russian emigre Count Alexandre Bennigsen, peddler of Islamic fundamentalism as a potent weapon against the U.S.S.R.

The modern version of Reventlow's league is the Society for Endangered Peoples, a control-point for separatist terrorism in Europe. Those of the "endangered peoples" support networks who clothe themselves in scholarly garb, may be found in intimate dialogue with the staff of Yulian Bromley's Soviet Institute of Ethnography.

A 1976 conference of Soviet and Western anthropologists, attended by Bromley and top British ethnographer Ernest Gellner, was sponsored by the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research and held at its Burg Wartenstein castle in Austria; originally known as The Viking Fund, this foundation had been endowed in 1941 by Swedish industrialist Axel Wenner-Gren, who was so notorious a supporter of the Nazis that hardly a single American anthropologist would take its money after the war.

In 1939, the future Wenner-Gren Foundation activist Paul Fejos led an anthropological expedition to Peru, where his studies of indigenous Indian culture fed into a corpus of work, the result of which is the epidemic of "indigenist" terrorism, epitomized by the murderous Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) guerrillas in that country today. There was a Soviet and Comintern part in this project, too; the full name of the guerrilla gang is the "Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui," after the founder of the Peruvian Communist Party, whose works served as "bible" for the anthropologists who built up the indigenist cult. In the 1920s, Mariategui sojourned in Europe, in the milieu of Radek, imbibing the primitivist doctrines of Soviet Russia's culture commissar, Anatolii Lunacharskii.

Today, Anatolii Shulgovskii of Moscow's Latin America Institute writes that the "Indian question" is the central issue of revolutionary struggle in Ibero-America, that "the characteristic trait of Latin America today is the broad incorporation of the indigenous masses into the liberation movement." Shulgovskii especially praised the work of one Nilo Ceyu-

queo, an adviser to the executive committee of the Congress of Indian Movements of South America, founded in 1980. The manifesto of that group contains a list of indigenist principles, marking it as a movement directed against nation states, and toward the destruction of the people on whose behalf it is allegedly fighting. For example, it defends the coca leaf, the widely-used brain-dulling drug, as "for the Andean peoples a bible provided by a sacred divining power; it is for this reason that it is used in the ceremonies, the offerings to Mother Earth, Father Sun and the other natural divinities."

The glorification of mother-cult practices that hold a population in bondage to its own backwardness, barring the road to economic and cultural progress, is the hallmark of the "cultural relativism" that is hegemonic in anthropology and ethnography, Soviet included—the same way of thinking, which led the American Museum of Natural History in New York at one time to display the stuffed bodies of captured human beings, Eskimos.

There is hardly an ethnic sub-group anywhere inside or outside the U.S.S.R. that has escaped scrutiny by the brigades of ethnographers from Bromley's Institute of Ethnography. On the home front, this means studies like *Sufism in Turkmenia*, *From the History of Buryat Shamanism*, and *Khorezm Legends as a Source Material for the Study of the History of Religious Cults of Soviet Central Asia*. Abroad, they look at such matters as: *Small Peoples of Southern Asia*, *Indians and Pakistanis Abroad*, *Ethnic Processes in the Countries of South America*, *Small Peoples of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines*, *Symbolism of Cults and Rituals of the Peoples of Asia (the U.S.S.R. Excluded)*, *The Church and the Oligarchy in Latin America, 1810-1959*, *The Maronites*, and so forth. Their work has been turned to account by the KGB in Southwest Asia, Europe, Latin America, and wherever else separatism and separatist terrorism suit Soviet purposes.

Recommended reading

EIR Special Report, *How Moscow Plays the Muslim Card in the Middle East* (1984); detailed history of Nazi-Soviet collaboration in the Middle East.

EIR Special Report, *European Terrorism: The Soviets' Pre-War Deployment* (1985).

Mexican Labor Party, *The PAN: Moscow's Terrorists in Mexico* (1985); includes history of the Synarchist movement, where Nazis and Communists cross paths once again.

EIR Special Report, *Narco-Terrorism in Ibero-America* (1984).

EIR, Vol. 12, No. 14, "Syria's role as the center of world terrorism."

EIR, Vol. 12, No. 20, "Behind the conspiracy to create a unified, fundamentalist Islam."

6. The Soviet Plan of Attack

Soviet doctrine, and patterns of build-up of capabilities and military exercises coincide, to the following effect. Under the maximum option provided by the current Soviet war-plan, the Ogarkov Plan, the Soviets will launch World War III from a standing start, without what would be revealing forms of pre-assault mobilizations and deployments from barracks.

This means, that all Soviet nuclear weapons and antisatellite weapons would be deployed simultaneously:

- 1) U.S. territory would be targeted for successive echelons of "first strike" thermonuclear assault, with the first to arrive being an SLBM barrage exploding over U.S. territory within several minutes of the beginning of the general assault, followed by arrival of successive waves of initial and reload salvos of ICBMs.
- 2) There would be a simultaneous assault against all U.S. nuclear submarines, aided by continuous tracking of these over an extended period prior to assault.
- 3) There would be a simultaneous assault against all European and Mediterranean targets by intermediate- and short-range missiles, and reload fire of these missiles to provide cover for deployment of general assault forces under cover of nuclear artillery.
- 4) Under the cover of nuclear-artillery and supplementary missile bombardments, there would be a general, coordinated, naval, land, and vertical troop-assault against the territory of Western Europe, leading into the occupation of Bristol, England, by Marshal Ogarkov personally, within about 14 days of the general assault.

The U.S. territorial targets of thermonuclear bombardment include the following prime targets:

- 1) Pin down all U.S. thermonuclear capability, and destroy as much as possible, by successive pin-down and destruction assaults, with initial and following reload salvos, and destruction of the U.S. nuclear-submarine fleet.
- 2) Destroy all U.S. Atlantic port-cities through which reenforcement of forces in Western Europe might be attempted, such as Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Hampton Roads area, Savannah, and New Orleans.

Unless the United States is operating on a "launch on warning" targeting of, especially, the territory of Muscovy and its prized Siberian assets, giving an assured penalty in excess of "acceptable penalties of victory" for Soviet war-plans, such a first-strike attack, launched by 1988, would ensure a victory for Soviet forces, with virtually assured immediate surrender by governments of Western Europe and the United States.

This plan of attack presumes not only the capability for launching the assault to this effect, but also deployment of measures of active and passive Soviet ballistic missile defense.

In the matter of active defense, it is clear that the Soviets are presently relying upon a combination of antisatellite technology plus very crude but effective thermonuclear means against U.S. missiles: saturating the exoatmosphere with neutron and EMP densities sufficient to neutralize the greater portion of U.S. missiles, plus some degree of first-generation point-defense forms of ground-based ballistic missile defense.

In the matter of passive defense, Soviet civil defense approaches that of Switzerland, whereas civil defense is virtually non-existent in Western Europe and the United States. An important factor is the medical component of Soviet civil defense, including deployment of medical services and mass inoculations of the population. Aided by a state-by-state campaign conduited through the ACLU, the formerly prevailing programs of inoculation of school-children in the United States are becoming almost non-existent. The vulnerability of the United States to biological warfare is increasing rapidly, whereas Soviet defenses in this respect are rapidly improving.

Documentation: See *Appendix* on general principles of use of neutron-fluxes and electromagnetic pulses (EMP) as BMD modes.

7. Keys to U.S.A. and NATO Counter-Strategy

The two key problems to be solved, representing the cornerstones of an Atlantic counter-strategy, are 1) Exo- and endoatmospheric defense against Soviet missiles and nuclear artillery, and 2) Deployment of enhanced-radiation battlefield weapons against Soviet naval and ground assault forces.

It must be stressed afresh, especially in light of some very foolish chattering among some news media, politicians, and systems analysts, that there are no perfect weapons-systems either of offense or defense. Contrary to old theories of set-piece warfare demolished in 1806 on the battlefield at Jena, the efficient planning and conduct of warfare is a matter of constant improvisation in firepower and mobility, in an environment of forced-draft technological attrition in design and effectiveness of weapons-systems and tactics. All competent planning and conduct of warfare is of the form of "crash program" mobilization and deployment, whose product is a rapid-fire succession of improvisations merely approximating the optimal result sought asymptotically.

The object of defensive counter-strategy is to administer, by successive improvisations, a sufficient penalty to the assault, to impose unacceptable degrees of losses in vital self-interests to the assaulting power. The essence of assault, is to win and survive warfare with acceptable degrees of losses; the same applies to the defense. The essence of both is mobile development of capabilities, both in space and in technology of firepower and mobility: to gain freedom of continuing action in depth, at the expense of relatively reduced freedom of action and depth of opposing forces. The essence of battle is not the battle itself, but the results of the battle respecting the larger matters of freedom of action in depth.

If the defending power can contain the assaulting power's freedom of action sufficiently, the balance of advantage shifts to the defending power, which is then able to deploy counterassault against the constrained opponent. Thus, a nominally inferior force, with superior freedom of action, may defeat a nominally superior force.

If we can exhaust the adversary's assault capabilities, by means which minimize the penalties we suffer as a defending power, and can exhaust the adversary's capabilities sufficiently that his freedom of action is weakened significantly relative to our own, we survive and win the conflict.

If our adversary is militarily rational, as the Soviet military command is, and if he knows that we have such a potential advantage, he will not launch war under those conditions, unless we give him no option but that of launching the war despite the known risk.

Limiting ourselves, for a moment, to the issue of weapons systems. The advantage is determined by three factors: firepower, mobility, and relative cheapness. If we can provide the defense with greater mobility and firepower for destroying assaulting forces than those assaulting forces represent, and if we can destroy a unit of assaulting force more cheaply than that unit can be produced and deployed, then the defense has an implicitly absolute superiority to the offense.

For example: How many of a flotilla of Soviet missiles can be neutralized by the detonation of one average thermonuclear warhead of defense detonated exoatmospherically in ballistic missile defense? Or, how many of a flotilla of Soviet missiles can be destroyed by an average, nuclear-powered array of x-ray laser beams? What is the cost of deploying the defensive weapon, as compared with the cost of producing and deploying the flotilla of assault-missiles it destroys? What is the firepower and mobility of the defensive system, relative to the firepower represented by the combined production, deploying, and attempted anti-BMD defenses of the assault-missile flotilla?

If the defense can deploy greater firepower and mobility than the offense, and deploy this more cheaply, then, given approximately equal total efforts, the defense wins. If the defense wins by a sufficiently large margin, then the offensive capability of the defense will next be able to overwhelm the attacking power with a counteroffensive. Soviet spies are very industrious and numerous, and the Soviet military command is rational in these technicalities of war-planning; if they discover that we have a margin of effective defense adequate to neutralize the war-winning margin of a "rolling first strike" assault, they will postpone the launching of warfare accordingly.

We must educate the politicians and others to recognize, that under this universe, there exists no absolute offense, nor perfect defense, as there exists neither irresistible force nor immovable object. Only the lawfulness of the ordering of the laws of the universe is unchangeable, such that everything of lesser degree, including the largest galaxy, can be moved or dissipated as a matter of principle.

It is the rather obvious corollary of this, that it is a self-deception, to imagine that we must first perfect the application of one technique, before advancing to a superior technology. There is nothing which can be accomplished by improving the application of a lesser technology, which could not be accomplished better with even a fairly crude application of a most advanced technology. In economic science, "better" signifies advances in the productive powers of labor; in military applications, we describe "productivity" as "firepower" and "mobility," or, the same thing, as "relative freedom of action."

We must situate the task of developing a ballistic missile defense, and defense against ground and naval assault, and other forms of airborne assault, not as a task of perfecting any particular set of technologies, but rather as a rapid-fire succession of successively more advanced technologies. Rather than pausing at each stage of technology, to perfect the application of those principles, we must race ahead to the next higher technology as soon as we have deployed even relatively crude applications of the technology now in hand.

Consider simple illustrations of the point from ordinary economics.

The idea of a piston-engine fired by fossil fuel is now more than 300

years old; the first outline of the principles of this engine was developed by Gottfried Leibniz's collaborator, Christian Huyghens, during the seventeenth century. During the past decades, we have behaved very foolishly, trying to perfect automobiles based on the variety of internal combustion engine currently in general use. Instead of wasting tens of billions of dollars on emission controls for present designs of internal combustion engines, we could have developed engines which burn methane, or better, hydrogen, as a fuel; the waste-product of well-organized methane oxidation is water and carbon dioxide, whereas the waste-product of well-organized hydrogen combustion is water, which is not exactly a pollutant of air.

Similarly, the failure to improve railway systems, has given us excessive dependency upon highway motor vehicles, as well as a worsening air-traffic problem. Inherently, we can move passengers and freight more cheaply by modern technologies in rail transport, than by air or highway vehicles, and if we take into account the time lost in travel to and from airports, over distances of about 250 miles or less, between population-centers, the elapsed time of travel from starting-point to destination between cities, can be readily less by rail transport than by air-transport.

Some argue that the combined convenience and cost of using automobiles to the purchaser, militates against investment in improved rail-transport between cities and against greater use of intra-urban rapid transit. This narrow view overlooks the real cost to society of operating the motor vehicle, including such costs as highway construction and maintenance, urban traffic management, and pollution, for example.

Had we not tolerated the foolish policy of failing to develop and maintain mass-transit rail-systems, we would have discovered that the very large concentration of travel costs in mass-transit systems would have already created the preconditions for superseding simple rail roadbeds of the type now in use, by new technologies such as magnetic levitation. The gains in economy, and social benefit of personal time saved, would have been so great, that it would have been foolish to continue to improve systems based on present designs of railway networks, when more advanced technologies would enable us to accomplish the same end-result cheaper and better. In automotive production, better materials, such as ceramics, new combustion-systems, would give us a better, cheaper, safer, and more durable product, than efforts to perfect existing modes of automotive design.

In military science, the urgency of this recommended policy confronts us more forcefully. Whenever we have the choice of perfecting existing technologies, or racing ahead to develop improvised applications of more advanced technologies, the improvisation of more advanced technologies is always the correct choice of policy. Whenever we catch ourselves lingering over the idea of perfecting an existing technology in use, we must become suspicious that our military adversary may be bypassing us, developing a crude but workable improvisation of a more advanced technology, by aid of which he may defeat us.

In both economics and military science, advances in productivity or advances in firepower and mobility, have a very simple rule-of-thumb measurement: increase of both the amount of usable energy per-capita, and increasingly coherent application of higher energy-flux densities in applications. It should not be astonishing that we measure productivity and increase of firepower and mobility in the same terms; they are ultimately the same thing. Firepower and mobility are essentially nothing but the application of the principle of increased productivity to the battlefield. Moreover, the ability to deploy superior firepower and mobility

depends upon the technological level and scale of productivity in depth in the economy producing the means of warfare.

In economy, the principle of success is not that of achieving some fixed level of technology, of productivity, but, rather, of achieving a rate of increase of the level of technology, of productivity. In the preparations for, and conduct of modern warfare, the precondition for superiority is not perfection of fixed types of weapons-systems, but, rather, a rapid increase in the level of technology—of fire-power and mobility—achieved during the entire span of the process of preparations for and conduct of that protracted war-fighting. A high rate of technological progress, in depth and scale, in the economy, is the precondition for achieving high rates of improvised progress in firepower and mobility in the conduct of war-fighting.

The process of developing a defense adequate to outweigh the Soviet offense, must be viewed, not as the production and deployment of a fixed array of weapons-systems in a fixed way, but as a more fluid process of successive improvisations, and this on an ever-more-extended scale at an accelerating pace.

Tactical defense

One of the more frequent objections to Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense, is the argument that successful ballistic missile defense, by weighing against Nuclear Deterrence, introduces once again the possibility of fighting protracted forms of generalized warfare. This objection is more frequently met in Europe than in the United States, for the obvious reason that it is on the battlefields of Europe that Soviet general assault must be faced.

This kind of objection to SDI is flawed on two principal accounts. Immediately, it overlooks the fact, that the "new physical principles" essential to SDI have immediate and obvious applications to defense against naval and land assault. Secondly, it overlooks the fact, that a return to the possibility of general warfare fought by soldiers, is a most desirable reversal of recent decades trends in capabilities and doctrines.

The folly of much influential Western military thinking on these points, is most directly and forcefully illustrated by examining the development of Soviet strategic doctrine and war-plans since Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii's 1962 book on this subject. Soviet military thinking throughout the postwar period to date, has concentrated upon effecting developments in both thermonuclear offense and defense which permit Soviet commanders to bring the Soviet ground-forces into play as the decisive weapon of winning wars. What frightens European commanders most, is the prospect that loss of the nuclear-deterrence umbrella would unlock the floodgates for Soviet armored assault, the much-cited vast inferiority of the Atlantic Alliance to the Soviets in terms of so-called conventional war-fighting capabilities.

If we compare the male populations of combat-age of the two opposing alliances, we must deem absurd the notion that the Warsaw Pact should have an intrinsic superiority in so-called conventional capabilities. On condition that deployed and reserve forces of the Atlantic Alliance nations are maintained at acceptable levels of quality, the vast superiority of the combined economies of the OECD Western nations over the Soviet economy 15 years ago, ought to have shown that the end of the nuclear-deterrence umbrella should have been greatly to the advantage of the Atlantic Alliance. The difference is, that the Soviets have developed their total war-fighting capability, while the Atlantic Alliance has relied so much on the mythical nuclear umbrella, that it has allowed its total war-fighting capability to collapse.

Even with no more than readily feasible alterations in total Atlantic

Alliance capabilities, over the coming three to five years, an effective policy of strategic ballistic missile defense can be complemented by a total war-winning potential for the Atlantic Alliance. Not only does BMD apply as immediately to the endoatmospheric trajectories of medium- and short-range missiles, as to exoatmospheric ICBMs. The same technologies have ready application to ground-warfare problems of defense. The case of the use of the so-called neutron bomb as an infantry-weapon of defense against armored assault, illustrates the general principle.

The advantage of the neutron bomb, and other varieties of enhanced-radiation devices, is that it destroys exposed armored and other assaulting forces over large areas, while leaving such a low residue of radioactivity, that defending troops can immediately counterattack through the regions over which the devices have been detonated. It is inherently a means of defense, since it is relatively inefficient against troops dug in behind a shielding yard of ordinary dirt, whereas attacking forces must, inherently, be in the open for such bombardment. Once the adversary's rear-echelon defense capabilities are significantly neutralized, the counter-attack is able to carry the battle to the attacker's territory.

It must be emphasized again, that we are not speaking of absolute weapons, such that with aid of these our forces might advance with impunity. War remains war, with all the toll that implies for even the best forces. We are speaking of winning, rather than losing general warfare, and of the survival of the victorious nations.

The myth of 'War to End War'

During the course of the first World War, the fraudulent piece of rhetoric was popularized among the Western allies, that that "Great War" was "A War to End All Wars," representing the massive killing and destruction of four years in Europe as a noble act of pacifism.

There is only one condition under which warfare could be banned from our planet. That is the condition under which our planet is composed of sovereign nation-states, each and all self-governed by Augustinian principles of natural law. In this condition, and no other condition, the force of natural law becomes the efficient means by which peoples and nations arrange the remedy of those injustices which might otherwise be just cause for wars or insurrections.

Especially absurd, is the popularized doctrine of this century, that war flows from the egoism of nation-states. This popular delusion requires us to assume that, since the modern form of sovereign nation-state was established during the last half of the fifteenth century, there were no wars on this planet prior to that century.

Contrary to the silly and dangerous delusions of the modern pacifists, warfare is the most natural condition of diplomacy for as long as nations echoing the laws of the Chaldean and Roman empires, and of Sparta, continue to command means adequate to warfare. Such states and populations must perpetually seek the destruction of societies echoing the constitutional principles of Solon. If such states succeeded in eliminating all republicanism from this planet, such states would make war upon one another, since the "blood and soil" racialism inherent to the Spartan, Chaldean, and Roman models of religion, philosophy, and law, requires the subjugation of many peoples by one people, and are so composed that by their nature they must proliferate vile injustice upon the greater portion of humanity.

There can be no end to war until the point is reached, that the heritages of Spartan, Chaldean, and Roman law are eradicated as a significant force on this planet.

The pacifists shrilly, hysterically insist, that war is the greatest of all

evils. On the contrary, it is the second greatest of all evils; the greatest evil would be the bestialization of mankind through lack of efficient resistance to the heritage of Chaldean and related religions, philosophies, and legal doctrines. If no alternative means exist for this purpose, than warfare is the most justified means which the republican cause must deploy, to combat the efforts of the Chaldean or similar heritage to impose its sway upon mankind.

So, today, the Soviet dictatorship and its pacifist fellow-travelers in the West, argue that submission to Soviet rule were the commendable alternative to the penalties of attempting to resist Soviet ambitions. Were we to submit so, for the sake of peace, what then would be the ensuing condition of all mankind? In particular, the Judeo-Christian heritage of Western European culture would vanish from this planet, and the Chaldean bestiality of Sodom and Gomorrah would rule this planet everywhere. To prevent that, war is not only justified, but imperative, if no efficient alternative can be found.

There can be no durable peace between us and the Soviet empire, so long as Soviet society shall persist in being an echo of the socialism of the Diocletian reforms. At best, there can be protracted war-avoidance. Between the heritages of Solon and Lycurgus, no peaceful accommodation but the full submission of the one to the will of the other is possible. Where there is no agreement in law, the law exerts no force; in such a case, the lack of the force of law renders the decision to the law of force. Durable war-avoidance can be secured by no means but the adversary's certainty that should he launch war, he shall not win nor survive that war.

We of the West, with all our faults, did not destroy the Soviet Union when we had the overwhelming superiority of force needed to accomplish such a result. Give the Soviets such a superiority of force, and they will destroy us, even to the point of obliteration, if we fail to surrender abjectly to their rule. Therein lies the expression of our moral superiority; we, at least, sought war-avoidance as a more or less perpetual state of affairs, awaiting the moral self-betterment of Soviet society. They will not be so charitable. Against war launched by the Soviets, no law has force but the law of force.

The Soviets, like their cousins, the Sufi mystics, are essentially irrationalists, whose doctrine of law is the triumphant exertion of the arbitrary will of a race which deems itself destined to be the ruling imperial race of this planet. On this account, and other important accounts, there is no important difference between the present Soviet *Nomenklatura* and the leadership of Hitler's Nazis. The logic which the world should have employed during the 1930s, in dealing with the Nazi menace, is the logic we must not fail to employ in strategic assessments and related matters of policy respecting the Soviet menace of today.

Fortunately, the Soviets are less immoral than the cothinkers of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the latter the most obscenely evil eruption existing on this planet today. The Soviets' morality is delimited to the aspect of their behavior in which they are scientific and rational, a rationality most efficiently manifest in the military domain. Unlike a totally irrational form of superstitious Sufi mystic, the Soviet command will not risk a war unless it can precalculate the winning of such a war with acceptable losses. The essence of war-avoidance between the superpower blocs, thus reduces essentially to affording the Soviets two key items in its own strategic calculations: We must deny them the pleasure of precalculating "victory with acceptable losses," and we must also cause them to estimate that if they avoid war by postponing its launch, we shall not threaten the destruction of the Soviet state itself.

This calculation must be provided the Soviet command through the only means it can be provided: We must launch immediately a "science-driver" form of "crash program" comparable to that launched by President Franklin Roosevelt during the interval 1939-43. We must make such drastic reforms in monetary and economic policies, as precisely reverse the trend toward "post-industrial society" unleashed with introduction of the "Great Society" program of the late 1960s. By shifting our credit and taxation policies, and our infrastructure-building practices, back to emphasize employment in production of physical goods, at expense of administration and intensive mode. The increase in per-capita physical output, so effected, will enable us to sustain defense-expenditure rates in the U.S.A. easily in the \$400-500 billion annual range. If comparable shifts in policy occur among our allies, and respecting our trading-partners of the developing nations, the power of the Alliance will be increased in amounts and at rates which deter the Soviets from implementing their war-plans.

In that context of policy-shifts, we must constantly improvise commitments of our existing strategic capabilities, to such effect that the "first strike" potential of Soviet forces is significantly nullified, forcing them to a postponement of the projected date of launch of general warfare. These immediate and continuing improvisations, must be situated in exploiting the potentialities of shifting the balance of warfare to the advantage of the defense, through a "science driver" mode of "crash program" in developing the technologies which supply superior firepower and mobility to such defense.

There are many who propose that improvements to such effect might be made gradually over the coming years, and perhaps more fully unleashed approximately 1989, when perhaps Vice-President George Bush succeeds President Reagan. What deluded folly such and comparable opinion is! Unless we change U.S. monetary, economic, and defense policies rather immediately, in the directions indicated here, the Soviets will assuredly be positioned to launch, survive, and win general warfare as early as 1988. Then, unless we submit, they will launch war. In that case, President Reagan will be either the last President of the United States, or the last President to complete a term in office.

We face an ominous Global Showdown with a ruthless, rapidly advancing Soviet power. Yet, the more ominous showdown we face, is with ourselves. We can survive, if only we have the wisdom and courage to effect immediate and sweeping changes in our present monetary, economic, and military policies. If we can not face that challenge to ourselves, history will judge, before the close of this present decade, that ours was a nation which lost the moral fitness to survive.

Appendix

Soviet Coverage of Lyndon H. LaRouche 1983-85

Soviet and Eastern European coverage of individuals and policies associated with Lyndon LaRouche increased following President Reagan's March 23, 1983 endorsement of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviets blame LaRouche for the adoption of this policy, and for the scientific, technological, and economic outlook that, if adopted in the West, would ruin current Soviet designs for world domination.

April 11, 1983. Yugoslavia. *Politika Ekspres*, a widely circulated afternoon paper. Article by the news agency Tanjug's Bonn correspondent Milenko Babic, who interviewed Helga Zepp-LaRouche, chairman of the European Labor Party and wife of Lyndon LaRouche.

At present, Helga Zepp-LaRouche assuredly proposes . . . the debt bomb. She affirms: the indebted developing countries are potentially the biggest power of the contemporary world. Finally she concludes: if it were put to use, this power would accelerate the building of a new world economic order. . . . A dreamer? Perhaps, because she has the "prescription for development." . . . She founded the Club of Life, which is counterposed to the "Malthusianism of the Club of Rome." The theoretician of her club is her husband, the otherwise renowned American politician Lyndon LaRouche. . . .

Zepp-LaRouche proposes a "debtors cartel." . . . Such a cartel could declare a moratorium and stop repaying the debts. The IMF and the financial oligarchy would be forced to accept a global dialogue. . . . The aim? First: Write off the debts of the poorest countries completely. . . . Second: For the remaining indebted countries, transform short-term credits with high interest into long-term credits with low interest. For her, this is a second step towards recovery. Third: Having ended the monopoly over technology, and with its free transfer to the underdeveloped countries, the new order calls for creating an alliance of sovereign states for the international division of labor. For Zepp-LaRouche, this is "the only way for humanity to survive," since "the depression creates the conditions for fascism." . . . Zepp-LaRouche doesn't pretend to be an altruist. She openly lectures for capitalism and its interests, but its "genuine interests." Which are? The West needs new markets, and therefore

it is foolish to send the Third World into bankruptcy. If you want to prop up capitalism, you must have strong purchasers. The financial oligarchy, however, does not work for the benefit of capitalism, which they are pushing towards suicide. They are less capitalists than pre-capitalists, precisely oligarchs—that is feudalism, according to Zepp-LaRouche.

May 1, 1983. Poland. *Zycie Warszawy*, leading non-party daily in Poland. Article by deputy editor Karol Szyndzielorz.

It is not often that one day after an article on anti-missiles, we get a visit to our editorial office. This is what happened last week when, reacting to my "Missiles Against Missiles" article, two representatives of the Executive Intelligence Review, a publication whose founder is Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., came up. They wanted to convince us that skepticism toward the possibility of building anti-missile systems is but ill founded. Indeed, L. H. LaRouche had started, as early as 1977, a campaign on the subject of taking advantage of the most advanced technologies for strategic needs.

(Szyndzielorz quotes "a report prepared by the Fusion Energy Foundation," on the board of which LaRouche sits. *Zycie Warszawy* noted that the FEF report counts on "the known technological optimism of Americans" as a factor in carrying out the a crash program for defensive strategic weapons.)

May 23, 1983. U.S.S.R. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, a popular weekly. Article by Prof. Rostislav Ulyanovskii, Deputy Chief of the International Department of the party Central Committee. The book *Hostage to Khomeini*, which is the subject of the article, was commissioned by LaRouche.

Not only those who were directly or indirectly involved in the long drawn-out American-Iranian conflict, not only the Carter administration, but also the forces which opposed the administration in the contest for the presidency made capital out of the hostages. Interesting in this regard is the book by American journalist Robert Dreyfuss, *Hostage to Khomeini*, published in New York in 1980 in connection with the election campaign. Illustrating with concrete, real facts the unscrupulousness of Carter's policy in the hostage crisis (it is to him that the title of the book refers), the author at the same time makes his criticism of the U.S. president so grotesque that it practically goes beyond the limits of credence. Thus, R. Dreyfuss asserts that it was Carter, in collaboration with British Intelligence and the BBC, who helped the coming to power in Iran of "a gang of cutthroats" headed by the Ayatollah Khomeini, whom he describes without batting an eyelid as a "profound moral evil" and "an amoral, vindictive old man, whose perverted model of Islam actually has nothing in common with religion." Moreover, R. Dreyfuss claims that "the seizure of the U.S. Embassy took place with the knowledge and support of the Carter administration." Having "defamed" Carter and above all Khomeini in this way, the author does not omit to pay "attention" also to the Soviet Union, asserting with reference to "information from a certain source" that the piratic U.S. air raid into Iran in April 1980 failed because of the "intervention" of Soviet MiG-21 airplanes. R. Dreyfuss does not conceal that one of his main goals is to discredit the Iranian revolution. "Khomeini," he writes, "in fact did not make the revolution. Power

was handed to him from outside." He also proclaims another of his aims—"to contribute to the political education (?) of Americans." In special instructions "How to use this book," printed on the first page, the reader is invited to "buy two copies of the book and send one to your congressman. Ask your local bookstore to carry this book. Ask the local newspaper to publish it in condensed form." The ordinary American is supposed to pay for everything, even for the "right" to be held up for public dishonor. This is the basic commandment of bourgeois morality and ethics, which propagate unspiritual ideals.

July 6, 1983. U.S.S.R. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. Part III of a series by Iona Andronov on the assassination attempt against Pope John Paul II.

. . . Wiesbaden. Dotzheimer Strasse. No. 164. The West German branch of an American subversive institution under the mask 'Neue Solidaritaet.' The speciality of the Wiesbaden center is to infiltrate the ranks of peace movement supporters and left-leaning youth organizations, shadowing them and disorganizing them from the inside. The basic method of their diversionist intrigues is an intensive anti-Soviet propaganda. Zealous on that in Wiesbaden is the American Paul Goldstein, holder of the intricate title of a "European counterespionage expert. . . . In the opinion of his New York bosses, Goldstein has one out-of-office flaw: he hates fascists. Anti-Sovietism is for Goldstein a business with which you can make money. But the hatred against Nazis is a burning emotional passion, born obviously from the thirst to take vengeance on the contemporary Epigones of the former torturers of his European kinsmen. Goldstein, who is living in Wiesbaden today, knows by heart the names and biographies of a multitude of Hitlerites living in the FRG, of strange Turkish fascists and other different races of brown dirt.

Oct. 26, 1983. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*. Article by Fyodor Burlatskii.

Notes of a political observer

'Star Wars'/The Space Program: a *casus belli*?

The White House and Capitol Hill are starting to discuss a five-year program for the development of space-based weapons. Its initial cost is 17 to 18 billion dollars, but in the long run, not less than 40 to 50 billion dollars. The program has been drafted by a group of scientists and political advisers under the leadership of Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger. With this step, President Ronald Reagan is entering a new round of militarizing the U.S.A. American observers laconically and expressively call the current plans the president's "star wars."

At the same time, the international public, in the U.S. itself and in Western Europe, is getting more and more actively involved in deliberations about what entering into the military space era promises humanity: strengthening of security or its final destruction.

The leader of our country, Yu. V. Andropov, clearly precisely defined the Soviet position on this issue, in a declaration. Space weapons, if they are created, will undoubtedly represent a most dangerous factor of destabilization. If you allow, for example, that the Americans could be the first to create an effective system of space weapons—putting into orbit 400 satellites armed with nuclear and laser beams—then they could hardly resist the temptation to launch a first strike. This in turn would face the U.S.S.R. with a

completely new military and political dilemma. In other words, space weapons are a *casus belli* for nuclear war.

In the responses to my article "War Games" (LG, 8/10/83), foreign commentators tried to contest this conclusion. But unlike the leaders of the U.S., who don't hide that they are seeking military superiority over the U.S.S.R. by militarizing space, these commentators present themselves in the role of liberals or even pacifists. They pretend that they believe that space weapons, in counterbalance to strategic weapons, are not arms of attack, but means of defense.

In the article "Yu. Andropov's Space Diplomacy" in the Swiss paper *Neue Zuercher Zeitung*, the basic ideas of the article "War Games" are laid out in considerable detail. [Translator's note: Burlatskii is citing an Aug. 25, 1983 NZZ article, "Andropovs Weltraumdiplomatie," which he quotes with several omissions and distortions.] "It is completely obvious," writes the paper, "that in the center of the author's attention is not only the threat of a declaration of war; the basic pathos of his article is aimed at dramatizing space weapons, whose use will have, in his opinion, catastrophic consequences next to which the tragedy of Troy, Carthage and Hiroshima grows pale and the horrifying pictures of the future painted by H.G. Wells and the nightmarish visions of Kafka fade. With the appearance of deep moral indignation, Burlatskii depicts how one fine day robots will be able to decide the fate of humanity." Further on the conclusion follows: "Thus, Yu. Andropov's space initiative appears before us as a propagandistic maneuver to incline Washington to negotiate."

To incline Washington to negotiate. . . What is reprehensible about that? Does the paper really seriously propose that even talks on banning the militarization of space can be dangerous? Does the paper really believe that "star wars" are capable of strengthening anybody's security—the U.S.A.'s, Western Europe's or that of Switzerland itself?

Another response was sent from Wiesbaden (FRG) in the name of some "European Labor Party." Its headline sounds like this: "Beam Weapons: Soviets threaten nuclear strike." The problem, as we see, is immediately turned upside down. Everything is precisely the reverse: the U.S.S.R. is proposing to ban beam weapons and any other space weapons, while the U.S. is planning to create such weapons. "Burlatskii," says the response, "is a fervent supporter of the nuclear weapons freeze, who on March 23 personally took up cudgels in Minneapolis against a committee of the 'European Labor Party,' writes that with the development of the new American strategy, the Russians are confronted with a new dilemma. He threatens a Russian preventive strike in the following words: 'Space weapons are undoubtedly a *casus belli* for nuclear war.' In other words: instead of accepting Reagan's proposal for joint development of beam weapons, which the Soviet Union is secretly developing anyway, Burlatskii threatens a Russian preventive strike." [Translator's note: The preceding paragraph quotes a leaflet distributed in Europe after Burlatskii's Aug. 10 article and published as an editorial in *Neue Solidaritaet*. Burlatskii misquotes the leaflet, which was put out by the ELP, but referred to the International Caucus of Labor Committees' intervention on a pro-freeze conference where Burlatskii appeared in Minnesota.]

Reading these lines, I did not know if I should be indignant or laugh about the amusing and ridiculous maxims of the authors, the

conjugal symbiosis of the American LaRouche and his wife, the German Helga Zepp-LaRouche, who come out in the name of the committee of a nonexistent party. We will not pay attention to their trivial pretensions, but return to the essence of the question.

Nobody has succeeded or will succeed in refuting the conclusion, that space weapons represent one of the most dangerous factors for violating strategic stability. And this stability has served and until now does serve as an important guarantee against thermonuclear conflict. And besides that, who has given and who could give a guarantee that today's plans for satellite defense against missile strikes will not tomorrow be transformed into satellite systems of laser and nuclear attack? Any serious physicist will affirm that this problem can quite well [be] solved. For the White House it is only important to get started on implementation of their space program. And later—later on, everything will roll along quickly in the direction of destabilization.

They say that "star wars" very much stirs the imagination of R. Reagan. But if this is so, perhaps it would be worth proposing to the American president a calmer version of "star wars," which would simultaneously sooth the soul, caress the ears and eyes, and not cause fear in the pit of the stomach. Why not invite the American actor Gregory Peck and our Michail Ulyanov, and at the same time perhaps the English Lawrence Olivier together with I. Smoktunovskii, and also A. Mironov with J. P. Belmondo to participate in a joint movie on some space subject, let's say: "Star Wars of the earthlings against the extraterrestrial empires of evil?" Then all of us—earthlings—could enjoy "star wars" without risk of their turning into a nuclear conflict. I liked this phrase from an American commentary: "Wars are waged by little boys." Perhaps the cinema is the best modern form of satisfying this childish passion? . . .

Nov. 15, 1983. *Izvestia*. Article by Rome correspondent N. Paklin.

Sabbath at the Hotel Majestic

Outwardly, they in no way looked like cavemen. They were well-dressed, clean-shaven and their manners were courteous and polite. And the conference hall in the chic Roman Hotel Majestic where they assembled in no way resembled a cave. But all it took was to turn up in that hall and listen to the speeches, and no doubt remained . . . you were among the troglodytes. They came to Rome from various countries, on invitation from a certain Lyndon LaRouche. In the United States, this economist by profession sought to advance his presidential candidacy in the last presidential elections, but burned out in the very first steps. Now he is once again trying to run. As the hobbyhorse of his electoral campaign LaRouche has chosen . . . space weaponry. He was delighted with the proposals Reagan made on March 23 of this year, to fill near-earth space with lasers and other types of "total weaponry," and now he is sparing no effort in the propaganda of this misanthropic idea. The get-together at the Hotel Majestic showed that both Reagan and LaRouche have followers in the Old World.

. . . The first to come up to the microphone was the proper-looking Signora Fiorella Operto. On the program of speakers, she was identified as a member of the "Club of Life," financed by the same LaRouche. The theme of her presentation sounded like this: "Why Western Europe should join in the production of space weaponry."

Why, indeed? In order, proclaimed Fiorella Operto, to counter the "Soviet threat." As for the nuclear "Pershings" and "Tomahawks," which Washington is bestowing upon the Western Europeans, they—so she said—can help the West only partially.

"You should get space weaponry"—that was the leitmotif of the presentation of the American Paratroop General V. Warner. But something else, too . . . "alongside the creation of space weaponry, it is necessary in the future to increase the production of nuclear missiles and all types of conventional arms." He finished his presentation amid the applause of those present, among whom there were several high-ranking representatives of the Italian Defense Ministry. The elderly Italian General G. Macri, who used to serve in special units of the American army in the Federal Republic of Germany, spoke in the same vein. "We will answer the Soviets with space weaponry"—he appealed to the audience. Of what deadly sins did the enraged orator not accuse our country!—including that the Soviet Union has outstripped the West in the creation of space weaponry. The general, naturally, kept quiet about the fact that it is precisely the Soviet Union that is coming out against the militarization of space, and at the last, 38th session of the United Nations General Assembly introduced a draft treaty to ban the use of force in space and from space against the earth.

It was shameful and horrifying to listen to the French Col. M. Geneste. This warrior was presented as the "father of the French neutron bomb." He talked breathlessly about how his offspring kills, accompanying his story with slides. "It is necessary immediately to supplement neutron weapons on earth with laser weapons in space,"—this was the conclusion of M. Geneste. He was supported by Bundeswehr Colonel G. Seuberlich and other speakers—military men, pseudo-scientists, and journalists who have put their pens to the service of military business.

In Rome, LaRouche and his supporters held already their second sabbath of recent weeks. Setting aside the personal ambitions of this unsuccessful aspirant for the presidential office, then the aim of these get-togethers is to propagandize among the Western European public the "advantages" of the Reagan proposal to spread lethal types of weapons in space. Understanding that naked propaganda will not accomplish anything, Western European industrialists are being asked to join in the creation of "global space weaponry." They are being seduced by tens and thousands of billions of dollars, which the U.S. is not skimping on allocating for the militarization of space. The Reagan Administration wants to bind Western Europe even more closely to its criminal policy in the area of nuclear and space armaments.

March 28, 1984. *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, international news section. Article by Aleksandr Sabov, Paris correspondent.

Pulse of the Week

"The Call of the Hundred" Is Heard!

"War or peace is the concern of all peoples . . . We are convinced that the nuclear arms race will not guarantee the security of peoples, that its intensification puts humanity at the brink of an abyss. . . ." These are lines from the "Call of the Hundred," which is printed day after day in the pages of "L'Humanite." And the last Saturday and Sunday of March confirmed that even one progressive news-

paper, despite the total silence of the so-called "free" press, is capable of bringing to thousands and millions the alarm for peace. The initiating group of one hundred prominent public figures in France addressed its appeal to the intelligentsia of the world—writers, artists, scientists, doctors, lawyers, teachers. Last year, this initiative brought emissaries to Paris from seven countries; now they arrived from forty countries. Among them was a Soviet delegation, headed by Academician N.N. Blokhin. The 500 guests voted for the final document of the Paris forum, "Call to the Intelligentsia of the World." And thousands of their Parisian hosts. And there were so many telegrams from all over the world! The poet Jannis Ritsos, the writers Guenther Grass and Heinrich Boell, the film directors Volker Schlöndorff and Juan Bardem, the architect Oskar Niemeyer.

But here is another "forum," with the same address and the same date: Paris, March. "The Activity of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the USA in 1938-1943 and Charles de Gaulle after 1960—Two Twentieth Century Examples Which Inspire Our Movement."

The organizers of this get-together did not invoke the name of Roosevelt in the sense of honoring him as a champion of dialogue between the great powers! His authority is steered onto a narrow military path: it was under him, they say, that work began on the atom bomb. Charles de Gaulle, too, is exalted only as the creator of the independent French nuclear forces. While doing this, they consciously sweep aside the military doctrine of Gaullism: defense in all directions, independence above all from NATO and the USA, and even more, his political conception: peaceful co-existence and detente. Such cynical speculations on the heritage of Roosevelt and de Gaulle are resorted to by the U.S.-based "International Caucus of Labor Committees," which in Europe is called the "European Labor Party." Even the "free" press directly calls this caucus and party neo-fascist organizations, protected by the CIA, and calls its leaders, the American Lyndon LaRouche and the Frenchman Jacques Cheminade, "Fuehrers."

Let us alternate playing voices from the tape cassettes. You will not mistake, reader, which voice is from where! Thesis: "We, Spanish writers, together with the teachers unions, want to conduct a peace week in the schools, since peace must be taught." Thesis: "We will rewrite the schoolbooks in the spirit of Judeo-Christian civilization! . . ." A concerned question: "Shouldn't we be disturbed by the fact that in France the very concept of 'pacifist' is beginning to be interpreted as 'traitor'?" The answer is martinet-like, straight from the shoulder: "France must become the best ally of the United States in Europe, at least in military might!"

At the first forum they said: "If there were a minute of silence to honor the memory of the victims of the second world war, then our earth would fall silent for several decades. . ." And on the same day, in the same city: "When I become President of the USA (!), I will, without wavering, pose the Russians this choice: either they accept our conditions, or—total nuclear war!"

Lyndon LaRouche was answered with applause. The crowd, of course, did not compare with the overflow at the other, genuine peace forum. There the doors were open to all. But here, they first search you head to foot with an electronic sensing device and take one hundred francs entrance fee, and only then let you into the hall.

Had this been altogether a sparsely-attended and insignificant

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meeting, I would not for the world draw a parallel with the forum of intelligentsia from forty countries—that would be too much honor! But alas, it was quite well attended.

. . . The 500 intelligentsia from 40 countries, together with their French co-thinkers, also put the question thus: if the arms race is not stopped, a minute of silence may grow into a hush for eternity. . . .

Krafft Ehricke's Contribution to Global and Interplanetary Civilization

The following address by Lyndon H. LaRouche was given on the occasion of the Krafft Ehricke Memorial Conference sponsored by the Fusion Energy Foundation and the Schiller Institute June 15-16, 1985 in Reston, Va.

As each of us is born, each of us must die. Within that brief interval of life, what distinguishes a life as human, as exalted above the condition of mere beasts, is that which the individual contributes to the enduring benefit of future generations. Our beloved and most accomplished friend, Krafft Ehricke, has bequeathed to future generations a beautiful and most valuable gift.

For the information of those who have not been told, let this be said here, so that it may be repeated elsewhere. Krafft's adult life was dedicated to what became an important part of the work of a small group of dedicated pioneers associated with Dr. Hermann Oberth. These men and women, assembled amid the horrible conditions of material and moral decay following Germany's defeat in the First World War, dedicated themselves to uplifting the moral condition of all humanity, to turn mankind's eyes from petty squabbling in the mud of this planet, to exploration and colonization of space. To this purpose, these pioneers of science, drew upon one of the most precious contributions which German culture had already given to all mankind, the scientific heritage of Nicholas of Cusa, Johannes Kepler, Gottfried Leibniz, and Karl Gauss.

With the aid of that scientific heritage, these pioneers have enabled mankind actually to explore, and now soon to colonize nearby space. What they have accomplished, could not have been accomplished, without the advantage of the heritage of Leibniz and Gauss. They have led all mankind along the only pathway by which we might reach the stars.

In that effort, our dear Krafft Ehricke served with notable distinction, to the degree that his name must be remembered most prominently by those who construct the first colonies on the Moon and Mars. He has helped in an important and practical degree, to make clear to humanity, that it has been the intent of the Creator that mankind's destiny is to

become mankind in the universe. There, in the stars, lies mankind's entry into the long-awaited Age of Reason, when our species sheds at last the cultural residue of the beast.

To the pioneers assembled around Hermann Oberth, as to all leading currents of scientific progress in modern history, came the awful truth, that no government thus far, has been able to muster itself to support generalized scientific and technological progress, except in connection with military ventures. This has been the twentieth-century history of the United States and Western Europe. It has been the history of Germany in particular.

The circles of the great Friedrich Schiller represented the highest degree of progress of understanding of the direct connection between scientific progress and the principle of pure beauty. Yet, all their efforts were frustrated, until the battle of Jena so humiliated the Prussian state, that that state reluctantly turned to the circles of Schiller, to prepare the Liberation Wars out of which every later institutional progress of Germany emerged. In the feudalistic reaction which seized Europe at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the efforts of the Humboldts to make Germany a center of the world's scientific progress, would have been crushed, if the Prussian military had not intervened to subsidize the efforts of Alexander von Humboldt and Crelle's Journal.

In the United States, when the economic and scientific policies of the Founding Fathers had been all but crushed out of institutions of government, it was the war of 1861-1865 which transformed the United States into a great agro-industrial power. It was Britain's mobilizing the United States for the First World War, which produced the industrial progress of the decade following 1907. It was the mobilization for the Second World War, which unleashed the United States' agricultural, industrial, and scientific recovery from the Great Depression. It was the aerospace mobilization of the United States, up into 1966, which continued the agricultural, industrial, and scientific progress of the United States after that war.

So, it is the lawful irony of the modern history of science, that the noble passion of the Oberth group is known to the world today in terms of their military accomplishments. They are known to common opinion, not as the conquerors of space, but in terms of the military contributions of Peenemuende. They are known as the group of scientists and engineers who gave the world military rockets, the principles of supersonic aircraft, shaped explosive charges, and numerous other such artefacts. If the Soviet Union had not gotten about 6,000 Peenemuende veterans drunk, and hauled them into Soviet workshops, Moscow would not have acquired that German science upon which its acquisition of modern military rockets and thermonuclear detonations depended. Without "Operation Paper-Clip," the United States, too, would have had great difficulty in mastering these technologies.

It is therefore not accidental, that a unit of Soviet intelligence established by the late Suslov, has successfully penetrated a corrupted channel of the U.S. government, to convey forged Soviet libels against U.S. veterans of the Peenemuende project. The Soviet government knows very well, through its own scientific debt to Peenemuende, that the United States will be defenseless against the Soviets' massive military mobilization for 1988 now being conducted, unless the United States turns once again to the resources of aerospace development built up here around our Peenemuende veterans. So, the Soviet intelligence, working through the Moscow Procurator and the East Germany-based VVN, has conduited forged documents, through known Soviet agents, into the

Office of Special Investigations, for the purpose of scapegoating and demoralizing the persons who are either veterans of Peenemuende or closely associated with them.

This action by certain officials and other citizens of the United States, is very simply, very plainly, pure and simple treason, pure and simple aid and comfort to a Soviet government which has declared its mobilization for impending "Holy War" against the United States and its allies. According to documented Soviet military doctrine, the Soviet Union is already in a state of war against the United States, and under those conditions, those persons who are aiding and abetting this Soviet-directed scapegoating of Peenemuende veterans, are guilty of treason as the U.S. Constitution defines treason, as giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States in time of war.

My friends, we are again in a condition of warfare. Except for escalating sabotage and assassinations, in Europe and the United States, being directed by Soviet intelligence, it is not yet a shooting-war. However, Soviet doctrine specifies, that the state of war begins with a pre-war mobilization up to the level of full-scale war-economy. Not only are Soviet forces mobilizing just so; that new Stalin in Gucci shoes, Gorbachov, and other principal Soviet officials, have affirmed, repeatedly, that this is the present practice and intent of that government. True, there are many wishful dreamers around Washington, who deny the simplest facts known to every European leader on this and related questions. Avoidance of the facts, does not alter the facts. We are again at the threshold of general warfare, and sane men and women will act accordingly.

So, once again, as the veterans of Peenemuende have twice experienced this hard reality, those of us who would prefer to colonize the Moon and Mars, are condemned to devote our competencies to perfecting the instruments of warfare.

Krafft Ehrlicke understood this bitter truth very well. By "very well," I mean, that as my wife and I were deeply privileged to know him and to collaborate with his efforts, Krafft as we knew him was both a world-citizen and a patriot, in precisely the sense Schiller defined this quality of the beautiful soul. We must hate war, as General Douglas MacArthur hated war, but we will not buy peace at the price of the degradation of all civilization; we will not buy a peace at the price of transforming our children and grandchildren into slaves or degraded beasts.

These foregoing observations are essential, to situate both the subject-matter of my report to you today, and to situate that subject-matter in the common spirit we here assembled share, in reflection on the memory of our dear friend.

It is now nearly three and a half years, since I announced the design of a new strategic policy for the United States and its allies, a policy later announced by President Ronald Reagan in his famous televised address of March 23, 1983. What I outlined, and that for which my associates and I have campaigned throughout most of the world ever since, was a combined strategic and tactical defense, based upon the orders of magnitude of superiority in firepower and mobility of coherently directed electrohydrodynamic impulses. I proposed that this be accomplished by means of the kind of "crash program" we experienced most recently in the 1958-1966 phase of the Apollo project and related aerospace developments.

Although the relevant industry of France, Germany, and Italy, among other nations, is already committed to these lines of research and development, the new policy of defense is not yet a "crash program." Once

Washington belatedly awakens to the reality of the present strategic situation, SDI and its tactical complements, will be transformed into a "crash program." It is in this setting, that we today have urgent lessons to be learned from the Peenemuende experience.

Although many of the valuable lessons of the Manhattan Project and of the Apollo Project, are embedded in the knowledge of some of our military specialists and scientists today, the essence of the principles of a successful "crash program" is not competently understood. To implement the SDI and related projects through a "crash program," not only must we eradicate the obstacle of "systems analysis" from the Department of Defense. The best specialists in our military need the best insights which can be contributed into the deeper principles of a successful "crash program."

There are either assembled, or represented here, today, a body of knowledge and experience, which, in total, is best equipped to assist in providing the urgently needed answers to such questions. The connection between the primary dedication of the Oberth group, to reaching the Moon, and the military work of the Peenemuende veterans, is perhaps the best case in point from recent experience. To that point, I shall now summarize a draft proposal, indicating my best estimate of what the essential principles of the needed "crash program" are.

I stress draft proposal, to emphasize that this is subject to modification through aid of the experience represented here today. I would hope thereby, to stimulate such a discussion-process. However, although the proposal is conditional in detailed features, it has the advantage and authority of resting primarily on known principles of the current of economic science established by Leibniz, and upon the standpoints in method, successively, of Carnot and Monge in France, and of the circles of Gauss in Germany.

I summarize first, the essential historical background, and then summarize the draft policy itself.

The history of 'crash programs'

By "crash program," I mean the tight integration of the most advanced, most fundamental scientific research with the production and deployment of new technologies in a general way, such that there is no organizational separation between the most fundamental scientific research and production in general.

The history of "crash programs" begins with the collaborations on this matter, between Cosimo de Medici in Italy, during the rise of the Golden Renaissance. The first implementation of a true "crash program," was that led from Milan Italy, by the collaboration between Luca Pacioli and Leonardo da Vinci. The next true "crash program," was launched by the French Minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert, following the 1653 defeat of the Habsburgs by Cardinal Mazarin. Colbert's sponsorship of Huyghens and Leibniz in Paris, was the driver out of which European scientific progress was revived, and out of which the industrial revolution was directly planned and set into motion. The next true "crash program," was that attempted in France, beginning 1793, under the leadership of Lazare Carnot and the 1794-1814 Ecole Polytechnique. The development of Germany's world supremacy in science, around the central figure of Gauss, was the result of the attempt, led by Alexander von Humboldt, with collaboration of the exiled Carnot, to transfer the work of the Ecole Polytechnique, then being suppressed in France, into a safe haven in Germany. The economic reforms introduced by Friedrich List, intersecting the work of Humboldt's collaborators at Berlin and Goettingen, both backed by heirs of Scharnhorst in the German military, is the secret

of the scientifically-driven industrialization of nineteenth-century Germany.

The superiority of the work of the Peenemuende veterans' work in implementing crash-program efforts, might seem to be explained by the fact that the Goettingen tradition, including the Betti-Beltrami offshoot of Goettingen in Italy, is peculiarly superior to the Cartesian tradition of France and English-speaking countries in hydrodynamics. So, it should be noted, during the 1920s and early 1930s, Italy was the world's leader in air-frame design, and already a leader in the scientific principles of supersonic aircraft-design. Professor Busemann has emphasized the debt which the Oberth group had to its Italian collaborators during the 1920s and early 1930s. So, it might be assumed that Peenemuende had only a specialized competence, well-suited to rapid advances in aircraft and rocketry.

Such notions of limited competence must be cast aside, as we examine the point, that Bernhard Riemann's 1859 paper "On The Propagation of Plane Air Waves of Finite Magnitude," pertains not only to the transition to supersonic velocities, and shaped charges, but is key to isentropic compression of thermonuclear plasmas, and was also the starting-point for Schroedinger's exploration of the hydrodynamical structure of the electron.

The successive heritage of Nicolaus of Cusa, of Kepler, of Leibniz, of Monge, and of Gauss, is an elaboration of the principle that physical space-time is essentially hydrodynamic in character, and that the mathematics of physical space-time must be derived by aid of a rigorous development of, and training in what is called synthetic, or constructive geometry. In the rise of German science, out of Schiller's attack on Immanuel Kant on the issue of aesthetics, the efforts of the anti-Kantian student of Schiller, Herbart, to base education upon a fusion of the classics with education in geometry, Gauss's elaboration of the implications of the arithmetic-geometric mean, and Riemann's basing his program for advancement of Gaussian physics entirely upon a correction of Herbart's error, are crucial. The explicitly anti-Kantian physics of Gauss, is based on elaboration of the principle of scientific method discovered by Nicolaus of Cusa, called today the isoperimetric principle, that only circular action, not straight-line motion of point-masses, is self-evidently existent in physical space-time.

Hence the physical space-time of Riemann, which is the proper physics for economic science, defines the invariant characteristics of the laws of our universe as congruent with an harmonically ordered hyperspherical function, in which conic self-similar-spiral action is the form of physical least action. The general method of experimentation, which flows from the Gaussian manifold, requires a synthetic-geometric construction of the indicated relations of a phase-space, and the extension of this construction hydrodynamically according to principles of self-similarity.

If this is taken into account, economic science shows us how a properly defined "crash program" must work, and why the Gaussian tradition, as mediated to a large degree by the work of Prandtl, is the best vantage-point for such programs.

The possibility of correlating fundamental scientific progress directly with increases of the productive powers of labor, was opened up by Leibniz's founding of economic science, with emphasis on Leibniz's defining the meaning of the term "technology," in the context of study of principles of heat-powered machines. Instead of accepting a Cartesian scheme, in which straight-line motion of point-masses is axiomatic, economic science consistent with the principle of least action, is based upon

the fact that action in physical space-time is intrinsically circular action, as Leibniz shows in his famous refutation of Descartes' errors on the notions of momentum and work.

The notion of "technology" arises in elementary study of the principles of heat-powered processes, by considering the simplest ideal case. In the hypothetical case, that two machines employed to produce the same quality of product, consume coal-equivalent at the same rate, consider the special case, that the operative employing one of these two machines, produces greater output than employing the other. This ideal case, forces to our attention, the notion of the internal organization of the productive process as a cause of increase of the productive powers of labor. The notion of ranking such internal organization of processes, according to correlation with increase or decrease of relative productive powers of labor, is the simplest outline of a generalized notion of "technology."

Since I have elaborated this conception in several published locations, I shall not repeat those details here. I shall merely summarize those features of economic science, which bear directly on the proposition chiefly under consideration in this report as a whole.

The correlation between advances in technology and increase of the productive powers of labor, is measured by functions of the interrelations among these four categorical elements:

- 1) The usable energy-throughput per-capita and per-square-kilometer.
- 2) The energy-flux density of the power supplied.
- 3) The capital-intensity of production.
- 4) The internal organization of the productive process as such.

These are the four, interdependent factors employed for measuring accurately the relative level of technological development of compared economies. Provided that productivity is measured in units of increase of potential relative population-density, existing statistics from national and supranational agencies, provides provably accurate qualities of measurement. This measurement has the specific and more or less indispensable usefulness, of enabling us to estimate the investment-budgets needed to increase the productive powers of labor of any economy by some projected amount.

The measurement of the causal relationship between quantified advances in technology and resulting increases in the productive powers of labor, requires specific choices of method and procedures in mathematics. The method must be based on a rigorous application of the principle of synthetic geometry, and the physical space-time of economic action must be geometrically the physical space-time elaborated by the work of Gauss, Dirichlet, Weierstrass, Riemann, and Cantor.

To unify mathematically, the four interdependent aspects of technology, we must define "energy" in terms of self-similar circular action in a Gaussian manifold. We must think of energy in terms of both radian-measure of perimetric action in space-time, and in terms of the areas and volumes subtended by either cylindrical or conical self-similar-spiral action. Only on those conditions, can the four interdependent aspects be integrated. So, for example, we think of the measurement of energy as action, by a standard wavelength of coherent electromagnetic photon, such as a standard wavelength of perfectly lased yellow light.

There is one additional point concerning economic science, which must be stressed here and now, if the nature of well-designed "crash programs" is to be exposed. To make the point clear to those who are

not professionals, I illustrate the problem which requires economic science to employ the mathematical physics of Riemann.

If we measure the relative productivity of the U.S. economy, during various intervals of the post-war period to date, we have the following picture of the relationship between technology and productivity. We make these measurements in terms of changes in potential population-density, and measure productivity in terms of per-capita physical-outputs.

The U.S. economy recovered from the post-war recession, with the launching of military mobilization during 1939, and stumbled along on the basis of this up-tick, until the deep recession of 1957-1958. The U.S. economy recovered rather vigorously under the combined impact of the aerospace and Kennedy investment-tax-credit impulses, into the middle of the 1960s. With the partial demobilization of research, under the "Great Society" program, the economy stagnated into 1971, and has been in continual, accelerating collapse ever since.

Look more closely at what has occurred since President Carter and Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker introduced what Volcker described as "controlled disintegration of the economy," beginning October 1979.

By February of 1980, Volcker's measures sent the economy into a rather steep decline, until the summer of that year. A slower rate of decline, which some called a partial recovery, followed. During the spring of 1981, the economy went into another steep decline, into October 1982. Beginning the first quarter of 1983, the rate of decline slowed significantly, and then began to accelerate again during the Spring of 1984. Since March of this year, the rate of decline has been accelerating rapidly, erupting now in the forms of a declining price of the U.S. dollar, and waves of bankruptcies throughout the banking system, as well as in agriculture and industry. This is the steepest decline in the economy since the 1931-1933 period.

Most of you have either ridden on a roller-coaster, or have at least watched the procedure. You chug up to the high point of the structure, and then begin an accelerated descent. You go up and down. Each time you go up, you reach a high point which is lower than the preceding highest elevation of the ride. Finally, you reach the bottom.

That is the way economies usually collapse. Since October 1979, the U.S. economy has been on a roller-coaster ride downhill. The brief periods which some have called "economic recoveries," during this period, were not recoveries. That is, the rate of per-capita output of physical goods never reached the level of a previous high.

In the history of modern economies, general advances and declines in productivity always occur in jumps. General falls in levels of productivity always resemble a roller-coaster ride downhill, whereas general rises occur in the reverse pattern. Why is this so? The answer is elementary. At least, the answer is elementary to an economic science based on the Gaussian manifold.

To make the explanation as brief as possible, I show you some diagrams from my article refuting the notion of "artificial intelligence."

How do we describe an economic process, in which growth of productivity is caused by consistent technological progress under conditions of rising energy-intensity and capital-intensity? In first approximation of the ideal classroom case, the function we require is generated as the compounding of conic self-similar-spiral action with conic self-similar-spiral action. The result, as you see, is an hyperboloid. This seems to present us with a nasty problem. It seems that the arms of the hyperbola

are shooting off into Cartesian infinity. This is a mathematical discontinuity. Yet, we know that economies do not come to a halt because of successful increases in productivity.

First, we must eliminate the Cartesian absurdity. We do this by projecting the image onto a Riemannian sphere. No more silly Cartesian infinities. I discuss this in some detail in the published item I have indicated, and in additional detail in a published criticism of the incompetencies in Professor Wassily Leontief's featured report in the June 1985 *Scientific American*. Since those items are available for those who wish to follow up the details, I need only summarize the most essential point now.

At each discontinuity, there is the addition of at least one singularity to the economic phase-space. This corresponds thermodynamically, to an increase of the energy-of-the-system of the economic process, when energy of the system is measured as potential population-density per-capita. We measure action as the perimetric area of action swept by our figure, and the work done as the volume of the sphere subtended by that area of displacement. So, increasing the energy of the system per-capita, means that at the point of apparent discontinuity, the continuing action occurs on the surface of a larger concentric sphere. What you see in the figure now, are projections of the action on larger spheres projected on the one sphere.

In the ideal classroom case, the concentric spheres are in a self-similar harmonic ordering, as we would expect by adding a third degree of conic self-similar-spiral action to the mathematical model.

This classroom model I have outlined, conforms more or less exactly to what has occurred historically, both in periods of technological progress, and in periods of economic devolution, such as the post-1966 period of the U.S. economy's descent into what is sometimes called a "post-industrial society." The roller-coaster character of economic collapse, means, that as a period of steeper collapse destroys elements of the physical economy's farms, industries, and basic economic infrastructure, the economy drops to a lower sphere in our classroom example. It appears to stabilize itself briefly in that lower state of the system, and then collapses to a still lower sphere. In the rise of productivity, in a technology-intensive mode, the pattern indicated in the model occurs.

This model illustrates what we ought to mean, when we observe that economic processes can not be analyzed by methods of systems of linear inequalities, because economic processes are intrinsically, everywhere non-linear. Economic advances occur in approximately the same way Riemann describes the generation of trans-sonic shock-waves, in his "On The Propagation of Plane Air Waves of Finite Magnitude." Let us term the singularities of economic processes, "technology waves." The radiation of the impact of newly introduced, advanced technologies, spreads through the economy in waves, altering the division of labor and productivities throughout the economy, and adding new kinds of materials and instruments to the repertoire of production as a whole.

In devolution, the reverse occurs, as we note that the United States today has lost many of those branches of industry which were essential to the Apollo Moon Landing. We also observe, that the raw energy throughput and energy-flux densities of production, have collapsed per-capita for the U.S. population as a whole. We are operating in a lower state of structure, and at lower per-capita energy of the system, than we did in 1970, when the general and generally accelerating rate of decline began.

Now, we must reverse that decline. I review briefly the key parameters

The new industrial revolution

of the needed technology-driven recovery, and then come to my summary proposals on "crash program."

It is a remarkable experience today, to view the Fritz Lang film of 1929, "The Woman On The Moon." The elements contributed to the design of that film by Dr. Oberth, show us how little we have progressed beyond the conceptions of spaceflight which German science had outlined more than fifty-five years ago. Especially under the conditions of relative scientific stagnation of the past twenty years, we know very well what present frontiers of science will shape the technological revolutions of the coming twenty to thirty years.

In projecting either the fulfilment of the SDI, or technological revolutions in the economy generally, we divide the required technologies into two classes, which we may term quite usefully as primary and auxiliary technologies. The primary technologies available to us for SDI and technological progress today are three:

- 1) Control of thermonuclear plasmas as a source of very high quantities and energy-flux densities of organized electromagnetic action;
- 2) Coherent organization of directed-energy impulses;
- 3) What we call, in short-hand, optical biophysics: the electrohydrodynamic characteristics of living processes.

The auxiliary technologies include such improvements in computer technology as true parallel processing, and true analog-digital hybrids designed for efficient processing of the class of non-linear functions implicit in a Gauss-Riemann electrohydrodynamic manifold. In terms of SDI and related classes of military assignments, the first two categories of new technologies are the source of the firepower and mobility of the weaponry, and the auxiliaries are needed for acquiring and aiming at targets, as well as delivering the systems to their firing-positions.

To grasp the general implications of the new technologies for both the economy and military science, the most efficient view is developed by giving our "crash program" teams the mission-assignment of establishing and maintaining colonies on both the Moon and Mars. In other words, if we wish to develop the SDI and its offshoots in the best way, the way to organize the program is as a by-product of a mission-assignment for colonizing first the Moon and then Mars. Every technology we require for military purposes, will appear as a by-product of the primary mission-assignment. The Soviets already understand and are applying that principle, which U.S. policy has so far failed to grasp.

Fusion provides us the needed technology for powered interplanetary flight, superseding the problems of unpowered ballistic trajectories of space-flight. Fusion is also indispensable for power to the colonies. Since we can not carry vast quantities of manufactured articles or food from Earth to Mars, we must have tools specifically qualified to produce needed materials and articles from the raw materials of that planet. This requires not only very high quantities of power per-capita, but also energy-flux densities at least four times those prevailing in U.S. production. We require a universal class of tools, to use such very high energy-flux densities; we require the self-focussing characteristics of lasers and particle-beams, for example, which enable us to conquer every problem of materials. To feed the colonies, and long-range manned interplanetary expeditions, we require not merely present biotechnology, but the more profound capabilities locked up within optical biophysics.

It should follow, that if we can create and maintain viable cities in

artificial environments on Mars, the Sahara and the Gobi deserts ought to be mastered easily by using the same technologies on Earth.

In the condition of mankind estimated to be most primitive, so-called hunting-and-gathering society, the potential human population is in the order of a maximum of about ten millions individuals. Today, we are approaching five billions, the greatest portion of which increase has been the product of the Golden Renaissance and Colbert's, Huyghens', and Leibniz's launching of the modern scientific-industrial revolution. There are limits to natural resources for the lower beasts, but not for mankind's technological progress. We have moved upward in potential population-density, through the maritime fishing revolution, the ensuing agricultural revolution, and so on. Today, by increasing the energy-flux density of modes of production by a factor of about four, which these new technologies will permit us to do, we effect a revolution in the meaning of the terms "primary materials" and "natural resources." With sufficient abundance of cheap and coherently organized energy per-capita, at sufficiently great energy-flux densities, there are no limits to natural resources for mankind anywhere in this universe. With mastery of optical biophysics as well, the frontiers for mankind become immediately implicitly limitless.

The measure of effectiveness of weapons in particular, and military forces in general, is firepower and mobility. In production, firepower and mobility is called productivity. Both of these equivalent qualities are reflections of the technologies embodied in the construction of those scientific instruments which we call capital goods. It is impossible to introduce through capital goods, those new technologies which increase the productive powers of labor, without implicitly creating the means of production of weapons of comparably increased firepower and mobility. It is impossible to introduce the capital goods needed to produce weapons of increased firepower and mobility, without creating thus the productive capacity for effecting comparable increases in productivity.

That is key to effective "crash programs." By accelerating the use of new technologies for defensive weapons, we create the new technologies of production for accelerating productivity in the economy generally. The latter aspect of the process up-shifts the economic process, to the effect that a large-scale "crash program," so directed, costs the nation not a single added net penny. The gains in productivity produce marginal increases in per-capita output in excess of the military expenditures which foster those gains in productivity.

These gains in productivity proceed in non-linear jumps, as I have indicated. Thus, it would not cost the United States a single net penny to construct a colony on the Moon beginning some time during the next decade, nor to work toward building a colony on Mars by approximately thirty years ahead. The spill-overs of increased productivity into the economy as a whole would vastly more than pay for the research and deployment of such colonization projects, probably the pay-back would be approximately ten-fold. The "systems analysts" might argue that their computers tell them this is not possible; but as long as they cling to the delusion that "cost-benefit analysis" can be based upon systems of linear inequalities, they are ignorant of the fact, that technology-driven economic processes are non-linear.

Science driver 'crash programs'

From the foregoing and related considerations, I propose the following to be at least approximately true:

- 1) That all science-driver "crash programs" must have a mission-orientation, based upon a task which subsumes required solutions

to each class of the problems to be solved as a by-product of that undertaking.

- 2) That the mission-orientation of all science-driver programs, must encompass the full spectrum of all frontier developments in science, and that the work must be organized on a properly defined conception of the geometrical composition of physical space-time.
- 3) That no boundaries be constructed among fundamental research, development of prototypes and generalized production and deployment of new technologies.
- 4) That the method of development must be in the best tradition of the scientist devising materials and instruments in collaboration with manufacturers and tool-makers. All producing facilities included in the spectrum of required classes of production of materials and instruments, must assign corners of their facilities to work with scientific teams in the same mode scientists work traditionally with tool-makers in the construction of scientific instruments. In short, the extension in scale of the normal practice of good scientific research, into the sphere of generalized production as such.
5. That no restrictions on area of fundamental research be assigned. Any research which bears upon any class of problems subsumed by the primary mission-assignment, is implicitly authorized research.

It would be an error, if the task-orientation of the SDI were limited to a list of projected military requirements. The proper mission-orientation adopted as the mandate of the program should be the Moon-Mars-colonization task. Each weapon-system developed, should be developed by accelerating the by-products of the primary mission-assignment.

The point is, that the various of the scientific capabilities for devising the military and capital-goods products required, must have a common coherent basis. This basis must be defined by a task which explicitly subsumes all of the relevant technologies, and which taxes to the limit the foreseeable potentialities of each and all of those technologies.

Let us proceed to colonize the Moon and Mars, as Krafft Ehrlicke committed himself to implementation of this process. Along the way, we have a military problem to solve, which the technologies of space-colonization are best suited to solve. Being patriots and world-citizens, we shall solve that intervening task, but we shall solve it best by never taking our eyes away from our primary mission-assignment. Once civilization is secured, and the productivity of labor throughout this planet increased greatly by the technological revolution flowing through our SDI task, we shall have established the more powerful economy we require to begin actually the colonization, first of the Moon, and then of Mars. All this we shall do best, if we view the practical task of colonization of Mars as a necessary way of bringing to all of mankind a vision of man as man in the universe, and thus fostering the opening of the long-awaited Age of Reason.

That search in conquest of space, for this higher moral condition of mankind, is the great scientific and moral legacy of the Oberth group and its crash-program exertions. We need not put that legacy aside because of military needs; we shall solve the military tasks best, if the light of the stars is never out of our eyes. Let us pledge to the memory of our beloved Krafft Ehrlicke, that we shall never do otherwise.

Dr. Lowell Wood on the First Eight Hours of Nuclear War

In November 1983, when the Soviets announced that they were increasing the number of missile-armed submarines deployed close to U.S. coasts, Dr. Lowell Wood of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory publicly outlined the opening phase of a potential Soviet attack—in order to motivate the speedy implementation of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, the development of a capability to kill attacking missiles in the boost phase. Addressing a National Press Club forum on beam-weapons defense, on Nov. 30, 1983 (excerpts of the transcript appeared in EIR, Dec. 20, 1983), Wood said:

I would like to briefly recapitulate the current strategic arms situation for you, which I suggest is essentially that of two men staring each other face to face holding cocked guns thrust at the other fellow's head. . . . We are faced with a situation in the United States, that Soviet strategic ballistic missile-launching submarines are positioned right off both coasts of the United States. We, of course, have the bulk of our international assets on or close to the coasts, including our capital, and, in particular, from the time that Soviet submarines launch ballistic missiles toward the United States, there is roughly three minutes for political decision-makers, located in or about the capital of this country, to live, after the breakwater event is confirmed. That is to say, after the military command centers notify the decision-making authorities in and about Washington, there is somewhere between 150 and 200 seconds to go. That, I would suggest, leaves very, very little time—realistically, negative time—for intelligent political decision making. Maybe it leaves time for no political decision making at all.

Then, the thing that happens after that is that you have six to eight minutes after breakwater confirmation, until the North American Air Defense Center at Colorado Springs and the Strategic Air Command post at Omaha are destroyed by these same missiles. The bomber field in Fort Omaha is in about the geographic center of the country, so all the U.S. bomber fields are under attack by that time, and the missile fields of the United States are subject to pindown attack—that is to say, having bombs exploded over them launched from submarines, until Soviet missiles from ICBM fields in Central Asia and elsewhere arrive to definitively destroy missile fields and any remaining bomber bases. After that,

U.S. decision-making capability falls to the National Emergency Command Post's so-called Looking Glass—that's a plane that flies around over the United States and tries to stay alive and tries to command strategic war; it's going to run out of fuel within eight hours and it would have no place to land. And so, sometime within eight hours of the time that war starts, the United States is left with essentially no political or military decision-making capability.

In a circumstance such as I've just sketched, the evaluation of options by the commander-in-chief of the Strategic Air Command—to whom authority will legally devolve to become the commander-in-chief after most of the political decision-making capability of the country has been wiped out—would be circumscribed, to phrase the matter delicately.

On the other side, in particular the deployment of Pershing IIs leaves the Soviets less than 10 minutes to make intelligent decisions after launch confirmation, because, to be candid about it, the Pershing IIs will be aimed, if they are optimally deployed in a military-political fashion, they will be aimed at Soviet decision-making points, Soviet command posts, and not just Soviet military pockets, in order to symmetrize the situation that Soviet ballistic-missile-launching submarines place the United States in.

So I suggest to you that automatic means, particularly computers, and not political military leaders, will fight strategic war after it's initiated, and very specifically, I invite your attention to the likelihood that strategic weaponry will come under attack . . . very, very early in the war because of its very high military potential; strategic weaponry will come under attack, and the owners of strategic weaponry will have the option of using it very quickly or losing it in its entirety, and that provides a great deal of impetus toward across-the-board salvo in strategic weaponry by both sides very early in the war.

Soviets Project Collapse of the West

Castro forecasts collapse by 1988

Soviet projections of the collapse of the western economies, discussed in the second part of this report, are reflected in Fidel Castro's June 2, 1985 interview with Joelmir Beting in the Brazilian publication, Folha de São Paulo. Excerpts follow:

Castro: Now we will discuss the salvation of capitalism. . . . The world is going towards the abyss and the abyss may be bigger than the world. . . . We are living the Third World War, the economic war. It is an undeclared war, the war of extortionary interest on the debt, the war of debased prices on trade. The world is already counting the corpses and already is walking in the ashes, but the aggressors in this war, still without a response from the aggressed, hold that the war does not exist, that the dead ones are healthy. The aggressors are the rich countries, which enrich themselves in recent years from the impoverishment of the poor. . . .

The poor have nothing more to lose. The collapse which is getting closer is going to bring down the American and European creditor banks of the non-performing debtors. And the banks are the physical ballast of capitalism. . . . Clearly, the creditor can't kill the debtor; that is a rule I learned when interned with the [Jesuit] fathers, where I passed 12 years of my life and where I only left on Holy Week.

The IMF itself deserves to be saved, but as a forum for governments, not banks, to make decisions. . . . The deviations of the IMF are a subproduct of the greater crisis, the disorganization of the monetary system, the indiscipline of the financial system, and the truculence of international trade practices.

Last year, Latin America had to pay a total of \$70 billion to the creditor countries. By our evaluation criteria of the bills being collected by the creditors, they are receiving a legitimate amount of \$25 billion and an additional illegitimate amount of \$45 billion. . . . By illegitimate debt we mean usurious interest, which has nothing to do with the Moslem business of interest. By our criteria, any interest above 8% annually . . . is spurious interest, since it is a usury rate from economies with inflation under 4% annually.

. . . The spoilage can be calculated by liter, by meter and by dollar. Latin America had to indebt itself by \$45 billion just to cover that spoilage attributed to the free market.

The rich countries don't want to save capitalism. They think that capitalism faces no risks, at least their capitalism. . . . All we Latin

Americans are in agreement with what the diplomatic movement of the Cartagena Club says: foreign debt is an essentially political problem and the solution will have to be necessarily political. The effect of the debt itself, with the social explosion of the people and the political implosion of the government, cannot be neutralized by banking routines or financial shows.

Where is the differentiated treatment in favor of Brazil or in favor of Argentina? . . . The extortion of interest and despoilment of trade is done as a bloc, but the debt may not be renegotiated as a bloc . . . a renegotiation . . . must start, politically, with the distinction of legitimate debt from illegitimate. The first must be paid. The second must be cancelled.

My scheme is to save the banks and not merely the depositors. A proposal to save capitalism before the defeat [derrocada] which is approaching in 1988 at the latest.

Q: Two years from now?

A: The count-down of the time bomb of the "debt crisis" [English in original] could reach zero in 1988. The indebted countries will not be able to pay their accounts in 1986, if they are able to honor their interest obligations in 1985. Then the crack appears in 1987 and the castle comes down on top of the king in 1988. The forecast is not only mine. The prophesy also comes from some American economists and certain European bankers. One of these economists just came through Havana. I don't know if he is a good prophet, but he has a Nobel Prize in economics.

. . . We are going to save the banks. The debt no longer collectable from the Third World will be reimbursed to the banks by governments, with the approval of their parliaments, through a simple budgetary transference with low annual payments: a small part of the military budget will be injected into the financial system, the pillar of capitalism, the foundation of national security. And, for dessert, the survival of capitalist democracy in the Third World, a question of international security. The political destabilization of the Third World [stems from] the arms race financed by U.S. taxpayers. And the American taxpayers would like to see a tenth of that money shifted to a more noble cause. The Third World's hunger is the trigger of the Third War, the last war, the war of final retaliation.

Q: What about retaliation against moratoria or bankruptcy?

A: . . . But they can't against all the debtors as a bloc. The industrialized countries need our raw materials and our markets. . . . Reprisals is a story to scare naughty children. In Imperial Rome, which had a Senate as democratic as the U.S. Senate, a debtor who did not honor his debt was automatically transformed into a slave, in the line of Roman law.

Q: What would be the bankers' reaction?

A: Like an ostrich. They don't want to invest in correcting the system. If my proposal seems utopian, it is due to the foolishness of men. President Reagan's projection on the recovery of the world economy is based on a nice fantasy, if not to say an elegant lie. . . . The U.S. recovery is a facade; its foundation is not solid; the internal process is a repressed volcano. . . .

Q: Where is the eruption of the repressed volcano?

A: The public sector in the U.S. is the world's most deficit-ridden in absolute terms and is trying to break the record in relative terms. . . .

Q: But isn't the United States, through Bretton Woods, the owner of the world's mint?

A: Incredible isn't it? The manager of that fantastic machinery is the IMF. In 1972 [sic] Nixon began the project: he cut the dollar's link with gold, by telephone. He did so because the gold-base, a bookkeeping asset dependent on a physical asset, the vile metal, has as its largest producer a country banished from the monetary planet, the Soviet Union.

The "debt crisis" will reach its climax in 1988, and at that time, the idea should sprout in the form of some sort of opening or solution. Things will have to change for better or for worse. This is the law of nature. In 1988 at the latest, the utopian or fantastic proposals of renegotiation of the foreign debt outside the bank offices will function as lifesavers on the cresting waves wrecking the ship.

We must prevent the disaster.

Moscow bets on Reaganomics

In a March 30, 1985 television broadcast in Moscow on the topic of the arms-control negotiations, the chief Soviet Americanologist, Georgii Arbatov of the U.S.A. & Canada Institute, put forward the Soviet approach to the Geneva talks, based on an evaluation of whether the United States could afford to move ahead with the Strategic Defense Initiative under its current economic policy. As the following quotations show, the Soviet view is that the U.S. economy cannot. Therefore, the Soviet strategy is to buy time on the assumption that the U.S. economy will collapse before the White House can actually implement the SDI, under current U.S. policy.

The excerpts below are from the translation provided by the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service. Arbatov and Pravda's Yevgenii Grigoryev were guests on the March 30 edition of "Studio Nine"; the host was Valentin Zorin. Emphasis has been added.

Arbatov, discussing the U.S. debt, which he blames on military spending: "How to get out of the situation? Fearing inflation they do not want to set the printing presses in motion, to print money. What happens? This cost of credit increases. . . . This has now become the curse of the American economy at all levels. An enormous number of farmers have gone broke—and are continuing to go broke—since last fall. Moreover, many of them go broke simply because they cannot get into such credit situations, of enormous and literally usurious interest rates.

Grigoryev: They say that only in the last year, the U.S., or its banks, pumped nearly \$100 billion from Western Europe and certain other Western countries; \$100 billion is almost one-third of its annual military budget.

Zorin: I would like to say that the present Washington leadership, having uncoiled an enormous spiral of the arms race, has apparently made a very serious mistake with long-term consequences. *The mistake lies in the fact that the resources of the American economy have been overestimated and the scale of the arms race has exceeded its resources.*

Georgii Arkadyevich, you talked about last year's budget deficit. This fiscal year, the budget deficit—that is, the excess of expenditure over revenue—is already more than \$200 billion. In order to somehow extricate itself from this position, the administration has to plunge ever deeper into the quagmire of debt, and the U.S. national debt to private corporations and banks has already exceeded quite astronomical amounts, having far exceeded the limit of a trillion dollars, and cannot continue like this for long. Today, one can live in debt, but debts must be repaid. . . . Sooner or later the United States will have to face this bitter truth, and some people in Washington now understand this.

It is interesting that the current White House chief of staff, when he was not in the White House but still in the post of Secretary of the Treasury—I mean Donald Regan—said, I will quote him: “If the most serious measures are not taken and the current budget deficit remains, we will lose our economy.” These are very responsible words, and the Secretary of the Treasury does not just make idle statements. Admittedly now, finding himself in the White House, Donald Regan does not make such statements—at least, not out loud—but the essence of the matter does not change.

It is difficult to tell what Washington is counting on when it uncoils the arms race not according to the means or resources of the U.S. economy. *Either the boss of the White House is insufficiently aware of all the consequences or, like one of the French kings, he operates on the principle: Après nous le déluge*, and is not very concerned about the legacy he leaves for his successor. But the fact remains—an objective fact—the current level of military expenditure is a backbreaking burden for the U.S. economy. If appropriate modifications are not made, the future situation will be fraught with the most serious consequences. *I do not know whether the officials of Washington are aware of this, but if someone believes that we in Moscow do not see this and do not follow this problem carefully, he is making a very serious mistake. We can see it.*

Arbatov: Yes, we are aware of this. After all, the U.S. economy is the most powerful economy in the capitalist world, and of course, one cannot underestimate its resources, but these resources certainly have their limits. In general, not only the desire to impose the arms race on us in order to bleed us dry economically . . . was behind the arms race. I cannot say that it is very easy for us. Of course, our country has to, in looking after its security, spend more than it would like to on the arms race. But on the path to achieving their aims—and one can see this today—the Americans themselves will not survive, so to speak, I mean economically. *You see, this question of the deficit has today already become the main question of political struggle in the United States.* I think that it will be the primary question in the whole political campaign associated with the congressional elections, when the current administration—if these problems grow—could also lose the Senate. Their political rivals already have the House.

Lagovskii assessing the economic potential of Moscow's enemies

Exemplary of the Soviet commitment to the study of every conceivable facet of the U.S. economy, from the standpoint of how it will affect the correlation of forces in a global showdown, is the 1957 book by General Major A.N. Lagovskii, Strategiya i ekonomika, cited in Chapter 1.1 of this report. Excerpts are from Chapter 4: “The Strategic Plans and the Economy of the Adversary.”

The study of the economic potential of other countries furnishes material on the ability of these countries to wage armed struggle and, on the other hand, it reveals the weak and strong points of their economies. This information is also reflected in strategic plans for influencing the economic potential of the aggressor.

. . . One has to determine what the enemy's armed forces are, . . . which are the most vulnerable points in his military communications, and so on. This makes it possible to draw conclusions concerning the approximate timetable for the enemy's mobilization of his war production, the weak points in his economy, the geographical distribution of his productive forces, his transportation networks, etc. . . . [On this basis] the strategic command can determine against which economic targets, when and by which means an armed assault will be most effective.

. . . In assessing the economic capacities of the probable adversary, strategy must have concrete data and knowledge about the economy of the enemy as well as that of those states whose economy can be utilized by the enemy in war.

. . . The elaboration of war plans and of plans for upcoming military operations is impossible without a clear conception of all the strong and weak points of the enemy with respect to both his military and his economic and moral potential. The enemy's economic potential must be carefully studied, both with respect to its present levels and its prospects for development, so as to identify and analyze the strong and weak points of his economic potential. This analysis will make it possible to stake out the main directions for effectively weakening the war economy of the enemy—at what times, within what periods, and against which objects an attack would be most effective and what category and what amount of resources will be required for carrying out the next battle.

. . . The economic centers and the facilities required for waging war are important combat targets for strategy in modern war. For this reason, one of the most important tasks which strategy has to fulfill, already in peacetime, is to investigate the economic relations of the probable adversary, the geographical distribution of his industry, and his domestic and foreign trade links. In addition to plans of military action, there also has to be a plan for action against the enemy's economy. In elaborating this plan, an entire range of questions has to be studied, ranging from statistical data to fundamental principles, so as to shed light on the laws and the contradictions of the enemy's arms production and his armed forces. One has to identify the enemy's strong and the weak points and draw the correct conclusions from these economic facts.

. . . In a state with a socialist planned economy, a close relationship between strategy and the economy can be established . . . by means of constant contact between the military and the economic commands. . . .

In a modern army there must also be officers who are professional specialists in the field of military economics. We call such persons (by analogy with military engineers) "military economists." These specialists must absolutely be included on senior military staffs as well as in the leading state planning and economic bodies.

The economic issues which military art, and especially strategy, is interested in are manifold. Under present conditions, military professionals are not the only people concerned with "purely military" questions, nor are economists the only ones concerned with economic matters. Today, a large number of problems which fall into the immediate field of activity of the military command to a large extent touch upon questions of the economic policy of the state both in peacetime as well as in war. Examples of such questions are: preparing the state for war, increasing the personnel and the technical equipment of the army and navy, command and control in battle, etc. Consequently, every senior staff must include a group of military economists who compile, investigate and evaluate the most varied categories of economic data. Properly processed, this data will serve military planning per se.

The economic issues which have to be investigated by military science today extend far beyond the boundaries of a discipline such as, e.g., military geography. Military economists must as a first priority master the material contained in subjects that could be

termed "military-economic statistics" and "military-economic inventory of national resources." These special disciplines must be the subject of special attention by Soviet military science and be given a prominent place in the educational curriculum for military economists.

. . . Another topic which has to be included among the tasks of military economists is the preparation of data on the strength of the war economy of the probable enemy as well as the weak and strong points of his economic potential. This data is the precondition for drawing up a plan of military attack on the economic potential of the aggressor.

Lagovskii motivates the necessity of establishing departments of military economics at all military academies and schools, publishing the appropriate textbooks, etc. Such a program was established at the General Staff Academy itself, headed by Lagovskii. Marshals Ogarkov and Kurkotkin were among the first graduates of the new program.

In the early 1960s, IMEMO (the Soviet Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow) organized a secret special Department of Technological and Economic Research, which was given special offices in Moscow. While the main IMEMO center is located on Profsoyuznaya ulitsa 28, this secret military department is housed in its own three-story building on Kalinin Prospekt 6, virtually next door to the Soviet General Staff.

The special department is staffed almost entirely by Soviet officers, including colonels and generals. Their assignment is to analyze the Western economies with a single aim: to identify the most vulnerable facets of each country's war economy potential. They also are required to make proposals as to which vital economic complexes and logistics centers should be spared so that they can be used by the Soviet armed forces in an invasion and occupation.

Edict Ending the Diocletian-Galerian Persecutions

This edict is discussed in Chapter 2.3 of this report, under the heading, "Imperial Soviet Russia and the Chaldean-Byzantine Model of Empire."

The Emperor Caesar Galerius Valerius Maximianus Invictus Augustus, Pontifex Maximus, Germanicus Maximus, Egyptiacus Maximus, Thebaicus Maximus, Sarmaticus Maximus five times, Persicus Maximus twice, Crpicus Maximus six times, Armeniacus Maximus, Medicus Maximus, Adiabenicus Maximus, Holder of Tribunical Authority for the twentieth time, Imperator for the nineteenth, Consul for the eighth, Pater Patriae, Proconsul; the Emperor Caesar Flavius Valerius Constantinus Pius Felix Invictus Augustus, Pontifex Maximus, Holder of Tribunical Authority, Imperator for the fifth time, Consul, Pater Patriae, Proconsul; and the Emperor Caesar Valerius Licinianus Pius Felix Invictus Augustus, Pontifex maximus, Holder of Tribunical Authority for the fourth time, Imperator for the third, Consul, Pater Patriae, Proconsul—to the people of their several provinces greetings.

Among the other steps that we are taking for the advantage and benefit of the nation, we have desired hitherto that every deficiency should be made good, in accordance with the established law and public order of Rome; and we made provision for this—that the Christians who had abandoned the convictions of their own forefathers should return to sound ideas. For through some perverse reasoning such arrogance and folly had seized and possessed them that they refused to follow the path trodden by earlier generations and perhaps blazed long ago by their own ancestors, and made their own laws to suit their own ideas and individual tastes and observed these; and held various meetings in various places.

Consequently, when we issued an order to the effect that they were to go back to the practices established by the ancients, many of them found themselves in great danger, and many were proceeded against and punished with death in many forms. Most of them indeed persisted in the same folly, and we saw that they were neither paying to the gods in heaven the worship that is their due nor giving any honor to the god of the Christians (because meetings were forbidden). So in view of our benevolence and the established custom by which we invariably grant pardon to all men, we have thought proper in this matter also to extend

our clemency most gladly, so that Christians may again exist and rebuild the houses in which they used to meet, on condition that they do nothing contrary to public order. In a further letter we shall explain to the justices what principles they are to follow. *Therefore, in view of this our clemency, they are duty bound to beseech their own god for our security, and that of the state and of themselves, in order that in every way the state may be preserved in health and they may be able to live free from anxiety in their own homes.*

Anglo-American Contributors to Soviet Hegemony

The Soviet Empire could never have reached the present degree of probability of victory without massive collusion from inside top-most leading circles in the Atlantic Alliance—the crucial ingredient in the redrawing of the world's political map discussed in chapter 3.1.

Leo Szilard's 'pax Russo-Americana'

In a speech to the Pugwash conference in 1958, Dr. Leo Szilard, the model for the movie character "Dr. Strangelove," created the script for so-called limited nuclear wars, based on a deal between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was entitled: "How to live with the bomb and survive—The possibility of a Pax Russo-Americana in the long-range rocket stage of the so-called atomic stalemate." Note that Szilard anticipates the scenario, now circulating in the East bloc press, in which the apparent resurgence of a Nazi movement in Germany is used as the pretext for a Soviet invasion of West Germany. Excerpts of the 1958 speech, later printed in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, follow:

. . . A conflict between two nations which America and Russia are committed to protect but which they do not fully control might lead to a major disturbance, because it might induce America and Russia to intervene militarily on opposite sides. A political settlement between America and Russia which is specifically aimed at eliminating the possibility that they may intervene on the opposite sides in any of the presently discernible potential conflicts would therefore go a long way toward averting the worst kind of disturbances. . . .

. . . In the long-range rocket stage, when they no longer need to threaten each other's security, there may remain no major conflict between America and Russia. Moreover, in that stage, they will have one interest in common which may override all of their other interests: to be able to live with the bomb without having to fear an all-out war that neither of them wants. In these circumstances, America and Russia ought to be able to reach a political settlement, specifically aimed at the danger that they may be forced to intervene militarily on opposite sides in any one of the presently foreseeable conflicts.

It is conceivable that America and Russia may be able to go one step further, that they may be able to agree on a revision of the map, and

that they may subsequently act in concert with each other, should other nations attempt to change the map by force or the threat of force. Could such a pax Russo-Americana conceivably evolve during the next stage? . . .

The threat of massive retaliation, on which American policy was based during some of the postwar years, may well be an effective threat as long as the nation thus threatened is unable to strike back. No objection can be raised, therefore, against such a policy on grounds of expediency. A policy which calls for the dropping of bombs on Russian cities and the killing of millions of Russian men, women, and children in retaliation to a Russian military intervention in Western Europe is, of course, difficult to justify from a moral point of view, particularly if one holds that the Russian government is not responsive to the wishes of the Russian people. . . .

Many . . . people now believe that conflicts between the great powers will be henceforth resolved by using small atomic bombs, locally in the contested area, that the large bombs which America and Russia have accumulated will remain in the stockpiles, and that their existence will in no way affect the outcome of the "limited" war. The most persuasive argument in favor of this view may perhaps be phrased as follows:

" . . . A limited war need not deteriorate into an all-out war, if the United States and Russia realize that the objective of such a war cannot be anything approaching 'victory,' not even victory in the contested area to which the fighting may be limited. The objective of such a limited war would rather be to exact a price and therefore make it costly for the enemy to extend its rule. America and Russia would need to impose upon themselves certain far-reaching restraints, proclaimed well in advance. They could do this, for instance, by both declaring unilaterally at the outset that they would use atomic bombs only against troops in combat and only within their own side of the prewar boundary. . . ."

. . . Clearly, if America and Russia, which had threatened each other with the destruction of all the cities of the enemy, as a reprisal against the loss of one of their cities, such a threat would not be believable, except at the cost of wholesale destruction of the cities of both nations.

Could America or Russia threaten to retaliate for each injury by inflicting double the injury suffered? Could she threaten that for every city demolished in her territory she would demolish one or more cities totaling its inhabitants twice the cities she has lost? Clearly, if both nations adopted this principle, there would be in the end total destruction on both sides, coming more slowly but just as surely as in the case of massive reprisal. . . .

. . . If Russia demolishes one or more evacuated cities in America, she must tolerate the destruction of cities with the same aggregate population.

. . . If one of these two nations chose to abolish the threat of war, and to substitute the threat of demolishing evacuated cities instead, the other nation would have practically no choice but to follow suit.

. . . Let us now assume, for the sake of argument, that in the long-range rocket state there may occur some major disturbance affecting the Arabian peninsula, which threatens to cut off Western Europe from its Mideast oil supply. Let us further assume that America is on the verge of sending troops into [the area]. . . .

Russia would then have to decide whether she wants to fight an atomic war on her southern border, and take the risk that such a war might not remain limited. . . . she might decide to proclaim that she would not resist an American intervention locally in the Middle East but would, if need be, exact a price from America not in human life but in property.

She might proceed to name some 20 American cities and make it clear that in case of American troop landings in the Middle East, she would single out one of these cities, giving it four weeks warning to permit its orderly evacuation. In order to make this threat believable, Russia would have to make it clear that she . . . would tolerate, without threatening any reprisals America's demolishing Russian cities having the same aggregate population.

In the long-range rocket stage, America and Russia are going to become increasingly indifferent to changes that might take place on the continent of Europe. In that stage there will be no important reason why the United States should wish to maintain any military bases on foreign soil. And a military alliance with the nations of Western Europe would no longer add anything much to the security of America, even if America should continue to maintain an alliance with the nations of Western Europe. She would be bound to regard these allies as more and more expendable. . . .

Right now, the nations of Europe are tired of war. Clearly, the people of Western Germany are more interested in increasing their prosperity than in the problem of unifying Germany.

Yet the time might come when unifying Germany may become the overriding political issue on which all Germans may unite. And similarly, once Germany has been united, the issue of recovering for Germany some or all of the territories lost to Poland may become the overriding issue on which all Germans may unite.

. . . then Russia and America might be willing to guarantee, jointly or separately, the agreed upon status of Europe against changes brought about forceably by either Poland or Germany. they could do this effectively, without a risk or appreciable cost to themselves, by relying on the threat of demolishing, if need be, a few cities, either in Germany or in Poland, perhaps giving each city several weeks of warning to permit its orderly evacuation.

Bertrand Russell: totalitarian world government

In October 1946, Bertrand Russell, father of the so-called peace movement, wrote an article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists advocating the creation of a totalitarian world government "to preserve peace":

When I speak of an international government, I mean one that really governs, not an amiable façade like the League of Nations or a pretentious sham like the United Nations under its present constitution. An international government . . . must have the only atomic bombs, the only plant for producing them, the only air force, the only battleships, and, generally, whatever is necessary to make it irresistible. . . .

The monopoly of armed force is the most necessary attribute of the international government, but it will, of course, have to exercise various governmental functions . . . to decide all disputes between different nations, and will have to possess the right to revise treaties. It will have to be bound by its constitution to intervene by force of arms against any nation that refuses to submit to arbitration.

In his 1951 book, The Impact of Science on Society, peacenik Russell wrote:

War has hitherto been disappointing in this respect [reducing population] . . . but perhaps bacteriological war may prove effective. If a Black Death could spread throughout the world once in a every generation, survivors

Henry Kissinger: U.S. should not be a superpower

could procreate freely without making the world too full. The state of affairs might be unpleasant, but what of it?

On July 23-24, 1982, at a secretive meeting of corporate, banking and political leaders at the elite San Francisco area mens club, the Bohemian Grove, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger gave an address which, according to a reporter who penetrated the exclusive session, included the following:

. . . In the period following World War II, the United States controlled 55% of the world's gross national product. The figure today is more like 25%. Now as a result the United States needs to conduct a different kind of foreign policy that accounts for its diminished economic influence—a foreign policy that would be more like that of Great Britain.

. . . You are now a once-developed nation like Britain. You must now reduce your economic and military commitments globally, and instead resort to British tactics of psychological and cultural warfare.

In the March 5, 1984 issue of Time magazine, Kissinger wrote an article titled, "A New Role for Europe," recommending the U.S. "decouple" from Western Europe:

. . . During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination, insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas except security. With respect to defense, the U.S. has been indifferent at best—at least since the failure of the European Defense Community—to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the common security. The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the U.S. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the U.S. essential. Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major conflict it would be nearly impossible to keep this hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burden sharing," paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural—a more rational balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling—if more imperceptibly—statesmanship impels a new approach. . . .

Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings and pressures provides a facade of unity; shared purposes require a deeper sense of participation. Specifically:

1) By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for conventional ground defense. . . .

2) This requires that planning for Europe's defense become a more explicitly European task. . . .

3) Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary-General . . . has been European. In the new structure . . . it would make more sense for this official to be American—whenever the new Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. . . .

Redeployment

The issue of redeploying American forces touches raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities; it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of European neutralism. But if present trends continue, it is certain to become a central issue in the alliance relationship. . . .

Let us assume a group of wise men and women from both sides of the Atlantic came together to plan a global strategy unconstrained by the past . . . Such a group would almost surely conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities would be for Europe, with economic resources and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate on the conventional defense of the Continent. To maintain the global balance of power—by definition as essential for Europe as for America—the U.S. would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the Middle East, Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibilities would also enable our military establishment to shift some of its intellectual energies and scientific research from a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies to the defense of regions where conflict is much more likely. In such regions our allies are less prone to see their interests immediately engaged, and the countries being threatened are in a worse position to assist in the defense effort. . . .

In my view, persisting in a deployment that is losing its rationale accelerates these attitudes. Pacifism and neutralism are on the march in Europe even under the present setup; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerfully encouraged by endless allied disputes. An alliance that cannot agree on its political premises cannot sustain itself by clinging to military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally different circumstances. With current trends the issue of the rationale for the NATO deployment will become unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral component in a comprehensive design but as a single question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most destructive means—the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench away from Europe and in Europe a panicky resentment against the U.S.A. change in deployment without a positive political and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary and tempt aggression.

There is an urgent need for a serious and rapid re-examination of NATO doctrine, deployment and policies, conducted by men and women known for their dedication to Western unity. The group—to be formed immediately after the [1984 fall] elections—must begin with one of the most divisive issues before the alliance: an agreement on the nature and

scope of the threat . . . A deadline for completion should be set—certainly no longer than two years. . . .

If Europe should agree to build a full conventional defense and were prepared to express that commitment in unambiguous yearly obligations to increase its forces, the U.S. should accept the judgment that its present ground forces in Europe are an indispensable component. Such a decision might in fact invigorate the conventional arms-reduction talks and in time lead to stability at a lower level. But if Europe should opt for a perpetuation of the present ambivalence or for only a token improvement, then the U.S. will owe it to the overall requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions. If Europe by its own decision condemns itself to permanent conventional inferiority, we will have no choice but to opt for a deployment of U.S. forces in Europe that makes strategic and political sense. If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion, perhaps up to half, of our present ground forces would be a logical result. To provide time for necessary adjustments, that withdrawal could be extended over five years. To ease the transition further, we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for a time afterward in a new status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared for use in Europe but also available for use in emergencies outside it. Any withdrawal would make sense only if the redeployed forces were added to our strategic reserve; if they were disbanded, the effect would be to weaken the overall defense.

The proposed redeployment would leave intact air and naval forces, as well as intermediate-range missiles, so long as Europe wants them. A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic re-evaluation of the existing inventory of very short-range tactical nuclear weapons, a legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions; these weapons now represent at one and the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war because, being deployed so far forward, they are unusually subject to the exigencies of battle.

In this scheme, withdrawal would not be an end in itself—as it will if frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic go much further—but one component of an adaptation to new circumstances extending over some eight years that rededicates the U.S. to the alliance for the indefinite future. . . .

The United States cannot lead the alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. . . .

Mastering EMP for Offense and Defense

The deployment of thermonuclear technologies designed to saturate the exoatmosphere over U.S. missile sites with neutron and EMP densities, is a significant aspect of the Soviet plan of attack discussed in Part 6 of this report.

Since June 1983, Dr. Edward Teller of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has emphasized in several national interviews the need to educate industry and the public about large electromagnetic pulses (EMP) generated by space-based nuclear explosions. One large, space-based nuclear explosion is capable of generating an EM pulse sufficient to destroy most unshielded electrical and electronic devices and systems throughout the United States without necessarily causing any other type of direct bomb damage.

Teller's statements on this matter strongly indicate his concern that EMP effects may not be limited to those generated by offensive Soviet nuclear explosions. EMP effects could be used as part of a layered defense against nuclear-tipped missiles. This particular defense could be generated with part of the U.S. arsenal of offensive nuclear warheads.

This possibility of using nuclear explosions in space to interdict ICBMs was noted by Marshal V.D. Sokolovskii in *Soviet Military Strategy*: ". . . and the use of electromagnetic energy to destroy the rocket charge in the descent phase of the trajectory or to deflect it from its target."

All nuclear explosions generate extremely short bursts of intense radio waves. These EM pulses are created when the initial radiation (x-rays and gamma rays) of the nuclear fireball ionize and accelerate electrons in the air, thereby producing large electrical currents.

In exoatmospheric (space-based) detonations, EM pulses were found to be both more intense and extensive than in air bursts. The United States discovered this empirically in 1962, when a space-based nuclear test over Johnson Island generated an EMP signal which "turned off" the lights in Hawaii thousands of miles away. At the same time, the Soviets exploded a 60 megaton monster H-bomb in a high altitude test. The Atmospheric Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was signed shortly after this test series. In retrospect, U.S. scientists realized that the Soviet Union was aware of a dramatic increase in EMP associated with high altitude detonations long before 1962. The U.S.S.R. had completed an extensive

program of high altitude nuclear explosions to empirically map out the potential of EMP effects.

EM pulses dramatically increase in amplitude and extent in exoatmospheric, as compared with atmospheric, detonations for two basic reasons. EMP is primarily due to bomb-generated gamma rays. The electrical current that they create through the ionization and acceleration of atmospheric electrons is called a Compton current. It is this short-lived current which generates the EM pulse. In the atmosphere burst case, the Compton current propagates symmetrically outward from the point of detonation. Thus, if we drew lines representing each radial direction along which a Compton current is found, it would define a sphere with the detonation point at the center. This simply indicates that the gamma rays are deposited into the atmosphere in a spherical shell.

In the exoatmospheric case, however, only a portion of this spherical shell of gamma rays intersects the Earth's atmosphere. As a result, the Compton current generated is no longer spherically symmetrical. Therefore, the interaction between the Compton current and the Earth's magnetic field is greatly enhanced. And this interaction leads to the generation of a Compton current perpendicular to the radial direction. This new, transverse component of the Compton current generates out-going and in-going fields of the magnetic dipole type. The out-going magnetic dipole EMP is a short pulse of high amplitude, because the Compton current pulse moves outward in synchronism with this part of the EMP.

The Earth is surrounded by a thin plasma (the ionosphere) whose properties determine conditions for shortwave radio communication. EMP and the Compton currents which generate it interact with the ionosphere, causing long-lived disturbances which interrupt and distort radio communication.

It has long been recognized that EM pulses can directly disrupt the functioning of ICBMs. If an ICBM warhead is not shielded against EMP, EM pulses can be absorbed into the electrical circuitry of the missile's guidance and detonating system, causing short bursts of intense electrical current which either destroy or permanently disrupt the circuits. Moreover, the effectiveness of electromagnetic shielding can always be overcome through increasing the intensity of the EM pulse. This has spurred great emphasis on the development of optical fiber circuits for military systems, since these non-electrical circuits are not effected by EMP.

EMP may have a number of possibilities for indirectly disrupting an ICBM. The huge amounts of energy contained in the ionosphere are normally so diffuse that the ionosphere is harmlessly traversed by an ICBM; but it may be possible to use EMP as a sophisticated kind of "ionospheric modification," and so replicate the self-generated beams, streamers, and density changes that are seen in other ionospheric modification experiments. Some combination of bomb-pumped plasma instabilities in the ionosphere, scientists have speculated, may be usable for large-area defense against ballistic missiles. In such an application, a high-altitude burst of a nuclear weapon or deposition of energy from an x-ray laser would be used to energize the ionosphere and to act as a "seed crystal" for organizing ionospheric plasma energy. The resultant plasma instabilities may be capable of generating missile-destroying electron beams, electric field changes, or plasma density variations.

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
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Maps




Map 1. "Line of force" of current Soviet military deployments, illustrating global envelopment of continental United States.




Map 2. The first Soviet nuclear salvo against Western European strategic assets, in the first minute of a general Soviet "pre-emptive strike."



Maps 3, 4, and 5 show the sequence of Soviet actions in the first 20 minutes of a "pre-emptive strike," after Soviet ICBMs have been fired from their silos, but before they have hit their targets.

Map 3.
Soviet First Strike (Surprise Attack)
Destruction of U.S. Command and Control Centers (2-3 minutes)




Map 4.
Soviet First Strike
Destroy Strategic Air Command Bases







Map 6. Soviet ICBMs strike strategic assets in the continental U.S.A., 20 to 30 minutes after the initiation of hostilities.



Map 7. The 16 Military Districts and 4 Groups of Forces, of the Soviet Armed Forces.



Map 8. The High Commands of the Soviet Armed Forces.







Map 9. The furthest advance of Western Christendom, under Charlemagne and his successors.



The expansion of Russia. Map 19 projects Moscow's intended expansion by 1988.





Map 10.













Map 19.




Map 20. The eastern Mediterranean before and after 1453. Besides sponsoring the Ottoman Empire as a continuation of the Byzantine Empire, Venice directly controlled the indicated regions of the Adriatic, portions of Greece, and key Mediterranean ports.



Map 21. The Three Romes—Rome, Byzantium, and, finally, Moscow.



Map 22. European Old Russia.



Map 23. The Union Republics and ethnically-defined Autonomous Regions of the U.S.S.R.

Republics

1. Armenian S.S.R.
2. Azerbaijan S.S.R.
3. Estonian S.S.R.
4. Georgian S.S.R.
5. Kazakh S.S.R.
6. Kirgiz S.S.R.
7. Latvian S.S.R.
8. Lithuanian S.S.R.
9. Moldavian S.S.R.
10. Russian S.F.S.R.
11. Tadzhik S.S.R.
12. Turkmen S.S.R.
13. Ukrainian S.S.R.

14. Uzbek S.S.R.


15. Byelorussia S.S.R.

Autonomous S.S.R.s and National Regions

1. Abkhaz A.S.S.R.
2. Adygey Aut. Oblast
3. Adzhar A.S.S.R.
4. Aginsk-Buryat Nat'l Okrug
5. Bashkir A.S.S.R.
6. Buryat A.S.S.R.
7. Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.
8. Chukchi Nat'l Okrug
9. Chuvash A.S.S.R.
10. Dagestan A.S.S.R.


11. Evenki Nat'l Okrug
12. Gorno-Altay Aut. Oblast
13. Gorno-Badakhshan Aut. Oblast
14. Jewish Aut. Oblast
15. Kabardin-Balkar A.S.S.R.
16. Kalmuck A.S.S.R.
17. Karachay-Cherkess Aut. Oblast
18. Karakalpak A.S.S.R.
19. Karelian A.S.S.R.
20. Khakass Aut. Oblast
21. Khanty-Mansi Nat'l Okrug
22. Komi A.S.S.R.
23. Komi-Permyak Nat'l Okrug
24. Koryak Nat'l Okrug

25. Mari A.S.S.R.
26. Mordvinian A.S.S.R.
27. Nagorno-Karabakh Aut. Oblast
28. Nakhichevan' A.S.S.R.
29. Nenets Nat'l Okrug
30. North Ossetian A.S.S.R.
31. South Ossetian Aut. Oblast
32. Tatar A.S.S.R.
33. Taymyr Nat'l Okrug
34. Tuvinian A.S.S.R.
35. Udmurt A.S.S.R.
36. Ust'-Ordynsk-Buryat Nat'l Okrug
37. Yakut A.S.S.R.
38. Yamal-Nenets Nat'l Okrug




Map 24.

Muscovy in the 15th Century, showing the different nationalities inhabiting the area, at the time that the messianic doctrine of the Third and Final Rome was adopted by Moscow's rulers, and the great expansion of the Russian state began.




Map 25. Redrawing the political map of the world: all of continental Eurasia and Africa under Soviet domination.




Map 26. Northern Europe and environs—the weakest flank in defense of the West.

Map 27.
The Northern Theater of Military Actions. The biggest concentration of Soviet military power is based on the north side of the Kola Peninsula.






Map 28.
"Zone of the Straits" connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean:
Dardanelles-Sea of Marmora-Bosporus.



Map 29. Consequences for the Eastern Mediterranean of Greece's land, airspace and water falling under Soviet influence.



Map 30. Military roads at the disposal of Soviet forces for enveloping Turkey's eastern defenses.



Map 31. Axes of force employed in the 1984 Warsaw Pact maneuvers in Bulgaria.

Soviet forward-based SRBM launchers in Eastern Europe


In East Germany: 114 SS-21s
126 SS-23s
72 SS-22s

In Czechoslovakia: 36 SS-21s
36 SS-23s
36 SS-22s


In Hungary: 30 SS-21s
36 SS-23s
18 SS-22s

Range of Soviet SRBMs

SS-21—120 km (70 mi)
SS-23—600 km (325 mi)
SS-22—1,000 km (625 mi)



Map 32. Areas of Western Europe covered by the range of Warsaw Pact tactical nuclear missiles, the SS-21, SS-23, and SS-22 (in increasing order of range). Note that these weapons can neutralize the independent, nuclear deterrent of Britain and France.



Map 33. Operating areas of Soviet ballistic missile submarines, including the SLBM bastions in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.



Map 34. NATO and Warsaw Pact ground forces deployed in Europe. Symbols represent division strength, including division equivalents for countries lacking divisions organized as such. Not shown are armies of Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Albania. Source: IISS, the Military Balance 1984-85.

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 Gen.Sec. General Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

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